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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is about social mobilizations in rural Kyrgyzstan from 2010-
2015. Following a constructivist approach, I aim to answer a puzzling question in 
regard to multiple but rarely sustainable protests in this global periphery: Under 
what conditions can provisional episodes of mobilization be transformed into 
sustained mobilization? In particularly, I consider Eric Hirsch’s insight that the 
commitment of participants of mobilization to the cause is formed within collective 
instances, i.e. ‘group processes’, and I employ it in the Kyrgyzstani context of 
generalized distrust and discredited corrupt politics. I explore the conditions in 
which participants of episodes of mobilization create trust in organizers and into 
the cause of mobilization. I investigate these conditions in two case studies: one 
concerns a fragmented labour force at a state-owned gas and oil company in 
which, in the course of four years, workers succeeded to empower themselves as 
a collective actor within the group processes of collective learning and collective 
decision-making. The second tells a story about a fragmented rural community 
that goes against mining operations but sees the decline of an initially successful 
mobilization within group processes of monitoring. These findings point to the 
presence of a specific ‘pre-condition’ for any lasting mobilization: trust between 
organizers and participants of episodes of mobilization must be established in the 
process of monitoring the commitment to collective interests. With this insight I 
contribute to the literature on social movements and mobilizations that tends to 
take commitment and trust as pre-established resources. Furthermore, this work 
intervenes in the ongoing discussion on social change in the former Soviet Union. 
First, my observations of the difficult formation of protest groups lead, 
surprisingly, to the conclusion that the weak state produces a weak society.  
Second, due to the fragmented and localized nature of these mobilizations, social 
and political change in Kyrgyzstan is most likely to occur at the local level. 
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CHAPTER I: PHENOMENON OF PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN KYRGYZSTAN 
 
I.   Protest Movements, Politics and Society in Contemporary 
Kyrgyzstan 
Today, there are riots throughout the world, from workers’ and 
peasants’ riots in China to youth riots in England, from the astonishing 
tenacity of crowds under gunfire in Syria to the massive protests in 
Iran, from Palestinians demanding the unity of Fatah and Hamas to 
Chicano sans-papiers in the United States. There are all sorts of riots, 
often very violent, but sometimes barely hinted at, mobilizing either 
specific social groups or whole populations. They are prompted by 
governments’ and/or employers’ decisions, electoral controversies, the 
activities of the police or an occupying army, even by simple episodes 
in people’s existence. They immediately take a militant turn or develop 
in the shadow of a more official protest. They are blindly progressive 
or blindly reactionary (not every riot is up for grabs…). What they all 
have in common is that they stir up masses of people on the theme 
that things as they are must be regarded as unacceptable.1  
        Alain Badiou 
 
                                                       
1 Badiou, A. (2012) The rebirth of history. Times of riots and uprisings, translated by Elliott, G., 
London, New York: Verso, p. 21. 
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When I began my doctoral research in 2011, the Kyrgyzstani arena of social 
mobilization was similar to that noted by Badiou above. With its two successful 
uprisings against the central regime and countless protest movements, the 
country represents a fascinating case study of social mobilization.  
 
Social mobilization has become an enduring feature of politics for both the elite 
and the marginalized. Yet a fascinating aspect of the Kyrgyzstani protests has 
been their extensive yet also elusive nature. In my dissertation, I focus on social 
mobilizations instigated by social groups that operate within the ‘periphery’ rather 
than the epicentre of political life in the capital Bishkek.2  In this chapter, I 
introduce the reader to an expansive field of social mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan 
and to my main theoretical and empirical problematic, i.e., under what conditions 
can provisional episodes of mobilization be transformed into sustained 
mobilization. I will first provide a quick overview of ‘revolutions’ and the ‘evolution’ 
of protests over the past ten years, which will lay the groundwork for discussing 
my case studies in the second place. Finally, I will present my research agenda 
and provide an outline of the dissertation.  
 
1.1. ‘Revolutions’: March 2005 and April 2010 
Kyrgyzstan’s early years of independence were fairly undisturbed3 (Cummings 
and Hinnebusch, 2011), in contrast to other parts of the Soviet Union, where 
independence movements emerged to contest Soviet rule and put in place 
                                                       
2 Edward Shils, who is known for conceptualizing a comprehensive political model based on 
‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ to explain the constitution of societies and states, viewed the centre as 
comprising three core aspects: values and beliefs, institutions and elites. Thus, the centre 
exercises various types of authority (economic, political, military and other) and disseminates 
values (religious, cultural and other) through institutions. The elite at the centre not only govern 
these institutions, but also contains the periphery. Although in the remaining part of the 
dissertation I refer to ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ as a heuristic way to highlight the phenomenon of 
local grassroots mobilizations that operate against the centre, my analysis differs from Shil’s 
model. Shil viewed the periphery as an amorphous recipient of the values and beliefs of the 
centre. Contrary to this, I indicate the nature, albeit a non-coherent one, of local structures and 
processes of change at the periphery. Moreover, I also demonstrate that the centre has less 
integrative authority to ‘blend the differences’ from disparate corners of society, as stated in Shil’s 
model. See Shils, E. (1975) Center and periphery: Essays in macrosociology, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
3 With the exception of ethnic pogroms among the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan 
in 1990.  
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national governments (Beissinger, 2002). Contentious politics finally arose in 
2002 with a local mobilization, which was later labelled as the ‘Aksy events’ 
(Radnitz, 2005). The Aksy events were crucial to the history of independent 
Kyrgyzstan, as they introduced new practices of popular contestation. 
Specifically, the Aksy events set in motion new dynamics of contestation to 
central politics from the periphery. In March 2005, ‘peripheral’ sites of resistance 
coalesced with elites at the centre to produce what became known as the ‘Tulip 
Revolution’ (Radnitz, 2010), which put an end to the rule of first Kyrgyzstani 
president Askar Akaev and his family (1991 to 2005). 4  On 7 April, 2010 
Kyrgyzstan experienced a second popular uprising with the subsequent 
overthrow of the Bakiev family’s authoritarian regime. This time, the uprising 
against the central regime was much bloodier than the Tulip Revolution; more 
than 100 people were killed and more than 1000 were wounded by government 
troops.5 A change in government was once again instigated from the periphery 
when protesters first stormed state buildings in the small provincial town of Talas 
in Northern Kyrgyzstan on 6 April 2010 and the next day in the capital of Bishkek. 
Kurmanbek Bakiev’s rule lasted five years only, from 2005 to 2010. 
 
With few exceptions, these major political events have been analysed from the 
‘elite’ perspective. Sally Cummings, for example, points out a large degree of 
fragmentation within the elite and views the unsuccessful attempts of both 
                                                       
4 With the advent of ‘colour revolutions’ in post-communist societies, it was popular to view social 
mobilizations as a product of the maturation of civil society. See, for example, Beissinger, M. R. 
(2007) ‘Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of 
Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, June, pp. 259-
276; Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik view Rose, Orange and Tulip revolutions as part of a 
global wave of democratic change and occurring as a process of international diffusion. See 
Bunce, V. J. and Wolchik V. L. (2011) Defeating authoritarian leaders in post-communist 
countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011; Demes, P. and Forbrig, J. (ed.) (2007) 
Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 
German Marshall Fund. See also Tucker, J. A. (2007) ‘Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action 
problems, and post-communist coloured revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 5, no. 3, 
September, pp. 537-553.  
5 For a detailed chronology of events, see Kyrgyzsky perevorot, Mart-Aprel 2005 [The Kyrgyz 
overthrow, March-April 2005] (2005) Moscow: Evropa. See also Akaev’s daughter’s account of 
the Tulip Revolution, Akaeva, B. (2006) Cvety zla: o tak nazyvaemoi “tulpanovoi revolucii” v 
Kyrgyzstane [Flowers of evil: About the so-called ‘tulip revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan], Moscow: 
International relations. 
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presidents Akaev and Bakiev to control competing fractions as conducive to the 
Tulip and April Revolutions.6 Scott Radnitz makes a similar point: ‘Akaev thus 
followed in the footsteps of other leaders whose policies inadvertently 
empowered critical actors in society who would later come to oppose or topple 
him.’ 7  Fairbanks continues in the same vein: ‘[The] “Tulip Revolution” only 
replaced one former communist apparatchik with a less sophisticated one, and 
the northern elite with a more parochial southern elite.’8 Eugene Husky writes 
about the competition between the government regime and the opposition in the 
run-up to the Tulip Revolution: 
Set against [a] presidential ‘family’ desperate to maintain its power and 
perquisites is a growing opposition that is drawn not from the ranks of the 
permanently disillusioned, but from leading government officials. This 
contest between two irreconcilable forces sets up the possibility, although 
not the likelihood, of a ‘yellow revolution in Kyrgyzstan’.9 
 
Finally, it is worth noting an interesting suggestion by Henry Hale, who viewed 
political developments in the post-communist world not as a ‘trajectory’ or 
‘transition’ from autocracy to democracy, but as a cyclical process that is 
characterized by elite contestation and consolidation phases. From this 
perspective, a regime change becomes a matter of fluctuations between these 
phases and may therefore occur anywhere where the necessary conditions for 
contestation have been united.10  
 
Some exceptions to these regime and elite readings of events11 include Radnitz’ 
                                                       
6 Cummings, S. N. (2012) Understanding Central Asia: Politics and contested transformations, 
London and New York: Routledge, p. 73. 
7 Radnitz, S. (2006) ‘What really happened in Kyrgyzstan’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 17, no. 2, 
pp. 132-146. 
8 Fairbanks, D. (2007) ‘Revolution reconsidered’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 42-57. 
9 Huskey, E. (2004) ‘National identity from scratch: Defining Kyrgyzstan’s role in world affairs’, in 
Fawn, R. (ed.) Ideology and national identity in post-communist foreign policies, London: Frank 
Cass. 
10  Hale, H. E. (2005) ‘Regime cycles. Democracy, autocracy and revolution in post-Soviet 
Eurasia’, World Politics, vol. 58, no. 1, October, pp.133-156. 
11 Other scholars also proposed a ‘foreign’ intervention, directly or indirectly, in events and 
processes in the run-up to the Tulip Revolution. David Lewis has convincingly argued that the 
Tulip Revolution had been a product of the subtle convergence of domestic and international 
factors. See Lewis, D. (2008) ‘The dynamics of regime change: domestic and international factors 
in the ‘Tulip Revolution’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 27, nos. 3-4, September-December, pp. 265-
 13 
account of ‘strong localism’, Fuhrmann’s explanation of ‘social capital’ and 
Temirkulov’s ‘patronage’ concepts. 12  In addition to his ‘elite-led mobilization’ 
thesis, Radnitz (2005; 2010) also details how mobilization works on the ground, 
by situating rebellious communities within local social settings marked by strong 
norms and values. Radnitz claims that the economic dependence of communities 
on central patrons, as well as group pressure, create a distinct sense of localism 
and provide a mobilization infrastructure for elites. Azamat Temirkulov elaborates 
a comparable proposition for the Tulip Revolution by stressing that, 
The basic methods used to attract supporters to mass mobilization were 
pre-existing informal, often traditional, institutions. These institutions 
attracted supporters by offering material and solidary incentives. They were 
run by patronage networks, which were pursuing their own material ends. 
Thus, different centres of mobilization emerged at the periphery.13 
 
Using resource mobilization theory conceptualized in the US in 1970, Temirkulov 
puts forward a number of ‘traditional institutions’ such as kurultay (assembly), 
aksakal (elders) and palvan (wrestlers) as able to provide individuals with 
material and solidary incentives. Since they offer such incentives, local leaders 
and elites can employ these institutions for ‘mass mobilization’. Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
277. Boris Pétric stressed the partial responsibility of Western NGOs in provoking the Tulip 
Revolution. See Pétric, B-M. (2005) ‘Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan or the birth of a globalized 
protectorate’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 319-332. 
12 National scholars have attempted to formulate alternative explanations. Akylbek Djumanaliev 
looks, for example, at macro socioeconomic structures and found that poverty and corruption 
were the main factors that led to popular uprisings against two regimes. See Djumanaliev, A. 
(2011) ‘Revolutions in Kyrgyzstan: causes, goals and tasks’, in Aprelskaia narodnaia revolucia: 
uroki istorii I vzglyad v budushee Kyrgyzstana [April people’s revolution: Lessons of history and a 
vision into the future of Kyrgyzstan], Bishkek: Biyiktik. David Gullette concurs with this vision 
when he suggests viewing economic inequalities as ‘institutionalized instability’. See Gullette, D. 
(2010) ‘Institutionalized instability: Factors leading to the April 2010 uprising in Kyrgyzstan’, 
Eurasian Review, vol. 3, November, pp. 89-105. Osmon Togusakov is one of the few national 
academics of the Kyrgyzstani Soviet scientific generation that does not overlook micro dynamics 
in favour of macro explanations. He suggests, for instance, investigating micro developments 
within protest groups that gathered on the day of revolution at the Media Forum [one of the bases 
of opposition where the first marches against the regime began in April 2010]. See Togusakov, O. 
(2011) ‘Will we learn from the March revolution of 2005?’, in Aprelskaia narodnaia revolucia: uroki 
istorii I vzglyad v budushee Kyrgyzstana [April people’s revolution: Lessons of history and a vision 
into the future of Kyrgyzstan], Bishkek: Biyiktik. Unfortunately, the accounts by these national 
scholars are not based on extensive empirical findings and do not offer theoretical frameworks to 
advance a deeper knowledge of the phenomenon of social mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan. 
13 Temirkulov, A. (2008) ‘Informal actors and institutions in mobilization: the periphery in the ‘Tulip 
Revolution’, Central Asia Survey, vol. 27, nos. 3-4, September-December, pp. 317-335. 
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Matthew Fuhrmann attempts to explain the successful outcome of the Tulip 
Revolution with the help of Putnam’s concept of social capital by noting the 
synergy between the, 
Imported social capital and indigenous social capital [that] aided the 
revolution. Derived from these sources, social capital…lowered the 
transaction costs associated with human interaction, which enabled the 
Kyrgyz people to coordinate actions between the rural South, where the 
Tulip Revolution began, and the more urban North.14  
 
Although Furhmann’s attempt to bring together the roles played by Western 
NGOs and indigenous ‘community institutions’ is an interesting approach for 
explaining the Kyrgyzstani revolution, the problem with Furhmann (as well as with 
Radnitz and Temirkulov) is that he applies indigenous social capital as already 
possessing and providing trust for the purposes of mobilization. Such an 
unproblematic treatment of local institutions emanates from a widely accepted 
assumption that ‘more often than not, traditional practices cultivate social 
networks, establish norms of reciprocity, and build interpersonal trust.’15  
 
My view on the Kyrgyzstani periphery differs from the above accounts in terms of 
how I bring to the fore the highly contingent and less homogenous nature of local 
sites of resistance. To begin with, I highlight some of the conceptual problems 
with the elite-centred approach and the focus on informal institutions. By 
privileging the focus on elites’ intentions and strategies, we inadvertently end up 
presenting any social mobilization as a result of someone’s struggle for power. 
This focus suffers from ‘scientific reductionism’ (Sanghera, 2013) as it reduces 
the agency of ordinary participants to actors executing someone’s strategies. 
This leads to a situation where much knowledge is produced on national elites 
and partially on local bosses but little is known about ‘local actors’ who are 
ordinary participants and/or observers of provincial social mobilizations. The 
approach also results implicitly in devaluation of socio-economic and other 
inequalities as a possible driver of mobilization; elite manipulations are not the 
                                                       
14  Furhmann, M. (2006) ‘A Tale of two social capitals: Revolutionary collective action in 
Kyrgyzstan’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 16-29. 
15 Ibid. 
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only possible sources of resistance. Finally, these approaches do not take into 
account that Kyrgyzstan has transited from a closed regime based on informal 
politics towards a more open politics and thus towards more volatile and less 
Machiavellian outcomes. Whereas the discussed explanations do not leave room 
for random events, contingencies and provisional episodes that are part of a 
normal life in any society, and are especially an intrinsic part of conflicts. It seems 
to me that in a contemporary Kyrgyzstani society that is increasingly embedded 
in social media, Internet, TV shows and other intermediary means of observation 
and meaning-making, informal politics alone cannot decide the path of 
mobilization. Rumours and open discussions that shape opinions within compact 
settlements (open politics) play a significant role. Thus I challenge the 
assumption that the so-called ‘traditional’ society readily offers resources such as 
trust, solidarity and unconditional support to central patrons as a basis for the 
‘infrastructure of mobilization’. 
 
1.2. ‘Mitingy’: evolution of protests 
If one continues to explore the newly emerging contentious political arena of 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan, one finds an incredible diversity of ‘smaller’ events 
that nevertheless air political and societal voices. For example, shareholders in 
the Renton Group have been organizing pickets each year since 2003 
demanding a return on their investments. In 2012, former employees of Kyrgyz 
Railroads staged a series of protests in front of Government House against 
unpaid wages and the organization’s management. In October 2012, a group of 
approximately 100 individuals protested at Gorky Park in the capital, Bishkek, 
and later stormed several micro-credit companies from which they had borrowed 
credits that they were unable to return. In May 2013, a group of citizens protested 
in Bishkek against the ‘expansion of Chinese citizens in Kyrgyzstan’. In the same 
month, another group of citizens with limited means organized a demonstration 
for ‘equal access to education’. In spring 2015, representatives of NGOs and 
small political parties demonstrated in front of Parliament against changes in the 
constitution. As Andrea Schmitz and Alexander Wolters note, these protests 
 16 
represented expressions of ‘genuine grievances’ that had been accumulated in 
the region for decades regarding neo-liberal reforms and corrupt politics. 16 
Moreover, these multiple small ‘initiative groups’ can be understood as elements 
of newly emerging leftist politics. Meanwhile, many other protests have been 
organized in support of individual politicians who have attempted to access 
official positions or who have sought to avoid state repression. Such protests by 
small groups with specific issues proliferated with each instance of the political 
system becoming more inclusive and open (first in 2005-2007, secondly from 
2010-2015), and have become a permanent feature of politics in the aftermath of 
the second so-called ‘April Revolution’ as post-revolutionary authorities aspired to 
having more ‘protests but no revolutions’.17  
 
Since the first major public mobilization in Aksy village in 2002, ‘mitingy’ or ‘aktcii 
mitingov’, which can be best translated from Russian as ‘protests’, have 
undergone significant transformations. 18  Gradually abandoning the prevailing 
form of communication – appeals to notables – new forms and subjects of 
societal grievances have manifested in Kyrgyzstan. These new forms included 
campaigns in support of opposition, as well as publicly articulated programmes 
through associations, demonstrations, strikes, petitions and direct actions. The 
nature of grievances has also changed. During two authoritarian eras, mitingy 
were employed by social groups to channel ‘social’ concerns in areas such as the 
environment, resource extraction, labour and wages, amongst others; however, it 
can be stated that mitingy featured most prominently in terms of ‘political’ 
contestation, i.e., struggles for power. In the post-revolutionary period of 2010, 
mitingy became increasingly available to a large variety of social actors, who 
viewed protests as a means for communicating their grievances. This includes a 
diverse range of professional associations that includes petty traders, 
                                                       
16 Schmitz, A. and Wolters, A. (2012) ‘Political protest in Central Asia: Potentials and dynamics’, 
SWP Research Paper, no.7, Berlin. 
17 ‘Almazbek Atambaev: ‘V Kyrgyzstane budut mitingi, no otnyne ne budet revolucii’ [Almazbek 
Atambaev: in Kyrgyzstan there will be protests but no revolutions any more], Kabar (28 
November 2012), http://kabar.kg/politics/full/44860 [4 February 2014]. 
18 More on the usage of these terms can be found in Chapter 3, Part 2. 
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shareholders, miners, single mothers, credit borrowers, families, and others. 
Thus, mitingy have become a popular means for public communication of 
societal anger, discontent and disagreement. Using a large-n survey, Dilshod 
Achilov established a strong connection between social mobilizations and 
economic grievances, and noted that ‘to an extent, solving problems through 
protesting has become an effective tool that has a higher chance of pay-off in the 
Kyrgyz Republic.’19 
 
The emancipation of social actors led to the emergence and consolidation of 
specific cultural aspects of collective action. The radical Kyrgyz term ‘Ketsin!’, 
which can be translated as ‘Get out!’, became widely used during mobilizations 
for designating disagreement against someone. 20  Ketsin! was, for example, 
employed against authoritarian presidents Askar Akaev and Kurmanbek Bakiev, 
as well as many other members of political, economic and foreign elites. Ketsin! 
is a radical albeit simple claim, as those who employ it do not see an 
intermediary solution to unjust situations but rather the complete exit of a 
wrongdoer. It is interesting to observe why the ‘ketsinism’ phenomenon became 
popular in Kyrgyzstan compared to other possible frames of disagreement. It can 
be speculated that Ketsin!, as a protest frame, became dominant because the 
official channels and institutions designed for mediating conflicts had been scarce 
or not functioning properly. Hence, an exit scenario is one of the least costly 
solutions available to protesters that aspire to change or retain the status quo. 
 
Yet even ketsinism became a rather ambivalent tool for local communities once 
politicians at the centre began using it to discredit one another. The ‘last-exit’ 
connotation, an attractive trait of the Ketsin! claim, is conveniently at hand in 
political struggles that are constantly in need of new extremist demands, when all 
                                                       
19 Achilov, D. (2015) ‘When actions speak louder than words: Examining collective political 
protests in Central Asia’, Democratization, 1-24. (doi:10.1080/13510347.2015.1012504). 
20 Of course, Kyrgyzstani protesters are not unique in producing the ‘Get out!’ claims. In many 
Russian cities, for example, single issue movements have produced similar claims towards city 
authorities. See Clément, K. (2008) ‘New social movements in Russia: A challenge to the 
dominant model of power relationships?’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 
vol. 24, no.1, pp. 68-89. 
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others have become meaningless within the inflationary game of political 
accusation and discrediting. In general, politicians and would-be-politicians have 
been increasingly employing mitingy in making bargains with the incumbent 
regime. Such an instrumental use of protests gave rise to numerous smaller 
satellite organizations of ‘professionalized’ protesters known as ‘torpedy’ (one’s 
torpedoes), ‘dejurnie aktivisty’ (activists on duty) and OBON (women’s unit with a 
special mission). These groups are known for their violent occupation of state 
administrations and courts, the intimidation of peaceful demonstrators and civil 
servants, participation in elections in form of agitators and intimidators, as well as 
the organization of radical collective action such as blocking highways and the 
storming of state institutions. However, even these groups cannot uphold a 
monopoly on organized mobilizations, due to the increasing monetization of 
protests. Today, anyone can organize and participate in a protest with the aim of 
financial compensation.  
 
These non-manipulated and manipulated mobilizations in the capital or vicinities 
usually confuse national, public and local audiences that observe them via 
television.21 Unable to differentiate between ‘real’ and ‘fake’ grievances, between 
‘societal’ (‘genuine’) and ‘political’ (power-oriented or ‘fake’) protests, observers 
end up disbelieving and discarding them all together. 22  A protest is then 
                                                       
21 For a detailed study of public opinion and political conflict in the period 2005-2007 see Wolters, 
A. (2015) Die Politik der Peripherie. Protest und Öffentlichkeit in der Republik Kyrgyzstan, 
Bielefeld: Transcript. On the other hand, the evolution of public opinion on various phenomena 
was possible through the development of mass media in the capital and other regions. See 
Svetlana Jacquesson’s study of the evolution of public ‘expertise’ of genealogies, Jacquesson, S. 
(2012) ‘From clan narratives to clan politics’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 277-292.  
22 This distinction arose from my own attempts to evaluate people’s perceptions of protest 
performances; I drew these perceptions from popular forums such as Diesel.kg and 
commentaries within primary news agencies like Akipress.kg, Kloop.kg, etc. Although the 
authenticity of protests has been featured in press reports, scholarly contributions on the topic 
remain scarce. In Kyrgyzstani national scholarship, Arzymatova is one of few authors who have 
attempted to describe the politics of discrediting and demobilization in these terms: ‘The 
functioning of ‘people’s kurultay is a result of the constant [political] games and manipulation of 
people’s opinion for the realization of private interests of competing groups’. See Arzymatova, A. 
(2011) ‘Systemic patterns of March 2005 and April 2010 revolutions in Kyrgyzstan’, in Aprelskaia 
narodnaia revolucia: uroki istorii I vzglyad v budushee Kyrgyzstana [April people’s revolution: 
Lessons of history and a vision into the future of Kyrgyzstan’, Bishkek: Biyiktik, p.15, 17. See also 
Dyatlenko, P. (2010)’ Kyrgyzstan: Protests on demand: Marginalised groups serve as rent-a-mob 
demonstrators whenever the country is convulsed by unrest’, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 
 19 
perceived as ‘a performance for the sake of performance’ (vystuplenie radi 
vystuplenia) or a ‘political game’ (saiasiy oyun), stripped of its democratic power 
and potential for change. In addition to contentious politics, as national surveys 
demonstrate, citizens have distrusted state institutions, justice systems, political 
and other interest organizations in the post-independence decades.23 Increasing 
awareness of arbitrary rules, the impunity of elites, unresponsiveness on the part 
of state institutions and the corruption of justice systems by the public 
discourages acts of disobedience. Against this generalized distrust and the 
demobilizing effects of the power system, ‘authentic’ protest groups find it difficult 
to be noticed, to distance themselves from other multiple ‘noise-makers’, gain 
public attention, attain committed followers, achieve their goals and expanding 
beyond a core group of believers. 
 
For all of the above features, Kyrgyzstan stands out amid other post-Soviet 
states, where the effects of state repression are translated into more focused 
categories distinguishing between real and fake. In the rest of Central Asia, 
where protest movements exist, they are expressions of genuine opposition to 
the status quo, since social and political actors cannot afford to ‘play games’ with 
central authorities that do not involve ‘real’ things. Eric McGlinchey writes that 
‘grievances expressed during episodes of post-Soviet Central Asian violent 
protests are grievances that have long been present in these polities.’24 In these 
countries, central governments employ harsh measures against any political and 
social dissent, thus sending a clear signal of what opposition, protest and societal 
grievances are. The few examples of dissent existing in this region can briefly 
illustrate these dynamics. In clashes between oil strikers and police in December 
2011 in Zhanaozen, an industrial city in Western Kazakhstan, 17 people died and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
RCA no. 626 (August 24), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/kyrgyzstan-protests-demand [02 October 
2015]. 
23 ‘Uroven korrupcii. Uroven doveria naselenia institutam vlasti’ [Level of corruption. Level of trust 
of the population towards power institutions] (2013) MVector: Bishkek. According to this survey, 
65% of the Kyrgyzstani population distrusted the justice system, 57% of the Kyrgyzstani 
population distrusted police, 47% of the Kyrgyzstani population distrusted both central 
government and local administrations.  
24 McGlinchey, E. (2013) ‘States of protest in Central Asia’, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 
299, September. 
 20 
an additional 100 people were injured. This clash was a result of the seven-
month mobilization of workers who demanded better wages and safer work 
conditions, and highlighted existing tensions between society and the neo-liberal 
state. In clashes between police and business entrepreneurs in May 2005 in 
Andijan, a city in Eastern Uzbekistan, 187 people were killed according to official 
statistics and ranging from 500 to 700 according to international organizations.25 
This bloodshed was indicative of a growing conflict between the state and society 
on issues regarding Islam. Clashes between law enforcement bodies, political 
opposition and the local population in July 2012 in Khorog, a Gorno-Badakhshan 
autonomous region of Southern Tajikistan, in which 30 militants were killed, can 
be viewed as renewed conflict over autonomy within a highly centralized state. In 
this part of the post-Soviet space, protests still symbolize a well-pronounced 
demarcation between state and society. In Kyrgyzstan, despite an obvious 
connection between poverty, social marginalization and political corruption on the 
one hand and protests on the other, social mobilizations have seen mixed results 
in terms of sending a clear message regarding societal anger and disagreement. 
In this context, the country is a particular place that needs to be further explained.  
 
1.3. Case studies 
The general developments discussed above shaped my initial fascination with 
Kyrgyzstani social mobilizations. The establishment of popular uprisings as the 
primary means of contesting existing orders (which became obvious via two 
revolutions) triggered my interest in the phenomenon of protest movements. I 
was intrigued by highly politicized individuals who became harsh critics of the 
ruling regime and who became involved in numerous local movements of 
resistance. From mid-2010, I began following their activism throughout a range of 
political clubs, associations and local anarchic groups that burgeoned during the 
immediate post-revolutionary period. In particular, the so-called ‘revolutionary 
committees’ (revolutsialyk komitetter) that have been active across the country 
                                                       
25 For the critique of official version see Megoran, N. (2008) ‘Framing Andijon, narrating the 
nation: Islam Karimov’s account of the events of 13 May 2005’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 
1, pp. 15-31.  
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since the first Tulip Revolution of 2005 caught my attention. These committees 
were part of the opposition led by parties like Ata-Meken, SDPK and Ak-
Shumkar, and were active in almost all Kyrgyzstan’s provinces. I was amazed to 
learn stories about such provincial committees that opposed the central regime 
within their respective vicinities. Thus, the popular uprisings against the Bakiev 
regime of 7 April 2010 would not have been possible without a local uprising in 
Talas Province one day earlier. It was captivating to hear members of these 
committees elaborate on their understandings of revolutions, of the state, politics 
and resistance. While travelling between the Talas, Osh and Jalal-Abad 
provinces in the summer and autumn of 2010, I was able to observe how 
members of these committees, some of whom had gained the status of national 
heroes, participated in the re-composition of local governments and councils. 
They were also influential during national elections in October 2010, since parties 
generally had weak anchoring in regions outside electoral cycles. Finally, 
members of revolutionary committees instigated protests on a wide range of 
topics not directly related to politics or the elections. For example, members of 
the committee I followed in Talas Province have been involved in mobilizations 
against foreign miners operating in the province, as well as against the central 
monopoly over the production of beans. In Jalal-Abad, members of the 
committee participated in protests against the low price of cotton, corruption and 
the privatization of a state owned gas and oil company, among others. In Osh 
province, the committee was active on a wide range of topics; however, the 
majority concerned nationalist politics as a result of preceding ethnic clashes in 
June 2010. Guided by their anti-regime discourses, I viewed these committees as 
local anarchic groups aspiring toward effecting major changes in their regions. 
 
However, my enthusiasm about these local actors was soon replaced by 
confusion and even disappointment, as I increasingly became aware of other 
aspects concerning their political activism. Subsequent observation of local 
events involving members of committees showed that their participation in local 
politics, elections and protests was not meant to contest existing pre-
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revolutionary authoritarian institutions or to suggest alternative politics, but to 
offer themselves up to cooptation by central actors. Their informal negotiations 
with central parties concerned the new distribution of resources and power in the 
regions. In exchange for appointments to local state assets and official positions, 
members were obliged to anchor party influences in the regions and secure votes 
during elections. Alternatively, they resorted to protests as another means of 
communication with central actors when negotiations were unsuccessful. In this 
light, these activists, who contributed to the instigation of the 2005 and 2010 
revolutions, appeared to be no more than opportunist political entrepreneurs, who 
bargained for power while hiding behind progressive revolutionary discourses.  
 
However, I had again been mistaken in my analysis. These local groups were not 
expressions of romanticized democratization or politics as usual. Not everyone 
was coopted and resistance was growing and taking on various forms. However, 
central politics, which became perceived in the two decades following 
independence as merely a struggle for power disguised by democratic 
discourses, set specific conditions for the formation of grassroots groups. Its 
pervasive demobilizing and discrediting effects were such that they fragmented 
collective action and hindered processes of association. In such an environment 
of political volatility and institutional uncertainty, it becomes difficult to sustain 
practices of resistance and contestation. This led to at least two resulting 
consequences: on the one hand, local actors mimicked central actors in the way 
they adopted the dominant form of politics, i.e., cooptation and corruption. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that local politics mirror to a great extent the features of 
central politics. Yet, local actors also adopt ‘unconventional’ means such as 
protests and violent actions. However, any collective action run a significant risk 
of falling apart before being consolidated as a result of the effects of uncertain 
central and local politics. 
 
These different interpretations, which have shaped my research progression over 
time, left me with a confusing image of protest movements. How could I 
 23 
understand the many protests that have emerged within Kyrgyzstan on a large 
variety of topics, but which appeared to be rapidly declining? Are these protests 
manifestations of resistance to and the contestation of existing orders, or yet 
another type of cooptation by means of blackmailing and threats of unrest? Also, 
what type of change do they bring about for politics and society if they are 
fragmented and rarely successfully sustained? Furthermore, how do protest 
movements function, given the precarious conditions that work against collective 
action? Finally, how could I conceptualize these protest movements analytically 
to make sense of what can be observed empirically within the country? The 
primary aim of this dissertation is, therefore, to understand the conditions under 
which provisional local episodes of mobilization transform or not into enduring 
social practices of resistance and contestation.  
 
To study the conditions for the (non-) formation of sustained practices of 
resistance, I decided to include two examples of provincial mobilizations that I 
had observed during my preliminary fieldwork. I also deliberately opted for 
including one successful and one failed case of sustained mobilizations. This was 
pursued because unlike the successful example, the failed case fits best to 
demonstrate the exact stages and conditions accountable for the deconstruction 
of initial mobilization.  
 
Since provincial economic assets served as the primary source for both local and 
central actors to plunder in the post-revolutionary period, and therefore served as 
a major factor of contention, my choice fell to protests within the extractive 
industry. Thus, in Talas Province, members of the committee were involved in the 
area of gold mining, whereas in Jalal-Abad Province, they were implicated in the 
gas and oil industry. In Talas, I chose an anti-mining protest movement that 
erupted within the small village of Aral the day after the April Revolution and that 
was carried out by farmers whose lands had been subjected to mining, and who 
were also members of the opposition. In Jalal-Abad, I selected a labour 
movement that emerged within the provincial town of Kochkor-Ata in the 
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aftermath of the April Revolution with the aim of protesting against privatization 
and corruption within the company employing them. I had to eliminate my case 
study in Osh Province, as members of the committee were active in nationalist 
and political movements there.26 
 
More should be said about the relevance of the chosen conflicts. Social conflicts 
in the extractive industry are presently understudied. Writing about various 
protest movements of the post-revolutionary period following 2005, Charles 
Buxton made an important remark, that is, that ‘labour and land were mainly 
“unacknowledged” claims within the Kyrgyzstan revolution.’27 It is surprising that 
social mobilizations within this sector have remained unexplored, since they 
represent an additional fascinating puzzle against the backdrop of a Soviet 
legacy and current socioeconomic stagnation in the country. Writing about the 
Kyrgyzstani post-independence economy, Gul Berna Ozcan summarizes it in the 
following terms: 
When the USSR collapsed, Kyrgyzstan had a small but diverse industrial 
base consisting of machine tools (the production of machine parts, 
weaponry, electrical machines, hay bailers, regulatory instruments and 
gauges, electric lamps), mining (extraction of mercury and antimony, rare-
earth elements, gold, coal and oil), electric power, the production of 
industrial materials, furniture and consumer goods (textiles, shoes, cotton 
textiles, etc.), as well as processed food products (meat and milk, bread, 
candy, alcoholic drinks). Agriculture was also diversified with products 
ranging from animal feed and commercial crops such as cotton, tobacco 
and sugar beets, grains and fruits. However, as the eminent Kyrgyz 
reformist Koichuev (2001) describes, the economy suffered the ills of the 
USSR pattern of economic development, with extensive exploitation of 
                                                       
26 In this dissertation, I do not discuss other forms of social mobilization that do not hold political 
implications such as, for example, the safety nets that occupied a significant place in people’s 
strategies for coping with the hardships of the post-independence period. See, for example, an 
extensive study on safety nets in the Kyrgyzstani Northern Province by Botoeva, G. (2014) 
‘Hashish as cash in a post-Soviet Kyrgyz village’, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 25, no. 
6, pp. 1227-1234. I also decided to omit from my analysis ethnic mobilizations that took place in 
the southern part of the country in 1990 and 2010, as they encompass separate scientific 
research. I do not include religious groups and movements, although these were considered by 
some scholars as powerful factors, to such an extent that they even envisaged the collapse of 
newly independent Central Asian states. See, for example, Carrère d'Encausse, H. (1990) La 
gloire des nations, ou, la fin de l'empire soviétique, Fayard: Édition. 
27 Buxton, C. (2011) The Struggle for civil society in Central Asia. Crisis and transformation, 
Kumarian Press: An Imprint of Stylus Publishing, p. 85. 
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resources and no emphasis of intensive development and technological 
advancement.28 
 
In addition, with a rapidly declining industry, old trade unions lost their previous 
influence and were unfit for mediating current labour conflicts. As Buxton notes: 
‘unofficial workers’ action was an embarrassment to labor movement bureaucrats 
who had never led strikes in the Soviet period.’29 At present, this legacy leads 
contentious workers to organize resistance outside of official unions or to create 
independent unions, which inevitably bears implications for modes of labour 
mobilizations and the problems related to the institutionalization of social 
divisions based on economic specialization.  
 
On the other hand, the social fragmentation that followed neo-liberal reforms has 
had an immense impact on the ways in which individuals mount a collective 
resistance to modern resource extraction projects. Reflecting on problems of 
association in another Kyrgyzstani context, Ozcan observes,  
There is almost no collective organization of entrepreneurs in Kyrgyzstan 
apart from a handful of associations promoted by donor agencies and the 
state. [Female entrepreneurs] who were involved in business associations 
prefer to use this affiliation for the promotion of their own individual 
interests, which leads to a common mistrust towards interest representation 
through collective action.30  
 
Finally, Zemfira Inogamova rightly notes that Kyrgyzstan’s access to 
independence from the Soviet Union ‘was a huge upheaval; [the] infrastructure 
crumbled and the fabric that had held society together for seventy years was 
transformed.’31 From this perspective, social mobilizations in post-Soviet rural 
Kyrgyzstan have the potential to provide us with fascinating research material 
                                                       
28 Ozcan, G. B. (2006) ‘Djamila’s journey from kolkhoz to bazaar: Female entrepreneurs in 
Kyrgyzstan’, in Welter, F., Smallbone, D. and Isakova, N. (ed.) Enterprising women in transition 
economies, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p. 96. 
29 Buxton, C. (2011), p. 88. 
30 Ozcan, G.B. (2006), p. 100. 
31  Inogamova-Hanbury, Z. (2015) ‘Resilience techniques: Spiritual practices and customary 
economics within farming communities in Amanbaev village, Kyrgyzstan’, in Deane-Drummond, 
C., Bergmann, S. and Szerszynski, B. (ed.) Technofutures, nature and the sacred: 
Transdisciplinary perspectives, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p. 194. 
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and new directions for thinking about post-Soviet society and politics. As already 
noted by Balihar Sangera, Central Asia offers a fertile context for exploring ‘the 
transformation from a planned Soviet economy into an uneven market society.’32 
My examination of social dissent in extractive industry aspires to contribute to this 
area of literature. 
 
By inductively developing a theoretical framework from empirical cases that apply 
to local episodes of mobilization, I aim to make two contributions with this 
dissertation. First, I challenge the structuralist approach of traditional social 
movement theory, which tends to focus on macro structures such as class, 
socioeconomic inequalities, state structure, political opportunity structure and 
access to institutions and resources, among others. Kyrgyzstani mobilizations 
defy such preconditions by emerging within ‘unfriendly’ environments, while 
straddling the threshold between development and decline. If such macro-
structuralist approaches are adopted, Kyrgyzstani social mobilizations will be 
analysed as highly irregular and disjointed processes. Drawing on insights from 
the recent social construction of protests approach, I investigate the internal 
processes of local mobilizations to uncover the dynamics that have led some 
provisional episodes of mobilization to remain ephemeral expressions of 
resistance, while enabling others to develop into sustained mobilization. For 
social scientists studying collective action, my dissertation aims to contribute to 
theoretical debates on the role of internal dynamics, as well as the impact of 
social distrust on the trajectory of social movements. 
 
Finally, the dissertation provides insight into contested politics in the post-
revolutionary period in Kyrgyzstan. For those who are interested in Central Asia 
and post-communist states, I offer insight into the interplay of societal concerns 
and uncertain central politics on a subnational level and promote the view that 
the best way to learn about the power system is to observe it from a local 
                                                       
32 Sanghera, B. (2013) ‘Theorising structure and agency and Central Asian scholarship’, Central 
Eurasia Studies Society Conference, 5 October, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. 
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perspective. The argument here is that neither elite manipulation nor informal 
politics can counter fragmented state bureaucracy, highly contentious central 
politics and an uncertain institutional environment to such an extent that it 
promotes social mobilizations.  
 
II. The Argument, Methodological Approach and Outline of the 
Dissertation 
In light of the above puzzling picture of protest movements, my principal research 
question can be formulated as follows: 
 
Under which conditions can local provisional episodes of mobilization be 
transformed into sustained mobilization? 
 
Before addressing this question, it is perhaps worth noting the types of social 
mobilizations that I am dealing with in my dissertation. Troughout my dissertation 
I use such terms as protest movements, social (structured/ 
sustained/fragmented/provisional/lasting) mobilizations, resistance, collective 
action and contentious politics. The Social Movement Theory (SMT) is incredibly 
expansive and proposes various definitions for these terms. I define ‘local 
provisional mobilizations’ as episodes of mobilizations that are unstructured or 
weakly structured and therefore do not last within time and space. ‘Structured’, 
‘sustained’ or ‘lasting’ mobilization will be used interchangeably, because 
sustainability comes with structure. ‘Resistance’, ‘provisional mobilization’, 
‘collective action’ and ‘movement’ all include the mobilization of individuals in one 
way or another. I have separated these into different stages of mobilization, as 
these stages require different degrees of mobilization structuration, movement 
being its highest degree of organizational sophistication. 
  
Although the terms ‘collective action’ and ‘mobilization’ are widely used in a 
variety of settings, definitions of protest and social movements have posed 
problems for scholars of contentious politics in non-Western contexts. Authors 
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generally differentiate between ‘protest movements’ and ‘social movements’. 
Opp, for example, defines protests as the ‘joint (i.e., collective) action of 
individuals aimed at achieving their goal or goals by influencing decisions of a 
target.’33 Opp’s definition of protest includes a diverse range of actions such as 
‘violent protests and negotiations’. Karine Clément, a sociologist who studies 
Russian protests, proposes the following definition of social movements: ‘by 
social movements we mean every kind of collective action provided by any kind 
of networks which have a certain regularity, are sustained by some coordinating 
or organizational bodies and advance some general claims about social and 
political issues.’34  
 
Other more restrictive and wider definitions are also present, though it seems that 
the major difference between a protest and a social movement lies in the 
sustainability of practices of contestation. This criterion is difficult to meet in non-
Western contexts, especially in cases where the state represses demonstrations 
and where expressions of social discontent are therefore provisional and 
spontaneous, i.e., less structured.35 This has led some scholars to adopt a wider 
concept of ‘contentious politics’.36 I will use Tarrow’s definition of contentious 
politics, which states that the latter ‘occurs when ordinary people, often in league 
with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, 
and opponents.’37
 
When these forces are sustained and ‘backed by dense social 
networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, 
contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents. The result is 
the social movement.’38 
                                                       
33  Opp, K-D. (2009) Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary 
introduction, critique, and synthesis, London and New York: Routledge p. 38-39. 
34 Clément, K. (2008). 
35 Beinin, J. and Vairel, F. (2011) Social movements, mobilization, and contestation in the Middle 
East and North Africa, Stanford California: Stanford University Press. 
36 McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, Ch. (2001) Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Tilly, Ch. (2008) Contentious performances, Cambridge University Press: New 
York. 
37  Tarrow, S. (1994) Power in movement: social movements, collective action and politics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2. 
38 Ibid. 
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2.1. Research agenda: the argument, variables, concepts and 
methodological choice 
To study captivating examples of Kyrgyzstani fragmented and provisional 
mobilizations, I followed the so-called decentred ‘social construction of protests’ 
approach. Why do protests need to be constructed? I argue that in the 
Kyrgyzstani context, social grievances can no longer serve as straightforward 
indicators of the authenticity of protests although these grievances are genuine; 
otherwise they would not lead to initial episodes of mobilization. In the context of 
widespread corruption, generalized distrust and poverty, everyone has a 
grievance. Moreover, individual and collective concerns can be easily exploited 
for parochial interests. For this, political mobilizations have often been organized 
along state or elite channels. Therefore, the availability of social grievances per 
se (or their attractive ‘framing’) does not determine the emergence and 
development of movements, because individuals have learned to be suspicious 
of those who act on behalf of public interests and collective grievances.  
 
Therefore, successful grassroots mobilizations do not only require appealing 
grievances but most importantly, a legitimate organization of mobilization, i.e. 
structure of trustworthy leaders and committed followers to begin with. Yet, 
leadership and membership do not originate in these qualities as given 
resources, but need to be constructed and maintained in time and space. It could 
be said then that at the initial stage, when a mobilization exists in its provisional 
and weakly structured form, leaders and members represent only the ‘initiators of 
initial mobilization’ on the one hand, and ‘participants of initial mobilization’ on the 
other. Only later, when initiators prove their commitment to collective interests 
and when participants are in return convinced that initiators are authentic and do 
not pursue personal benefits can the categories of leadership and membership 
be formed and sustained. This type of trust in the organization of mobilization is a 
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condition sine qua non for the sustainability of grassroots mobilizations in 
Kyrgyzstan.39  
 
With this brief problematization about how grassroots mobilizations work if they 
aspire for lasting existence in Kyrgyzstan, we come outright to the important point 
in the literature of construction of resources such as trust, commitment and 
solidarity. The traditional SMT that had initially been conceptualized in and for 
Western contexts approaches production of so-called ‘cognitive’ or ‘cultural’ 
resources as a necessary step for movements that are already constituted as a 
mechanism to maintain existing participants and to attract new members 
(McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In the Kyrgyzstani context, I argue, 
the production of trust (ishenich) in the authenticity of the resistance’s cause and 
organization is required even at the earlier stages. This process of the 
transformation of provisional episodes of mobilization into structured mobilization 
is precarious and faces multiple challenges; these stem from uncertain 
environments that invite individuals to adopt opportunistic behaviours within the 
process of mobilization.  
Therefore, trust is required even at the stage of formation of a movement and not 
only at intermediate stages when a movement is already established and seeks 
to achieve its goals. I adopt Piotr Sztompka’s conceptualization of trust that 
follows Gambetta’s insight to specify that ‘trust is particularly relevant in 
conditions of ignorance or uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable 
actions of others.'40 For Sztompka, trust is ‘a bet about the future contingent 
actions of others. In this account trust consists of two main components: beliefs 
and commitment.’41 It means that on the basis of certain expectations about 
others’ actions in the future, individuals make bets when they decide to place 
trust into someone’s actions. But betting is an active process because it involves 
                                                       
39 Trust might not be required for ‘manipulated’ mobilizations that are organized either by state or 
elites and that has access to other resources to secure coherence within mobilizations. 
40 Gambetta, D. (1988) ‘Can we trust trust?,’ in Gambetta, D. (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 218, in Sztompka, P. (1999) Trust: A 
sociological theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 25. 
41 Sztompka, P. (1999), p. 25. 
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one’s commitment for the consequences such betting might entail in the future. 
Distrust is a ‘negative bet’.42 
Furthermore, I adopt the social construction approach because it views cognitive 
and cultural resources as created within a dynamic process. I chose this 
approach because unlike a number of Central Asian scholars, I question whether 
the success of collective action can be found in ‘pre-existing structures of 
mobilization’ such as regional identities (Luong, 2002), kin and clan-based bonds 
(Ismailbekova, 2014; Collins, 2006) or patron-client networks (Radnitz, 2010). My 
contention is that in the context of generalized distrust and corruption, even these 
identities and structures are suspected of cooptation. I argue, therefore, that trust 
within emerging protest groups is constructed within the process of association 
and actual mobilization.  
 
My approach to the processes of production of trust is analogous to Rick 
Fantasia’s conceptualization of the formation of solidarity43 and Eric Hirsch’s 
conceptualization of the creation of increased commitment44 as taking place 
within actual episodes of mobilization, as well as in group dynamics. Hirsch and 
Fantasia paid specific attention to actual episodes of mobilization and group 
processes as moments and sites in which movement participants are most likely 
to develop solidarity bonds, as well as belief in the success of collective action. 
We can, therefore, argue that episodes of association and group processes 
provide a space in which these resources are dynamically created and which 
consequently determine the course of social movements. Applied to Kyrgyzstani 
cases, episodes of mobilization and group processes provide a space for 
establishing trust. Specifically, this space creates conditions for the possibility of 
observation and monitoring over an extended period of time. In other words, 
conditions of monitoring allow the participants of initial mobilization to verify the 
                                                       
42 Ibid., p. 26. 
43 Fantasia, R. (1988) Cultures of solidarity. Consciousness, action, and contemporary American 
workers, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
44 Hirsch, E. (1990) ‘Sacrifice for the cause: Group processes, recruitment, and commitment in a 
student social movement’, American Sociological Review, vol. 55, no. 2, April, pp. 243-254. 
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organization of mobilization. In other words, to check out whether the initiators of 
mobilization are authentically committed to the cause, i.e., whether they 
represent collective interests. This function arose as a response on the part of 
individuals to widespread distrust of politics in general and protests in particular. 
The relatively small membership number where protests are concerned, despite 
the great number of protests themselves, is indicative of levels of trust (or lack 
thereof) outside of the core believers. 
 
From the above preliminary problematization, it appears that two conditions 
shape opportunities for unstructured or weakly structured provisional mobilization 
to transform into structured mobilization: 1) initiators of initial mobilization 
overcome generalized suspicion by proving their commitment to collective 
interests; 2) participants of initial mobilization establish trust in initiators 
and continue participating in subsequent mobilizations. For this research, I 
also adopted an intervening variable – the existence of opportunist activists 
whom I call ‘brokers’ – whose effects magnify fragmentation of the organization 
of mobilization and therefore its authenticity.  
 
The two conditions above consist on the one hand of the deliberation practices of 
initiators and the observation practices of potential members on the other. As 
already mentioned above, such reciprocal interactions between initiators and to-
be-members are established through a variety of group processes, among which 
monitoring is the chief process. In the context of widespread distrust, only the 
monitoring process can provide individuals with the possibility of making repeated 
observations regarding the authenticity of organization and to make decisions 
about their participation within collective action. In other words, monitoring leads 
either to the production of trust or the intensification of suspicions and the further 
defection of individuals. Divergent outcomes of monitoring are accountable for 
various degrees of sustainability of mobilization, i.e., their degree of structuration. 
My research objective consists of exploring the two conditions in the upcoming 
empirical chapters and establishing causal relationships between their values 
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and the dependent variable, sustainability of initial mobilizations. I believe that 
examination of these conditions can deliver a useful contribution to social 
movement literature and specifically, to studies of fragmented social 
mobilizations that operate within weakly institutionalized societies and uncertain 
environments.  
 
A few words need to be said about the methods that I adopted to set my research 
agenda. Since the onset of my research, I employed largely inductive and 
ethnographic approaches, the objective of which was avoiding the problems of 
not correctly applying theories of social movement and mobilization within a 
divergent case. My initial inquiry into the Kyrgyzstani phenomenon was inspired 
by general theories of social movements and mobilizations. As the study 
progressed, new empirical findings made me reconsider Western approaches to 
social insurgency. Therefore, my approach turned out to be circular and my main 
objective grew more ambitious, as my aim is to contribute both to a better 
understanding of political developments in post-Soviet Central Asia and to the 
literature on social mobilizations. The research aims to do this by developing new 
propositions regarding the appreciation of protest movements in the developing 
world. I also adopted a case-study methodology. Although such an approach 
suffers from several weaknesses, the case study is particularly strong in clarifying 
concepts, exploring causal complexity and generating theory. My case study 
methodology is ‘hybrid’ in nature, as I employ three formats: multiple within-case 
comparisons (or congruence procedure), controlled comparison and process 
tracing. In this way, I do not only compare observations across cases, but I also 
capture variations of the dependent variable over time within a specific case, and 
trace the cause-and-effect link that connects the independent variable and 
outcomes within smaller steps. 
 
To address issues pertaining to ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ within my study, I also 
employ elements of the ethnographic approach. Within the chosen cases, the 
aim is to closely consider local arenas of contentious politics while observing their 
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operation against a background of large-scale socioeconomic and political 
structures. In practice, this meant that my research journey had to follow the 
actions of local actors that took them from their localities to the capital in order to 
explore central institutions, to look for political support and build alliances with 
other civic groups, before following them back again to their respective vicinities. 
For the purpose of this study, I conducted fieldtrips to the Kyrgyzstani provinces 
at different periods between 2010 and 2015. The research proceeded via 
interviews with activists and rank-and-file participants in two contentious sites. I 
collected 65 interviews and complemented them with additional data yielded from 
regular observation, available official documents and analysis of press reports.  
 
2.2. Outline of the dissertation 
In Chapter II, I introduce selected theoretical approaches that deal with the 
studied phenomenon. The literature on social movements and mobilizations is 
extensive; therefore, I chose directions that first contrast and subsequently help 
to address the problem of weak protest movements. Through this exercise of 
dissecting useful approaches, I divided existing literature into ‘structuralist’ and a 
‘constructivist’ approaches. This division is somewhat heuristic, but it permits for 
clearly observing the development of social movement theory from a macro- to 
micro focus and from an emphasis on structures to an emphasis on processes. 
Thus, in the first (structuralist) part, I explore such theories as resource 
mobilization, political opportunity structure and political process. These 
approaches indicate the salience of organizational resources and external factors 
for the emergence and development of social movements. However, the reaction 
to external political circumstances and access to resources can only partially 
explain the trajectories that protest movements take. Therefore, in the second 
(constructivist) part, I turn to the frame alignment concept, which had been an 
early intellectual attempt at conceptualizing social mobilization as a social 
construction based on cognitive resources. Frame alignment is an important 
concept, because it demonstrates that movements are fragile constructions that 
are dependent on ongoing processes of meaning-making, the formation of valid 
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injustice frames, the creation of enemies and others. Yet frame alignment fails to 
conceptualize protest construction as a dynamic action and a group process. I, 
therefore, draw on the recent decentred approach, proposed by authors like Eric 
Hirsch and Rick Fantasia, who pay attention to episodes of mobilization and 
group processes as sites where the actual construction of collective action takes 
place. 
 
In Chapter III, I transit from theory towards my own conceptualization of an 
explanatory framework. In doing so, I once again formulate my research 
problematic and clarify concepts that will help me to explore the values of 
conditions that shape the divergent outcomes for the dependent variable. I also 
explain my methodological approach and the logic that informed the selection of 
case studies. In order to understand the fragile consolidation of provisional 
mobilizations, I look at the following two conditions that I initially identified in my 
preliminary fieldwork: 1) initiators of initial mobilization overcome generalized 
suspicion and prove that they represent collective interests; 2) participants of 
initial mobilization establish trust in initiators and accept participating regularly in 
subsequent mobilizations. I also include an intervening variable, i.e., the 
existence of opportunist activists whom I call ‘brokers’, whose activities are 
detrimental to the integrity of social mobilizations. The future construction of 
grassroots mobilization is therefore dependent on the availability of repeated 
interactions, by which to-be-members can monitor the behaviour of initiators and 
initiators can demonstrate to a local audience their authenticity, i.e., their 
commitment to collective interests. Such reciprocal interactions between initiators 
and to-be-members are established through a variety of group processes, in 
which monitoring is the chief process. In the context of widespread distrust, only 
monitoring process can provide individuals the opportunity to make repeated 
observations regarding the authenticity of initiators and making informed 
decisions about their participation in subsequent mobilizations. If trust in initiators 
has been established, in addition to trust maintenance via continuous monitoring, 
other group processes such as collective learning, collective decision-making and 
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collective empowerment can emerge and enhance the odds of sustainability. 
Such a conceptualization of sustainability of mobilizations clearly categorizes my 
analysis as one centred on micro dynamics and processes that are inherent to 
the existence of movements.  
 
The outline presenting the methodology and conceptual tools for this research 
prepares a good basis for the empirical analysis. Starting from Chapter IV, I delve 
into the empirical nature of protest movements. The chapter presents my first 
case study, which is devoted to a labour-based movement that took root in a 
state owned oil and gas company located in the small provincial town of Kochkor-
Ata, in Southern Kyrgyzstan. I relate the events regarding rebellious workers who 
seized momentum to oust their corrupt director on the day following the April 
Revolution in 2010. However, they did not imagine that the takeover of 
management would set up new competition for resources among central elites 
and thereby provide new impetus for the continuation of the workers’ movement. 
From then on, the ‘Movement for Truth’ took new shape to include new claims 
not only against corrupt elites, but also against ‘unresponsive’ state institutions 
and ‘arbitrary’ justice system. To effect these changes, workers doggedly staged 
protests in their province and in the capital Bishkek, and engaged in informal 
lobbying and court litigations. At home, trust in leaders and the belief in success 
of the movement was cultivated via group processes such as monitoring, 
collective decision-making, and self-empowerment. Resulting from this 
continuous engagement was a growing consolidation of an initially fragmented 
mobilization around a reformed Soviet trade union. In this empirical chapter, I 
explore the ways in which workers gained significant experience in protest-
making and established sustainable practices of contestation over a five-year 
period. 
 
Chapter V continues with social conflicts within the extractive industry and takes 
us this time to the field of gold mining. I explore in length anti-mining resistance, 
set in motion within Aral village in Northern Kyrgyzstan. In the immediate 
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aftermath of the April Revolution, a group of residents launched a process of 
public contestation against a foreign mining firm accused of environmental and 
human rights violations. These farmers, with an affiliation to the political 
opposition in the centre, claimed that mining operations had caused decreased 
harvests, the death of animal stock and divisions within the community. Using 
local mechanisms of consciousness-raising such as public gatherings, they 
attempted to persuade other residents to take part in the resistance. Sharing 
ecological grievances, hundreds of individuals attended public gatherings at the 
initial stage, but gradually developed distrust towards the organization of 
resistance. The failure to construct resistance led activists to change their tactics 
from public engagement to informal networks and from peaceful demonstrations 
to violent attacks against the company. The escalation of conflict brought about 
the fragmentation of social interactions within the village and caused complete 
demobilization. In this empirical chapter, I investigate the ways by which public 
scrutiny and monitoring exposed initiators’ ambivalent agenda and consequently 
caused fragmentation of resistance.  
 
Having presented this rich empirical data, I proceed, in Chapter VI to an 
interpretation of observations that I did not manage to include fully in the 
empirical chapters. Here, I return to my initial theoretical propositions and reflect 
on the values of independent variables and different manifestations of the 
dependent variable from a comparative perspective. First, I highlight that trust in 
initiators of contestation was established in one case but not the other, despite 
the availability of repeated interactions in both cases. In contrast to workers who 
granted confidence in their initiators of mobilization, residents of Aral village 
discovered the non-authenticity of initiators and declined to further participate in 
contestations against the mining firm. Second, I note that opportunist activists 
were present in both cases and that their activities distorted collective action in a 
number of ways. Yet in contrast to Aral, in Kochkor-Ata, participants were able to 
detect and subsequently marginalize brokers’ activities via the monitoring 
process. I therefore pause here to explore in detail the dynamics that occurred 
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within the monitoring process. To do so, I analyse dynamic ‘sites’ in which 
monitoring took place in Aral and Kochkor-Ata; these include village gatherings 
and episodes of collective action, respectively. I come to the conclusion that 
supported my initial propositions about the necessity of monitoring process for 
the production of trust, which is in return a condition sine qua non for lasting 
mobilization. Various outcomes that stem from the monitoring process were 
accountable for two divergent outcomes of sustainability: consolidation of the 
workers’ movement in Kochkor-Ata on the one hand and the demobilization of 
anti-mining resistance in Aral on the other. 
 
In the concluding Chapter VI, I summarize the trajectory of my intellectual 
endeavour and discuss my empirical, methodological and theoretical 
contributions to the two bodies of literature. I recap my contribution to the 
literature on social movements and mobilizations in three ways: by discussing the 
critical role of trust as a pre-condition for sustained open practices of 
contestation, the salience of group processes as a conceptual and 
methodological approach for analysing fragmented mobilizations in precarious 
conditions within the present, as well as the original concept of brokerage as 
problematization of the agency of collective action. Finally, I elaborate on my 
contribution to the existing conceptualizations of state, politics and society in 
Central Asia. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the type of social and 
political change that such fragmented mobilizations might induce upon society. 
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CHAPTER II: THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATIONS 
 
The Kyrgyzstani phenomenon of insurgency is diverse and includes various 
actors ranging from political opposition and their regional networks, ‘civil society’ 
or NGOs, elites, bureaucracy and the decentred ‘interest’ groups comprising 
teachers, traders, parents, farmers, etc. The object of my study is the under-
investigated ‘local’ sites of resistance that operate at the periphery against central 
politics. Specifically, I am interested in social mobilizations and protest 
movements within the extractive industry. According to the National Agency of 
Geology and Mineral Resources of Kyrgyzstan, there were approximately 40 
cases of conflicts involving local communities in the extractive sector in 2012.45 
These social mobilizations occur far away from the attention of mass media and 
central authorities, but have become a currency where the Kyrgyzstani fringes 
are concerned.  
 
The above-mentioned mobilizations and protest movements subvert many 
theoretical assumptions about social movements: they rise despite weak 
organizational resources, lack of public resonance, weak political support and an 
insignificant success record where collective action is concerned. Moreover, 
Kyrgyzstani protests attempt to effect change with only a small number of 
participants and do not particularly care about the lack of wider followers. It 
seems as if protests emerge relatively undisturbed in different locations, 
moments in time and for different causes. But how many of these protests 
manage to produce a lasting challenge to existing hierarchies and hegemonies? 
More importantly, how can the conditions pertaining to the emergence of protests 
secure sustained practices of resistance and contestation? 
 
In order to explore these types of mobilizations, I draw in this chapter on the large 
body of literature on social movements and mobilizations. This literature can be 
                                                       
45  State Agency of Geology and Mineral Resources (2013) [Online], Available: 
http://www.geology.kg/mineral/data [10 March 2013]. 
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conceptually divided into two groups that are of particular interest for this 
dissertation. One group can be labelled ‘structuralist’ and include such theories 
as resource mobilization, political process and political opportunity structure. The 
second group follows the constructivist assumption and consists of such 
concepts as frame alignment processes, an action-oriented approach and group 
processes that highlight a decentred approach to collective identity. This 
categorization should be understood as part of my conceptual discussion of the 
literature; however, in reality, it is much more fluctuant since, as Della Porta and 
Diani point out, concepts overlap across these theories and are subject to 
change.46  
 
In the following, I will discuss, in order, each of these groups of literature. The 
procedure throughout this critical exercise of engagement with the existing 
research is to use selective theoretical ideas as a heuristic foundation for the 
formulation of my own conceptual proposition. 
 
I. Structuralist Approach to Social Movements and Mobilizations 
Most scholars of social movements and mobilizations have been to a degree 
perplexed by the question of when and why social insurgency erupts. The 
thinking in this direction has evolved from the irrational behaviour of aggrieved 
individuals to analyses of sociopolitical structures and the rational behaviour of 
individuals. In this part of the chapter, I will discuss three main bodies of literature 
that deal with these issues from a structuralist perspective. I will start with 
resource mobilization first. 
 
1.1. Resource mobilization	
Resource mobilization theory emerged primarily as a counter explanation to the 
overly irrational approach of the previous social psychology literature on 
                                                       
46 Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (1999) Social movements: An introduction, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
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collective behaviour.47 The initiators of this theoretical approach, John McCarthy 
and Mayer Zald, shifted from the grievance explanation model and instead 
centred their vision of social movements’ development on internal resources. 
This was an important move, which rendered social movements and their internal 
workings the subject of their own history. In their seminal 1977 publication, 
McCarthy and Zald set out the approach of their research, which aimed to 
examine ‘the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social 
movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external 
support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate 
movements’.48 
 
According to this model, social movements require the following items to sustain 
their activities: aggregation of resources (money and labour), minimal form of 
organization, followers and a system of rewards designed to motivate 
membership. All of these elements are aggregated within a ‘supply and demand’ 
model. Conceptualized in these terms, McCarthy and Zald’s model differs from 
previous interpretations in several ways. Conscience (which in some cases, as 
authors have admitted, even supersedes emotional and ideological values) 
overtook grievances in terms of importance. Furthermore, social movements’ 
chief tasks are now being concentrated on mobilizing supporters and maximizing 
the volume of resources. Finally, the social movement’s relation to wider society 
is defined as a supply and demand relationship. These elements are amenable to 
a specific understanding of the role of social movements within society:  
We view social movements as nothing more than preference structures 
directed towards social change [emphasis added].49 
 
It is clear that by assuming individuals as ‘rational actors’, resource mobilization 
                                                       
47 I do not address in my thesis the social psychology school, due to the lack of space for doing 
so and its limited usefulness to my dissertation. This approach represents an overly deterministic 
view of social grievances, as well as actors’ irrationality in joining social movements. See, for 
example, Le Bon, G. (2009) Psychology of Crowds, Sparkling Books edition: Sparkling Books. 
48 McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (1977) ‘Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial 
theory’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 82, no. 6, May, pp. 1212-1241. 
49 Ibid. 
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theory puts forward the organization and the effectiveness it provides to social 
movements in pursuing their strategies and tactics. In a later version of their 
model, Zald and Useem push this point even further. They stress that the model 
rests on features of an advanced industrial society, in which ‘rising personal 
incomes give individuals the discretionary funds to buy memberships in 
movement interest groups.’50 In addition, the government, corporate businesses 
and large organizations discover one another in market relationships 
characterized by impersonal transactions. 
 
Although resource mobilization theory was clearly a breakthrough in the social 
movement literature, it poses a number of insurmountable problems. If 
movements were thought to have formed once they mobilize a sufficient number 
of resources and members, what would be the threshold that accounts for the 
variation in successes across cases? Why is a certain amount of resources 
accountable for the emergence and maintenance of social mobilizations in one 
context but not another? Far from answering this question, the model assumes 
the sort of environment that conflict groups rarely have. Even among specialists 
researching American social movements there is an argument that resource 
mobilization theory applies to the later stage of contention in which organizations 
‘have been accepted as regular participants in the political system.’51 Lo stresses 
that McCarthy and Zald’s model does not deliver justice to ‘challengers’ who 
need substantial personal commitments from a limited group for a specific 
conflict’ in order to make a breakthrough into the polity.’52 In a similar vein, 
Schwartz and Paul, and Piven and Cloward also stressed in their research that 
resource mobilization theory fails to account for the distinctive politics of ‘lower-
                                                       
50 Zald, M. and Useem, B. (1987) ‘Movement and countermovement interaction: Mobilization, 
tactics and state involvement’, in Zald, M. and McCarthy, J. (ed.) Social movements in an 
organizational society, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books. 
51 Lo, C. (1992) ‘Communities of challengers in social movement theory’, in Morris, A. and 
Mueller, C. (ed.) Frontiers in social movement theory, New Havel and London: Yale University 
Press, p. 224. 
52 Ibid. 
 43 
stratum groups’ compared to middle-class mobilizations.53 The general criticism 
that arose against resource mobilization theory stresses that the privileged focus 
on organization and resources has led to the neglect of ‘[the] more expressive, 
spontaneous, and disruptive role of conflict and violence.’54  
 
Other authors have challenged the economistic perspective of resource 
mobilization theory. One such thread of criticism challenges authors’ 
overemphasis on individuals’ rationality when ‘deciding’ whether or not to join a 
movement. For Hirsch, resource mobilization theory omits the role of emotional, 
ideational and group commitment that is crucial for group processes:  
Increased costs do not always result in decreased participation in the 
movement; protesters often respond to threats and repression by 
developing a greater willingness to ignore personal costs in favor of the 
collective struggle.55 
 
In her ethnographic exploration of Brazilian small farmers, Wolford rightly notes 
that the motivations for becoming a participant in a movement is a not a 
straightforward process and not a ‘decision’ at all. Wolford points out that moral 
economies of individual participation are embedded in complex historical, 
socioeconomic and cultural conditions that have real implications on movements’ 
trajectories. Her criticism of rational theory is insightful: 
 A vision of movements as ‘things’ with observable, quantifiable 
characteristics: numbers of members, demonstrations, opposition rallies, 
and so on. But movements are more than just visible entities or structures; 
they are – perhaps more importantly – a set of discourses, or narratives, 
ways of talking about justice and injustice, ways of imagining change.56 
 
                                                       
53 See Schwartz, M. and Paul, Sh. (1992) ‘Resource mobilization versus the mobilization of 
people: Why consensus movements cannot be instruments of social change’, in Morris, A. and 
Mueller, C. (ed.) Frontiers in social movement theory, New Havel and London: Yale University 
Press; Piven, F. and Cloward, R. (1992) ‘Normalizing collective protest’, in Morris, A. and Mueller, 
C. (ed.) Frontiers in social movement theory, New Havel and London: Yale University Press. 
54 Morris, A. and Mueller, C. (ed.) (1992) Frontiers in social movement theory, New Havel and 
London: Yale University Press, p. 17. 
55 Hirsch, E. (1990). 
56 Wolford, W. (2010) This land is ours now: Social mobilization and the meanings of land in 
Brazil, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
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In terms of my own research agenda, I share the concerns of those scholars who 
explore the dynamics of social mobilization in non-Western contexts or in non-
middle class societies. In my case studies, I am interested in the type of 
sustainability of fragile mobilizations that cannot be explained by resource 
mobilization theory only. The Kyrgyzstani protest movements struggle to sustain 
their autonomy, to not be assimilated by central political games or being 
discredited by suspicious public opinion. Yet McCarthy and Zald’s model can be 
useful to account for the later stages of mobilization, where Kyrgyzstani protest 
movements have succeeded in establishing some sort of sustainable structure. 
Here, the model can, for example, provide some answers to the success of a 
resource rich labour movement in one of my case studies, in contrast to a 
resource poor community-based resistance in the second case study. However, 
the model is not a good fit for attempts to understand the early stages of 
mobilization in which protest movements emerge and attempt to sustain their 
activities against existing precarious conditions. The idea behind including 
resource mobilization theory in my literature review was to pursue the research 
objective of highlighting the gap between the Kyrgyzstani and Western settings in 
which grassroots movements operate and therefore, the need for concepts that 
can better reflect movements’ efforts to construct sustained practices of 
contestation within a precarious environment. 
 
1.2. Political opportunity structure  
Another way to consider social movements and mobilizations was initiated by 
scholars who were interested in the external environment and specifically, in 
political conditions for explaining social insurgency. One of the leading authors in 
this area is Sidney Tarrow, who notes: 
The outbreaks of collective action cannot be derived from the level of 
deprivation that people suffer or from the disorganization of their societies; 
for these preconditions are more constant than the movements they 
supposedly cause.57 
 
                                                       
57 Tarrow, S. (1994), p. 81.  
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To indicate the limits of the relative deprivation theory in a comparative scale, 
Tarrow convincingly explains variations within labour insurgencies in France, 
America, Germany and Britain in the 1930s, despite the similarities of economic 
distress in these countries. In these cases, it was less workers’ grievances or 
their access (or lack thereof) to resources, but rather the new political 
opportunities offered by the respective French Popular Front and the American 
New Deal that led to labour mobilizations.  
 
To the previous deprivation explanation, Tarrow offers a new approach towards 
studying social insurgency, i.e., the political opportunity structure (POS). In 
Tarrow’s research, this structure is a condition sine qua non for any social 
activism; thus, the formation of a movement is ‘the product of people seizing and 
making opportunities.’ 58  By political opportunity structure, Tarrow means 
‘consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success or failure.’ 59  Tarrow lists four main 
changes in the opportunity structure that can provide such expectations: the 
opening up of access to participation, shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of 
influential allies and fractures within and among elites. He illustrates the role of 
electoral realignments for giving rise to political opportunities within the American 
Civil Rights Movement, or the role of increasing access to political action in 
accounting for protests of democratization in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe in 1989. In addition to these major changes in opportunity structure, 
Tarrow also considers ‘stable aspects’ of opportunity structures such as state 
repression and facilitation. 
 
Another adherent of the POS approach, Charles Tilly, explained various 
European mobilizations in the same vein. In their study of French violence after 
1830, Snyder and Tilly come to a similar conclusion as Tarrow about the 
                                                       
58 Ibid., p. 85. 
59 Ibid. 
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dynamics of popular mobilizations. In their view, this participation was more likely 
due to electoral opportunities and changes within the regime and less related to 
grievances and deprivation.60  
 
Many scholars followed and nuanced Tarrow’s innovation as a way to appreciate 
the importance of macro political changes, even for social actors who are 
assumed to operate from outside the ‘polity’. 61  This trend gave rise to an 
impressive scope of research, which the present chapter cannot possibly do 
justice.62 However, Tarrow’s concept has also received major criticism. Although 
Tarrow acknowledges the non-linear relationship between POS and a rise in 
protests, he does not manage to escape, according to critics, structural bias, i.e., 
the structural determinism of essentially fluid situations. Goodwin and Jasper, the 
most vigorous critics of POS, convincingly argue that, 
Such opportunities, when they are important, do not result from some 
invariant menu of factors, but from situationally specific combinations and 
sequences of political processes – none of which, in the abstract, had 
determinate consequences.63  
 
Kurzman makes another important point that specifically concerns the gap 
between scholars whose job is to detect and analyse opportunities and societies 
that are empirically affected by opportunities. In his interpretation of the Iranian 
revolution, Kurzman argues that there had been dramatic dissonance between 
political opportunities discerned by scholars and perceptions of political 
opportunities on the ground held by participants in the revolution. He notes,  
These Tocquevillean analyses recognize that structural opportunities and 
perceived opportunities may not always match. The correlation between 
                                                       
60 Snyder, D. and Tilly, Ch. (1972) ‘Hardship and collective violence in France: 1830-1960’, 
American Sociological Review, vol. 37, no. 5, October, pp. 520-532. 
61 Tilly, Ch. (2008) Contentious performances, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
62  See for example, Kriesi, H. (1994) ‘Political opportunity structure’, in Jenkins, C. and 
Klandermans B. (ed.) The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives on states and 
social movements, London: UCL Press; Gamson, W. and Mayer, D. (1996) ‘Framing political 
opportunity’, in McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (ed.) Comparative perspectives on social 
movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
63 Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. (1999) ‘Caught in a winding, snarling vine: The structural bias of 
political process theory’, Sociological Forum, vol. 14, no.1, March, pp. 27-54. 
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subjective perceptions and structural conditions may not hold true for some 
cases. Two possible mismatches occur when (1) people fail to perceive 
opportunities, or (2) they perceive opportunities where none exists.64  
 
Whether Kurzman’s interpretation of the Iranian revolution represents a ‘deviant’ 
case or not, it seems to me that the point made by him challenges the POS in 
relation to whether the concept serves as an analytical tool or an analytical 
category. The conflation between the two becomes even more salient in the non-
Western context, where non-existent public opinion polls cannot be used to test 
hypotheses about the popular perceptions of political opportunities. For example, 
in the context of Central Asian social mobilizations, the authoritarian regime of 
the Bakievs and political observers alike could hardly have predicted the popular 
uprisings of April 2010 that swept away the regime against the background of 
constricted opportunities for the opposition and civil activists. In non-democratic 
states, shifts in ruling alignments and changes within the elite occur secretly, and 
although they constitute important points of vulnerability for the regime they are 
not easily detectable to the to-be-insurgents. This was the case with the death of 
the Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov in 2006 and the quiet succession to 
power of a previously unknown dentist, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. In 
Uzbekistan, shifts among ruling elites are crucial for the stability of Karimov’s 
regime; however, their nature is too opaque to be encoded by ordinary citizens 
and activists. Thus, the level of informality might hinder to a great extent the 
possibility for ordinary citizens to understand the availability of opportunities.65 
 
With regard to my case studies, I found the POS concept partially useful. On the 
one hand, it is clear that revolutionary changes at the centre served as powerful 
triggers for insurgency at the Kyrgyzstani periphery in March 2005 and April 
                                                       
64 Kurzman, Ch. (1996) ‘Structural opportunity and perceived opportunity in social-movement 
theory: The Iranian revolution of 1979’, American Sociological Review, vol. 61, no.1, February, 
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2010. Dissent groups reacted each time to the opening up of the political system 
in the capital in order to advance changes in their localities. On the other hand, 
POS cannot truly reflect further developments of the central political system or 
account for its subtle nuances such as, for example, depoliticizing and 
discrediting effects on grassroots mobilizations. Thus, POS is unable to fully 
explain why protest movements keep emerging and attempting to sustain their 
activities against the background of ‘negative’ political opportunities. I therefore 
continue the literature review with the objective of observing how the literature 
has evolved in reaction to criticism of the major existing concepts. 
 
1.3. Political process theory 
Political process theory, an innovative approach by American sociologist Doug 
McAdam, attempts to even up the shortcomings of the earlier POS concept. The 
theory offers scholars of social movements much more than a reformed POS, as 
it proposes an attempt to synthetize concepts that were elaborated on by earlier 
competing approaches. Thus, McAdam’s political process represents a 
combination of several aspects of resource mobilization, new social movement 
theory and POS, which had previously been treated separately. According to the 
author, a movement’s emergence is therefore accountable to the ‘level of 
organization’ that provides the means for taking action, the ‘cognitive liberation’ 
that serves as a transformation of consciousness and inspires individuals into 
taking action and finally the availability of ‘political opportunities’ that sets an 
external context in which movements can operate. This combination allows 
McAdam to conceptualize social movements as a continuous process, 
Accordingly, any complete model of social insurgency should offer the 
researcher a framework for analysing the entire process of movement 
development rather than a particular phase of that same process.66 
 
McAdam also views social movements as an interactive process between protest 
groups and the larger environment that they seek to challenge. As such, 
                                                       
66 McAdam, D. (1982) Political process and the development of black insurgency 1930-1970, 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, p. 36. 
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McAdam highlights the balance of both external and internal factors. In his 
opinion, 
Neither environmental factors nor factors internal to the movement are 
sufficient to account for the generation and development of social 
insurgency… [instead] social movements are an ongoing product of the 
favorable interplay of both sets of factors.67 
 
McAdam’s theory marks at least three differences between the political process 
and the POS concept. First, McAdam attempts to remedy the earlier 
overemphasis on external factors and seeks to balance out his analysis by 
looking for conditions of ‘cognitive liberation’ and organization within protest 
groups. Political opportunities are therefore only a part of broader social 
processes. Second, the political process also differs from POS in its historical 
approach of social change and appreciates the longer impact of sociopolitical 
structures over insurgent groups. As such, McAdam is likely similar to another 
above-mentioned structuralist scholar, Charles Tilly, who, for example, studied 
the evolution of the forms of collective action in correlation with historical state-
building in Great Britain. 68  Third, McAdam’s explanation of the movement’s 
development as a ‘response to an ongoing process of interaction between 
movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment’69 better highlight’s 
the interactive model that featured in Tarrow’s concept as too instrumentalist. 
The point that social movements do not develop in isolation but in interaction with 
their environment renders the interactive model an innovative concept. 
 
However, McAdam’s list of factors has been judged as too structuralist. Despite 
the innovative focus on the interactive model and on internal processes, Goodwin 
and Jasper claimed that McAdam’s theory fails to avoid the mistake of the 
previous POS concept, where the attention was centred on macro structures and 
                                                       
67 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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69 McAdam, D. (1982), p. 40. 
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in which ‘smaller’ events were neglected as insignificant for social movement 
generation. 70 
 
To acknowledge the authors of POS and PPT, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
recognized these criticisms and sought to address them in their recent work, 
Dynamics of Contention, a text that breaks away from ‘the static, individualistic, 
and often reified character of previous analyses – including our own.’71 Dynamics 
of Contention offers a new ‘relational’ perspective compared to older concepts. 
Thus, according to new perspectives, the concept of political opportunity 
structure was upgraded to become a set of ‘perceptions of opportunities and 
threats’. Tarrow’s earlier emphasis on rigid ‘mobilizing structures’ was replaced 
by episodes involving the ‘active appropriation of sites of mobilizations’, whereas 
‘interpersonal networks’ – previously hinted at by McAdam – were given a central 
role in the dynamics of social mobilizations. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly also 
privilege a dynamic construction of ideological frameworks over McAdam’s 
previous concept of ‘cognitive liberation’. In doing so, they conceptualize forms of 
collective action as ‘contentious performances’ against Tilly’s stable ‘repertoires 
of collective action’. In addition, collective action by social groups is considered to 
be part of politics, albeit non-conventional and non-institutional, which waves to a 
certain degree the dichotomy between state and society. As a result of the 
adoption of these innovations and revisions McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly come to a 
‘processual’ and ‘relational’ understanding of contentious politics that represents 
a clear departure from older obsessions with the origins of social mobilizations.72  
 
Although Dynamics of Contention made a significant effort to decentralize 
research on social mobilizations, conventional literature still suffers from an 
important structuralist bias, whether it concerns the focus on organizations or 
large historical and sociopolitical structures. Instead of focusing on macro 
structures, I argue that conditions for the emergence and development of 
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protests can be found foremost in micro foundations of collective action. In 
addition to problematic levels of analysis, another challenge can be directed at 
the ontology of grassroots activism. My conceptual problem with political 
processes and contentious politics at this point concerns the exaggerated focus 
on the generation of social insurgency. The motivation for explaining the ‘why’, 
which is so inherent in political science unfortunately leads to a serious omission 
of contingency, which is the essential characteristic of social insurgency. The 
titles of recent publications that seek to explicate the ‘unexpected’ uprisings in the 
Middle East (e.g., ‘Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring’) illustrate 
this trend.73 Yet the very fact that such uprisings regularly occur in different parts 
of the world is likely indicative of the fact that social insurgency represents the 
flipside of mainstream politics. In a bid to list all the possible reasons for the 
emergence of insurgency, political science simply rules out the role of 
contingency and uncertainty that are part of this type of social and political 
activism.  
 
II. Operational ‘Tools’ of the Structuralist Approach 
Up until now, I have discussed the major tenets of the American school of social 
movements and mobilizations. From resource mobilization, political process and 
dynamics of contention, we have learned that social mobilizations are not linear 
manifestations of societal grievances and inequalities; rather, they are the 
products of complex interconnections between external influencing factors and 
internal capacities of mobilization. By focusing on their ontological foundations, 
however, I did not observe the ways in which these theories are practically being 
conducted. This omission will be remedied in this section, since the meso-level 
concepts will be useful in my own empirical analysis. I will first briefly discuss 
selected concepts with the goal of contrasting the basic assumptions behind this 
operationalization against preliminary knowledge of the Kyrgyzstani context.  
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The analytical ‘toolkit’ of the aforementioned theories is naturally diverse. 
However, the way in which they unanimously emphasize the role of formal 
organizations, mobilizing structures, networks, leadership, membership and 
cultural and cognitive resources permits for treating this toolkit in a more or less 
unified fashion. As noted earlier, the focus of traditional social movement theory 
on agency and structure is conditioned by a distinct view that conceptualizes 
them as ‘pre-conditions’ for movement generation. The proliferation of concepts 
such as ‘membership based on preexisting networks,’74 ‘established structures of 
solidarity incentives,’75 ‘existing cultural frames’76 and ‘facilitative leadership’77 
illustrate this purpose. Moreover, these agential and structural conditions are 
considered as an available ‘infrastructure’: ‘both the failure of a new movement to 
take hold and the rapid spread of insurgent action [has] been credited [with] the 
presence or absence of such an infrastructure.’78  
 
For Oberschall, one of the authors of resource mobilization theories, 
organizational capacity plays a central role in social movement consolidation. 
Without advanced capacity, Oberschall argues, endogenous populations will not 
be able to produce beyond ‘short-term, localized, ephemeral outbursts and 
movements of protest such as riots.’79 Tarrow’s definition of the organization of 
collective action is much more relaxed and includes a variety of forms ranging 
from ‘temporary formations of challengers all the way to formal cells, branches 
and militias.’ 80  He finds that the most efficient organizations are not hard 
structures or anarchism that shaped twentieth-century European social 
movements, but intermediate models found in nineteenth-century American civic 
movements that were based on ‘semiformal and episodic organization rooted in 
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informal social networks.’81 Tarrow goes on to explain that ‘the most effective 
organization of collective action draws on social networks in which people 
normally live and work because their mutual trust and interdependence can 
easily be turned into solidarity.’82 McAdam follows this perspective and observes: 
‘if there is anything approximating a consistent finding in the empirical literature, it 
is that movement participants are recruited along established lines of 
interaction.’83 Similarly, Roger Gould, who explored the 1871 Paris commune, 
found ‘that the enlistment groups in the Paris National Guard were most effective 
when they were based on informal social ties rooted in…neighborhoods.’ 84 
Students of authoritarian contexts have extended the concept of mobilization 
structures to include other types such as work units85 and student dormitories86 in 
China. 
 
Furthermore, networks have been explored from various angles: based on a wide 
range of informal social relationships (such as friendship, kin, neighbourhoods, 
activist, sub-cultures and affinity groups), as well as deriving from more formal 
settings (such as political parties, unions, professional associations, voluntary 
committees, churches, etc.). The network analysis appears particularly promising 
within the advent of information and communication technologies (ICT) such as 
Twitter and Facebook and their ambivalent role in Arab revolutions, but also in 
Occupy- and other movements.87 A large number of scholars believe that it is 
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through the mobilization of such networks that movements recruit members.88 
Network analysis has also been popular within Central Asian research. Some 
authors have explored informal clan networks89 and patron-client networks in 
Central Asia. 90  Other Central Asian critics have, however, pointed out the 
ambiguity of clan-networks to serve as back-up units for social mobilization.91  
 
Although a clear mobilizing structure based on specific networks or pre-existing 
identities is needed to maintain existing members and to attract new followers, 
many Kyrgyzstani protest movements suffer from a lack of such discernible 
structures. On the surface, they are based on some ‘pre-existing’ structures such 
as trade unions and regional identities on the one hand, and clan and kinship 
solidarities on the other. Yet, none of these mobilizing structures offer an 
unproblematic structure of incentives and motivations for joining the dissent. I 
therefore argue that the structuralist approach towards the ‘infrastructure’ of 
mobilization is wrong to take these resources for granted and as readily 
convertible into collective action. The Kyrgyzstani cases show that social 
mobilizations are constructed in the process of mobilization and that they hardly 
afford to rely on previously established relationships, networks, identities and 
other lines of interaction. Writing in the Middle East and North African contexts, 
Beinin rightly notes that, ‘mobilizing structures were often considered to be pre-
existing rather than dynamically created and appropriated.’92 
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Another important element in analyses of social mobilizations is that of 
leadership. McAdam holds that ‘to assert the importance of leaders or organizers 
in the generation of social insurgency requires not so much a particular 
theoretical orientation as common sense.’93 Leaders are conceptualized as the 
official interface of movements, which are charged to convey a coherent image of 
an ideologically committed movement that aspires to carry out an alternative 
agenda for social change. These leaders have significant responsibilities for 
directing a movement, communicating its values to followers and wider 
communities, set a collective agenda, define strategies and tactics, and for 
managing intra-group relations. This has led some scholars to linking a group’s 
leadership style to group cohesion. Harff and Gurr assume that strong leaders 
are able to cultivate a climate in which participants are inclined to relinquish their 
personal preferences for the sake of group cohesion. 94  Barker writes that 
‘leadership involves, however dimly, a vision of a transformed movement, a 
judgment of the present in terms of an aspired-to-future.’95  
 
These accounts end up depicting actors of contentious politics as organized 
within coherent unified entities in order to convey a perfect picture and gain 
followers outside of their core activists. Ideologically committed, ready to devote 
personal time and energy, they deliver their expertise and professionalism for the 
sake of public service. The notion of leadership became so unproblematic that 
citizens in the West rarely pay attention to the personalities of leaders of, for 
example, Greenpeace or PEGIDA movements. Instead, they join such 
movements because they share similar beliefs and values and rarely question 
leaders’ commitment to the cause.  
 
In Kyrgyzstan, leaders of protest movements are met with outmost suspicion. In 
recent times, individuals that claim to represent public interests have acquired a 
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bad reputation of ‘dejurnye activisty’ or ‘activists on duty’, a popular idiom that 
designates professional individuals who are hired in return for financial 
remuneration in order to organize protests. 96  Such paid and manipulated 
practices put into question the authenticity of collective action in the eyes of 
ordinary participants, opponents and the wider public. As a result, the ensuing 
distrust towards actors of contentious politics complicates the structuration of 
movements along clear leadership and membership lines. But how can we 
understand the ambiguous roles of leaders and the implications of this ambiguity 
on the course of social mobilizations? Leaders of Kyrgyzstani fragmented 
mobilizations rarely represent a guaranteed resource on which a contentious 
community can draw to keep its rank-and-file militancy.97  As such, we can 
hypothesize about the contingent nature of the social climate inside movements 
and about the roles of individuals that do not remain unchanged once they 
become part of a movement. 
 
Similarly, the traditional literature portrays membership in social mobilizations as 
a ‘marketplace of ideas and decision-making’, in which people decide to join 
and/or leave movements because they correspond (or do not) to their beliefs and 
interests. However, such treatment does not hold true in practise. Wolford’s 
ethnographic observation is again very challenging, 
Membership is a dynamic process, not a solid category or concrete group of 
people. The movement is a double-sided site of hegemonic contestation, 
with both internal and external points of contact, and the subaltern – the 
ostensible “subject” of resistance – represented by the movement is fluid 
and shifts frequently.98 
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It seems that the structuralist approach towards leadership, mobilization 
structures, and membership as pre-existing unproblematic conditions shows little 
usefulness when it comes to non-institutionalized and volatile societies. The next 
part of the chapter will carry this preliminary problematization further by 
contrasting the structuralist literature against constructivist approaches. Both 
discussions will eventually prepare the basis for my own theoretical 
operationalization, which I present in the following chapter and further 
demonstrate in my empirical chapters. 
 
III. Social Construction of Protests 
I would like to stress once again that the major critique directed at the rational 
approaches is that the elements of social structure and culture are viewed as 
having the potential to translate directly into collective action. This part of the 
chapter argues that these resources have a rather mediated effect. New 
concepts have appeared whose main goal is to suggest that the potential of 
social movements to ‘take on’ these resources is not as straightforward as first 
assumed. Issues of meaning construction and structural inequality that shape 
actors’ ability to seize resources and opportunities in different ways have gained 
increasing attention within the ‘social constructivist’ perspective. This perspective, 
especially in its latest conception, offers the most suitable approaches for 
considering the conditions for sustainable practices within collective action, even 
in the contexts of weak formal organization and meagre resources. This part of 
the chapter will pay attention to the constructivist school of thought and address 
its early and recent approaches in order.  
 
3.1. Early constructivist approach 
The social constructivist approach rests on the premise that not all social 
problems become issues, despite being no less acute than situations that do 
become rallying points in the present. As such, the social constructivist approach 
is radically different from naturalistic and instrumental resource mobilization 
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theory and from early versions of the political opportunity approach, which 
conceived social mobilizations as direct reactions to ‘objective’ external events. 
 
Authors like Snow and colleagues, 99  Melucci, 100  Kurzman, 101  Hirsch, 102 
Fantasia103 and others have put forward the idea that social mobilizations are 
constructed in the processes of making sense of ongoing events, of attempting to 
frame concerns and grievances within existing and new structures of belief, and 
that these processes are subjected to ongoing interpretation and internal 
dynamics that occur during collective action. Kurzman notes that ‘social 
movements may be a particularly conducive site [for] privilege meaning-making, 
because their activities foreground resistance to the dominant norms and 
institutions of society.’104 
 
Snow and colleagues’ critiques of earlier approaches capture best the departure 
of the social constructivist school from earlier premises. These authors identify 
three fundamental shortcomings in the existing literature. The first problem rightly 
concerns the conceptualization of grievance mobilization. According to Snow et 
al., previous frameworks neglected ‘the process of grievance interpretations,’ 
whereas ‘what is at issue is not merely the presence or absence of grievances, 
but the manner in which grievances are interpreted, [as well as] the generation 
and diffusion of those interpretations.’105 Social movement participants do not 
only take action in the world they seek to change, but ‘frame’ it according to their 
own worldviews. The second problem identified by Snow and colleagues is linked 
to the tendency of social movement literature to see participation in social 
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movements as a ‘static dependent variable based in large measure on a single, 
time-bound, rational decision.’106 Yet the volume and form of participation are 
contingent on changes that social movements undergo over time and across 
space and hence, are part of a dynamic process that requires proper 
conceptualization. The third weakness of the previous approaches concerns the 
failure to ‘specify the extent to which various participation-related processes, 
such as bloc recruitment…network recruitment… [and the] mobilization of pre-
existing preference structures…vary across social movements.’ 107  This rich 
critique presents a good starting point from which we can discuss the innovations 
introduced by the social constructivist approach against these shortcomings. 
According to this trend, one particular theory of interest to my study is Snow et 
al.’s ‘frame alignment’.  
 
In 1986, Snow and colleagues published an article that offered an innovative 
approach for studying social movements. Drawing on Goffman’s earlier works 
involving framing processes,108 Snow et al. suggest that cultural processes, or 
what they call a ‘frame alignment’, mediate collective action. Frame alignment 
essentially signifies a process by which an individual’s understanding of the world 
can be aligned to the SMOs interpretive frames. Several features characterize 
this process. First, since frames are constructed by SMOs, they are not directly 
based on a grievance structure. Second, in order to secure and maintain 
participation level high, frames fulfil a number of interrelated but not similar 
functions: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame 
transformation. Third, the effect of frame alignment cannot be understood as a 
fixed achievement once and forever; frame alignment is an ongoing process that 
is subject to constant negotiation and adjustment among participants. All of these 
                                                       
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Goffman, E. (1974) Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience, New York: 
Harper & Row. 
 60 
points on frame alignment render it in the eyes of Snow et al. a ‘crucial aspect of 
adherent and constituent mobilization.’109 
 
The above detailed process of collective action framing relates to how social 
movements construct meaning. According to David Snow and Robert Benford, a 
frame is, 
Interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” 
by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, 
experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past 
environment.110  
 
Furthermore, Snow and Benford distinguish between diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational functions of frame alignment. These frames can be employed in 
order to amplify, modify or transform the existing interpretative schemata.111 In 
contrast to resource mobilization theory, movement leaders create these tools 
and their existence is not simply taken for granted. In addition, Snow et al.’s 
contribution is important in the way it stresses the temporality and contingency of 
these cultural resources. This means that frame alignment is never temporally 
fixed and its success depends on situational contexts. Della Porta and Diani 
stress the importance of the frame concept, as it ‘allow[s] a phenomenon whose 
origins [had] previously [been] attributed to natural factors to be transformed into 
a social or political problem.’112 
 
Although the frame alignment concept became popular among social movement 
scholars,113 it has also attracted significant criticism. German scholar Karl-Dieter 
Opp asks whether frame alignment necessarily leads to collective action and 
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conversely, whether collective action can happen spontaneously without any 
prior frame processes.114  Other scholars have challenged the model for its 
insensitivity towards contexts: the same collective action frame might be 
successful in building membership in one case, but fail to do so in another case 
without the model accounting for these variations.115 Although these critics have 
a valid point, I still find the frame alignment concept helpful for the design of the 
activities of protest movements’ leaders, as well as for their efforts to present 
grievances and worries in culturally specific and valid frames. In the Kyrgyzstani 
context, both labour and rural ‘activists’ have resorted to frame alignment 
processes in order to attract the attention of fellow workers and rural residents, 
respectively, to previously unknown grievances. However, there are limits to the 
concept when it comes to the analysis of ordinary members of mobilization, 
because in my opinion, they are not merely recipients of frames but equal 
participants of frame construction. I will address this point in the final section of 
the chapter. 
 
3.2. Recent decentered approach 
The previously discussed constructivist literature explored the deliberate 
character of meaning-making and consciousness raising processes such as 
frame alignment and treated them as another resource designed to either attract 
new members or sustain old participants. Kurzman’s critique made in the 
Introduction of the special issue on meaning-making in social movements is 
illustrative of the point,  
While the cultural turn conquered social movement studies, some of its 
most radical implications were lost in the process. In effect, meaning-
making has been turned into a set of independent variables. Does a group 
have a strong sense of solidarity? Check. Does the movement have a 
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message that resonates with core values? Check. This may be an 
exaggeration, but not by much.116 
 
Taking into account this important caveat, recent literature has increasingly found 
that participation can form and change in the process of action, whether designed 
intentionally or not. Let us take a closer look at what the authors of this literature 
provide.  
 
Already in earlier versions of the social constructivist approach, there was an 
understanding that ‘consciousness raising during episodes of collective action 
affects primarily people engaged in a collective action [italics added].’117 Recent 
constructivist literature rendered the processes of meaning-making and 
construction of internal cultural resources even more action-oriented. Hirsch and 
Fantasia are authors that have made consciousness-raising during episodes of 
mobilization the core of their approaches to collective action. By detecting such 
episodes, they fill an important gap left by Snow and Benford’s explanations of 
the functioning of different framings. As discussed earlier, Snow et al. identified 
and detailed diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings, but omitted 
specifying the conditions under which their generation becomes possible. Hirsch 
and Fantasia explore first and foremost the conditions in which meanings are 
collectively produced and in which solidarities are bound.  
 
Rick Fantasia is a well-known sociologist of the American working class. In his 
important study on contemporary labour mobilizations, he explores what has 
been assumed as absent solidarity among American workers. He suggests that 
cultures of solidarity are,  
Neither ideas of solidarity in the abstract nor bureaucratic trade union 
activity, but cultural formations that arise in conflict, creating and sustaining 
solidarity in opposition to the dominant structure [emphases added].118  
                                                       
116 Kurzman, Сh. (2008). 
117 Klandermans, B. (1992) ‘The social construction of protest and multiorganizational fields’, in 
Morris, A. and Mueller, C. (ed.) Frontiers in social movement theory, New Havel and London: 
Yale University Press, p. 98. 
118 Fantasia, R. (1988), p. 20. 
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He goes on to say that ‘solidarity is created and expressed by the process of 
mutual association [italics in original].’119 Fantasia further highlights the ‘often 
fragile, fragmentary and defensive character’ 120 of expressions of solidarity. An 
upshot of this vision is a distinct research methodology. In order to study 
American rebel workers during the 1980s, Fantasia investigated sites of 
expressions of solidarity not in the traditional structures of the working class, but 
in activities in which solidarity is likely to emerge. Such potential activities can be 
found in the creation of unions, the maintenance of strike action and the 
preservation of rank-and-file militancy within unions. 
 
The focus on the processes of association, which represents a much more 
challenging methodological task than the crediting of ‘pre-existing’ identities, is an 
important finding that has the potential to explain the eruption of ‘unexpected’ 
labour mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan, too. Presently, labour is considered a 
vanished collective actor, because following post-Soviet de-industrialization, the 
country turned primarily to agrarian production in the form of small and medium 
enterprises. If one concentrates only on these ‘objective’ factors, based on labour 
issues and labour identity, nothing will likely be able to predict the possibility for 
any large mobilizations to emerge. Moreover, if we were to search for ‘hard’ 
evidence of pre-existing labour solidarities such as, for example, workers’ firm 
ideological commitment or independent unionism or again, a connection between 
rebellious workers and socialist parties, we will remain uninformed, since none of 
these evidences is explicitly observable in Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, in divided rural 
communities, the erosion of social bonds (if we assume that such bonds 
prevailed from the pre-Soviet and/or Soviet periods) due to neoliberal reforms121 
will most likely undermine sustainable collective action. Rural populations have 
thus far been able to engage in bifurcated and brief forms of mobilizations only. 
                                                       
119 Ibid., p. 11. 
120 Ibid., p. 23. 
121 See Botoeva, G. (2014); Satybaldieva, E. (2015) ‘Political capital, everyday politics and moral 
obligations: Understanding the political strategies of various elites and the poor in Kyrgyzstan’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 67, no. 3, May, pp. 370-387. 
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However, if one looks at these associations as expressions of solidarities, one 
can produce a better understanding of how even such provisional expressions 
successfully translate into punctual collective actions. These expressions should 
not be underestimated. Only if I approach the problem of precarious protest 
movements this way (instead of counting all the missing links that traditional 
mobilization assumes for a successful protest) can I ask what might actually 
appear as a result of such expressions and whether it can translate into 
something more lasting. 
 
Another influential scholar in this area, Eric Hirsch, examines the power of 
association and notes convincingly that, 
Even the most sophisticated rational choice models…cannot account for 
group solidarity in movement recruitment and commitment because they 
focus on the individual decision to participate and neglect the group 
processes which influence those decisions.122  
 
Rejecting both the rational choice and social disorganization explanations, Hirsch 
focuses instead on the social creation of commitment, which is in line with the 
earlier constructivist approach. However, Hirsch differs from the previous 
literature in important ways; he places activists and ordinary participants within 
group dynamics, in which each voice is crucial for determining individual and, 
consequently, collective commitment. In contrast to this, the previous framework 
analysis cantered on how frame alignment affected participation, thus making 
participants, albeit critical, mere recipients of meaning rather than architects of 
their individual and group commitment.  
 
In his study of Columbia University student mobilizations, Hirsch identifies four 
such group dynamics that motivate individuals to align with a collective cause: 
consciousness-raising, collective empowerment, polarization and group decision-
making. By using an ethnographic methodology, he observed and surveyed 
students who took participation in demonstrations against the personal risk they 
                                                       
122 Hirsch, E. (1990). 
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took of being expelled from the university. Hirsch’s observations led him to 
suggest that potential members were likely to join protests if they developed an 
‘ideological commitment’ to the group cause and believed that protests were 
efficient for achieving the group’s goals. Ideological commitment and beliefs were 
nurtured in a series of different group processes. For example, group discussions 
that were intentionally left open to everyone were conducive to consciousness-
raising. The author notes that consciousness-raising was, however, a challenging 
task, since it necessarily involves the questioning of existing authority 
relationships. However, group discussions provided a bridge between individuals 
who had not previously been exposed to the ideas of others. 
 
Another group process, collective empowerment, is a group dynamic in which 
participants have an opportunity to test the ‘real’ commitment of others by 
checking at actual protest sites ‘how many are willing to take the risks associated 
with challenging authority.’123 Hirsch’s next group process is polarization, i.e., 
opposition to authorities, during which a group grows to become from a collection 
of isolated individuals into a powerful opposition. His final group dynamic is 
collective decision-making, which, 
Plays an important role in motivating the continuing commitment of 
movement participants. Movements often have group discussions about 
whether to initiate, continue, or end a given protest. Committed protesters 
may feel bound by group decisions made during such discussions, even 
when those decisions are contrary to their personal preferences.124  
 
Like Fantasia, Hirsch places emerging commitment to the cause within episodes 
of collective action and not within romanticized, preexisting mobilizing structures. 
Their conceptualization is clearly distinct from the earlier vision, where ‘before 
collective action is likely to occur, a critical mass of people must socially construct 
a sense of injustice.’125 The authors also stress the contingent and fragile nature 
                                                       
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125  Benford, R. (1997) ‘An insider's critique of the social movement framing perspective’, 
Sociological Inquiry, vol. 67, no. 4, October, pp. 409-430. 
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of these formations, which nonetheless determine the course of social 
mobilizations. 
 
The objective of this chapter was to review major theories and approaches in the 
field of social movements and mobilizations. The rational choice, resource 
mobilization and the political opportunity approaches may partially explain the 
insurgency of social groups in the Kyrgyzstani periphery in the immediate post-
revolutionary period. The attractiveness of these approaches is that they rest on 
the assumption that power is concentrated within a limited scope of political 
actors and hence, they view social movements as popular efforts of the 
marginalized against domination. From the rational choice and political 
opportunity perspectives, it can be argued that the Kyrgyzstani peripheral 
uprisings are rational attempts by excluded groups who were able to seize a 
unique revolutionary opportunity in a bid to end domination. To do so, we 
assume, they employed available resources of mobilization such as pre-existing 
informal networks, community solidarities and regional identities. 
 
Conceptual problems arise, however, when these concepts face the difficulty of 
explaining what follows after emergence of social mobilizations. Assuming that 
the central structure of political opportunities is a stable variable (because the 
political centre is equally ‘uncertain’ for all rebellious groups, whether they 
originate from x or y periphery), the rational choice theory fails to account for why 
actors keep engaging if their environment has a demobilizing effect on them. 
Furthermore, resource mobilization cannot predict under what circumstances 
impoverished peripheral communities can engage in protracted contention 
against their opponents. Moreover, resource mobilization fails to clarify the 
varying degrees of sustainability among different social mobilizations due to their 
seemingly equally poor access to resources. It appears therefore that, from the 
preceding discussion, the emergence of social mobilizations is less puzzling than 
the persistence of social mobilizations against the Kyrgyzstani demobilizing 
environment.  
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As a result, it is therefore natural that my interest shifts from explaining the 
emergence of protests toward understanding their capacity to endure. In making 
this shift, I rely on social protest construction approach that focuses on actual 
mobilizations and processes of association in order to explain how groups can 
sustain against their opponents, cultivate internal solidarity among participants 
and shape individual beliefs within collective action. The focus on action-oriented 
events and group processes allows me to ‘see’ dynamics that are conducive to 
the construction of protests, group formation and the consolidation of enduring 
practices of contestation in places where traditional theories will fail to do so. Yet 
to adopt an approach that was designed to explain Western mobilizations within 
a contemporary non-Western context is generally a questionable exercise. I will 
therefore take the Kyrgyzstani theoretical and empirical contrast further in the 
next chapter, where I will introduce my own conceptual framework, created on 
the basis of existing literature and preliminary empirical observations of the 
Kyrgyzstani context.  
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CHAPTER III: FROM THEORY TO RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
As already noted in Chapter I, the study of Kyrgyzstani social mobilizations has 
both empirical and theoretical benefits. Empirically, it is interesting to discover 
how protest groups within this global periphery are able to rise up and organize 
themselves against a background of weak resources and precarious structural 
conditions. Theoretically, it is especially useful to observe what the Kyrgyzstani 
phenomenon can teach us about social mobilizations in a non-industrialized and 
weakly institutionalized context. In this chapter, I will further the discussion 
regarding the development of social mobilizations and outline my methodological 
approach. It is my hope that in the process of contrasting the expectations 
provided by previous research and the challenges that stem from the field, I will 
be able to formulate new explanations and develop a conceptual framework. In 
the first part of the chapter, I will lay out my own explanatory framework. In the 
second part, I will provide an example of data deficiency concerning social 
mobilizations in order to practically demonstrate the severe limitations they 
impose on quantitative and qualitative inquiries made in Kyrgyzstan. In the final 
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part, I will explain my selection of case studies, as well as my methodological 
approach. 
 
I. Proposal: the Production of Trust and the Formation of 
Conditions for Structured Mobilizations 
Except for the late constructivist approach, other theories found within the 
traditional social movement literature that I have addressed in the previous 
chapter seem to be largely concerned with already established movements. But 
how do we account for the Kyrgyzstani context in which social mobilizations 
seem to be sporadically erupting and expressing themselves in unstructured or 
weakly structured episodes of mobilizations, which do not yet constitute coherent 
organizations? How do we account for the middle stage that occurs (if indeed it 
does) between the provisional expressions of resistance and the formation of 
organizations of resistance? This problem can, perhaps, be addressed by 
investigating the conditions in which these episodes are constructed.  
 
But why would one actually need to construct meaning of ongoing events, 
formulate a picture of one’s opponent, categorize processes and invent new 
frameworks in order to participate in social mobilizations? From the perspective 
of a current Western activist, such endeavours may seem outdated, because she 
is most likely to act upon the long history of extended political participation and 
rich experience of questioning of existing hierarchies and orders. In addition, 
views on issues of modernity and post-modernity have already been formulated 
in both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses and propagated via the 
institutional vehicles of education, family, profession, citizenship and others. It 
does not take much effort, then, to become, for example, a follower of the Green 
movement, because ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ nuclear positions have been long researched, 
formulated and consolidated. Similarly, to be a feminist in the West is no longer 
position that entails the laborious work of making sense of the histories of male, 
the state, ideological and other types of domination; all these are long ‘banalized’ 
by and made available by social movements. 
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The situation is less obvious in countries that are part of the ‘developing’ world 
and that are marked by emerging weak public spaces, narrow political 
participation, minor experience regarding peaceful popular mobilizations and few 
success stories concerning the efficacy of protests in terms of advancing societal 
interests. In addition, new opportunities for global finances and economies in 
these countries produce unseen subjects and objects of contention; however, the 
role of the state in regulating these new experiences remains far too insignificant 
in Kyrgyzstan. The role of education is another important factor: at one end of the 
spectrum, public schools and universities offer a non-critical worldview based on 
Soviet legacy; on the other end of the spectrum, private institutions promote the 
values of either American liberalism or Islamic establishments. In turn, local 
governments and public associations have a hard time incorporating the new 
experiences introduced by development aid agencies, foreign investors and 
transnational elites into their traditional lifestyles. In Kyrgyzstan, social actors 
struggle to make sense of these events, notions and processes before they can 
eventually translate their confused attitudes into collective resistance.126 
 
Moreover, certain features of central politics add to this obfuscated picture. From 
the external observer’s point of view, Kyrgyzstani central politics can be 
characterized by weak political organizations that are unfit to represent diverse 
social interests, state institutions that are diverted to serve elite interests and 
arbitrary courts that often fail to mediate conflicts. Although researchers are 
always better positioned than the social activists of developing countries by the 
simple advantage of having better access to information and knowledge, the 
peripheral groups that I studied over four years expressed uncertainty and mixed 
                                                       
126  In this context, it would not be unwise to suggest the impact of Soviet legacy on the 
development of grassroots activism in post-Soviet states. See the ‘path dependency’ discussion 
in the following literature: Linz, J. and Alfred, S. (1996) Problem of democratic transition and 
consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore and 
London: The John Hopkins University Press; Nielsen, K., Jessup, B. and Jerzy, H. ‘Institutional 
change in post-socialism’, in Hausner, J., Jessop, B. and Nielsen K. (ed.) (1995) Strategic choice 
and path-dependency in post-socialism institutional dynamics in the transformation process, 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
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emotions about these same features of central politics. Specifically, protest 
groups were unsure which institutions were in charge of their issues, who made 
informal decisions outside of formal regulations and to which side judges would 
ally themselves when deciding on their issues. The uncertainty regarding these 
centres of power had real implications for social mobilizations in terms of their 
form, volume and intensity.  
 
I argue that in the context of generalized distrust and discredited politics, the 
condition that allows sustaining mobilizations is the production of trust. The task 
for any local resistance group is to overcome the suspicion that surrounds, a 
priori, anyone who claims to represent collective interests and grievances. The 
production of trust is an active process and is effected in instances where 
initiators can be observed and monitored. Only the production of trust can allow 
for provisional protest groups to pass to a more sophisticated level of internal 
organization where there is hope for sustainability. Once trust is produced, it 
needs to be maintained. This process is no less easy than the preceding task of 
producing trust and more resources are required to sustain a protest movement. 
Following Piotr Sztompka on trust and the social construction of protests 
approach, I will explain in this section how a successful production of trust within 
protest groups determine the course of development of fragmented or provisional 
mobilizations. 
 
Before doing so, it is perhaps useful to detail once again the level of my analysis 
under which I will be discussing the production of trust. If traditional SMT 
operates essentially in terms of two categories of leaders and members, the 
unstructured nature of Kyrgyzstani local mobilizations forces me to diversify my 
analytical toolkit. Thus, I propose that local episodes of mobilization start with the 
‘initiators’ or ‘organizers of mobilization’, the ‘participants of mobilization’ and the 
‘wider local audience’ that observes mobilization and attempts to make sense of 
it. Initiators and participants of initial mobilization are not leaders and/or members 
of a movement yet. To achieve this, both leadership and membership must be 
established discursively, but most importantly, within the process of action. My 
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point about the structuration of the organization of mobilization as a necessary 
condition for the formation of sustainable mobilization does not imply either the 
adoption of Western models of organization127 within the weakly institutionalized 
Kyrgyzstani context, nor does it suggest structuring fluid aspects that cannot be 
structured such as loose networks of sympathizers.  
 
My emphasis on the organization of mobilization implies issues of legitimacy and 
authenticity, which are hard to achieve in the Kyrgyzstani context of generalized 
distrust towards representative politics and collective action. By generalized 
distrust I mean a current condition by which the increasing clash between 
informal and open politics have not yet produced tangible meanings: informal 
politics does not provide any longer with explanations of ongoing events and with 
orientations for future, whereas open politics has not developed enough. In 
addition, the current political climate sends strong signals to individuals that any 
collective action will not be worth the effort, because state institutions are 
perceived as ‘non-responsive’ or as reacting slowly and/or arbitrarily to societal 
grievances, while political organizations appear as inefficient with regards to 
mediating social conflicts. In Kyrgyzstan, there are no established institutions that 
allow for regularly channelling societal grievances into political agendas, as is 
largely also the case in Western societies.  
 
The general fatigue about politics results in smaller protests; they rarely exceed 
100 individuals (the topic of discussion in the next section of this chapter). 
Indeed, most of the Kyrgyzstani grassroots movements remain ‘local’ in terms of 
how they are rooted within local arenas and rely on local resources. With the 
exception to the Tulip Revolution of 2005, localized mobilizations have never 
managed to unite into nation-wide movements despite the existence of (albeit 
                                                       
127 Within the Western conceptualization, social movements are understood as a combination of 
the organization of social movements and loose networks of movement members and 
sympathizers (Tarrow, 1994). If the first serves the primary task of organization and coordination, 
which consists of fundraising, media representation and building alliances with other movements 
and elites, the second remains within loose networks that are activated during times of actual 
mobilizations (Della Porta and Diani, 1999). 
 73 
fragmented) informal networks across provinces. The geographical confinement 
of mobilizations has real implications for their modes of operation: issues of 
membership recruitment and the viability of the cause are subjected to many 
more ‘mundane’ questions of loyalty, everyday life conflicts and the local 
structures of political and economic relations.  
 
For a group of initiators that aspire to effect change (institutional, policy, 
legislative) through peaceful public contestation it becomes essential to form 
lasting mobilizations. Taking into account the above influencing factors, lasting 
mobilizations in return require leadership structures that are legitimate in the eyes 
of members, as well as membership that is committed to the cause whithin time 
and space. This may sound self-evident to Western readers; no new member 
will, for example, think to question the commitment of the head of Greenpeace to 
the cause prior to joining the movement. In the Kyrgyzstani context, however, this 
condition is difficult to achieve; local audiences often suspect mobilization 
initiators of not being authentic, whereas initiators cannot be sure that members 
who show commitment one day will turn up the next. Yet only the crystallization 
of a legitimate organization from the initial spontaneous unstructured mobilization 
can provide conditions for lasting, i.e. structured, mobilizations for the purposes 
of public contestation. If the local group of initiators does not succeed in being 
recognized as a legitimate leadership and subsequently create a followership, it 
can only hope to continue producing sporadic episodes of mobilization, with 
fewer opportunities for achieving goals. By constitution of structures of leadership 
and membership, I imply the established and recognized roles of leaders and 
members.  
 
Amid generalized distrust that proliferates even in the remotest corners of 
Kyrgyzstan, how then are structures of trustworthy leadership and membership 
formed? I argue that they can be created if mobilization participants overcome 
suspicions and establish trust in each other. What type of trust over what types of 
suspicions is implied here?  
 74 
 
In Kyrgyzstan, future group members need to be convinced that to-be-leaders 
represent collective interests (open politics) and do not seek to exploit societal 
grievances in a bid to advance their own personal benefits (informal politics).128 
This type of trust is a condition sine qua non for the formation of leadership and 
membership, which in turn provides resources for structured social mobilizations 
in Kyrgyzstan. In this regard, only active engagement with the local audience can 
provide the potential means for overcoming generalized suspicion and for 
disrupting the logic of discredited corrupt politics, and the resulting social 
disintegration. Neither external resources (whether material or cultural), nor 
forced ideologies or grievance agendas can be taken for granted. Furthermore, to 
fully understand the challenge ahead for any social mobilization on the 
Kyrgyzstani periphery, one must also reject simplistic notions of traditional bonds, 
whether regional or kinship-like, which often feature prominently in both 
academic and common sense narratives alike in accounts of quick mobilizations 
in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Local provisional expressions of resistance can therefore be expected to 
transform into structured mobilizations against a background of a weak 
institutional infrastructure and generalized distrust if (1) initiators of initial 
mobilization overcome generalized suspicion and prove that they represent 
collective interests; (2) participants of initial mobilization establish trust in 
initiators and participate in subsequent mobilizations. As such, I have 
created an important causal effect between the successful production of trust 
within reciprocal interactions and the sustainability of mobilizations. I have also 
included an intervening variable, i.e. the existence of opportunist activists whom I 
call ‘brokers’ and whose effects magnify the fragmentation within protest groups. 
My model is similar to what scholars of social movement literature have written 
                                                       
128 Social movement literature and specifically, rational choice theory pays attention to the issues 
of free- riding attitudes within collective action. Mancur Olson’s seminal work is a good example 
of the intellectual problematization of human behaviour within groups. Yet rational choice theory 
has limited explanatory power in non-Western societies, where individuals can only make 
hypotheses about situations in which they operate. 
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about persuasion and beliefs. Consider, for example, the following according to 
Klandermans: 
[The] public can be persuaded if one of the three following conditions 
prevails: the public adheres to the collective belief system of the persuading 
agent; the persuading agent can, in one way or another, anchor its 
arguments in the collective beliefs of the public; or the persuading agent 
succeeds in transforming the collective beliefs of the public.  
 
This reasoning is also akin to Snow et al.’s concept of frame alignment (1986), 
except for one chief difference, i.e. that ‘neither anchoring nor transformation 
takes place among individuals in isolation [italic original].’129 Although Western 
scholarship connects persuasion to problems of credibility regarding proposed 
beliefs by the persuading agents, Klandermans’ model highlights the circularity of 
interactions between the persuading agent and the public, which is also the case 
in my own logic. Yet, in Kyrgyzstan, efforts and challenges of persuasion are 
levelled not only at suspicions of the credibility of the cause, but also at the 
persuading agency per se. 
 
At this point, my research problem has been delineated in a preliminary fashion; 
the task ahead will consist of exploring the two conditions that shape the 
sustainability of social mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan. However, these conditions 
need to be further discussed. More specifically, how do participants test the 
would-be-leaders for authenticity and where do would-be-leaders prove their 
commitment? In order words, I need to outline my conceptualization of the 
production of trust before examining the two conditions.  
 
Different explanations of the power of ‘cognitive’ (McAdam, 1982) or ‘cultural’ 
(Johnston, 2013) resources exist in the context of the development of social 
movements and mobilizations. As already noted in Chapter II, I find Hirsch and 
Fantasia’s social constructivist approaches more useful in this regard. These 
authors discovered separately that such resources are formed during the 
                                                       
129 Klandermans, B. (1992) ‘The social construction of protest and multiorganizational fields’, in 
Morris, A. and Mueller, C. (ed.) Frontiers in social movement theory, New Havel and London: 
Yale University Press, p. 84. 
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processes of association. For Fantasia (1988), solidarity bonds are created within 
actual episodes of mobilization. For Hirsch (1990), participants are most likely to 
develop ideological commitment to a collective cause within group processes.  
 
Following their action-oriented and processual approaches, I argue that in the 
Kyrgyzstani context, trust is produced within a special monitoring process. The 
monitoring process offers opportunities for individuals to regularly observe the 
behaviour of initiators of mobilization and other participants, and to make 
informed decisions about whether to participate on the basis of these 
observations. The monitoring process is an ongoing and important exercise, 
because individuals have to be continuously convinced that the organization of 
mobilization represents collective interests and does not employ societal 
grievances to seek for private benefits. Monitoring as a social practice emerged 
as a response to the discrediting effects of politics in Kyrgyzstan. If a given local 
site has no previous contentious experience that can inform the local audience 
about the behaviour of initiators, monitoring takes place in action, i.e., during 
actual episodes of mobilization. Thus, individuals might take part in initial 
mobilization because it presents the only means to form opinions about 
organizers and ongoing events. This explains the paradoxical occurrence of 
sporadic mobilizations that may not necessarily lead to further developments. 
Such conceptualization of ‘active’ production of trust is akin to Sztompka’s 
concept of trust, which involves commitment on the side of individuals who make 
bets in regard to others’ conduct in the future.130  
 
Taking into consideration the weak state of infrastructure that could allow 
individuals to form informed opinions about local and national events, the next 
question to ask is how and where monitoring processes occur. From my 
preliminary observations of two case studies, the conditions for monitoring 
emerge as a result of the desire of initiators to extend and sustain their 
mobilizations by attracting new participants. By attempting to convince people to 
                                                       
130 Sztompka, P. (1999), p. 25-26. 
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join the cause, initiators create what I call ‘open spaces’ that serve to propagate 
injustice frames and grievances, share information, formulate collective demands 
and discuss a programme of actions. Such open spaces are usually provisional 
and serve as an occasional but indispensable basis for different group 
processes, including monitoring. In Western contexts, the recruitment of 
members is nowadays facilitated by social networks, publicity and mailing lists. In 
Kyrgyzstan, if a local protest group wants to grow beyond the core group of 
believers, it has to use available resources, the creation of open spaces being 
one of them. In the case of mobilization in Aral village, monitoring took place 
within new ‘village public gatherings’ that initiators of anti-mining resistance 
established for the purpose of shaping environmental and nationalist claims 
against a foreign miner. Residents used these gatherings to observe initiators 
and to draw conclusions about their authenticity. Observations made during 
these gatherings were central to the trajectory of this brief anti-mining 
mobilization. In the case of labour-based mobilizations in Kochkor-Ata, workers 
had many more opportunities to check on initiators and new management, from 
inspecting their production performances to establishing collective control over 
the company’s policies and budget. Hence, the monitoring process took place on 
a variety of occasions created by local mobilizations. 
 
However, monitoring does not always lead to the production of trust; monitoring 
processes can also foster suspicion. The creation of open spaces that provide 
possibilities for observation inevitably brings the risk of increased public scrutiny 
and hence, includes high odds for initiators to be discredited if they are 
suspected of non-authenticity. For this reason, monitoring can cause the further 
fragmentation of protest groups and the deconstruction of initial mobilization. This 
in turn can have an important impact for the study of collective action in Central 
Asia. In contrast to traditional social movement literature, social mobilization can 
in this case – to put it bluntly – cause further social disintegration. I therefore view 
trust as a fragile and contingent resource that is being constructed or 
deconstructed within the processes of association. 
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Since both the initiators and participants of mobilization are involved in open 
spaces, the latter represent a reciprocal dynamic consisting of bottom-up and 
top-down communications. As such, this reciprocal dynamic presupposes a 
certain degree of voluntary transparency and deliberation on the part of initiators 
on the one hand, and the participation of interested individuals, if only by 
monitoring and observation on the other. It becomes apparent that initiators need 
to deliberate in public if they seek to overcome the suspicions of a local audience 
and individuals require open spaces in order to observe others before 
establishing trust in the authenticity of an ongoing collective enterprise. Trust is 
therefore shaped actively and through repeated interactions.  
 
Only if trust is established can legitimate leadership and committed membership 
arise. Only if this critical stage is achieved can a local group of resistance hope to 
transform its initial provisional episodes of mobilization into structured 
mobilization. Thus, the production of trust is a condition sine qua non for the 
formation of lasting mobilizations.  
 
The creation of trust is also conducive to further processes that contribute to 
increased commitment to the cause, belief in the success of collective action and 
solidarity bonds. These processes include collective learning, collective 
empowerment, and collective decision-making. The final two processes I have 
borrowed from Eric Hirsch, who employed them to explain increased political 
commitment to the cause among Columbia University students in the U.S. Below, 
I will briefly outline my conceptualization of each of these processes.131 
 
Collective learning can be understood as consciousness-raising in action. It is a 
process by which participants and initiators of mobilization gain new knowledge 
and information about a contentious topic (the subject of grievances and 
                                                       
131 The list is far from exhaustive and can also include new processes to reflect aspects of 
political and social relations in a given context. 
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disagreement) and their opponents. Since protest groups address their issues to 
institutions such as central government, the justice system and political 
organizations, local participants also learn about central politics and the rules by 
which they operate. In the context of widespread corruption and a ‘fragmented’ 
state, ‘knowing whose rules rule’ becomes essential for local groups in order to 
attribute blame (Javeline, 2009). In most cases, local groups address their issues 
to all possible institutions, because of not knowing their rights and understand the 
functioning of institutions and regulations. New knowledge and information 
subsequently shape internal strategies and tactics that imply public contestation. 
Learning process also shapes internal processes of sense-making regarding 
ongoing events, adjusting injustice frames, reformulating grievances and 
demands and correcting agendas (Snow et al. 1986). Depending on the available 
resources, learning process can be proactive in the sense that a local resistance 
group can undertake trips to the capital to gain information and exchange their 
experiences with other groups. In the case of Aral village, in the absence of 
resources, learning process occurred within few village gatherings, whereas in 
Kochkor-Ata, learning took place in frequent, all-worker gatherings and trips to 
the capital. 
 
Collective decision-making. Hirsch argues that participants are more likely to 
continue committing to a movement’s cause if they consider themselves part of 
collective deliberation and decision-making. Indeed, collective decision-making 
can be critical to establishing democracy within a group as a powerful 
mechanism for securing existing membership and attracting new followers. The 
effects of this process are particularly significant for groups who face internal 
conflicts. In addition, in the process of learning, some insurgent groups may 
deliberately choose to cultivate internal mechanisms of collective decision-
making in order to render their decisions more legitimate in the eyes of 
opponents and the public. This process also enables collectives to grow as 
powerful social actors once initial trust has been established and leadership and 
membership bases have been constituted. In the Aral case study, unsuccessful 
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construction of lasting mobilization led to breakdowns within the body of decision-
making, i.e., the Aral commission. In contrast, in the Kochkor-Ata case study, 
collective decision-making was established through strong union-based 
mechanisms of collective deliberation. 
 
Collective empowerment. As Hirsch notes, the actual protest sites can illustrate 
‘how many are willing to take the risks associated with challenging authority.’132 
These instances establish specific norms for participation and belonging that 
cannot be tested during other group processes that do not involve the risk of 
clashing with opponents or repression from the state. These new risks require 
from movement participants renewed confirmation of their commitment. These 
episodes generally lead either to weakened or heightened membership and their 
varied degrees of readiness for further resistance. Thus, successful collective 
actions further lead to an increased belief in the success of collective action, 
whereas unsuccessful episodes of mobilization are more likely to cast doubt on 
leadership and the worthiness of collective participation. In the following empirical 
chapters, I will show how the dynamics of collective empowerment set different 
trajectories for the development of mobilizations. In the case of Kochkor-Ata, 
collective empowerment was created during episodes of worker protest actions, 
whereas in Aral, this process was not achieved, because mobilization 
disintegrated already at the level of establishing trust in initiators.  
 
I will explore the conditions that account for structured mobilizations by 
investigating the above four group processes in the following empirical chapters. 
However, before doing so, I need to stress the additional values that a 
processual approach brings to my study. First, the focus on processes and action 
is more productive for ‘seeing’ aspects that the structural approach cannot 
                                                       
132  While Hirsch’s group processes concern an already established group of leaders and 
members whose authenticity and legitimacy are not questioned, my processes deal with the 
difficult task of creating preliminary trust in initiators and their proposed ideas. Hence, according 
to my understanding, group processes do not only account for the recruitment and commitment of 
members, as conceptualized by Hirsch, but are also accountable for the crystallization of 
categories of leaders and members.  
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capture. In the absence or weakness of existing local structures of integration, 
which usually provide individuals with knowledge and orientations, the salience of 
group processes acquires additional value in constructing collective meanings 
and action agendas. Second, I find the processual approach extremely useful for 
the purpose of rethinking current approaches to political participation in the 
Central Asian context, which in the words of Balihar Sanghera, suffer from the 
conflation of the interdependent but different natures of structure and agency. 
This conflation produces a ‘flat social ontology’ that in turn leads to a variety of 
reductionisms. According to one such scientific reductionism that Sanghera 
identifies in the regional scholarship, political behaviour is conceptualized as a 
result of self-interest, mutual reciprocity and social norms.133 In the light of this 
criticism, I view the emphasis on processes of meaning-making and contestation 
as a promising way to put forward the capacity of individuals to observe, reflect 
upon and evaluate individual and collective participation.  
 
Before explaining the methods that I have employed for exploring the conditions 
that shape the different values of the dependent variable, I will provide in the 
following part an example of problematic quantitative data regarding social 
mobilizations that limit methodological options. 
 
II. Insufficient Official Data On Social Mobilizations 
In this section I provide a detailed description of the problematic pre-existing data 
on social mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan. To date, there has been no systematic 
survey of protests in Kyrgyzstan. Existing material is a product of partial and 
irregular surveys conducted by a number of local and international NGOs. 
National police carries out very basic analyses of protests that are not available 
to the public and the precision of which is questioned by the relevant NGOs. 134 
For example, a leading employee of a local prominent NGO, Kylym-shamy, 
                                                       
133 Sanghera, B. (2013).  
134 In the past, the Foundation for Tolerance International employed its Early Warning for Violence 
Prevention project to conduct such surveying and data gathering. This lasted from 2005 until 
2008. The Coalition of NGOs also played a significant role in reporting information from the 
regions during the Tulip revolution. 
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contends that ‘the Ministry of Interior doesn’t bother to run aggregate analysis of 
protests. On the contrary, they got used to referring to our analysis when 
compiling their own scarce reports.’135 I attempted to gain access to the MI’s 
database but was denied admittance; I was also denied access to its database in 
the regional representations. 
 
Several caveats need to be taken into account when using the existing surveys. 
The first problematic point is the use of definitions regarding social mobilizations. 
The law of the Kyrgyz Republic on ‘peaceful gatherings’ employs only one term, 
mitingy, to refer to the complex phenomenon of collective mobilization. By 
mitingy, the law identifies the ‘intentional and temporary presence of individuals 
in places open for public access, with an objective of attracting the attention of 
state bodies, bodies of local self-governance and public opinion and including the 
expression of opinion on any matter.’136 However, as a 2013 report by Kylym-
shamy states: 
Despite the absence of the classification of gatherings [within] the law on 
‘peaceful gatherings’ state bodies continue to operate with non-effective 
norms by categorizing gatherings into ‘mitingy’, ‘pickets’, ‘public actions’, 
‘blockades of highways’, ‘actions’, ‘aktcii protestov’ and unlawful ‘aktcii 
protestov’.137  
 
Both state institutions and NGOs use mitingy, aktcii protestov, protestnie aktcii 
interchangeably, without properly defining these terms. The Ministry of Interior 
generally employs mitingy and protestnie aktcii, that can be best translated as 
‘protests’ and ‘protest actions’, together as an umbrella category that includes 
other types of collective action such as pickets, marches, road blockades, etc. 
Another problematic categorization occurs when the MI implements a typology of 
protests according to the nature of expressed grievances. Thus, the MI 
differentiates between ‘obchestvenno-politicheskie’ (public-political), ‘socialno-
                                                       
135 Interview with Gulshair Abdirasulova, NGO ‘Kylym-shamy’, Bishkek, January 2014. 
136 Article 3, paragraph 6, the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on ‘peaceful gatherings’. 
137 Kylym-shamy, (2013) ‘Observing the right for freedom of peaceful gatherings in the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Results of the monitoring carried out from October 2012 to June 2013’, Bishkek, p. 16. 
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economicheskie i bytovye’ (socioeconomic and daily routine) and ‘mej-
etnicheskie’ (inter-ethnic) causes of protests.  
 
Another disputable point in these reports and official data is the selectivity 
regarding the periods being reported on. Reports by NGOs generally review only 
a limited period of the year or a restricted geographical area in which surveys are 
conducted. For example, a 2012 report carried out by OSCE team covers the 
period from 1 June to 15 December 2012 and incorporates 220 mitingy 
(protests).138 OSCE is at least systematic in its comparative methodology: to 
compare protesting trends, OSCE selected the same period for the year 2011, 
which included 208 mitingy. Kylym-shamy’s 2013 report covers the period from 1 
October 2012 to 30 June 2013, in which 205 mitingy were observed. This is 
roughly a quarter of 838 mitingy that took place in the country during the same 
period, according to the Ministry of Interior official data. Kylym-shamy did not 
conduct similar surveys in the previous years of 2010 and 2011, since as 
Abdirasulova notes: ‘protests in these immediate post-revolutionary years were 
occurring almost every day, and the organization was overwhelmed with other 
events. We began conducting protest surveys again in 2012.’139 
 
Official data on protests is scarce and not always available to the public. The MI’s 
new Internet site, sponsored by OSCE, contains partial information only for the 
year 2013. For previous years, MI announced their data via national mass media, 
which do not always reflect it accurately. The most problematic data comes from 
2010, during which the MI registered only 685 ‘unsanctioned actions of protest’ in 
which 583 were mitingy, 83 were pickets, 15 were road blockades and four illegal 
land occupations. 140  Overall, 38 000 individuals took part in these actions. 
According to the same data, the overwhelming majority of these actions were 
                                                       
138 OSCE, (2012) ‘Sobludenie prava na svobodu mirnyh sobraniy v Kyrgyzskoi Respublike. 
Monitoring praktiki realizacii’ [Observation of the right to freedom of peaceful gatherings in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. Monitoring of practices of realization], M Maxima: Bishkek. 
139 Interview with Gulshair Abdirasulova, Kylym-shamy, Bishkek, 31.01.14. 
140 ‘V Kyrgyzstane v 2010 bilo 685 mitingov I akciy protesta’ [In 2010, in Kyrgyzstan there were 
685 protests and actions of protest], Obchestvenny Reiting (27 January 2011), 
http://www.pr.kg/news/kg/2011/01/27/18919/ [4 February 2014]. 
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‘political’ (524) and the remaining 161 had a ‘social’ character. The marginal 
‘social’ aspect appears odd if one considers the widely accepted notion that the 
2010 uprisings against the authoritarian regime arose as the result of poverty and 
elite corruption.141 The 2010 data, a year in which the country was shaken not 
only by popular uprisings but also by ethnic clashes, appeared to have been 
underestimated. The low number of mobilizations registered by MI during this 
year perhaps reflects the analytical and technical inability of official authorities to 
cover all events across the country.  
 
In 2011, MI accounted for 1193 aktcii (actions of protest) that included 680 
mitingy, 428 pickets, 18 marches and 16 demonstrations.142 During this year, 
participants blocked roads 51 times. The number of ‘political’ demands remained 
relatively at the same level compared to the previous year (626 aktcii), whereas 
the number of socioeconomic demands grew to 562 aktcii. Bishkek remained the 
most attractive protest site (582 aktcii) and Jalal-Abad Province was second (158 
aktcii) on the list. Despite the fact that the number of protests almost doubled, the 
amount of participants involved remained at the same level at roughly 38 000 
people. This possibly reflects the tendency that protests became a popular 
means for expressing societal grievances and demands, despite the size of 
protest groups remaining small. 
 
In 2012, according to MI data, protests continued increasing to reach some 1286 
aktcii that included 537 mitingy, 706 pickets, four marches, two demonstrations, 
36 road blockades, and one illegal land occupation.143 Traditionally, the majority 
of aktcii took place in Bishkek (726); the second largest number of aktcii occurred 
(already seeming to form a tradition) in Jalal-Abad Province (154). MI notes that 
the number of aktcii oriented towards socioeconomic themes (692) prevailed over 
politically-oriented aktcii (587). These also involved larger population groups 
                                                       
141 Gullette, D. (2010a). 
142  ‘Kyrgyzstan buzachiy’ [Restless Kyrgyzstan], Delo (17 April 2014), 
http://delo.kg/index.php/health-7/7138-kyrgyzstan-buzyashchij [29 June 2015]. 
143  ‘Kyrgyzstan buzachiy’ [Restless Kyrgyzstan], Delo (17 April 2014), 
http://delo.kg/index.php/health-7/7138-kyrgyzstan-buzyashchij [29 June 2015]. 
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totalling 73 000 people – almost twice as many as in 2011. This suggests that 
protests became larger in size and involved more participants. 
 
For 2013, MI recorded 849 mitingy and protestnie aktcii, which gathered some 
199 000 people, an unprecedentedly large number compared to previous 
years.144 These included 521 mitingy, 298 pickets, four marches, and 26 road 
blockades. Politically-oriented protests (519) were again a primary focus, with 
socioeconomic protests numbering 330. The majority of protests took place in 
Bishkek (37’000) and Issik-Kul Province (16’000). In 2014, MI registered only 448 
mitingy, which led Vice Prime Minister Abdyrahman Mamataliev to make the 
joyful conclusion that ‘citizens held a better respect for law and order.’145 
 
The frequency of protests in Bishkek is not surprising, given that it is the political 
and judicial capital of the country. A large amount of protest actions in Bishkek is 
related to resonant court cases, which attracted to the capital the families and 
sympathizers of those concerned. For example, the most publicly resonant case 
produced 79 aktcii in 2013 and regarded events concerning the April Revolution. 
Another important court case involved the trial concerning deputies Kamchybek 
Tashiev and Japar Sadyrov, who were accused of carrying out an attempt at the 
unconstitutional overthrowing of government in 2011; 27 aktcii were related to 
this case. Outside of the capital, the fluctuation of protests in provinces reflected 
the domination of political topics in public debates and political struggles. In 2013, 
Issik-Kul Province scored the highest amount of aktcii compared to other 
provinces, due to controversies surrounding the country’s largest gold mine 
Kumtor, located in Issik-Kul Province. Jalal-Abad Province was also one of the 
most agitated places of the country. Here, in 2012 and 2013, the primary 
                                                       
144 ‘V Kyrgyzstane v proshlom godu proshlo 849 mitingov I protestnih akciy’ [There were 849 
mitingy and protest actions in Kyrgyzstan last year], Kabar (20 February 2014), 
http://www.kabar.kg/rus/society/full/72047 [20 February 20140].  
145 ‘V Kyrgyzstane v 2014 godu bylo provedeno 448 mitingov i akciy protesta – A. Mamataliev’ [A. 
Mamataliev: There were 448 mitingy and actions of protest in Kyrgyzstan in 2014], Kabar (26 
January 2015), http://www.kabar.kg/law-and-order/full/89303 [24 August 2015]. 
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contentious topic was the trial involving deputy Tashiev, who is native of Jalal-
Abad.146 
 
In addition to the problematic methodology of the MI, OSCE specifies its own 
application of the above categories. By ‘public-political’ causes, it implies ‘political 
protest actions by citizens or organizations against political actions by bodies of 
power.’147 By ‘socioeconomic’ reasons, it understands ‘public protest actions that 
focus on questions related to conditions of life, labor, education, health of the 
population and other parameters of social and economic policies.’148 The point is 
that whatever the causes of protests, their interaction with central or local bodies 
of power ultimately turn them political. Thus, in many cases, ‘socioeconomic’ 
protests reach a climax where protesters demand the resignation of the political 
personnel of relevant institutions responsible for wrongdoings – or doing nothing 
at all. Either way, they become political; this gives rise to questions about the MI 
and others’ application of categories. The typology used by the state and other 
organizations informs us about the nature of public grievances and therefore, 
highlights the fixation of these institutions on the origins of protests. 
 
According to Kylym-shamy’s typology, which is similar to that of the MI, in 2013, 
73% of mitingy addressed public-political issues, while 15% addressed 
socioeconomic issues, 20% ‘inter-ethnic relations’ and the remaining 3% 
addressed cultural-historical claims. 149  OSCE’s survey also highlights the 
overwhelming prevalence of ‘public-political’ causes in 2011 and 2012 over 
others – 81.8% in 2012 and 76.2% in 2011, compared to ‘socioeconomic’ causes 
that were 18.2% in 2012 and 23.8% in 2011.150 A slight rise in the political over 
social causes in 2012 is a curious development. With the stabilization of the 
coalition government in early 2012, one would expect a drop in political claims 
                                                       
146  ‘Kyrgyzstan buzachiy’ [Restless Kyrgyzstan], Delo (17 April 2014), 
http://delo.kg/index.php/health-7/7138-kyrgyzstan-buzyashchij [29 June 2015]. 
147 OSCE, (2012), p. 17. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Kylym-shamy, (2013), p.18. 
150 OSCE, (2012), p. 18.
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and a rise in socioeconomic agendas. However, the presence of political protests 
can be explained by the electoral cycles that marked both 2011 and 2012. The 
OSCE notes that the surveys conducted during these consequential periods 
confirmed that, ‘the role of gatherings increase during elections.’ Protests 
become a popular tool when ‘political parties, candidates to elections and other 
groups and organizations aim to channel their programs and mobilize the 
electorate’s support.’ 151  Thus, 11.5% of 2011’s mitingy were related to 
presidential campaigns, whereas 35.6% of 2012’s mitingy were connected to 
local council elections.152  
 
In the period of October 2012 to June 2013, as reported by the Kalym-shamy 
survey, four types of agents were most active in staging protests. They were 
‘physical persons’ with 31% of participation, ‘political parties and politicians’ with 
26%, ‘initiative groups and public movements’ with 21.5% and ‘relatives and 
friends of politicians’ with 14.6%. NGOs that were separated into a distinct group 
organized only 3.4% of mitingy.153 That NGOs found themselves at the back-end 
of demonstrations is also a good indicator of the evolution of protests when 
compared to the period of 2005 to 2010, during which the ‘civil society sector’ 
was the most active. Again, figures presented in OSCE report are slightly 
different. In 2012, it found that actual persons were organizers of mitingy in 36% 
of cases, in 35.3% of cases they were political parties and in 19.6% of cases they 
were representatives of non-governmental organizations.154  
 
Another interesting point highlighted in surveys is the size of protests. Although 
these estimations are rough, the Kylym-shamy survey suggests the most 
prevalent size of protests as ranging from 11 to 100 people (52% of observed 
protests). Protests with less than 10 people were also commonplace (12% of 
observed protests). Protests that exceeded 1000 people were rare and were 
                                                       
151 Ibid., p. 18. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Kylym-shamy, (2013), p. 19. 
154 OSCE, (2012), p. 19. 
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staged by political parties only.155 The OSCE survey concurs with these results. 
Both in 2011 and 2012, the number of large protests was insignificant. In 2012, 
the most prevalent size of groups ranged from 2 to 50 (in 43.2% of observed 
cases); groups that reached 100 people occurred two times fewer (22.3% of 
cases) and groups that did not exceed 300 people made up only 10.4%.156 
 
Another interesting element is the place in which the organization of protests 
takes place. The Kylym-shamy report stresses that half of observed gatherings 
were conducted in the proximity of state buildings, 21% were carried out in public 
places of open territories (such as parks and squares), 15% took place on 
territories adjacent to courts and 6% were conducted in front of foreign 
embassies.157 The OSCE survey notes that protesters gathered in front of state 
institutions in 39.4% cases, on main plazas in 23.8% of cases, on streets in 
21.8% of cases and in parks in 6.2% of cases. The OSCE report goes on to 
highlight a curious development concerning this point. Authors note that 
participants of protests left main plazas in favour of territories directly adjacent to 
relevant state bodies. They explain this by the fact that there is a growing 
understanding among participants that ‘the majority of problems can be solved 
quicker if addressed to relevant state bodies rather than creating unaddressed 
claims directed at power [abstract vlast’] on the main plaza.’158 The difference in 
numbers in respective reports again stems from variations within the covered 
periods. 
 
To summarize this section, in comparison to Russian official data on protests, for 
example, as demonstrated in Graham Robertson’s work (2010), Kyrgyzstani data 
appears deficient and do not contribute much to a deepening analysis. From the 
scarce resources that I drew from in the above, we can nevertheless learn some 
important basic elements about modes of social mobilization: protest numbers 
                                                       
155 Kylym-shamy, (2013), p. 20. 
156 OSCE, (2012), p. 20. 
157 Kylym-shamy, (2013), p. 21. 
158 OSCE, (2012), p. 25. 
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declined since the most acute period of 2010 to 2011; protesters’ grievances 
have primarily political and social origins; protests are small in size; protests are 
primarily organized by actual persons. However, in addition to these general 
conclusions, neither official data nor NGO reports allow for elaborating on 
specific protest cases. The absence of data on particular case studies leads to an 
inability to establish basic facts such as the size and membership of protest 
groups. It is also not possible to account for modes of mobilization in terms of the 
protest agendas, the duration of mobilizations, etc. Another problem related to 
studying social mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan is the inability to account for public 
support. There is no established practice for measuring public opinion via 
national opinion polls, something that is common in the West. The absence of 
such data hinders our estimations about whether protest movements produce 
changes besides those effected in local contexts and personal situations. To 
summarize this section, scientific data are virtually unreliable and only superficial 
conclusions can be drawn from it. Given the Kyrgyzstani extensive history of 
protests and revolutions, it is even more surprising that this society has to date 
produced very little statistical observations on these matters. 
 
III. Methodological Approach 
Against this background of problematic quantitative data analysis and the 
unfeasibility of conducting a large-n analysis, what methods can be useful for 
answering the principal research question of this study, and what types of 
approaches will best illuminate the variables above? What are the empirical 
conditions for research conducted in Kyrgyzstan that have in additional ways 
shaped my methodological choice? In this section, I will outline my 
methodological approach and the selection of cases. 
 
Since the onset of my research, I opted for a case-study approach governed by 
the principles of political ethnography. The case study method is generally 
considered as the weakest option when compared next to a large number of 
other methods and experiments. The case study is in particular criticized for the 
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fact that the data generated from a small number of cases cannot be further 
generalized and therefore, the method is viewed as non-theoretical.159 However, 
scholars like Lijphart, Van Evera, George and Bennett have highlighted the 
benefits of the method in terms of its theoretical contributions to political 
science.160  Thus, the case study is particularly strong in terms of clarifying 
concepts, exploring causal complexity and generating theory in a manner that 
other methods may be weaker at. A large-n method, for example, will be less 
suitable for addressing the nature of my question, i.e., to illuminate explanations 
and trace causal relationships between factors, because ‘large-n methods tell us 
more about whether hypotheses hold than why they hold [emphasis added].’161 In 
the spirit of George and Bennett, it seems that even findings from a particular 
context can show conceptual relevance for a range of cases, especially those 
that share some of the empirical characteristics of a non-industrial society. A 
Kyrgyzstani study offers the potential for exploring a distinct phenomenon that 
can be translated into conceptual and theoretical discussions.  
 
My case study methodology can be considered a ‘hybrid’ approach, as I employ 
three formats: multiple within-case comparisons (or congruence procedure), 
controlled comparison and process tracing. The congruence procedure permits 
for capturing variations of the dependent variable within a case over time. I do 
this because in my cases, I noticed that the sustainability of protests changed 
over time. A controlled comparison procedure was employed when comparing 
observations across cases. In the case of my research, I used cases that shared 
similar background characteristics but displayed divergent outcomes. Finally, 
process tracing examines the chain of events and processes ‘by which initial 
case conditions are translated into case outcomes.’162 The usefulness of this 
                                                       
159 King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S (1994) Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in 
qualitative research, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  
160 George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences, Cambridge and London: MIT Press; Lijphart, A. (1971) ‘Comparative politics and the 
comparative method’, American Political Science Review, vol. 65, no. 3, September, pp. 682-693. 
161 Van Evera, S. (1997) Guide to methods for students of political science, Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, p. 55. 
162 Ibid., p. 64. 
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method is that the ‘cause-effect link that connects independent variable and 
outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps.’163 I believe my analysis 
will benefit from these methods in several respects. First, it will allow me to 
explore independent variables within case studies and to compare their causes 
across cases. Second, it is my hope that the combination of these procedures will 
permit generating a larger amount of observations sufficient for inferring 
theoretical explications about the studied phenomenon. 
 
3.1.  Selection of case studies 
At the start of my research, as already noted in the Chapter I, I looked at several 
cases of social mobilization at the Kyrgyzstani periphery. Eventually, I selected 
two of these cases. The intellectual and methodological considerations that 
informed this choice were as follows. I did not select these cases because they 
represented the largest instances of mobilization; on the contrary, they are rather 
typical in terms of contentious contemporary Kyrgyzstani politics. Hence, they do 
not constitute ‘deviant’ cases and their exploration will be particularly useful for 
establishing ‘a surprising value’ for the dependent variable.164  
 
The selection of cases followed dual-type logic. On the one hand, I explicitly 
selected two areas that vary in terms of geography and modes of economic and 
political organization. Thus, one case represents a rural ‘community-based’ 
mobilization that unfolded within a small village against a foreign mining firm and 
weak state. The second case exemplifies a ‘labour-based’ mobilization that took 
place in a small town against a multifaceted central power system. I have applied 
quotation marks to define these cases because they do not represent typical 
community and labour driven collective actions; they include elements of 
communal and labour resistance, which allows me to use these categories for the 
sake of differentiation and clarity. In fact, their blurred structures of mobilization 
                                                       
163 Ibid. 
164 Seawright, J. and Gerring, J. (2008) ‘Case selection techniques in case study research: a 
menu of qualitative and quantitative option’, Political research quarterly vol. 61, no. 2, June, pp. 
294-308. 
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will need to be established in the following empirical cases. The cases also 
represent different geographic locations (northern and southern provinces), which 
are believed to hold divergent political and cultural traditions. By juxtaposing 
these two different examples, my aim was to additionally observe whether the 
studied phenomenon was equally present across space and across different 
socioeconomic and political backgrounds.  
 
On the other hand, despite some geographic and organizational distinctions, 
most importantly, the cases share a set of traits that are specific to the context 
and modes of mobilization. The method of comparing similar cases that indicate 
a varying degree of the dependent variable is referred to as Mill’s ‘method of 
difference’. 165  Van Evera considers the method of comparison the weakest 
among other case study formats, because in ‘social science the characteristics of 
paired cases are never really identical (as the method of difference requires).’166 I 
agree with this argument and therefore complemented this method with other 
case procedures, as outlined in the previous section. However, in the absence of 
other possibilities, the selection based on the method of difference is a good start 
for testing explanatory propositions, because the chosen cases display 
contrasting values where the dependent variable is concerned.  
 
I would like to briefly outline the set of similarities that I observed in these 
localities and that helped me to establish my preliminary comparison. First, in 
both cases, peripheral dissent began immediately following major political 
changes at the centre. Local groups in both places began their opposition against 
the existing local order the day following the April Revolution. Regardless of the 
remoteness of the studied localities from the centre and their different 
mobilization ‘bases’ (work place and rural community, respectively), actors 
reacted to central developments as an opportunity for articulating and advancing 
their own interests. This suggests that the structure of political opportunities 
                                                       
165 Mill, J. S. (1843) A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the 
principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation, volume 1, John W. Parker. 
166 Van Evera, S. (1997), p. 57. 
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serves as a powerful trigger for the periphery to launch local contention. This 
points further to the possibility that in the initial phase of mobilizations, political 
triggers may be significant enough to compensate for the lack of organizational 
resources that are needed to establish sustainable practices of contestation 
when compared to provisional rebellions.  
 
Second, in both cases, groups suffered from weak organizational resources and 
a lack of experience in terms of engaging in contentious politics at the initial 
stage of mobilizations. Thus, in both cases, initial performances against 
opponents did not exemplify a coherent agenda, clear demands, an established 
repertoire of collective action or an ideological commitment. Furthermore, in both 
cases, protest movements had to invent new resources using existing scarce 
knowledge, unverified information and the weak local structures at their disposal. 
This was done while constructing their resistance and in the process of mobilizing 
participants, not before. It can thus be argued that access to limited resources 
and an absence of contentious experience do not, perhaps, discourage 
individuals at this stage, although they become crucial for sustained practices of 
contestation. 
 
Third, both contentious sites equally faced challenges pertaining to weakness of 
the organization of mobilization. Contrary to the regional scholarship on the 
structure of Central Asian societies based on clan solidarities, patron-client 
relationships and regional identities, my cases exhibited a critical problem in 
relation to ‘pre-existing structures of mobilization’. In both cases, the initiators and 
participants of initial mobilization had to form trustworthy leadership and a 
committed membership in the process of mobilization. The structuration of 
leadership and membership during the course of initial mobilization conditioned 
the future sustainability of groups’ practices of contestation. 
 
Fourth, against the background of these pre-existing conditions that worked 
against grassroots groups, the selected cases showed an amazing capacity for 
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the self-organization of individuals, whether it concerned reviving an old Soviet 
trade union or forming new associations. In both localities, actors resorted to 
‘conventional’ means of contestation such as organizing public discussions, 
writing petitions and appealing to courts, prior to turning to ‘unconventional’ 
means such as protests and violent actions. This evidence goes against the 
widespread Orientalist assumption about the ‘wild’ Kyrgyzstani province as a 
place necessarily ruled by looters and local bosses. It suggests that despite the 
remoteness of the periphery and the deficiency or weakness of institutional 
channels, individuals can still initiate collective action together.  
 
Fifth, my case studies are examples of resistance at the periphery against the 
centre. In both instances, actors opposed central policies and institutions in the 
sphere of the extractive industry, as well as the state management of natural 
resources. Bringing the ‘southern and ‘northern’ provinces into perspective, it can 
be said that both cases exemplified similar grievances with central politics, 
regardless of their possible divergent loyalties to the central regime. However, for 
local actors, the central power system (biylik) is not a fully comprehensible notion 
whose decisions and rules of the game are not completely intelligible. Not 
knowing who exactly the opponent is significantly complicates mobilization, 
especially when local actors are already disadvantaged by a structural lack of 
resources. The state, as an overarching category, then becomes the target of 
social dissent, even in cases where it is only indirectly or partially involved in 
contentious topics; this happens because the state is perceived and treated as a 
mediator of societal conflicts on the ground. 
 
Finally, both examples exhibited the presence of a high value on the independent 
variables under question and indicated salience pertaining to the trustworthiness 
of leaders and public group processes for the formation of trust within collective 
action. Yet they displayed a divergent degree of creation of trust and solidarity, 
which led in the two case studies to varying outcomes in terms of the 
sustainability of social practices of resistance. In the labour-based movement, 
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workers succeeded in strengthening the union as responsible for the organization 
of their movement whereas in the community-based movement, participants 
showed decreasing trust in the organization, which resulted in the demobilization 
of resistance. These similarities, I believe, will lead the analysis to the successful 
production of observations that can explain the varying outcomes in the two 
cases, i.e., the degree of sustainability of social practices of contestation. 
 
3.2.  Exploring the field  
When doing research in this part of the world, one has to take into account the 
specificities of the ‘field’. I would like to draw attention to some of these without 
attempting to provide an exhaustive list of problems. One of these specificities is 
the nature of political communications between the centre and the periphery, 
which has real implications for the ways ordinary citizens react to topics of 
concern and advance their rights via ‘non-institutional’ means. It can be argued 
that the localities that serve as prime research areas in this instance are 
characterized by a certain degree of political and information ‘isolation’. Local 
actors resent this isolation in terms of being disconnected from central 
developments. As one member of a local NGO in Talas Province stated, 
You, the people in Bishkek, are constantly in motion, there are ongoing 
protests and demonstrations on topics we ignore here. We, the people in 
Talas, are not even aware of these issues.167  
 
The above quote echoes an earlier finding by the non-governmental organization 
Kylym-shamy regarding the principal places that individuals nowadays select for 
protest-making. According to the Kylym-shamy report, in 2013, Bishkek was the 
most attractive place for protest activity: 113 out of 205 gatherings were 
organized in the capital.168 That a large amount of protests takes place in the 
capital follows simple logic, considering the power and mass media concentration 
in Bishkek; protesters have a better chance of gaining public attention if they 
agitate in the centre than in their remote localities. Yet not every protest group 
                                                       
167 Interview with a member of a local NGO in Talas Province, Bishkek, November 2014. 
168 Kylym-shamy, (2013), p.17. 
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can afford an organization of demonstrations far away from their homes in terms 
of money, time and human resources.  
 
Poor media coverage169 and deficient political communications do not only have 
real implications for the modes of self-organization of individuals at the periphery, 
but also have an impact for research. The lack of official data and insufficient pre-
existing literature makes the gathering of information about ‘location’ essential to 
this thesis. Most importantly, however, in addition to the insufficient structuring of 
data, the nature of my research question requires a different type of approach 
than the analysis of press reports and statistical data. In addition to discovering 
various modes of mobilization, I am interested in people’s perspectives about 
collective action, politics and the value of resistance against the status quo. As 
Charles Taylor writes, the imaginary pertains to ‘the ways people imagine their 
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between 
them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.’170 By following 
actors’ perspectives and imaginaries, my goal is to compile the intentions, beliefs 
and actions that do (not) guide them in organizing resistance in collective forms, 
while at the same time showing the constraints and opportunities in social 
structures that orient their mobilization within time and space.  
 
As these perspectives can be as rich and exciting as they can be contradictory 
and misleading, they point to what Morgan Liu has described in his book as the 
‘messy ground where ordinary people live.’171 Such messiness observed on the 
ground will not be particularly comforting to analyses and theories derived from a 
focus on macro structures. As Liu notes, the tendencies to ‘interpret the complex 
post-socialist transformations through a grand narrative of transition toward 
                                                       
169 Media coverage of popular dissent is a notorious problem in other parts of the world. See 
Zizek, S. (2012) The year of dreaming dangerously, Verso: London and New York. 
170 Taylor, Ch. (2002) ‘Modern social imaginaries’, Public Culture, vol.14, no. 1, winter, pp. 91-
124. 
171  Liu, M. (2003) ‘Detours from utopia on the Silk Road: Ethical dilemmas of neoliberal 
triumphalism’, Central Eurasian Studies Review, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 2-10. 
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democracy and the free market…[misses] the actual processes of change 
playing out on the small scales of communities and individuals.’172 In their earlier 
explorations of post-socialism, Burawoy and Verdery already made a call towards 
a focus on the ‘small’, 
It is precisely the sudden importance of the micro processes lodged in 
moments of transformation that privileges an ethnographic approach. 
Aggregate statistics and compendia of decrees and laws tell us little without 
complementary close descriptions of how people ranging from farmers to 
factory workers, from traders to bureaucrats, from managers to welfare 
clients are responding to the uncertainties they face.173 
 
When it comes to contemporary Central Asian studies, the need for ethnographic 
scholarship has been even more pressing. Previously unknown terrain has been 
advanced thanks to rich ethnographic work by Christine Bichsel on irrigation 
disputes,174 by Madeleine Reeves and Nick Megoran on borders and the nature 
of state,175 by Morgan Liu on Osh city and the postcolonial legacy of citizenship 
and ethnicity, 176  by John Heathershaw on peace-building operations in 
Tajikistan,177 by Judith Beyer on customary law,178 by Balihar Sanghera and 
Elmira Satybaldieva on moral economies179 and by Gulzat Botoeva on safety 
nets and drug production,180 to mention a few.  
 
                                                       
172 Liu, M. (2012) Under Solomon’s throne: Uzbek visions of renewal in Osh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, p. 18. 
173 Burawoy, M. and Verdery K. (ed.) (1999) Uncertain transition: Ethnographies of change in the 
postsocialist world, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, p. 2. 
174 Bichsel, C. (2009) Conflict transformation in Central Asia: Irrigation disputes in the Ferghana 
Valley, London and New York: Routledge. 
175 Reeves, M. (2014a) Border work. Spatial lives of the state in rural Central Asia, Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press; Megoran, N. (2007) ‘On researching ‘Ethnic Conflict’: 
epistemology, politics, and a Central Asian boundary dispute’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 
2, March, pp. 253-277. 
176 Liu, M. (2012). 
177  Heathershaw, J. (2009) Post-conflict Tajikistan: The politics of peacebuilding and the 
emergence of legitimate order, London: Routledge. 
178 Beyer, J. (2015) ‘Customizations of law: Courts of elders (aksakal courts) in rural and urban 
Kyrgyzstan’, PoLar, vol. 38, no. 1, May, pp. 53-71. 
179 Sanghera, B. and Satybaldieva, E. (2009) ‘Moral sentiments and economic practices in 
Kyrgyzstan: the internal embeddedness of a moral economy’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 921-935. 
180 Botoeva, G. (2014). 
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I also employ elements of ethnographic approach in my own research. The focus 
of ethnographic attention in this thesis is two localities that were marked by 
intense mobilizations. These localities represent the potential for being exposed 
to great diversity regarding politics, as well as the necessary conspiracies that 
accompany contentious politics. Yet ethnography is not employed for ‘finding 
pockets of knowability within a dizzy world system.’181 As Peters notes, ‘that 
much of this research is done in the name of ethnography suggests the 
perseverance of near-sight as a mode of human experience of the world, even 
when the objects of vision are transported from afar.’182 This is an important 
point, since – as already noted above – the very nature of relationships between 
protest movements and their opponents unavoidably brings together individual 
worlds representing different aspirations and concerns with a system of political 
and socioeconomic relations and public opinion. To address micro- and macro 
issues pertaining to ethnography of a locale, Peters suggests adopting a ‘bifocal’ 
approach to place in order to keep an ‘eye on both the local and the global.’183 In 
the cases observed in this thesis, this means looking closely at local arenas of 
contentious activities, while observing their operation against a background of 
large-scale socioeconomic and political structures. In practice, this means that 
my research journey had to follow the actions of local actors, which took them 
from their localities to the capital in order to explore central institutions, to find 
political support and to build alliances with other civic groups, before returning to 
their local vicinities in order to create new meanings and trust within their 
respective political communities. 
 
Time is another important analytical category. I began to more closely observe 
sites of anti-mining resistance in Aral when the most acute period of confrontation 
                                                       
181 Peters, J. D. (1997) ‘Seeing bifocally: Media, place culture’, in Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. (ed.) 
Culture, power, place: Explorations in critical anthropology, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
p. 80. See also Apandurai’s critique of current ethnographic approaches that are charged with too 
much focus on locality and not enough emphasis on the global circulation of objects, capital and 
people that are also central to localities, Apandurai, A. (1990) ‘Disjuncture and difference in the 
global cultural economy’, in Featherstone, M. (ed.) Global culture: Nationalism, globalization and 
modernity, London: Sage. 
182 Peters, J. D. (1997), p. 86. 
183 Ibid., p. 76. 
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between local groups and their opponents was over. If I were to address the most 
intense period of contestation between anti-mining activists and the mining 
company during the period from 2010 and 2011, I would be likely to conclude this 
as a successful example of rural resistance against a foreign firm. Observing a 
series of villagers’ collective action, which consisted of peaceful demonstrations 
that were later reinforced by more violent pressures on the company, would 
support such a conclusion. However, time showed that the use of violence 
unexpectedly led to the disintegration of the resistance movement from inside, as 
well as to the failure of maintaining the initial success of activists. Thus, the 
subsequent period from 2012 to 2013 showed the opposite result, i.e., the 
resistance movement was unable to consolidate itself in the face of internal 
problems. Time also helps us to appreciate the learning process of actors as an 
important element of the post-Soviet legacy. The learning process seems to be 
crucial for group formation, since groups learn and build up new expectations and 
hopes based on their past experiences of collective action. Thus, if I were to 
observe initial episodes of labour mobilizations that took place in 2010, I would 
expect them to fail at drawing the attention of authorities or the public. Such a 
conclusion would be informed by the fact that their early protests had been 
weakly structured, their leaders were controversial and their demands ill-
formulated. Yet, in a period of four years, workers gained impressive experience 
about learning strategies and tactics of contestation. Thus my study of cases of 
peripheral resistance during a lengthy period of time allows drawing observations 
on the sustainability of groups against external and internal challenges. 
 
3.3.  Collecting data 
For the purpose of this study, I conducted short and longer fieldtrips to the 
Kyrgyzstani provinces during different periods between 2010 and 2015. In both 
case studies, my data relied primarily on interviews and participatory 
observations. For the Kochkor-Ata case study, I conducted extensive interviews 
with participants of the movement, representatives of local and national trade 
unions, representatives of local ‘mediating’ organizations, members of the former 
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board of directors of the Kyrgyzneftegaz company, officials of relevant state 
agencies, members of the Kyrgyzstani Parliament and a small number of local 
journalists and NGOs. For the Aral case study, I conducted interviews with 
participants of mobilization, anti-mining activists, staff of the Gold Fields mining 
company, representatives of other extracting companies, local authorities, 
officials of state agencies and a small number of environmental, non-
governmental organizations and journalists based in Bishkek. In summary, for 
Kochkor-Ata and Aral, I collected 31 and 34 in-depth interviews, respectively. The 
interviews were semi-structured, that is, I did not have a written list of exactly 
worded interview questions, but rather a list of theory-generated topics that I 
could adjust to the situation at hand. Most interviews with protest groups were 
conducted in Kyrgyz; those that targeted state officials were mainly conducted in 
Russian, a language that is still dominantly used in officialdom. Interviews with 
the mining companies were conducted in English and Russian. 
 
None of the interviews were recorded for pragmatic purposes. For the Aral case, 
the reason for my decision not to put the interviewees on record was related 
primarily to the involvement of certain residents in violent acts against the 
opponent. Since the second violent attack did not receive full investigation, 
residents remained suspicious towards one another and as a result feared that 
recorded material could be used against them. In order not to further exacerbate 
these tensions or become involved in mutual accusations, I opted at an early 
stage not to use a recorder. In the Kochkor-Ata case, I was initially targeted as a 
journalist commissioned by either a state agency or a member of the elite and 
because of an ongoing ‘war of information’ between the labour force and various 
opponents, I decided it would be wise not to attract unnecessary suspicion and 
hence, did not record my sources. Instead, I took notes during interviews and 
observations or alternatively, wrote down notes after returning from meetings.  
 
In addition to the interviews as my major source of information, I employed an 
element of the ethnographic method, i.e., participant observation. I was lucky 
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enough to attend an annual meeting of shareholders in 2013, as well as a couple 
of union gatherings in the Kochkor-Ata case. During my final trip to the town, I 
visited labour brigades located around various deposits and was able to engage 
with them about politics and the mobilization of workers. In Aral, I attended a 
number of village gatherings, which had been organized to listen to matters 
concerning mining activities. Observations of instances of collective deliberation 
and (non-) decision-making provided a better understanding of dynamics and 
processes in situ.  
 
I also collected available written materials. For example, in Aral, I managed to get 
hold of an important file created by the leader of the anti-mining resistance, which 
consisted of 90 pages of protocols of village meetings and decisions, excerpts 
from national legislation and international norms governing environmental 
protection. In Kochkor-Ata, I was unable to review court documentation 
concerning the legal struggle between the labour force and their various 
opponents. I was also denied access to official materials of the parliamentary 
committee hearings in both cases, because it would require too much 
bureaucratic time spent on finding them in the archive.184 However, I used other 
sources of official information available to the public, such as small reports by the 
Kyrgyzstani Government and Parliament. Though they did not provide major 
analytical value, these materials were nonetheless helpful, as they illuminated 
additional information about the activities of resistance movements. It was 
striking, for example, to discover that protest groups on the periphery had tried 
extremely hard to establish legal and political connections with the centre by 
bypassing local official channels such as village and town authorities. In a 
Western context, social movements that work towards changing institutions and 
policies deal with local decision-making bodies in the first place and rarely reach 
out to higher echelons of power.  
 
                                                       
184 During the period between 2010 and 2011, the Kyrgyzstani Parliament did not yet have an 
electronic database. 
 102 
3.4.  Difficulties on the ground 
Each immersion within local politics brings about its own complexities and 
limitations. The difficulties I faced during my fieldwork were related to access to 
the field in general, as well as access to sources of information in particular. 
Some of these challenges were related to events directly but some emerged as a 
result of my own position as a female young researcher of Kyrgyz origin. My 
professional and personal identity had a direct impact on my involvement in local 
political life. Thus in the initial phase of my involvement in Aral, I was typically 
perceived as an ‘agent’ working for foreign firms. The profession of a scientific 
researcher is not well known among ordinary citizens and is often confused with 
other professions such as journalism or spying as mentioned earlier. I had a hard 
time explaining to my interviewees why someone would be genuinely interested 
in a small locale for scientific purposes only. I might have convinced some but 
others remained suspicious towards my ‘investigative’ activities until the end. On 
the other hand, being Kyrgyz and a young woman helped me gaining access to 
various informants including youth and women. I had an impression that after the 
initial challenge of bridging suspicion and gaining some sort of trust of informants 
my gender and ethnicity allowed me to create with them relations based on 
confidentiality. These interviewees opened up with their concerns because I was 
someone who could understand their worries much quicker than a foreign 
researcher and much better than a man. Finally, as someone coming from the 
‘centre’ I was often perceived as a representative of central decision-making 
institutions, whatever that meant to them. In saying what was on their minds, they 
often urged me ‘to pass the message to people who take decisions up there.’  
This pressing need to be heard and listened to made me a kind of confidant for 
some of my informants. 
 
Studying community-based mobilization turned out to be much more difficult 
compared to researching labour-based mobilization. When I first began gathering 
data in Aral village in the summer of 2012, I became associated with the mining 
company against which the community acted out violently in 2011. This 
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translated for some time into complications regarding gaining access to the field. 
When I returned a year later, I was able to conduct interviews and attend 
meetings without experiencing tensions on the part of respondents. However, 
because of opaque networks of power relations, it was challenging to identify and 
get into contact with several sources of information. In addition, my investigation 
in this area was to some extent limited by the sudden death in 2013 of a major 
actor of resistance, the then head of the village council, as well as the removal of 
another important player, the then director of a local school. Residents 
considered both these individuals as chief forces behind the violent attacks 
against the mining firm. 
 
In Kochkor-Ata, the identification of sources was challenging due to the so-called 
‘brokers’ or ‘activists’ who, among other functions, served as gatekeepers of 
information. The danger of focusing research on such activists is linked to the 
fact that they are well trained in terms of speaking to the mass media and political 
observers. They astutely manipulate anti-elite and anti-state discourses to, for 
example, give an impression of being situated, in Marxist terms, within a perfect 
labour struggle. Such an initial impression will no doubt be a positive surprise 
against the background of a neo-liberal economy. Yet if one does not move 
beyond this level of labour representation, a great deal of inner workings of 
resistance will be missed. Therefore, after using snowball sampling in the initial 
stage of inquiry for both case studies, I expanded my primary contacts to 
gradually include a wider number of resources. At the end of my inquiry, I had 
gathered quite a variety of interviewees, ranging from ordinary participants to 
individuals in leading positions; this allowed me to draw a more comprehensive 
‘map’ of local actors. 
 
Finally, in both areas, I conducted fieldwork in the aftermath of major events. This 
presented some challenges for the research. Since interviewees were not 
immediately focused on the particular phenomena under investigation, the 
reconstruction of events was subjected to peculiar processes. In Aral, for 
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example, the passage of two years did not lead to the convergence of narratives; 
individuals indicated a lack of a unified narrative regarding past events. In 
addition, the legacy of violence was still present, since individuals often 
expressed annoyance and a lack of interest or patience when reminded of violent 
actions that had taken place in the past. In Kochkor-Ata, in contrast I had to deal 
with the crystallization of a unified discourse among the workers. In order to 
unpack this homogenous narrative, I conducted interviews with workers in 
different ranks, from heads of departments to ordinary drillers, and sometimes 
conducted several interviews with the same person in a bid to better understand 
details about the history of mobilization.  
 
In this chapter of the dissertation, I presented the conceptual framework that I 
intend to apply in the forthcoming empirical chapters. I outlined a number of initial 
propositions that will be submitted to further empirical analysis and re-discussed 
in the chapter on the comparative interpretation of empirical findings. I also 
explained my methodological procedure, that is, the methods I will be using and 
the selection of case studies. I complemented my explanation of the methodology 
by providing examples of the difficulties I experienced in gaining access to the 
field and to quantitative data, problems that many researchers face in 
Kyrgyzstan. The dissertation now passes to the discussion of empirical material.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV: LABOUR-BASED MOBILIZATION IN KOCHKOR-ATA TOWN 
 
I. Introduction  
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Blocking the roads and storming the state institutions 
is a last option for us. You see, laws don’t work and 
formal complaints and official letters are inefficient. 
Only by staging protests can we make sure to grab the 
attention of authorities. In other words, it’s politics. In 
the past, workers weren’t able to do politics. 
 
People’s Defence Committee, Kochkor-Ata 
 
The above is how the Head of the People’s Defence Committee, Ondurush 
Zamanov, explained the four-year mobilization of workers in his town of Kochkor-
Ata, located in the southern agrarian province of Jalal-Abad. For the workers of 
the state company Kyrgyzneftegaz, mobilization began when a segment of their 
work collective, kollektiv – in Russian, seized a revolutionary moment on 8 April 
2010 to oust the incumbent Company Director, Iskhak Pirmatov. This large group 
of workers, supported by the local branch of the political party Ata-Meken, 
accused Pirmatov of corruption and regime cooptation. While this event created 
confusion among the remaining workers, the group formed the ‘Movement for 
Truth’ (Chyndyk uchun kyimyl), which would structure their subsequent 
mobilizations against various central decision-makers and the company’s policies 
in the future.  
 
The goals of the Movement for Truth were not immediately obvious. Reacting to 
revolutionary changes in the capital, the group that ousted the director was 
preoccupied with the struggle against ‘elite corruption’. As such, events unfolded 
here were similar to what Sarah Ashwin described for the case of post-
independent Russia, where mining workers had shown more interest for electing 
or dismissing their directors and less so for fixing labour problems.185 In the case 
of the remote ‘mono-town’ Kochkor-Ata, this intersection of political and 
economic interests at the heart of a state-owned company served as the 
beginning of my empirical puzzle. 
                                                       
185 Ashwin, S. (1999) ‘Redefining the collective: Russian mineworkers in transition’, in Burawoy, M. 
and Verdery, K. (ed.) Uncertain transition: Ethnographies of change in the postsocialist world, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
 106 
 
Given the extent of de-industrialization, labour-based mobilizations have been 
rare in the post-1991 period in Kyrgyzstan. Only a few examples of this type of 
industrial conflict occurred in the remaining scanty coal, railway and cotton 
sectors during the first post-revolutionary period between 2005 and 2006. Some 
of these conflicts were clearly power-oriented such as the occupation of the Kara-
Keche coal mine by the notorious leader Nurlan Motuev, the so-called ‘King of 
Coal’. Other examples include ‘real’ labour struggles that contested unpaid 
wages and human rights violations. One such known case involved the 
independent Union for the Protection of Railway Workers (UPRW), which fought 
against the company’s management and the official, ‘pocket’ trade union from 
2004 to 2006. Matthew Naumann and Burul Usmanalieva made a rare illustration 
of the success of this labour engagement against the system of power. Following 
two years of protests, the UPRW succeeded in receiving compensation for late 
payments, as well as the payment of debts to workers.186  
 
In Kochkor-Ata, growing union membership and an impressive record of victories 
against central politics after four years of political engagement situates my 
example of the mobilization of gas and oil workers on the successful side, too. 
Given the background of the continuous disintegration of political and social 
structures, and the relatively weak sustainability of protest movements in 
Kyrgyzstan, this case offers significant potential for studying a successful 
example of enduring practices of contestation.  
 
Using the social construction of protests approach, the objective of this empirical 
chapter is to explore the complex intersection of political and economic relations 
at the heart of the workers’ Movement for Truth. My study covers the period from 
April 2010 to January 2015 as the principal period of contestation between rebel 
                                                       
186 Naumann, M. and Usmanalieva, B. (2008) ‘Organizing railway workers and land migrants: 
Another side of civil society in the Kyrgyz Republic’, INTRAC Central Asia: Social movements 
case studies, [Online], Available at: http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/645/Social-
Movements-and-Conflict-in-Post-Revolution-Kyrgyzstan.pdf [15 July 2015]. 
 107 
workers and the central system of power. To present this material, the chapter is 
divided into two in-depth sections. In the first part, I present key aspects of the 
Movement for Truth by investigating the structure of leadership and membership, 
grievances and the forms of mobilization the movement has employed to 
politicize workers’ concerns to central authorities. On the one hand, I draw 
attention to the fact that during the early stages of the formation of mobilization, 
neither leadership nor membership had a clear structure and uncontested 
legitimacy. On the other hand, I show that the initially fragmented labour force 
has nevertheless produced an impressive volume of mobilization.  
 
In the second part of the chapter, I attempt to resolve this contradiction by delving 
deeper into the complex dynamics that are accountable for the success of 
mobilization. First, I show workers’ active engagement with the central system of 
power via learning process that involves a blame attribution dilemma. I 
demonstrate how they have gradually ‘professionalized’ their strategies and 
tactics of protest-making as a result of this process. Second, I describe the so-
called ‘brokers’ or opportunist workers, whose activities had a detrimental effect 
on the integrity of mobilization. Third, I link consolidation of the labour movement, 
despite brokers’ actions, to group processes, on which I elaborated in Chapter III. 
Here, I stress the salience of the chief group process, monitoring, by which 
participants of initial episodes of mobilization and the local audience established 
trust in the organizers of mobilization and their proposed agenda. I then 
demonstrate how workers strengthened their movement via collective decision-
making mechanisms. Finally, I put forward that workers further developed a 
sense of belonging to a collective agency and nurtured a belief in the success of 
collective action via collective empowerment. In sum, these group processes that 
emerged within the labour movement allowed establishing internal trust that 
helped to streamline the internal structure of leadership and membership, and to 
overcome the demobilizing effects of central politics, as well as the destructive 
activities of so-called opportunist ‘brokers’. However, before turning to these 
issues, it is useful to consider the circumstances of the state company, as well as 
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the political circumstances under which the conflict between former company’s 
management and workers erupted on 8 April, 2010. 
 
1.1.  State-owned industry 
Exploration activities in Kyrgyzstan began in 1930s when coal, mercury, lead, 
copper, and oil were found in the country but only few plants were constructed 
since most of the volume of extracted minerals was processed in other parts of 
the Soviet Union. 187  The Soviets have made significant investments in 
Kyrgyzstani mining and metallurgical sectors. According to Bogdetsky et al., up to 
50 million roubles had been invested each year in the exploration of minerals and 
the mining industry employed approximately 50 000 workers. However, following 
the country’s independence the role of industry declined in the country’s GDP: in 
2010, its contribution was 28% in which manufacturing including gold production 
was 17.8% only.188 
 
Assessing the impact of the disintegration of Soviet industry in neighbouring 
Kazakhstan, Catherine Alexander found that the dismantlement of existing 
transport, supply and distribution networks led to the devaluation of industrial 
enterprises.189 To this we can add implications for the organization of workers, 
i.e., unions. In the Soviet era, trade unions were created as completely different 
organizations for the purpose of a completely different political economy 
(Crowley, 2004). Charles Buxton writes the following about informal Kyrgyzstani 
workers’ actions and the trade unions in current conditions: 
After 1991 the trade unions rapidly lost members as public-sector 
employment plummeted. Unofficial workers’ actions [were] an 
embarrassment to labor movement bureaucrats who had never led strikes 
in the Soviet period and who remained tied up in defensive “social 
partnership” mechanisms, hanging on to gains inherited from the previous 
                                                       
187 World Bank Report No. 13024-KG, (1994) Kyrgyz Republic: Mining Sector Review. 
188  National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, (2012) [Online], Available at: 
http://www.stat.kg [24 Aug 2013].  
189  Alexander, C. (2004) ‘Values, relations and changing bodies: Industrial privatization in 
Kazakhstan’, in Humphrey, C. and Verdery, K. (ed.) Property in Question: Value transformation in 
the Global Economy, Oxford: Berg. 
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period.190 
 
Kochkor-Ata is located in the southern agrarian province of Jalal-Abad, 56 km 
from the provincial centre of Jalal-Abad, west of the Uzbekistan border. It was 
established in 1952, when the Izbaskent oil source was discovered and was 
granted the status of town in 2003.191 
 
Figure 1: Location of Kochkor-Ata town, Jalal-Abad Province, Southern 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The Kyrgyzneftegaz company, where the conflict unfolded the day after the April 
Revolution, is located in the Kochkor-Ata’s centre. Those who visit the company’s 
headquarters will observe a city-like infrastructure, most of which had been built 
in the Soviet era, and which is lacking in other sites in rural areas. Paved roads, 
solid buildings and sufficient social facilities stand out of the usual sadness of 
other provincial towns.  
                                                       
190 Buxton, Ch. (2011), p. 88. 
191 There are 6 out of 22 towns and 14 out of 29 urban-type communities that were founded in the 
areas of mineral extraction. See Bogdetsky, V., Stavinskiy, V., Shukurov, E. and Suyunbaev, M. 
(2001) ‘The mining industry and sustainable development in Kyrgyzstan’, Mining, Minerals and 
Sustainable Development, no. 110, November. 
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Figure 2: ‘Gas wealth’ – Kochkor-Ata town, Kyrgyzneftegaz headquarters  
(© Asel Doolotkeldieva). 
 
The company has the special status of ‘state’s strategic assets’ 
(gosudarstvennye strategicheskie ob’ekty)192 and employs approximately 2500 
people out of 14 814 town residents (2009).193  Ownership of the company 
belongs predominantly to the state: 85.16% of shares are owned by the state; the 
remaining 10% belongs to another state agency – the Social Fund – and less 
than 5% are divided among employees of the company. Although the country’s 
oil reserves do not exceed 89 million tonnes and approximately 26 billion cubic 
meters of gas,194 the company is involved in a full cycle that includes exploration, 
the extraction of crude oil and associated gas, as well as the transportation and 
refining of petroleum products. Locally produced gas covers partial needs of the 
Jalal-Abad and Osh Provinces: in 2013, the company produced 77 000 tonnes of 
oil and 25 million cubic meters of gas. According to 2004 statistics, the 
                                                       
192 Together with 50 other objects, the company represents one of the state holdings in strategic 
areas of energy, natural resources, defence and economy, among others. 
193 Wikipedia, [Online], Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kochkor-Ata [20 March 2015]. 
194 ‘Obchie geologicheskie zapasy gasa ocenili 26 mlrd kubometrov’ [Overall geological gas 
reserves are estimated to 26 billion cubic metres], Vecherny Bishkek (26 October 2012), 
Available at: 
http://www.vb.kg/doc/203987_obshie_geologicheskie_zapasy_gaza_ocenili_v_26_mlrd_kybomet
rov.html [29 June 2015]. 
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Kyrgyzneftegaz company contributed 96.2% to the town’s GDP.195 In 2012 and 
2013, it contributed 1 billion 410 million som to the national budget.196 
 
The Kyrgyzneftegaz company is an inherent part of the town’s identity. Workers 
expressed pride when talking about their company and profession. Many of them 
have been employed there for over 30 years and participated in the 
establishment of the industry and local settlements. The so-called ‘workers’ 
settlements’ (rabochie gorodki) near the main gas rigs are still populated by 
employees. Presently, the company offers a wide range of social services. These 
include a kindergarten for employees’ children, a college that offers industry-
related specializations for school graduates, a sports complex – one of the best 
equipped in the south of the country– a recreational hospital, opportunities for 
recreational activities at Lake Issik-kul for youngsters and adults 197  and 
concessions for using gas and electricity, among others. Such services are 
aimed at supporting social interaction against a backdrop of decreasing social 
integrative structures in rural areas of post-independent Kyrgyzstan. 198 
Bogdetsky et al. write about the Soviet urbanization of extractive areas: 
Towns were built, infrastructure developed, and the supply of goods and 
services improved. This was largely the result of the creation of new jobs 
and incomparably high salaries, the opportunity for education and a 
relatively well developed service sector. The network of schools, day 
nurseries and kindergartens, specialised secondary education schools, 
health care, cultural institutions, and the provision of public transport and 
communication were all included in the construction and development plans 
of mining companies.199 
 
                                                       
195  Association of municipalities of the Kyrgyz Republic, [Online], Available at: 
http://www.citykr.kg/kochkorata.php, [3 March 2015]. 
196 ‘Pribyl Kyrgyzneftegaza virosla v 25 raza za tri goda’ [Kyrgyzneftegaz’s profit increased by 25 
times in three years], Vecherny Bishkek (9 September 2013), Available at: 
http://www.vb.kg/doc/242470_pribyl_kyrgyzneftegaza_vyrosla_v_25_raz_za_tri_goda.html [22 
March 2015]. 
197 Issik-kul is the country’s most renowned recreational area. In the Soviet era, unions and large 
companies used to have their own sanatoriums here.  
198 According to statistics, Kochkor-Ata town hosts nine non-governmental organizations, five 
mosques, four trade bazars and 66 small and medium enterprises. See Association of 
municipalities of the Kyrgyz Republic, [Online], Available at: http://www.citykr.kg/kochkorata.php 
[3 March 2015]. 
199 Bogdetsky et al. (2001). 
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Far from implying that this social infrastructure mechanically procures specific 
pre-conditions for the development of labor insurgency, an inadvertent 
comparison with other rural and semi-urban areas, where such infrastructure has 
collapsed in the post-independence period, nevertheless reveals the more 
advantageous position of Kochkor-Ata workers in terms of access to 
organizational and cultural resources. 
 
1.2.  Local pre-revolutionary context and the chronology of major events in 
Kochkor-Ata 
Notwithstanding the feeling of pride regarding their production, some workers 
have been concerned about the fate of their company in the hands of a crony 
regime of the Bakievs. On 8 April 2010, these workers instigated a management 
takeover. On that day, following major political changes in the capital, several 
localized changes in power occurred in provinces, towns and villages. The 
specificity of Jalal-Abad Province also adds to this structure of political 
opportunities. The president Kurmanbek Bakiev’s native village is located in 
Jalal-Abad Province; prior to the revolution, the local situation was understood to 
be under the control of Akhmat Bakiev, one of the president’s brothers. From his 
company’s local office Saly-Ata, Akhmat Bakiev had allegedly been influencing 
political decisions in the province. According to local politicians and officials, the 
then structure of the Jalal-Abad city council had largely been a result of his 
personal arrangement.200  
 
Besides the fiefdom of the Bakievs, another major factor was involved – 
organized crime. The day after the revolution, criminal groups took advantage of 
the power change and were able to take hold of political and economic positions 
within the province. Both state and private property were appropriated. A large 
number of local councils were dissolved and village authorities were overthrown. 
Rival groups competed for the control of these local power structures in order to 
                                                       
200  Interviews with the former mayor of Jalal-Abad city and a local journalist, Jalal-Abad, 
December 2011. 
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gain access to land and commodity markets. According to the then governor of 
Jalal-Abad Province, approximately 20 assets that were in Akhamt Bakiev’s 
possession in Jalal-Abad Province are still being disputed by various actors, 
including criminal groups. 201 
 
Opposing the regime of Bakievs, opposition parties such as Ata-Meken and 
SDPK were active in the province in the form of small cells and informal regional 
networks. Ata-Meken’s local hold was recognized, for example, in the person of 
the party chairman’s brother, Asylbek Tekebaev. The local branches of these 
parties were involved in the takeover of management at Kochkor-Ata on April 8, 
2010.  
 
Following these events participants of the take-over of management formed the 
‘Movement for Truth’ (Chyndyk uchun kyimyl), within which a series of important 
mobilizations were organized during the period between 2010 and 2015 covered 
in this thesis. As a first step since the change of management, the movement 
initiated the election of the ‘people’s’ management (narodnoe upravlenie) that 
would respond to workers’ needs and rights.  
 
This election was not a straightforward procedure as multiple groups among 
workers supported alternative candidates. There is almost no information in mass 
media or in official reports since the event took place in the immediate post-
revolutionary chaotic period. Some of these groups were responding to political 
patrons located in Bishkek. For example, one group emerged within the 
department of transport, one of the biggest departments of the company 
employing more than 500 employees. The head of department, Kenesh Masirov, 
who was coopted by the outgoing director Pirmatov organized his subordinates to 
advance his own candidacy. Another group promoted the candidacy of Rinat 
                                                       
201 See ‘Bektur Asanov: Esli v Kyrgyzstane budet prosvetat’ korrupcia I reiderstvo, ne minovat 
tretiei revolucii’ [Bektur Asanov: If corruption and raiding continue thriving in Kyrgyzstan, there will 
be a third revolution], The Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights (20 April 2011), Available at: 
http://www.kchr.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2291 [20 January 2014]. 
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Makenov, proposed by the Ministry of Nature. Other smaller groups emerged 
within various departments supporting or rejecting these candidates. The 
Movement for Truth supported the candidacy of Kanybek Masirov, a respected 
manager with more than 20 years of experience in the oil industry, who was then 
officially appointed by the Provisional Government as an interim CEO on April 15, 
2010.  
 
The movement consisted of various actors and included not only the company’s 
employees but also members of opposition parties Ata-Meken and SDPK, the 
People’s Defence Committee, the local trade union and the new management. 
The local union was created in 1970s and performed along established Soviet 
functions whereas the People’s Defence Committee was a new organization 
formed prior to the April revolution. After the election, the new management also 
became part of the Movement for Truth. Thus the movement became an alliance 
of mixed forces (both labor and political) that were in opposition to the regime 
and the Director Pirmatov. In subsequent mobilizations, workers and the new 
management acted in union against external opponents. This is an interesting 
feature to note because unlike other labor conflicts that usually involve 
confrontation between workers and the management, our case relates to the fight 
of united workers and the management against external political actors. 
 
Besides this post-revolutionary union between the management and the 
employees, other actors are also worth mentioning, i.e. the political parties. Some 
press reports suggested that the change of management was a result of elite 
manipulation rather than a grassroots mobilization of workers. Such 
interpretations were influenced by several evidences of the implication of 
opposition parties at the workplace. Firstly, some employees were already 
connected to opposition parties as members of their local cells prior to the 
revolution. Second, the brother of the Ata-Meken party’s chair, Asylbek 
Tekebaev, was allegedly directly involved in taking control of the Kyrgyzneftegaz 
company on 8 April, 2010. This move helped encroaching the party’s hold on the 
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town and securing significant votes in subsequent elections. Third, at the moment 
of electing the new management and the board of directors, the party has 
succeeded to appoint the majority of candidates. 202  For example, Kanybek 
Masirov is believed to be the Tekebaev’s appointee. Although most of the 
interviewed workers said that the new CEO was genuinely popular among the 
workforce, others pointed to the fact that he was appointed by the Ata-Meken 
party that came to power after the revolution. Other members of management 
and the board of directors had affiliation with the SDPK party, which was leading 
the coalition government during the period between 2010 and 2011. Still others 
claimed their political neutrality, like the new chair of the board of directors, Aman 
Omurzakov, who was replaced in 2013 by a person loyal to SDPK party.  
 
Upon election, the new management raised workers’ wages and increased social 
benefits. In addition to these popular measures, new techniques were designed 
and introduced for a greater level of management transparency. Management 
established regular meetings that were aimed at informing workers of production 
processes. They also installed an ‘information board’ at the company’s 
headquarters that displayed daily changes in primary production indicators. 
Anyone could access this board and receive information about the company’s 
                                                       
202 According to the national legislation on joint-stock companies, candidates for the board of 
directors are selected through an open competition of civil servants. A state commission formed 
by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic carries out the selection of candidates. Upon 
recommendation of the commission, the Prime Minister makes a decision on the nomination of 
civil servants. The Fund of State Property under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic presents 
the candidates to the board of directors at the general meeting of shareholders. The general 
meeting of shareholders then elects the board. See Postanovlenie Pravitelstva Kyrgyzskoi 
Respubliki ‘Poryadok otbora I vidvijenia gosudarstvennih slujachih v sostav soveta directorov 
akcionernogo obchestva, sozdannogo v ramkah gosudarstvenno-chastnogo partnerstva’ №323, 
(27 May, 2009) [Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic ‘Order of selection and 
promotion of civil servants to the board of directors of the company, created through public-
private partnerships’]. However, since the inception of the parliamentarian system in 2010, parties 
have informally divided state agencies and state assets among themselves and exert a direct 
influence over nominations. The author’s interview with the former Chair of the Board Of Directors 
of Kyrgyzneftegaz, Bishkek, September 2013. See also Akipress’s chart on the general informal 
distribution of state resources among five political parties in the aftermath of the formation of the 
coalition government, ‘New Coalition in Kyrgyzstan Already Discredited before Forming the 
Government’, Central Asia Memory Blog (17 December 2010), Available at: 
http://alexdockg.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/new-coalition-in-kyrgyzstan-already-discredited-
before-forming-the-government/ [14 June 2015]. 
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performance, including the amount of drilled gas and oil, their prices on the 
market, etc. Even employees who worked in areas not related to production, 
such as the college or kindergarten, were well informed of these indicators. To 
continue increasing transparency, the new management also committed itself to 
eliminating corruption schemes established previously by the Director Pirmatov 
and thus gain trust among workers as a management free of corruption. Together 
with members of the Movement for Truth management launched an internal 
investigation of the largest corruption case that involved the purchase of Chinese 
equipment. They formed a delegation that traveled to China to investigate and 
later disputed the lawfulness of the purchase agreement achieved by Pirmatov in 
the court. The investigation of this case brought the newly established 
management and the divided workforce together and strengthened the 
Movement for Truth. 
 
Yet, the post-revolutionary conflict at the company did not end with the change of 
management alone. Following parliamentary elections in October 2010, a part of 
the old elite, including the ousted Director Iskhak Pirmatov, was propelled to the 
national parliament. To make things worse, following the formation of the 
Coalition Government in early 2011 and offices being informally divided amongst 
parties, the Kyrgyzneftegaz state company was taken over by Iskhak Pirmatov’s 
political party, Respublica. This happened because the important Fund of State 
Property, which manages all state assets including that of Kyrgyzneftegaz, was 
‘conferred’ to the Respublica party.  
 
Led by Respublica, the Fund rapidly acted to remove the Ata-Meken affiliated 
management and to appoint a new board loyal to the Respublica party. Starting 
from January 2011, the Fund has effectuated repeated attempts to unseat the 
current management. On 26 April, 2011 the Fund made a step of calling an 
extraordinary general meeting of shareholders with the aim of forcing the 
management to resign. Backed up by the employees, the management decided 
to resist to these attempts and made an appeal to the Bishkek inter-district court 
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to recognize the Fund’s actions of convening the general meeting unlawful. After 
an unsuccessful exchange of court litigations between the management and the 
Fund, employees decided to resort to demonstrations and strikes.  
 
Starting from 4 March, 2011 workers organized large protests in Kochkor-Ata 
town involving more than 2000 workers each, an exceptionally big number for 
Kyrgyzstani protests. They opposed the Fund’s attempt to appoint a new board of 
directors against the will of workers. Protests took place on 19 April, 28 April and 
30 May, 2011. During this series of demonstrations, workers presented a list of 
demands to the government, promising to resort to unrest if they were not met. 
The demands included the following: 1) the then Prime Minister, Almazbek 
Atambaev, was invited to assess the lawfulness of the Fund’s decision for calling 
an extraordinary meeting to change the board of directors; 2) should the Prime 
Minister make an unfair or unlawful decision, workers would begin indefinite 
striking; 3) in case of the non-execution of the first condition, they would block the 
Bishkek-Osh highway. 203  Responding to these threats of unrest, the Prime 
Minister Atambaev visited Kochkor-Ata in June 2011 and resulting from 
negotiations with employees appointed an ‘external’ manager, i.e. a manager 
above the party influence.  
 
Taking this example of fight against the central institution as a success of 
workers’ mobilization, the Movement for Truth enlarged the scope of its 
engagement with central policies and their repertoire of collective action. Along 
with organizing protest demonstrations in Kochkor-Ata, the movement also began 
launching contentious actions in the capital. During the period between 2010 and 
2012 they protested in front of the Parliament, Government House, the Supreme 
Court and a range of different ministries to address such various issues as the 
corruption involving the former Director Pirmatov, litigations against the Fund of 
State Property and as previously noted, the purchase of Chinese equipment.  
 
                                                       
203 This highway is the only road connecting the north and south of the country. 
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Besides the ‘unconventional’ ways of channeling their concerns and 
disagreement, members of the movement employed a wide range of 
‘conventional’ channels. They organized numerous press conferences as a way 
to inform wider society of elite manipulations at the company. The movement 
also sought to meet with a wide range of government officials and politicians 
including the head of the then Provisional Government, Rosa Otunbaeva. Finally 
they lobbied for the opening of a criminal case against the former Director (now 
MP) Pirmatov and for the vote to levy Pirmatov’s immunity in Parliament. Aided 
by the Ata-Meken party, they made their way into Parliament and held private 
talks with more than 70 MPs.  
 
Back home, at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014, the movement staged 
a series of protests in Jalal-Abad and Kochkor-Ata towns to contest the 
government’s decision to split an oil refinery located in Jalal-Abad away from the 
company. As a result of these successful demonstrations, the oil refinery 
remained the company’s balance. Overall, between 2010 and 2015 the 
movement organized more than 35 demonstrations and strikes.  
 
By the end of my research, early 2015, the Movement for Truth had consolidated 
itself despite interventions of multiple political forces and internal divisions. The 
local union grew to attract new members even outside of the company. The 
People’s Defence Committee was progressively sidelined because some of its 
members tried to conduct informal negotiations with the central government that 
opposed the movement’s official agenda. The union subsequently became the 
movement’s chief official representative. The union established a well functioning 
routine within the company that permitted employees to influence the 
management’s decisions. One mechanism of such collective decision-making 
was the organization of regular general meetings. Thus, every important decision 
made by the management had to be consulted with and approved by all 
brigades. Other mechanisms empowered employees to feel part of a bigger 
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collective. Finally, their impressive record of victories bolstered members’ belief 
in collective action and attracted many more individuals to join the movement.  
 
II. Key Aspects of the Movement for Truth: Grievances, Structure of 
Leadership and Membership, and Forms of Mobilization 
In this part of the chapter, I begin exploring the take-over of management that 
grew into the Movement for Truth. I will start with a description and analysis of 
the movement’s main features: grievances and concerns; the structure of 
leadership and membership, and the forms of mobilization or local ‘repertoire of 
collective action’ that was employed during a four-year engagement against 
central politics. While exploring these dynamics, in the spirit of Wendy Wolford, I 
do not ‘edit out’ things that ‘spoil’ the image of movements as cohesive 
organizations with a satisfactory ‘progression’ towards success. 204  On the 
contrary, I show that the workers’ goals, strategies and tactics were constantly 
being constructed; I do not intentionally minimize the salience of the fragmented 
structure of the movement in order to present the collective as a unified front. I 
demonstrate that the fragmented structure of the movement presented rather 
precarious conditions, but nonetheless did not hinder the development of 
mobilization of workers. I will begin by providing a picture of workers’ grievances 
and concerns that links the history of their mono-town, central elites and politics 
to feelings of dispossession and injustice. 
 
2.1. Grievances and concerns: corruption, injustice, employment 
The conventional social movement literature focuses on the ideological 
expression of social mobilizations inasmuch as grievances are clearly attributed 
either to inequalities (American school) or new identities (European new social 
movement school). In Kyrgyzstan, the picture is much more blurred as the 
analysis of grievances is complicated not only on the content level but also on the 
form. The understanding of the ideological content is problematic because the 
ways in which protest groups formulate and frame their 
                                                       
204 Wolford, W. (2010). 
 120 
concerns/disagreements/demands, or the ways in which they are portrayed by 
mass media dramatically distort the public image of protesters. As a result, 
protest groups often fail to send a clear message regarding their political position 
as a first means for gaining public support.  
 
In my case, in addition to ‘negative’ media interpretations, the workers’ own 
formulation of grievances as a ‘Movement for Truth’ was too ambiguous to assist 
in understanding its objectives at the outset. To gain a better understanding, one 
therefore has to delve deeply into the stories that link local history to central 
politics. These stories help to show how corruption becomes workers’ primary 
concern, as well as how such formulation reflects the movement’s goals. 
Consider the following concise opinion of a worker who has been employed at 
the company for more than 30 years and who viewed the situation at the onset of 
their mobilization as follows: 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians left and it was our 
responsibility to save the company from bankruptcy or privatization. In the 
beginning of 2010 we faced several challenges: worn-out equipment, 
accidents and injuries, an impoverished working class, elite predation, and 
weak law enforcement. That was our situation. We decided that it was a 
moment for the working class to take matters into their own hands.205  
 
Alongside this general state of affairs at the company, it appears that former 
Company Director, Iskhak Pirmatov gave rise to feelings of injustice and 
dispossession amongst company workers. In 2010, Iskhak Pirmatov’s monthly 
salary was equal to a specialist’s annual salary: while the Director earned 102 
272 som per month (2000 USD), a geologist earned 9492 som (less than 200 
USD) and a manual worker (raznorabochy) 5306 som only (100 USD). Iskhak 
Pirmatov also maintained a significant gap between workers and heads of 
departments. Thus, under his management, the head of the Technological 
Transport Department received a monthly salary of 75 226 som (1500 USD), 
whereas a manual worker in this department earned only 5705 som (100 
                                                       
205 Interview with the Head of the local union, Akynbek Raimkulov, Kohckor-Ata, December 2014. 
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USD).206 In addition to this perceived unjust distribution of benefits, workers were 
unhappy with Iskhak Pirmatov’s arbitrary firing practices. He made redundant 
many employees who disagreed with his policies. This arbitrary management 
was especially regarded as illegitimate in light of the fact that Iskhak Pirmatov 
himself lacked the professional credibility needed to run such a specialized 
company. According to workers, he was appointed to a high-end position with no 
previous experience in the oil industry, thus breaching organizational coherence, 
professional valorization and meritocracy. Being a ‘neftyannik’ (oilman) is a 
precondition for any nachalnik (boss) in this sphere of production and is an 
integral part of workers’ identity. As many interviewers stated, he ‘was not one of 
ours, not a neftyannik’.207  
 
In addition to low wages and uncertain employment, Iskhak Pirmatov was 
allegedly involved in the so-called ‘corruption schemes’ that served the Bakievs’ 
crony regime. According to these allegations, Iskhak Pirmatov employed complex 
informal deals and offshore jurisdictions that robbed the company and its workers 
of significant incomes.208 Workers feared that Pirmatov could have used his 
political connections and fake companies to privatize the company in favour of 
the regime’s cronies. Rumours about a forthcoming privatization were circulating 
in relevant circles in Bishkek and were a source of worker anxieties during the 
period 2010 to 2011. A female respondent explained the centrality of this state 
company to life in their town thus: 
There are no other jobs in the town… Our families depend on our 
employment. Only the children of workers are recruited into the factory; we 
                                                       
206 See Pravitelstvo Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki. Rasporyajenie ot 05.09.2011 [Government of Kyrgyz 
Republic. Order from 05.09.2011], [Online], Available at: http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-
ru/211207?cl=ru-ru#р1 [29 June 2015]. 
207 Interview with an employee, Kochkor-Ata, November 2012. 
208 These allegations led the new government to open a special inter-ministerial commission to 
investigate the financial situation of the company. On 30 December, 2011, on the basis of the 
commission’s findings, the General Prosecution filed a criminal case against Pirmatov in accord 
with the following articles of the Criminal Code: ‘Causing damage to property by fraud or breach 
of trust’ and ‘Abuse of authority by the employees of commercial or other organizations’. 
According to the General Prosecution, Pirmatov caused the state damage equal to more than 258 
MLN som (approx. 5 MLN USD) during the period from 2009 to 2010. 
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don’t accept strangers here. And we cannot allow our company to be led 
into bankruptcy and privatization.209 
 
By the time the April Revolution occurred, Kyrgyzneftegaz employees stated that 
workers’ discontent was high enough to instigate a means for removing Iskhak 
Pirmatov. Yet, mobilization against corruption should not be understood as a 
one-time action. Thus the Movement for Truth did not decline following the 
takeover and the rapid resolution of local labour issues, which saw wages 
increased and social packages already being enhanced in 2011. On the contrary, 
the development of the Movement saw the expansion of initial grievances and 
concerns in time, space and scope. Every new round of contestation engenered 
more claims of corruption to include new topics, new opponents and new 
geographic locations. At the end of my study in the beginning of 2015, the 
Movement was dealing with corruption of other members of elite, of courts and 
the central government. The evolution of initial concerns, which targeted primarily 
local conditions of employment, into the central political arena made it hard to 
understand whether this example was about economic and social inequalities, 
identity or politics. When asked what the Movement for Truth represented, an 
interviewee responded: 
The whole system is corrupt: the parliament, the government, courts, all of 
it… We don’t know where to go to get answers to our questions, which 
institutions to address, or who to consider accountable for wrongdoings. We 
are looking for truth and justice in one word.210 
 
The above quote highlights the movement’s vague title, the meaning of which 
had not been obvious at the outset to external observers. It alludes to the context 
of general weak governance, in which it becomes difficult for social groups to 
formulate succinct demands.  
 
2.2. Structure of ‘initiators’ and ‘participants’ 
                                                       
209 Interview with an employee, Kochkor-Ata, May 2013. 
210 Interview with an employee #1, Kochkor-Ata, November 2012. 
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The inquiry into the Movement for Truth continues with an analysis of the 
structure of leadership and membership. Leadership and membership are other 
ambiguous features of the Kyrgyzstani grassroots groups, because their 
performances appear so ‘erratic’ that these groups do not immediately manifest 
as having legitimate leadership, ideologically committed membership or being 
established organizations. This picture of ‘chaotic’ mobilizations can sometimes 
become worse in cases where mass media report about internal divisions and 
petty struggles for power within the movements themselves. Such reports can 
have real implications, as Kyrgyzstani public opinion is quick to react to such 
news by showing distrust towards weakly structured ephemeral movements with 
disputable leadership and cooptable membership. In Kochkor-Ata, the takeover 
of management gave rise to internal divisions among the workers that were 
fuelled by central elites and the outgoing Director Pirmatov. It therefore makes 
sense to take a closer look at this local arena in order to appreciate the uneasy 
development of the organization of labor insurgency.  
 
After the Director Pirmatov was ousted, the workplace became an arena in which 
competing groups vied for domination. Although the Provisional Government, 
which was established in the aftermath of popular uprisings, appointed Kanybek 
Masirov as an interim CEO on 15 April 2010, some workers’ groups contested his 
legitimacy. This internal competition began when the former Director Iskhak 
Pirmatov decided to effectuate a return to the company via workers who 
remained loyal to him. To this end, he co-opted the Head of the Transport 
Department, Kenesh Masirov, promising to appoint him to the board of 
management. The transport department is one of the biggest divisions in the 
company and employs approximately 600 people. Perhaps Iskhak Pirmatov did 
not expect that his cooptation of the head of the transport department would 
further lead to divisions within the department itself, as well as between this and 
other departments. Taking note of these cooptation possibilities, other 
departments began gathering their own workers with the objective of advancing 
their candidates for managerial positions. The contestation between departments 
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then took the form of small pickets in front of the company’s headquarters in 
Kochkor-Ata. In an interview with the author, an employee described this 
situation as the continuation of the ‘revolutionary fervour’.211  Groups of 100 
individuals stood in different corners and scanted contradicting slogans that 
looked completely confusing to an external observer. While one group demanded 
appointing their own manager and removing the incumbent CEO, the second 
group simply demanded the opposite. To these, a third group was added, which 
disputed the candidacy of Rinat Makenov, who had allegedly ‘parachuted’ from 
Bishkek. In this way, the small public space that the town was able to offer 
became a place of contestation for too many competing claims: - Rinat Makenov ketsin! (Out with Rinat Makenov!) - Kenesh Masirov ketsin! (Out with Kenesh Masirov!) 
- Kanybek Masirov ketsin! (Out with Kanybek Masirov!) 
 
To make things worse, these groups accused one another of corruption and the 
embezzlement of funds using their own interpretations of the past, in which the 
heads of departments were involved as part of Iskhak Pirmatov’s management. 
They gave contradictory interviews to national press, which rendered an 
understanding of events even more complex. Such pickets were obviously aimed 
at resolving a particular but important issue, i.e., the legitimacy of appointments. 
However, for an external observer, such a framing of protests was likely to signify 
a parochial competition for power in which too much focus was placed on 
positions and not on actual labour interests. During this period, workers who did 
not take part in the fight for power were significantly confused by ongoing events 
and feared that these internal fights would lead to the closure of the company. 
Those who became part of the Movement for Truth including ordinary workers, 
the local branch of Ata-Meken party, the local union, the People’s Defence 
Committee, and the new management, were worried that Pirmatov might 
succeed in returning to the company via his party’s control over the Fund. This 
                                                       
211 Interview with an employee #2, Kochkor-Ata, May 2013.  
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turmoil at Kyrgyzneftegas has endured for some time as central political parties 
have continued their attempts to get hold of the state company. 
 
It took time for the new management to be accepted by all departments and for 
the Movement for Truth to become a legitimate structure of mobilization for 
workers. This short account is important for our analysis as it shows the 
complexity of ‘mundane’ conflicts in the formation of grassroots mobilizations. It 
also demonstrates that a social mobilization constitutes itself in the process even 
if some pre-existing networks, patronage relationships and identities are already 
established prior to it. Similar to Hirsch (1990), I believe conflict to be a critical 
dynamic that reshapes loyalties and beliefs. This type of observation led me to 
apply in my preliminary conceptualization (Chapter III) the terms ‘initiators’ and 
‘participants’ instead of ‘leaders’ and ‘members’. Neither the workers nor other 
actors constituted at this stage a clear structure of leaders and members of a 
labor movement. Initiators and participants highlight rather those precarious 
conditions in which a grassroots mobilization is formed. These complexities on 
the ground also put in question the easy readings of elite manipulation: internal 
divisions inside the kollektiv were too important for ascribing too much power to 
elites. 
 
At this point, such a picture of blurred interests and exclusive claims led me to 
question whether these heterogeneous groups would be able to move forward as 
a united protest movement with a legitimate leadership and committed 
membership. This question became even more acute with the succession of the 
Director Pirmatov to the national parliament and the subsequent unexpected 
expansion of the local conflict. For rebels outside of Bishkek, this meant that not 
only did they have to deal with internal dynamics, but they also needed to be 
prepared for new complex and obscure developments in the centre. Thus, could 
a divided kollektiv withstand the challenges of an over-complex political system 
and its machinations? To seize a revolutionary opportunity is one thing, but to 
participate in a lasting engagement involving the complexities of central politics is 
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a different matter that requires more resources than those held when an 
improvised takeover of management took place. Expansion and politicization of 
the conflict necessitates a much more coherent organization of the social 
mobilization, with both leaders and members showing continued commitment to 
the cause. I will return to these intriguing questions in the second part of the 
current chapter; for now, I will continue describing the ways workers dealt with 
the sudden expansion of their local conflict and the ways they engaged with the 
central political system. 
 
2.3. Forms of mobilization and the repertoire of collective action 
This section presents various forms of mobilizations in which workers and the 
company’s new management became involved between 2010 and 2014, despite 
the aforementioned challenges related to initial labour divisions and complex 
political connections with the centre. Although I keep the reader informed about 
the ways in which the workers’ movement succeeded in overcoming these 
challenges only in the second part of the chapter, my objective here is to 
demonstrate the workers’ significant capacity for collective action. Here, we will 
see that peaceful protests occupy a significant proportion of the workers’ 
repertoire of collective action, but that these protests were also preceded and 
complemented by ‘conventional’ means such as legal actions, writing complaints 
and political lobbying. Again, we may not expect a weakly-formed peripheral 
movement to be capable of such creativity, resourcefulness and endurance, and 
this adds to the question regarding the conditions in which such a movement can 
eventually achieve victory. In the following, I draw on the most important 
instances of mobilization in a chronological order. 
 
 
Gaining domestic legitimacy 
At the time the takeover was effectuated and the new management was 
established the leaders behind the Movement for Truth were in need of a new 
raison d’être to continue its existence. Moreover, the continued co-optation of 
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workers by Pirmatov necessitated some action towards restoring integrity within 
the workplace and gaining a unanimous legitimacy for the new manager Kanybek 
Masirov. One way of achieving this was to convince the kollektiv about 
Pirmatov’s wrongdoings. Together with the leaders of the Movement for Truth 
and resorting to the discourses about the struggle against elite corruption, the 
new management involved workers in investigating Pirmatov’s notorious 
corruption schemes. 212 This enterprise became successful in bringing workers, 
the union, the People’s Defence Committee and the new management together. 
Resulting from this was legitimization of the forceful establishment of the new 
management, of the continuation of the Movement for Truth and the growing 
politicization of the kollektiv. Below I would like to give one example of this joint 
enterprise against corruption between the new management and workers. 
 
One of these corruption cases concerned the production process, since it was 
related to the purchase of drilling equipment from China worth of 8.5 MLN 
USD.213 The case was important, because it concerned the first new equipment 
ever bought by the company since the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the 
significant post-revolutionary slowdown of the economy, it was vital to launch 
new drilling sites and secure the extraction of at least 80 000-100 000 tonnes of 
oil annually. To carry out their investigation of the Chinese equipment, 
management put together a special delegation to China. In China, they 
established that equipment similar to what had been purchased cost only 3.7 
MLN USD. The difference between the real price and that agreed upon by 
                                                       
212 A full list of financial violations between 2008 and 2011 can be found in the official Zakluchenie 
Mejvedomstvennoi komissii po itogam revizii finansovo-hozaistvennoi deiatelnosti OAO 
‘Kyrgyzneftegaz’ za period s 1 ianvarya 2008 goda po 1 uinya 2011 goad [The conclusion of the 
Interdepartmental Commission for the audit of financial and economic activity of JSC 
‘Kyrgyzneftegaz’ between 1 January 2008 and 1 June 2011], [Online], Available at: 
http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/211207 [29 June 2015]. 
213 General prosecution draws a map revealing Pirmatov’s ‘scheme’ under which the drilling 
equipment was purchased, ‘Genprokuratura ozvuchila detali korrupcionnoy shemy mejdu 
‘Kyrgyzneftegazom’ i ‘Unitrade Company’ [General Prosecution announced details of the 
corruption scheme between ‘Kyrgyzneftegaz’ and ‘Unitrade Company’], Knews (4 April 2012), 
Available at: 
http://www.knews.kg/action/13775_genprokuratura_ozvuchila_detali_korruptsionnoy_shemyi_mej
du_kyirgyizneftegazom_i_yunitreyd_kompani/ [29 June 2015]. 
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Director Iskhak Pirmatov (4.8 MLN USD) was thus revealed and later publicized 
in mass media. In addition, the successful purchase of equipment from China at 
much lesser cost put a beginning to the impressive record of victories of the 
Movement for Truth. 
 
Back in Kyrgyzstan, management filed a lawsuit to invalidate the purchase 
agreement with China previously reached by Iskhak Pirmatov. However, taking 
legal steps turned out to be problematic. After the inter-district Bishkek court 
turned down the lawsuit in August 2010, management filed a new lawsuit with the 
Bishkek city court, which in October 2010 made the decision to recognize the 
contract as null and void. Workers were mobilized alongside their managers and 
travelled in order to assist in court hearings held in the capital. These delegations 
pursued a special mission; neither management nor the workers trusted the 
justice system to be free and fair and as a result, their goal was to make a 
‘weighty’ presence at the court hearings to put pressure on judges. As one 
participant of the delegation stated, 
We wanted to show to judges that not only chondor (big men) had power; 
regular people did, too. We thought that in the presence of workers, judges 
would make a balanced decision.214 
 
To effect pressure on judges more effectively, they also organized pickets in front 
of the courts. Thus, groups of up to 100 workers were bussed to the capital on 
hearing days in the autumn of 2010. When on 17 December, 2010, the Supreme 
Court ruled to leave the decision of the Bishkek city court in effect, the workers’ 
belief in their collective action grew even stronger. The outcome inferred that 
workers were powerful enough to have an effect on matters related to their 
positions. This was yet another important record in their long list of victories. As a 
side note, it can be mentioned that the decision to send workers to Bishkek to 
attend hearings was taken during one of the ‘general meetings of the kollektiv, 
which became a regular feature of the movement’s organization.215 The travel 
                                                       
214 Interview with a participant of a delegation to Bishkek, Kochkor-Ata, 2014. 
215 Protocol of the general meeting of the work collective no. 01/16, 17 November 2010. 
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expenses of workers who went to Bishkek were paid from the company’s 
budget.216 
 
Defending the new management 
While management and workers were attempting to get production on track via 
legal actions, the Fund of State Property (controlled by Respublica party and 
allegedly by the former Director Pirmatov) attempted to unseat the current 
management and replace it with a board of directors loyal to the Fund. This 
enacted the beginning of a new and unexpected round of contestation between 
the work kollektiv and the state agency. At the end of January 2011, the Fund 
decided to send a request to the acting board of directors to convene a general 
meeting of shareholders with the objective to elect a new board and a new 
executive. To exert stronger pressure on the acting management, the Fund 
mobilized other state agencies. Thus, in addition to the Fund’s request, the 
Ministry of Nature requested to dismiss the acting management and to elect 
Rinat Makenov as the new executive. Other state agencies effected heavy 
checks on the company. According to a member of the People’s Defence 
Committee, security services, customs, the audit chamber and parliamentary and 
inter-ministerial commissions made 26 checks in total.217  Workers perceived 
these checks as a threat and attempted to demobilize their movement. To object 
to these checks, workers met inspectors from the centre in large crowds and the 
slogan Kirgizbeibiz! (We won’t let you in!). 
 
On 21 April 2011, when the Fund dismissed four out of five members of the 
board of directors, the remaining member made an appeal to the Bishkek inter-
district court to recognize the Fund’s actions of convening an extraordinary 
general meeting unlawful. However, the court left the claim unconsidered. The 
                                                       
216 Some 271 000 som (approximately 50 000 USD) were allocated for ‘traveling expenses’ for 
this purpose; however, the investigation did not succeed in establishing the number of workers 
that were delegated to the hearings. See Pravitelstvo Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki. Rasporyajenie ot 
05.09.2011 [Government of Kyrgyz Republic. Order from 5 September 2011], [Online], Available 
at: http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/211207?cl=ru-ru#р1 [29 June 2015]. 
217 Interview with a member of the People’s Defence Committee, Kochkor-Ata, May 2013. 
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appeal was further transferred to an inter-district court in Jalal-Abad Province. 
Regardless of these developments, on 26 April 2011, the Fund nonetheless 
convened a meeting of shareholders, during which a new board of directors and 
an executive were elected. From the workers’ perspectives, this meeting and the 
ensuing election were unlawful, because they were not carried out in accordance 
with the national legislation on joint-stock companies.218 Three days later, the 
Jalal-Abad inter-district court made a decision on the recognition of the meeting 
and of the new management, and considered both unlawful. However, the case 
was transferred back to the Bishkek inter-district court. This exchange of court 
appeals did not help to regulate the conflict, since court decisions were still 
pending at the time of this research.219  
 
In this instance, workers once again supported management’s legal actions 
against the Fund. On 4 March, 2011, more than 2000 workers were mobilized in 
Kochkor-Ata, an exceptionally big number for Kyrgyzstani protests. 220  They 
opposed the Fund’s attempt to appoint a new board of directors against the will of 
workers.221 Workers took to the streets on 19 April, 28 April and 30 May, 2011. 
During this series of demonstrations, workers presented a list of demands and 
promised to resort to unrest if they were not met. The demands included the 
following: 1) then Prime Minister, Almazbek Atambaev, was invited to assess the 
lawfulness of the Fund’s decision for calling an extraordinary meeting to change 
the board of directors; 2) should the Prime Minister make an unfair or unlawful 
                                                       
218 The board of directors selects the head of the executive body, decides to terminate the powers 
of the executive body and convenes annual and extraordinary general meetings of shareholders. 
The board of directors carries out the general management of the company, whereas the 
executive body carries out the current activity of the company. See Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 
ob akcionernih obchestvah no. 64 (27 March 2003) [Law of Kyrgyz Republic on Joint-Stock 
Companies]. 
219 Author interview with Aman Omurzakov, former Chair of the Board of Directors, Bishkek, 
September 2013. 
220 I rely here on workers’ information and scarce media reports. In Chapter III, I noted that 
protests gathering together 1000 people are rare. 
221  ‘Neftyaniki OAO ‘Kyrgyzneftegaz’ obyavili besrochnuu akciu protesta’ [Kyrgyzneftegaz’s 
oilmen announced the beginning of an unlimited action of protest], Kyrtag (28 April 2011), 
Available at: 
http://kyrtag.kg/news/neftyaniki_oao_kyrgyzneftegaz_obyavili_bessrochnuyu_aktsiyu_protesta/ 
[29 June 2015]. 
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decision, workers would start striking indefinitely; 3) in case of the non-execution 
of the first condition, the Bishkek-Osh222 highway will be shut down.223 Framed 
this way, the movement’s actions turned out to be an effective step toward 
forcing the Prime Minister into ‘coming down’ to the periphery to negotiate with 
the movement. In June 2011, he visited Kochkor-Ata, at which time he promised 
to insulate the acting board from interference by the Fund. This promise was later 
translated into the appointment of an external manager that was ‘above party 
politics’ and hence deemed neutral to the kollektiv.  
 
Forcing the then Prime Minister to the table of negotiations and achieving the 
desired result was another significant success to the movement. Its success rate 
growing, the movement became unstoppable. As Amanda Wooden notes in a 
different Kyrgyzstani context of industrial protests:  
The role of efficacy in motivating protesters is a partial confirmation of the 
collective interest model, acting as a proxy for political opportunity, showing 
that individuals will join a group to protest if they believe their expenditures 
of time, energy, and potential risk will be worth their while.224 
 
The scope of contentious topics in which workers and their leaders became 
involved grew with each round of contestation. At the end of 2013 and the 
beginning of 2014, for example, the movement organized a series of protests in 
Jalal-Abad and Kochkor-Ata to contest the government’s decision to split an oil 
refinery located in Jalal-Abad away from the company.225 The largest protests 
involved 1700 people, according to the local newspaper, Aymak, where 
protesters demanded an end to the corruption schemes behind the split and the 
                                                       
222 This highway is the only road connecting the north and south of the country. 
223  ‘Sotrudniki OAO ‘Kyrgyzneftegaz’ vistupili protiv naznachenia novogo gendirectora’ 
[Kyrgyzneftegaz employees protested against the appointment of a new general director], Kloop 
(21 April 2011), Available at: http://kloop.kg/blog/2011/04/21/sotrudniki-oao-kyrgyzneftegaz-
protiv-naznacheniya-novogo-gendirektora/ [23 March 2015]. 
224 Wooden, A. (2013). 
225 ‘Kochkor-Atada ministr Sariev menen Mammulktun bashchysynyn otstavkasyn talap kylgan 
miting otup jatat’ [In Kochkor-Ata, the Minister of Economy Sariev and the head of the Fund of 
State Property are called to resign], Barakelde (20 December 2013), Available at: 
http://barakelde.org/news:61833/ [23 March 2015]. 
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resignation of highly-ranked government officials responsible for this decision.226 
Protests by workers were successful in suspending the split. Overall, more than 
35 protest actions took place between 2010 and 2014, all organized by the 
Movement for Truth.  
 
Figure 3: Occupation of the company’s buildings in Kochkor-Ata by 
workers, 20 December 2013 (courtesy Barakelde.kg). 
 
Defending local autonomy in the centre 
Along with organizing protest demonstrations in Kochkor-Ata, the movement 
began launching contentious actions in the capital. In Bishkek, participants of 
delegations became engaged in a range of activities: protest-making, raising 
public awareness through press conferences, meetings with high-ranked officials 
and political lobbying.  
 
In Western contexts, social movements generally engage with authorities at a 
local level and target specific ‘addressees’ and opponents. This likely happens 
because social movements are not confronted with the blame attribution dilemma 
                                                       
226 ‘Neftichilerdin kyjyryn kim kainatyp jatat?’ [Who is getting on oilmen’s nerves?], Aymak (1 April 
2014), Available at: http://www.aymak.kg/economic/1021-neftichilerdin-kyzhyryn-kim-kaynatyp-
zhatat.html [29 June 2015]; ‘Kto dushyt ‘Kyrgyzneftegaz’? [Who is choking ‘Kyrgyzneftegaz’?], 
Aymak (22 December 2013), Available at: http://www.aymak.kg/economica/440-kto-dushit-
kyrgyzneftegaz.html [29 June 2015]. 
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and because of a relatively decentralized system of decision-making.227 In the 
case of Kyrgyzstan, several reasons contribute to the motivations of peripheral 
protest groups to ‘transport’ their conflicts into a central arena. These reasons 
include the specificity of the formation of public opinion, the infrastructure of 
Kyrgyzstani mass media and the highly centralized character of state power. 
Regional protests do not always feature in national news and there is no 
guarantee that relevant central authorities will become aware of protests. 
Particularly in the post-revolutionary period, where protests were taking place 
daily and more urgent issues were deflecting the government’s attention, 
attracting media attention at a regional level was difficult for peripheral protesters. 
Staging protests in a central arena therefore provided better opportunities for 
being seen and heard.  
 
One way for workers to attract attention to peripheral issues was the organization 
of public demonstrations in front of primary political institutions in the capital: 
Parliament, Government House, the Supreme Court and a range of different 
ministries. Worker delegations came to Bishkek to stage protests on various 
topics and during different periods between 2010 and 2014. The major 
contentious topics included the vote against MP Iskhak Pirmatov in the 
Parliament, litigations against the Fund of State Property and as previously 
noted, the purchase of Chinese equipment. However, workers had mixed feelings 
regarding the efficiency of their protests in Bishkek. Because too many protest 
groups with various demands competed for the attention of authorities and as a 
result ‘overloaded’ public space they found it too difficult to ‘make a difference’. 
 
Another way of attracting public attention was the use of so-called ‘press 
conferences’. It is worth noting that press conferences have become a popular 
means of communication between society and the system of power, and they 
inform us about the malfunctioning of existing conventional channels of 
                                                       
227 Tarrow stressed a high degree of centralization regarding decision-making in the centre as 
one of the structural factors that conditions social movements. See Tarrow, S. (1994), p. 89. 
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communication.228 The Kyrgyzneftegaz delegates resorted to press conferences 
on numerous occasions; on one such an occasion, for example, they reported to 
the public Iskhak Pirmatov’s continuous interference in the company following his 
removal.229  It is impossible to establish with precision the number of press 
conferences workers gave, however, since these performances were not always 
coordinated among members of the movement.  
 
During these trips to the capital, delegates also sought to meet with a wide range 
of government officials and politicians in the hope of discovering the ‘real’ locus 
of power. To do so, they reached out to the highest-ranking power – the head of 
the then Provisional Government, Rosa Otunbaeva. In the words of one 
delegate: 
We were obliged to seek out the highest ranked politicians because we 
believed that our letters to Otunbaeva were not reaching her. They were 
intersected by her lower ranks. We naively thought that if we discovered 
who the real decision makers were in this country and provided them with 
first-hand information we would successfully bypass the partisan party 
politics and resolve our demands.230  
 
However, workers were disappointed to discover that even Otunbaeva’s powers 
were limited, since in 2011, power had gradually been transitioned to the newly 
formed Parliament and the Coalition Government. However, according to 
delegates, these travels to the capital helped them to better understand the 
complexities of central politics and prepared the background for their further 
engagement with central opponents.  
 
                                                       
228One example of such a press conference organized in Bishkek is ‘Politikam – politiku, 
proizvodstvennikam – proizvodstvo. Obrachenie trudovogo kollektiva OAO ‘Kyrgyzneftegaz’ 
[Politics to politicians, production to workers. Statement of Kyrgyzneftegaz work kollektiv], 
Akipress (3 May 2011), Available at: http://presscenter.akipress.org/news:10301. The 
phenomenon of press conferences is intriguing, as it became a popular tool for communication 
between authorities and society. 
229  ‘Rabotnik ‘Kyrgyzneftegaza’: Deputat Pirmatov meshaet normalnoi rabote kompanii’ 
[Kyrgyzneftegaz’s employee: MP Pirmatov obstructs the normal functioning of the company], 
Vecherny Bishkek (7 February 2012), Available at: 
http://www.vb.kg/doc/178062_rabotnik_kyrgyzneftegaza:_depytat_pirmatov_meshaet_normalnoy
_rabote_kompanii.html [29 June 2015]. 
230 Author interview with a participant of the delegation #1, Kochkor-Ata, May 2013. 
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Workers also learned about political lobbying during these trips to the capital. 
Political lobbying, more so than public demonstrations, permitted targeting 
centres of power more specifically. Thus, workers from Kochkor-Ata believed 
they needed to undertake closer engagement with politics. For example, they 
lobbied for the opening of a criminal case against the former Director (now MP) 
Pirmatov and for the vote to levy Pirmatov’s immunity in Parliament. Aided by the 
Ata-Meken party, they made their entry into Parliament and held private talks with 
more than 70 MPs. Unfortunately for the delegates, 89 deputies voted in favour 
of safeguarding Iskhak Pirmatov’s immunity and in the absence of a majority 
vote, the case was suspended. The delegates were disappointed and concluded 
that pacts with elites were highly unstable: 
After the voting, we checked the voting list and saw that those deputies who 
promised to back up our cause in fact voted to support their colleague, MP 
Pirmatov. They will never surrender one of their own. That’s how the rich 
work.231 
 
For workers, the major outcome of these types of engagements with the central 
system of power was a deeper understanding that the politicization of peripheral 
issues in the centre had its own limits. Lobbying highlighted the extent to which 
elites were ill placed to represent social conflicts whereas the protests revealed 
the functioning of the ‘saturated’ public space. This meant that to stand out 
against the background of other multiple and noisy claim-makers, a protest group 
needed to engage in sustainable repeated public appearances. This type of 
engagement is a costly endeavour and not all protest groups can afford it in 
current Kyrgyzstani conditions. Political lobbying and numerous demonstrations 
carried out for several months by the Movement for Truth is rather exceptional; 
the example of the second empirical case will highlight that peripheral groups 
generally suffer from a lack of resources. On the basis of these examples, we 
can also better appreciate the nature of difficulties that social groups face during 
the course of organizing themselves and politicizing their issues. Finally, this 
example reflects back on the argument presented in Chapter III that fragmented 
                                                       
231 Author interview with a participant of the delegation #2, Kochkor-Ata, May 2013. 
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protest movements require time to establish repeated public appearances and to 
learn how to make coherent demands in order to be efficient claim-makers. 
 
What do the grievances, leadership and membership structure, and types of 
mobilization tell us about the Movement for Truth? First, we see that grievances 
moved beyond their initial, albeit vague framework during the process of 
engagement, as each round of contestation with opponents brought about new 
concerns and disagreements, and newly introduced topics continued feeding 
contention.232 This case offers a different picture when compared to the second 
case study, in which the protesting community was unable to uphold and 
enhance its grievance structure. Second, although due to internal struggles for 
power and party interventions the initial leadership and membership structure 
had been obscure, it became more evident during the course of mobilization. We 
saw the emergence of an interesting alliance between workers and the new 
management as the result of the continuous engagement against central politics. 
Finally, the local repertoire of collective action in this empirical case was 
impressive. From travels to China to meetings with the President and Prime 
Minister, to presentations in Parliament, this movement by far exhausted the 
means that are generally available to other peripheral protest movements in 
Kyrgyzstan. This example also demonstrates that ‘unconventional’ politics, i.e., 
protests, were employed only after conventional channels proved inefficient. This 
leads me to suggest that even in the context of weak state institutions and 
arbitrary rules, official channels remain the primary means of contestation, and 
despite conditions that worked against early collective action, mobilization was 
possible and occurred frequently. Moreover, with every victory and episodes of 
contestation, the belief of workers in the success of collective action grew, which 
in turn secured their continuous engagement. Following the above presentation 
of the contradicting aspects of this study, it is high time to address the puzzle of 
this empirical case study. 
                                                       
232 Niklas Luhmann has suggested that social movements create new topics after their formation 
as a means of self-sustenance. See Luhmann, N. (1993) Risk: A sociological theory, translated 
by Rhodes Barrett, New York: Aldine de Gruyter b 
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III. Unpacking Mobilization Dynamics: Learning Process, 
Opportunism and the Successful Consolidation of Movement 
In this part of the chapter, I return to the primary empirical question to which I 
have previously alluded several times. I am intrigued by the ways in which the 
Movement for Truth succeeded in establishing enduring practices of 
resistance and contestation against the background of an obscure political 
system and the initial fragmented structure of mobilization. The previous 
account of successful episodes of mobilization and the extensive record of 
victories is, of course, an influencing factor in enforcing belief in collective action 
and enhancing movement membership. Yet I argue that this is but one of the 
factors among other important dynamics that account for the sustainability of 
protest movements. In this part of the chapter, I will focus on three points in order 
to ‘unpack’ these processes. First, I will show how resistance groups learn to 
operate in uncertain environments by gaining access to new information and 
knowledge. Second, I will describe the ways in which an uncertain environment is 
conducive to the appearance of opportunistic participants, whom I call ‘brokers’ 
and whose proliferation has detrimental effects on collective action. Finally, I will 
contend that a protest group can sustain itself against the background of both 
demobilizing central politics and discrediting brokers, if the group members 
nurture trust and successfully sideline brokers through specific group processes. 
In addition to the learning process, I highlight three other group processes: 
monitoring of initiators of collective action, episodes of mobilization and collective 
decision-making. I will begin with an analysis of the learning process. 
 
3.1. Learning process and the blame attribution dilemma  
After observing workers’ extensive engagement with the central system of power, 
I wanted to better understand the primary factors in these mobilizations: was it 
the expression of grievances per se (as a public outburst of anger/disagreement 
with the status quo) or the process that is the politicization of grievances? If a 
group had never been acquainted with strategies and tactics of politicization in 
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the past, it may require considerable learning experience before the said group 
can be classified as professional. Furthermore, in addition to the communication 
of grievances is the task and excitement regarding the process of politicization 
itself. The learning experience consists – especially if the group operates in an 
obscure institutional setting and volatile political environment – of understanding 
the nature of opponents, testing the rules of the game, trying to attribute blame, 
experimenting with public space, imitating others and attempting to engage with 
high-level politics before opposing or succumbing to it. One cannot appreciate 
the difficult path that Kyrgyzstani protesters had to forge in order to grow from 
being weak and fragmented groups into consolidated movements without 
accounting for the learning process. However, scientific analyses often yield final 
results that show already consolidated movements, as a result of what Wendy 
Wolford calls the editing off disturbing ‘noise’ and leaving only what is 
‘necessary’.233 Following Wolford’s advice, I will not ‘edit off’ details regarding the 
learning experience, as it has real implications for the movement’s trajectory, 
even if the details expose the ‘messiness’ of the ground. 
 
Improvisation and adventure  
From the previous chapter, we have seen workers employ various forms of 
mobilization in the period from 2010 to 2014. This picture may suggest that the 
workforce represented a collective that featured a high degree of organizational 
coherence. I would like to challenge this argument using the example of the 
movement’s early actions in Bishkek in autumn 2010. In an interview with the 
author, the head of the People’s Defence Committee represented workers’ 
protests as evidence of a very important and novel process, by which ordinary 
citizens such as workers were to appropriate public space: 
Blocking the roads and storming the state institutions are a last option for 
us. We witnessed that laws do not work and formal complaints and official 
letters are inefficient. Only by staging protests can we be sure to attract the 
                                                       
233 Wolford, W. (2010). 
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attention of authorities. It’s politics [sayasat]… In the past, workers were not 
able to engage in politics.234 
 
The above quote illuminates the ways in which workers and their leaders think of 
their contention and their path toward politics, and I will return to this matter later 
in the text. This ideal narrative depicts protesters as actors who have eventually 
managed to master central politics and the business of protesting. Luckily, 
ordinary participants also have intermittent memories of their initial protest 
experiences. The following story of a female participant, the head of the 
Kyrgyzneftegaz’s local kindergarten and a member of the Ata-Meken party, is a 
captivating one. 
KD: When I think of those days when we first came to Bishkek to protest, 
these were crazy days back then. We saw on TV how ordinary people from 
the regions went to Bishkek and we thought we could also voice our 
concerns there (maseleni kotoruu). Upon arrival, we went directly to the 
Government House. We stood there for some time not knowing what to do 
because it was completely silent, as if the building was empty. [Then] 
someone banded from a window and told us, ‘The government isn’t formed 
yet, don’t wait here’. We felt stupid, and decided to rush to the Supreme 
Court. While our men ran I couldn’t follow them. I have a leg problem; I told 
them to hurry and that I would catch up with them later. I didn’t even know 
the address and got lost in the streets (laughing and smiling). It was crazy! 
We were running around the city with our posters. When we came to the 
court, we met the ‘7 April’ guys235 there; they told us that it is actually best to 
go to the Parliament and protest in front of the deputies. So we ran again 
(laughing and smiling). Finally, when we reached the Parliament, which was 
just around the corner of where we were before at the Government House, 
we realized we were not alone. The place was full of other protesters… And 
there we stood not knowing what to do and how to distinguish ourselves 
from the crowd. We didn’t know how to attract attention of the deputies. Our 
men even suggested jokingly to the policemen to arrest us and this way, 
maybe, to catch the deputies’ attention (laughing and smiling). At the end of 
the day, a couple of deputies walked out and talked to us. We were so 
happy that our trip had not been in vain and we returned home! It was 
                                                       
234 Author interview with the Chair of the People’s Defence Committee, Kochkor-Ata, November 
2011. 
235 The ‘7 April’ movement emerged after the April Revolution of 2010. Formed in order to claim 
the rights of families whose members had died or had been injured during the revolution (87 
people were killed and hundreds injured), it quickly became what is referred to in Kyrgyzstan as 
‘politicized’. The movement became involved in a large number of protests on various topics, 
ranging from corruption and lustration to education. It was finally discredited amongst the public 
when a head of the movement’s southern branch was found cheating families who had been 
victims of the revolution.  
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crazy… I will never forget how we were running around in the city not really 
knowing what we were doing (laughing and smiling). 
AD: Why did you participate in these trips? Why did you go to Bishkek? 
KD: We were simply interested in how this all will end. We didn’t really know 
who to talk to or how to talk to officials. We only knew that there was one 
deputy sitting in the Parliament that was elected from our district in 
Kochkor-Ata. But we continued, regardless. On the one hand, we were 
naïve and on the other hand determined, just like children (laughing and 
smiling). We simply wanted to continue and to see what would happen. 
AD: How did you organize your trips to Bishkek? Who decided and how on 
who would go? 
KD: Organized? No, there was no organization as such. Cars were leaving 
from our company’s headquarters to Bishkek and everyone wanted to be in 
those cars. Sometimes we had to come very early in the morning in order to 
reserve a seat and we had to fight among ourselves. People were offended 
because not everyone could be included. I went to Bishkek on a couple of 
occasions because I was a member of the People’s Defence Committee 
and the Ata-Meken party. Later our movement has expanded and many 
more people joined the committee. I think they joined the committee 
because everyone wanted to go to the capital. I am glad to have been part 
of those trips to Bishkek. I was part of our history.236 
 
The events related above hold many important details for our study. First, it 
seems that much of workers’ activities have been decided ad hoc with no 
preliminary knowledge or coordination. The delegations to Bishkek were formed 
in a spontaneous and amateur manner. It suggests that participants had 
conducted no preliminary research. Had the opposite been true, such research 
would likely have consisted of, for example, acquiring basic knowledge about 
major political events such as the formation of central government, making 
appointments with relevant authorities, learning about protest-making strategies 
and tactics, preparing for negotiations, etc. Second, these revelations underscore 
that the workers’ delegations had not been that much different from the rest of 
the actors of that period: improvisation and simple participation in events were as 
significant as the cause for which they travelled to the capital. Additionally, 
improvisation and participation were likely to be a ‘natural’ reaction to complex 
events occurring within the central arena. Third, as the above account shows, 
workers from Kochkor-Ata were guided more by curiosity and a sense of 
                                                       
236 Interview with the head of the company’s kindergarten, Kochkor-Ata, December 2014.  
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adventure than by a specific rationale. In the context of institutional uncertainty, 
rational choice theories are not a fit for explaining protesters’ behaviour. 
Therefore, their protest actions appear as ‘situational’ performances rather than 
professional performances. Only later, through exchanges with other experienced 
protest groups, learning from them strategies and techniques and by informing 
themselves about many ambiguous centres of power did these protest groups 
grow more ‘professional’ in their protest making. As Tarrow writes, ‘once 
formulated and successfully employed, the collective action frame of one 
movement campaign is often imported into the messages of other 
movements.’237 I would push this notion further and suggest that it is not only an 
outward-directed, but specifically an inward-directed outcome, since workers 
created opportunities for themselves by introducing lessons learned into their 
own structure. Again, this example demonstrates that in order to stand out amidst 
other ‘noise-makers’, protest groups require experience and time. Again, the 
account goes against existing theories about elite manipulation in which 
protesters would be following a highly organized structure of events. 
 
The spontaneity of public actions also had a political background: the moment 
had to be seized while the window of opportunity was open, because nobody 
knew how the post-revolutionary political system would evolve from 2011 
onward. These protests differed from mobilizations that occur in both democratic 
and authoritarian regimes, in which the predictability of the regime’s features 
(openness and repression, respectively) allows participants to elaborate on their 
protest claims and to work on their strategies. In the case of the Kyrgyzstani post-
revolutionary environment, events were highly unpredictable and moved at a 
rapid pace. The openness of the post-revolutionary political system was both a 
facilitating factor for the emergence of social movements and a demobilizing 
condition for their further development. On the one hand, such weakened or 
fragmented polity sends a strong message to challengers that there will be little if 
any repression. On the other hand, such polity serves as a powerful depoliticizing 
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factor, because any sustainable contestation requires a responsive and not 
fragmented opponent. I argue that as a state effect, depoliticization rather than 
repression is an important institutional factor that affects social movements within 
emerging democracies. 
 
Knowing the unknown  
Observing the previously discussed restless but confused protesters running 
around in the capital, one might want to know why protesters do not choose to 
address the relevant authority responsible for their specific grievances, rather 
than trying to call out the entire system of power as a whole. Why do protesters 
engage with a wide range of political and legal authorities? A number of authors 
deal with similar questions that concern protest-making in non-established 
democracies or autocracies. O’Brien and Li, for example, show how Chinese 
rural protesters successfully pit one level of the state against another.238  In 
contrast, Debra Javeline illustrated how early independence Russian workers 
had been demobilized in the face of the ‘blame attribution dilemma’, that is, the 
failure to identify institutions or individuals accountable for unpaid wages.239 
These concepts are important because they highlight the ways in which citizens 
perceive the environment in which they operate.  
 
In Kyrgyzstan, far from demobilization, protesters make efforts to ‘transcend’ the 
obscure central politics as part of their learning process. This is, however, a 
daunting and resource-consuming task. Below I would like to provide a short 
example of the ways Kyrgyzneftegaz employees have engaged with uncertain 
central politics.  
 
Let me remind that the Kyrgyzneftegaz company is a state company and that the 
Fund of State Property is supposed to be the workers’ official ‘facilitator’ in the 
                                                       
238 O'Brien, K. and Lianjiang, L. (2006) Rightful resistance in rural China, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
239 Javeline, D. (2009) Protest and the politics of blame: The Russian response to unpaid wages, 
University of Michigan Press. 
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centre. However, as already indicated, the Fund had been ‘high-jacked’ by the 
new corporate party system, which resulted in the high fragmentation of the state 
by party politics and further complexification of the system of power. This meant 
that being a state company, which is supposed to be an advantage when 
compared to protest groups that operate outside of any institutional channels and 
established relations with the state, did not in fact ease the workers’ task of 
understanding better the central politics. The following anecdote by a participant 
of the workers’ delegation to the capital highlights this point: 
In one of the trips to the capital we, needed to confront the bureaucrats who 
supervised our sector, our production performance. In theory, our principal 
supervisors should be located in the Fund of State Property, the Ministry of 
Economy and the Ministry of Energy and Transport. We first approached 
the Ministry of Economy, but once there, we were told that we needed to 
address ourselves to the Ministry of Industry. At the Ministry of Industry, we 
were referred to the Ministry of Energy and Transport. Once there, however, 
we were sent back to the Ministry of Economy. It took us five days in total 
veering between these ministries until we finally established that the correct 
ministry was the Ministry of Economy and a special department therein that 
was responsible for our production. You see, in this country, there is no 
institutional memory; a high rotation of personnel precludes the normal flow 
of information which means that nobody knows anything any longer. I could 
never have imagined that our state system was such a mess! Of course we 
get angry, because nothing gets done in this country!240  
 
The above account illustrates difficult access to state institutions, a lack of 
knowledge about individual rights and uncertainty about centres of political 
decision-making. Another point of confusion for the protesters was the system of 
appointment to official positions, which had been at the heart of contention 
between the Fund and the workers in early 2011. As one employee recalls: 
When the Fund of State Property tried to unseat our managers, we ought to 
have had an understanding of how these appointments worked. 
Theoretically, the corresponding ministries should give their candidates to 
the Prime Minister, who then appoints the board of directors, who then 
selects the executive. In our case, these actors are the Ministry of Energy, 
the Fund of State Property and partly the Social Fund, which holds 10 per 
cent of our shares. Each should nominate their candidates to the board. Yet 
following the introduction of the party system the above-mentioned 
ministries were relegated under the control of five political parties. They 
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began informally nominating candidates to state companies using official 
ministerial channels. We thus suspected that the heads of ministries may 
not have been informed of these candidates and that party bosses 
communicated with the Prime Minister directly. We therefore wondered – 
does the Prime Minister have personal control over these matters? Why 
didn’t he manage to tame the appetite of the Fund, which continued its 
attempts to unseat us even after the government’s decision to insulate our 
board? Are there any rules either way? Or is everything decided personally, 
depending on the situation and elite’s interests? We wanted to safeguard 
our board and to do so, we had to understand where the threat was coming 
from and prepare our own attack. Yet, this was not an easy task.241  
 
Changing coalition government constantly fuelled confusion about bureaucratic 
rules and regulations. During the period starting from the end of 2010 until the 
end of 2014, the Coalition Government changed three times, bringing about a 
change of ‘controllers’ over state agencies and assets. As such, the Fund was 
first controlled by the Ata-Meken party, then Respublica, before moving finally to 
the SDPK. Encounters with state institutions taught workers that the state was 
not a monolith that applies non-arbitrary rules and regulations. Therefore, guided 
by political parties, state agencies can follow interests independently of the 
general governmental line. In a context of pervasive uncertainty, Kathleen 
Kuehnast and Nora Dudwick described the problem of personalized relationships 
and informal politics of corruption as knowing ‘whose rules rule’.242  
 
These inner workings of the system were preoccupying protesters’ minds for 
much of the period between 2010 and 2013. Thus, a significant part of the 
movement’s time was consumed for the purpose of making sense of national 
developments and calculating the behaviour of state institutions and elites. As 
McAdam writes, ‘challengers experience shifting political conditions on a day-to-
day basis as a set of “meaningful” events, communicating much about their 
prospects for successful collective action.’243 It became the responsibility of the 
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union and the People’s Defence Committee to track changes in the coalition 
government and supply employees with insider information.  
 
As illustrated above, the lack of credible information and uncertainty within the 
environment did not limit the quantity of initial engagement of workers, but did 
disorient them in the intermediate term. Complex central politics with unclear 
rules of the game serve as a powerful factor of blame attribution dilemma and 
inhibit many protest groups from developing already at the initial stage of 
contention. Protest groups must have enhanced resources in order to maintain a 
sustained access to information and knowledge located in the centre. We can 
now appreciate that movement coherence is contingent not only on internal 
organizational resources, but also on the wider conditions of economic 
development, access to information and knowledge of individual rights. This 
example provides us with an important context regarding antecedent conditions 
against which protest groups emerge and function. 
 
 
 
3.2.  Opportunism: brokers and institutional uncertainty  
From the above discussion, the impact of an uncertain environment on the 
development of protest groups was highlighted. Protesters were highly uncertain 
about whether state institutions and political organizations such as parties could 
assist them. In this section I would like to develop one more implication of 
political environment on protest-making business. Protracted institutional 
uncertainty has recently given rise to specific actors who employ this uncertainty 
as grounds for business. Within the conflict in Kochkor-Ata, I also met diverse 
actors who presented themselves as intermediaries serving as ‘bridges’ between 
disconnected peripheries and the obscure central political system. These 
individuals were very vocal and politicized but they proposed ways of carrying 
contentious collective action different from what is usually expected. I decided to 
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refer in my thesis to these intermediaries as ‘brokers’ and their activities as 
‘brokerage’. 
 
Why is brokerage an important phenomenon for the study of social movements? 
Brokers have emerged and proliferated in different spheres of social interactions 
and almost in every corner of the country. Their study is important because 
brokers transform, as I will show in the subsequent sections, the protest-making 
process in two significant ways that contrast the Western, generally positive 
conceptualization of brokerage as mediation. First, they use informal types of 
engagement such as cooptation to distort the very meaning of public 
engagement. Consequently, the difficult task of staging a collective public action 
is devalued if one seizes an opportunity to negotiate secretly behind closed 
doors. Second, brokers endanger the sustainability of grassroots mobilizations. 
They distort the complex processes of formulating legitimate demands, 
aggregating a consistent agenda, uniting around recognizable leadership and 
forging a common identity. In the rest of this section, I will describe brokers’ 
functions and provide examples of their interference in protest activities in 
Kochkor-Ata.  
 
Brokers: ‘bridging’ gaps between centre and periphery 
When I began my fieldwork in Kochkor-Ata, I expected to find some sort of local 
workforce led by a legitimate organization or leadership. When arriving at Jalal-
Abad’s provincial centre, I was advised outright to connect with two 
organizations: the local union and the People’s Defence Committee. Local 
journalists and representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) cited 
these organizations as the ‘drivers’ of the Movement for Truth. I should say that 
neither the union nor the committee appeared as brokers or intermediaries in the 
beginning of my study. The union, which was created in 1976, still carried out the 
same official activities as it had during the Soviet era, i.e., improving workers’ 
social welfare. However, during the past three years, its most important role had 
become mediation between the movement and central opponents. The union 
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worked in partnership with the People’s Defence Committee until 2014, when the 
committee became marginalized in favour of the union (I will return to this topic 
later). These two organizations, as partial leaders of the Movement for Truth, 
therefore deserve closer inspection. I will first discuss the People’s Defence 
Committee, because I believe it to have been the primary broker until being 
sidelined, and will discuss the role of the union in the final section of the chapter.  
 
The People’s Defence Committee (Eldik korgoo komiteti) was formed by a small 
group of workers in 2009; however, following the April Revolution, it grew to 
involve hundreds of members. The committee was active within the workers’ 
movement since the takeover of management in April 2010. At the time of the 
first interview in 2011, the chair of the committee could not precisely define the 
group’s exact number of members. However, the labour movement was not the 
only preoccupation of the committee. According to the committee chairman, 
Ondurush Zamanov, who was also an employee of the company, the 
committee’s primary function consisted of mediation between authorities and 
local constituencies.  
OZ: The role of the committee is organizational. We organize meetings 
between the population and authorities. In other words, we serve as a 
bridge (kopuroo) between these factions. I also organize protests on other 
topics of relevance, because people come to me with their concerns. 
AD: What kind of concerns? 
OZ: People come with complaints related to various contexts: farming, 
corruption, micro-crediting, the justice system, etc.  
         AD: Why do they think you can solve their problems? 
OZ: I can’t solve them, but I am good at writing complaints, making claims 
and representing their interests. In other words, as I have previously stated, 
I facilitate the need for ‘bridging’.244 
 
The above reveals that there exists a necessity for mediation between the local 
structure of grievances and authorities, and that special local committees such as 
this one facilitate this gap. It also tells us a little more about the nature of the 
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Kyrgyzstani state and the degree of its ‘spatial expansion’ in rural areas.245 
Specifically, it points yet again to the disconnection between Kyrgyzstani regions 
and the centre, which finds its expressions in the emergence and proliferation of 
these resourceful local committees. They do not claim to compete for state 
performance, since they lack such capacity; instead, they tap into state 
weaknesses in order to harness societal grievances. 
 
When it comes to the labour movement, the chair states that the committee’s 
goal was to defend the rights of employees. This defence yet again appears to be 
a bridging role between the centre and the periphery, and included the following 
functions. The committee fulfilled the function of ‘liaison’ between their 
contentious site and central decision-makers, in that it was responsible for 
acquiring the information and knowledge needed for local protest groups. Here, 
an important aspect of the committee’s job was its ability to engage with formal 
rules and regulations, such as writing official complaints and letters, preparing 
legal actions and reading court decisions. Its services rested on the reputation of 
having special skills in communication, in connecting people and in knowing legal 
contexts. The organization also managed news coverage and was responsible 
for organizing press conferences and giving official interviews. In this way, it 
acted as an important ‘gatekeeper’ of information. Third, in many instances, the 
committee acted as a ‘representative’ of the workers’ movement. Members of the 
committee led protest delegations to the capital and held negotiations with 
officials and politicians on behalf of the movement. 246  
 
However, these functions can be attributed to the leadership of any social 
movement or organization. Besides coordinating, representing and connecting, 
there is, however, another important role that the committee fulfils, that is, the 
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real or imagined establishment and maintenance of political relations. The chair 
of the committee described these activities in the following terms: 
I regularly make trips to Bishkek and keep in touch with politicians. If 
necessary, I can even reach out to the Prime Minister, Jantoro Satybaldiev. 
I constantly keep myself up to date with politics. Here in the province, we 
keep track of big politics (chon sayasat) and the types of alliances that are 
formed in the capital, because these have a direct impact on our company 
[Kyrgyzneftegaz].247 
 
Of course, in the context of major constitutional reforms that change the 
configuration of power, one might suggest that the leadership of a social 
movement should take into consideration political factors and spend significant 
time on cultivating networks and securing political support. However, brokers are 
not typical leaders and the grand statement above is a good illustration of it. It is 
difficult to know with certainty whether the committee chair mentions the names 
of top officials to make himself look important, or if he is indeed capable of 
activating such connections. On the one hand, it is interesting that a factory 
employee apparently requires a daily report about political alliances in Bishkek 
for an otherwise apolitical job. On the other hand, it is intriguing that the highest 
government officials might make themselves readily available to the heads of 
peripheral intermediating organizations. Such claims are heavily exaggerated. 
Given the ever-changing government coalitions and unpredictable alliances, 
central politicians will quickly be overwhelmed by the appeals of such local 
committees. However, the decisive point is that they cultivate at least the 
impression of access to the centre, as well as being in possession of special 
abilities. In this way, they send a message both to the centre and to their local 
clients, i.e., that they can do whatever is needed. Whether they actually can or 
cannot in the end is of secondary importance (after all, they act as gatekeepers 
of their own cultivated networks); what is important is the reputation such 
impressions gain them. Such social functioning already sets them apart from 
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genuine leadership, which rests not only on the impression of capability, but is 
also in reality tested against their successes and failures. 
 
Brokers and politicization of societal concerns 
If the real or fake cultivation of political relations is central to brokers’ position, in 
which contexts do they employ their brokering capacities? The following example 
will highlight the nature of their business in the centre.  
 
An opportunity to make connections with central patrons arose when in 
December 2011 the General Prosecution opened a criminal case against the 
former Director of Kyrgyzneftegaz company, MP Pirmatov. The case was opened 
on the basis of charges of corruption and required a special voting procedure in 
Parliament to levy the MP’s immunity. At this point, participants of the Movement 
for Truth had familiarized themselves with central politics and strategies, as well 
as protest-making tactics. They had already visited the capital on several 
occasions and the voting procedure turned out to be another great opportunity for 
creating connections with an important institution, i.e., Parliament. Since the 
procedure required a majority vote out of 120,248 a special worker delegation, 
including members of the People Defence Committee, travelled to Bishkek in 
order to conduct private talks with deputies. Members of the delegation proudly 
claimed that they had conducted negotiations with 70 deputies (!) in the hope that 
they would support the workers’ cause. However, as we already know, the 
majority of MPs did not succumb to cooptation and the negotiations failed 
entirely. Why then build alliances with politicians if contacts with them turn out 
rather superficial? Why become involved in conventional politics when traditional 
social movements generally criticize mainstream politics for their corruption and 
as a result prefer to employ ‘unconventional’ means to contest existing policies?  
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Again, answers to some of these questions can be found in the features of 
central politics and the ways in which protesters perceive them. Individuals 
observe the central political arena via television and mass media as a place 
characterized by both a high turnover of political personnel and the endurance of 
old elites. On the one hand, by watching how members of the elite compete for 
official positions via the mobilization of allegedly aggrieved social groups 
supporting them, local actors are also convinced that their own mobilization can 
serve as a means for gaining access to opportunities. On the other hand, this 
practice discredits the original, democratic meaning of protests and protesters 
already know that there is little chance that a central audience will believe the 
authenticity of their claims. Most of these reflections are tied with despair and 
disillusionment as my interviews with actors from both empirical chapters have 
revealed. This dilemma leads to some protesters eventually discarding public 
opinion and resorting to old politics, which in the context of the corrupt 
Kyrgyzstani system implies cooptation. From this arises the continuing necessity 
for seeking patrons in the centre. This further undermines any notion of 
democratic meaning inherent in protests if observed by a central audience. This 
outcome exposes the persistence of a ‘vicious cycle’ in which peripheral 
protesters attempt their best to combine methods in a bid to reduce the risks 
related to an uncertain environment and unspoken rules of the game. It also 
shows that brokers and central politics are in a circular relationship reproducing 
dynamics that reinforce their mutual existence. 
 
Thus, brokers cannot view the process of the politicization of social issues as 
merely a part of the protest business; for them, the process is part of personal 
business. They seek to interact directly with central political actors in order to 
send them the message that they can successfully fulfil the bridging role between 
an aggrieved community and the state. In this way, they imagine themselves 
‘doing politics’ in Bishkek and legitimize their role as intermediaries in the eyes of 
ordinary workers.  
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The next question that arises from this observation is what does politics bring to 
brokers and workers? I was puzzled by this question during the entire study and 
was unable to conclude ‘meaningful’ answers from my respondents. Workers had 
mixed feelings about the usefulness of actions in the capital and were inclined to 
think that their achievements were a result of the combination of unconventional 
(radical protests) and conventional (lobbying) tools. In relation to brokers, it is 
difficult to estimate the precise opportunities they observed during the process of 
politicization in Bishkek. It seems that these opportunities are hypothetical; 
furthermore, because it is impossible to know in advance whether delegations will 
return home successful, the capital Bishkek presents itself as a tempting political 
opportunity structure. 249  But would this not render any genuine leadership 
dependant on the highly contiguous outcome of pervasively corrupt conventional 
politics in the capital? I will provide one more example of the vagueness of 
opportunities in the following section. 
 
Brokers and internal cohesion 
Amid the exciting phenomenon of tricky brokerage, it is easy to lose sight of what 
their activities mean for the workers who perceive their employment and 
livelihood in the mono-town as being endangered by central politics. In this 
section, I will highlight how opportunist brokerage morphs protest agendas, using 
the example of a bargaining episode between the centre and workers. This 
episode serves not only the above-mentioned objective of not ‘editing out’ petty 
power struggles, but also highlights the challenges of establishing efficient 
leadership within protest movements in such contexts as the Kyrgyzstani 
periphery.  
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communities and the elite’s substitution of public goods. See Radnitz, S. (2005). This is a valid 
point; however, in my case, what connects peripheral brokers and hypothetical patrons in the 
centre seems to be much less concrete. Brokers try to squeeze something – anything – out of 
Bishkek: a job, some money, a favour, a nice lunch, a treatment at the Issik-kul resort and, most 
important, status. In addition, being able to meet with important men and women like Interim 
President Roza Otunbaeva, or the Prime Minister guarantees respect and prestige upon the 
return of brokers home. 
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In the summer of 2011, then Prime Minister, Almazbek Atambaev, insulated the 
board of management from party interventions, workers did not expect this to 
continue having an effect on their company two years later. Although Atambaev’s 
intervention secured the popularly elected management, the Fund of State 
Property continued its attempts to unseat the acting board at every general 
meeting of shareholders. In the spring of 2013, I attended one such annual 
meeting, during which the chair of the popularly elected board of directors was 
removed. 
 
The annual meeting was organized for the 223 Kyrgyzneftegaz shareholders and 
their trustees. The Fund of State Property represented the state, which owns 85 
per cent of shares. The meeting was highly anticipated by employees, due to the 
controversial question regarding the new composition of the board of directors. 
The reason for this was new pressure to appoint loyal directors, this time 
stemming from the ruling party, SDPK.250 The current Chair of the Board of 
Directors, the well-respected Aman Omurzakov (who had no party affiliation), had 
been unexpectedly relieved of his position. At the onset of the meeting, workers 
aired their concern about Omurzakov’s removal and demanded clarification for 
this action from the Fund, which they did not receive. Prior to the start of the 
meeting, I perceived tense discussions among the workers; they would attempt to 
defend Omurzakov and keep the majority of the board of directors in place. After 
a quick vote concerning other items in the agenda, workers demanded that the 
major issue of the day be addressed, i.e., the composition of the board of 
directors. One by one, workers began raising this issue. 
Worker 1: 
- Last year, thanks to the board of directors, we acquired a new factory and 
a drill. Our salaries were raised and our dividends were secured. These 
achievements were made possible by the current board. We are 
concerned about the fact that Omurzakov is being removed. Explain the 
                                                       
250 The party was formed in 1993 but was only registered on 16 December 1994. Abdygany 
Erkebaev was the party’s first chairman. The current President of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek 
Atambaev, replaced him on 30 July 1999. The majority of the party's membership is drawn from 
the country’s businessmen. The party has participated in two revolutions and is now a leading 
coalition member. Wikipedia, [Online], Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Democratic_Party_of_Kyrgyzstan [23 August 2015]. 
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reasons to us! Why? The current board must remain, because it has 
proven its commitment to honesty and zero corruption! Keep the current 
board or stop the meeting! (Applause and cheers). 
 
Nurbek Kalmatov, Spokesperson for the Fund of State Property: 
 
- Dear shareholders, I am familiar with your problems, as I was myself born 
and raised in Kochkor-Ata. I am a local guy. Today, the state is not in a 
position to make decisions about the future of Kyrgyzneftegaz; this is up to 
the 120 members of Parliament. The Social Fund is another shareholder 
and together with you, we are all in the same position.  
 
Worker 2: 
- Oh, give us a break with your origins! You say we are in the ‘same 
position’, but you have the largest stake of shares and hence impose your 
decisions on us! Don’t indoctrinate us!  
 
Nurbek Kalmatov, Spokesperson for the Fund of State Property: 
 
- I am one of yours; I am from Kochkor-Ata! And on your insistence, we 
have reserved three directors of your choice out of five! 
 
Worker 3: 
- Stop talking about your origins; talk about procedures! We demand four! 
Respect the people! (Applause and cheers). 
 
Aman Omurzakov [current Chairman of the Board of Directors]: 
- You all know that today, everything runs according to party principles. But 
I am not a Respublica or SDPK’s member. Quite to the contrary, my 
support stems from the work kollektiv. I have no idea why they are getting 
rid of me. I have worked here for three years and you all know my work. 
We are one of the best companies – we made a significant contribution to 
the national economy without any investors, all by our own means! 
(Applause and cheers). 
 
Worker 4: 
- We are repeatedly instigating revolutions but nothing changes! The people 
are satisfied with the government and with the board of directors. 
However, if you don’t stop these games, the people will take to the streets 
again! Let’s close down the meeting! (applause and cheers, movement in 
the auditorium). 
 
Ondurush Zamanov, Chairman of the People’s Defence Committee: 
- The People’s Defence Committee has supported workers in their fight for 
the truth. We won’t give up now! We demand clarification from the state or 
we will take to the streets again! (Applause and cheers). 
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Worker 5: 
- President Atambaev has launched the fight against corruption. Does it ring 
a bell for you? By your dubious moves in the board of directors you are 
undermining his efforts! You are working against national interests! 
(Applause and cheers). 
 
By this point, the workers’ anger over the state-secretary’s non-responsiveness 
was building. After dubious movements on the stage involving secret talks and 
phone calls, the state secretary announced a short break. During this recess, 
both workers and the state representatives left the building and conducted 
‘negotiations’. I took advantage of the break to talk to workers who had remained 
in the auditorium. While participants could not fully make sense of the ongoing 
interactions between state officials and the incumbent board, a rumour was 
circulating that Prime Minister Jantoro Satybaldiev had been reached out to. 
When the meeting reconvened, workers exhibited a dramatic change in attitude. 
If before they had demonstrated a unanimous and theatrical-like support for their 
Chairman, Omurzakov, after the break, they appeared to have turned against 
him. 
 
Figure 4: The annual meeting of shareholders, Kochkor-Ata, May 2013  
(© Asel Doolotkeldieva). 
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Worker 6: 
- Dear workers, well … you see, the ‘power’ [biylik] is not as weak as it used 
to be. This power is even able to imprison deputies and can also punish us 
if we continue doing things according to our will. We can lose everything 
and roll back to where we were three years ago. We better accommodate 
the [Prime Minister] Satybaldiev’s person in order to save our remaining 
directors. So, let’s carry on the meeting and come back to Omurzakov’s 
question later.  
 
Female worker 7: 
- You are hypocrites! A minute ago you were calling for everyone to 
sabotage the meeting if Omurzakov’s question was not resolved 
immediately. Now, you say just the opposite. You are proving your 
southern mentality in its best tradition! 
 
Worker 8: 
- No, he’s right. We ought to listen to the state and carry on with the 
meeting! We ought to take the state’s interests into account and not act 
selfishly.  
 
Ondurush Zamanov, Chairman of the People’s Defence Committee: 
- Yes, let’s obey the law, let’s stick to the rules! We need the rule of law in 
our country! Let’s stick to the rules! (Applause and cheers). 
 
The overall atmosphere in the auditorium was tense. A handful of workers tried to 
object to this dramatic shift, but voices supporting the new arrangement drowned 
them out. Ultimately, Omurzakov was removed and workers approved the new 
SDPK-affiliated chair. It is very difficult to ascertain exactly why this shift occurs; 
methods of political ethnography and participant observation do not always allow 
covering the gaps of understanding. In all likelihood, the state Fund and party 
officials had already decided to remove Omurzakov, and the meeting had simply 
been an exercise designed to make workers feel part of the decision-making 
process and to avoid major discontent.  
 
The obscure actions by central actors, however, left the door open for brokers to 
step in. It was difficult to ascertain beyond doubt whether workers and brokers 
knew in advance that the state Fund would play the Prime Minister card in order 
to convince the workers about the change of board of directors. Additionally, 
brokers’ interference made it unclear whether brokers had made a rational 
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concession in order not to lose the entire deal, or because of hypothetical 
opportunities they might gain from the Prime Minister’s cooptation. Regardless, 
members of the People’s Defence Committee used this opportunity to reconfirm 
their role as a bridge between workers and central politics.  
 
This example does not mean that workers lost the overall battle against central 
politics, but serves as an example of how brokers can transform labour 
resistance into yet another instance of cooptation. To be sure, the cooptation of 
social movements is historically known worldwide. In Latin America, the 
cooptation of unions by political parties has been viewed as a threat to labour 
movements’ autonomy.251 In the US, government and sponsors pressured civil 
rights movement leaders into containing their radical demands.252 In Kyrgyzstan, 
brokers offer themselves to cooptation in ways that differ from the above-
mentioned cases. In the case of Kochkor-Ata, the pressure exerted on the board 
of directors was not clear to the rest of the auditorium, but only to workers and 
brokers who were involved in bargains behind the stage. For other workers who 
were patiently waiting in the auditorium, neither the behaviour of their fellow 
colleagues or that of central actors had been clear. This led them to distrust the 
meeting and to interpret the ongoing bargain as nothing more than a ‘political 
game’ (oyun). For them, as exemplified by the outcry of a female employee, the 
process endangered the coherence and integrity of the workers’ agenda.  
 
It is difficult to precisely understand what happened during the meeting of 
shareholders, the agenda pursued by actors from the capital and the role of 
brokers in it. On the one hand, as seen from the above examples, brokers’ 
actions have detrimental effects on collective action. On the other hand, if 
brokers actually behaved as expected, i.e., in an opportunistic manner, the role of 
other workers becomes prominent. Brokers were not the only actors in the 
auditorium who were tempted by the Prime Minister’s real or hypothetical 
                                                       
251 Slater, D. (ed.) (1985) New social movements and the state in Latin America, Netherlands and 
USA: Foris Publications Holland/USA. 
252 McAdam, D. (1982). 
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cooptation. The same, extremely outspoken workers who blackmailed the state 
representatives into sabotaging the meeting were ready to shift position, this time 
indicating a greater degree of flexibility and deference to the central government. 
Quickly reacting to the shift, many workers appeared to be astute, politically 
informed actors for whom contestation and the threat of social unrest became a 
game. 
  
By pointing out the salience of brokerage as an emerging social practice, I do not 
wish to overemphasize the intentionality of actors’ way of thinking and acting. 
Wendy Wolford’s nuanced insight into the contentious politics of Brazilian small 
farmers is very timely in this regard. She writes: 
Whether the focus is on the “people” who engage in collective action or on 
some set of hegemonic actors who manipulate others (in the case of this 
book, the sugarcane elites), someone with access to perfect information in 
competitive political markets is making decisions [emphasis original]. When 
we come across “informants” who contradict themselves or who can’t 
explain their own motivations, we think of these contradictions as “noise” 
and edit them out: nonsense, by definition, does not make sense. And it 
certainly does not make revolutions.253  
 
Although my aim was to highlight the growing phenomenon of brokerage, which 
has spread both in the capital and in the periphery as a response to the 
fragmented state and over-complex politics, I tend to think that the line between a 
broker and an active worker is very thin. Ultimately, when the entire environment 
is conducive to opportunism it becomes generic and can affect many more 
members within contentious movements.  
 
The above poses important questions for our case study in terms of the impact of 
brokerage on social structures and identities. What are the impacts of cooptation 
on peripheral protest groups, on behalf of which brokers pretend to broker a 
deal? Do brokers pose a general organizational risk to the success of a protest 
movement? I suggest that brokerage bears several implications. First, easy 
cooptation undermines true leadership. The outgoing chair of the board of 
                                                       
253 Wolford, W. (2010), p.25. 
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directors, Aman Omurzakov, was praised for having made important 
achievements for the Kyrgyzneftegaz company. However, by the end of the 
annual meeting, the brokers’ actions had devalued his role. This meant that 
everyone, regardless of their achievements, could be deposed if new attractive 
alliances present themselves. Second, brokerage erodes relations of trust and 
solidarity among the workforce. As indicated by the female employee’s short 
interference, workers intercepted other workers’ shifting positions. The flexibility 
of brokers signifies that trust and solidarity can quickly be exchanged for 
hypothetical political opportunities.  
 
The micro foundations of collective action may be invisible in the short run, but 
they present significant transformations for the political system, intermediately 
and in the long run. If protesters do not own their negotiations, if middlemen 
manipulate the bargaining arenas, if collective decision-making is falsified and 
democratic deliberation is simulated, protest groups could wait a very long time 
for the desired change to occur. The distortion of these important processes 
devalues the meaning of politics and the meaning of public protests altogether. 
These observations once more give rise to the question: how was it possible for 
workers to achieve their impressive record of victories through collective action 
against the background of uncertain environment and intervening brokers? As I 
will argue in the final section, the success of weakly structured grassroots 
movements lies in their ability to marginalize opportunist activists and to cope 
with demobilizing central politics, which is conducive to brokerage. I will present 
the means by which workers had been able to do this in the next section. 
 
3.3.  Consolidation of the Movement for Truth 
How is it possible to succeed in the context of significant institutional uncertainty 
when even fellow colleagues act in a way that undermines collective goals? I ask 
under which conditions grassroots protest groups can master external and 
internal challenges, i.e. complex central politics and brokers. Furthermore, what 
means can allow them to overcome precarious conditions, i.e. limited access to 
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information and knowledge, lack of experience in engaging in contentious 
politics, the initial fragmented structure of leadership and membership, unknown 
opponents and others.  
 
In Chapter III, I argued that the creation of trust between the initiators of 
resistance and future members is a pre-condition for any group that aspires to 
transform its provisional performance into lasting practices of contestation. The 
production of trust is responsible for the constitution of legitimate leadership and 
committed membership, which are necessary for giving rise to continuous 
mobilizations. Following the social construction of the protests approach, I also 
argued that it is best to track the production of trust within ‘group processes’. One 
chief group process in which trust is either created or absent is the ‘monitoring’ 
process. Successful production of trust leads to further steps in the creation of a 
movement’s sustainability: learning capabilities, belief in the success of collective 
action, collective decision-making and group empowerment. In the following 
section, I will illustrate several group processes that contributed to the 
sustainability of the labour movement. I will start this discussion with an important 
monitoring process. 
 
Production of trust via monitoring process  
Monitoring is a salient interacting process by which both initiators of resistance 
and future members test one another for authenticity and commitment to the 
cause. It is in this process that initiators attempt to prove to the local audience 
their authenticity, i.e., commitment to collective interests. To be precise, the trust 
under question refers to one’s conviction regarding the commitment of initiators 
and other members for achieving collective interests. Thus, monitoring can be 
understood as a process of repeated observations that are needed for making 
ongoing decisions among participants of contention concerning participation in 
collective action, or alternatively, about disconnecting at any moment from such 
participation if suspicions about non-authenticity take over. Therefore, trust has to 
not only be acquired but also continuously maintained. Monitoring processes may 
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take place at different sites and times, depending on locally available resources. 
In Kochkor-Ata, monitoring was available both during significant events and daily 
routine actions. 
 
In the context of initial internal divisions and external cooptation, trust in the 
initiators of the Movement for Truth and their proposed cause did not come 
naturally; this is obvious from the reflections of a female worker noted below: 
In the beginning I was against his [Pirmatov’s] ousting, because I didn’t 
know whether charges against Pirmatov were true and whether the new 
management would act any better. But the new board gained our trust by 
revealing corruption schemes, by increasing our salaries and streamlining 
production. A year ago, our annual profit consisted of 18 MLN som only; this 
year, we made some 400 MLN som without resorting to production 
changes. This increase reveals much about the previous corruption 
schemes and the honesty of the present management. The current leaders 
now have our full trust.254  
 
The above interview was conducted in 2011, following a dynamic year filled with 
multiple episodes of collective action and major organizational and production 
changes taking place within the company. There was a change in management, 
the intrusion of political parties and petty inter-departmental struggles for power, 
which occurred within a short period of time and did not go unnoticed by ordinary 
workers. Respondents remembered this period as a point of severe agitation, 
which had the potential of placing the work kollektiv and employment in general 
in a great jeopardy. Thus, in order to show support for the new management 
against the central politics, workers first needed to be convinced that the new 
hierarchy was not yet another group of coopted individuals seeking to take 
control over this particular state asset. Against the background of these 
suspicions, workers grew to trust the new management and their proclaimed anti-
corruption cause only when managers showed consistency to the cause out of 
their own accord.  
 
                                                       
254 Author interview with a female worker #5, Kochkor-Ata, November 2011. 
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Management showed commitment to the cause through various approaches. 
First, management had to prove to suspicious workers that they were different 
from the previous management by exhibiting zero tolerance to corruption. For this 
purpose, the new management launched their own investigation regarding the 
Chinese equipment and exposed more of Iskhak Pirmatov’s corruption schemes. 
This gained them some legitimacy, but more was needed. To convince workers, 
the new management also committed itself to new accountability procedures. For 
example, new techniques were designed and introduced for a greater level of 
management transparency. Management established regular meetings that were 
aimed at informing workers of production processes. They also installed an 
‘information board’ at the company’s headquarters that displayed daily changes 
in primary production indicators. Anyone could access this board and receive 
information about the company’s performance, including the amount of drilled 
gas and oil, their prices on the market, etc. Even employees who worked in areas 
not related to production, such as the college or kindergarten, were well informed 
of these indicators; this was displayed in the interviews. This meant that 
information sharing and raising awareness among employees were being 
executed efficiently. As one employee stated, workers have been regularly 
informed about what was going on at the company, from local production plans to 
changes in gas prices within world markets and the impact of these factors on the 
company.255  Nobody wanted to be deceived again as they had been under 
Pirmatov’s management. Thus, transparency of management and production 
helped workers to be informed about the actions of new managers.  
 
Finally, when new management streamlined production indicators and as a result 
was able to raise workers’ wages and increase social benefits, workers felt that 
the anti-corruption cause not only benefitted the new management’s legitimacy, 
but collective interests, too. Workers were convinced about the authenticity of 
new managers who were among the initiators of Pirmatov’s ousting because the 
anti-corruption cause became a collective endeavour. This trust allowed workers 
                                                       
255 Interview with an employee #6, Kochkor-Ata, May 2013.
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to relate to the new management as being their leaders and thus permitted 
gradually to streamline the structures of leadership and membership of the 
Movement for Truth.  
 
Several other episodes contributed to this growing trust. On the one hand, the 
new management communicated its commitment to the cause by making their 
actions accountable to a local audience, inviting participants of the audience to 
participate in, test and follow their decisions. On the other hand, workers had an 
opportunity to observe the behaviour of their new management during various 
episodes and make conclusions about whether it was worth of following them or 
not. As a result of the monitoring process, management not only secured the 
continued commitment of existing members, but also attracted new members 
who had been hesitant about them in the past.  
 
Monitoring processes not only allow for observing the behaviour of initiators of 
resistance, but also of rank and file members. As noted above, one of the key 
aspects to the successful endurance of protest movements in Kyrgyzstan is the 
ability of resistance groups to protect their integrity from the opportunist 
behaviour of brokers. The above-related episode concerning the annual meeting 
of shareholders highlighted the destructive effects of brokers’ activities. The 
monitoring process allows participants to detect and eventually sideline such 
individuals. On my most recent trip to Kochkor-Ata in January 2015, I was 
informed that the primary broker, the People’s Defence Committee, was no 
longer active. To my surprise, the head of the trade union, Raimkulov Akyn, 
explained that the committee had recently integrated too many people with 
different interests and intentions, which had compromised the committee’s 
reputation. Taking into consideration the importance of the public reputation for 
the movement, it was then decided to move the head of the committee away to a 
different production site and close down the organization. In this way, the union’s 
role grew to become central to the organization of the movement.  
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Collective empowerment via belief in the success of collective action 
I argued in Chapter III that the production of trust is a necessary step to make if a 
provisional protest group aspires to sustain its mobilizations. The production of 
trust is a necessary and costly condition, but is not the only factor needed for 
such endeavour. In addition to increasing trust in the initiators of the movement, 
commitment to the cause has a better chance of being successful if individuals 
believe in the success of collective action. Again, belief in the success of 
collective action can be best tracked and explored within group processes. Hirsch 
(1990) contends that actual episodes of mobilization are such group processes 
that either enhance or decrease belief in success and efficiency of collective 
action. 
 
In Kochkor-Ata, the Movement for Truth produced a large volume of collective 
action and an impressive record of victories. During the period from 2010 and 
2014, the movement was successful in safeguarding the popularly-elected 
management against numerous attempts by central agencies to unseat it (with 
Omurzakov being the exception), winning the lawsuit concerning the Chinese 
equipment, effecting the advantageous purchase of the ‘Kyrgyz Petroleum 
Company’ refinery factory and offsetting attempts to split another refinery located 
in Batken Province, among others. Hirsch (1990) notes that actual protest sites 
can show ‘how many are willing to take the risks associated with challenging 
authority.’ Instances such as these establish specific norms for participation and 
belonging that cannot be tested during other group processes that do not involve 
the risk of clashing with opponents or repression from the state. These episodes 
usually lead either to weakened or heightened membership and a varied 
readiness for further resistance. As such, these achievements contributed in 
various ways to the significant transformation of the workers’ consciousness and 
their commitment. First, workers felt part of a distinct history unfolding within their 
town and within the company. Second, they witnessed that the movement’s 
strategies were capable of realizing its goals and were shown that the new 
management was worth their continued support. Third, they realized the efficacy 
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of acting collectively to achieve desired results or to safeguard the status quo. 
This awareness grew during the learning process that I described in an earlier 
section. Consequently, every successful sequence of contention with opponents 
and every fruitful episode of collective action enhanced group empowerment and 
boosted further collective action.  
 
Continuous engagement with opponents also provided endless possibilities for 
constructing ever-new grievances, topics of contention and opportunities. The 
general meetings offered workers an opportunity to make sense of external 
realities and raise their awareness about these realities. All employees have the 
right to raise issues of concern. For example, the Head of the Gas Distribution 
Service stated that he had recently addressed the issue of corruption among the 
previous executives who had served prior to the April Revolution. In doing so, he 
took advantage of the meeting and collected 30 signatures from worker-
shareholders; however, other workers did not support his initiative. The 
disagreement of other workers did not discourage the head of gas distribution; he 
stated that he would prepare his claim better and propose it at the next 
hearing.256 Thus, grievances are constantly constructed (which is in itself a sign 
of a successful movement) and set the movement on a certain path, where 
resistance was already being carried out for the sake of resistance. This means 
that the movement was capable of reproduction. 
 
Collective decision-making via a growing union  
Hirsch stresses that participants are more likely to continue committing to a 
cause if they feel themselves to be part of collective deliberation and decision-
making. The collective decision-making process enables collectives to grow as 
powerful social actors, in contrast to divided collectives with no established 
practices for discussion. In our case, such processes became possible on the 
basis of the growing union. Today, the local union continues to be the primary 
mobilization structure for protests; however, its main value stems from providing 
                                                       
256 Interview with the Head of the Gas Distribution Service, Kochkor-Ata, December 2014. 
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a platform for collective deliberation and decision-making. In doing so, the union 
achieved efficient internal organization. The company is divided into departments 
and each department has a union representative. These representatives serve as 
persons of contact and are responsible for communicating information between 
their departments and the union. Moreover, employees contribute 1 per cent of 
their salary as a membership fee to the union. In this way, the union’s activities 
and resources are stabilized and structured. Compared to its status prior to the 
revolution, the role of the union has been transformed in significant ways.  
 
In late 2014, four years following the take-over of management, the union’s 
achievements were not only praised by employees but were also being widely 
observed outside of the company. In addition to its current base of 2500 
members, who are all employees of the company, the head of the union claimed 
that he was expanding membership to other organizations and groups. Town 
residents who worked in other local companies or who were self-employed in 
local trades expressed their wishes to enrol in the union, which pushed 
membership numbers to 7750. The head of the union was aware of the union’s 
power and worked toward further enhancing it. When interviewed, he confessed 
that he had been considering creating an independent union along the existing 
one, a step that would provide him with more autonomy that was needed to carry 
out protest actions and would remove the pressure effected by management.257 
Presently, the union works in close cooperation with management à la Soviet-
style, with the exception that the ‘people’s management’ had itself been part of 
the workers’ movement. Close ties between the union and management were 
obvious from the fact that the union did not only protect workers’ rights, but also 
the rights of management in relation to central politics. Since the take-over by the 
new management, the union has made a point of delivering press releases 
whenever management came under attack by the central mass media and 
central institutions.258 
                                                       
257 Interview with the Head of the local union, Akynbek Raimkulov, Kohckor-Ata, December 2014. 
258 Presently, it is too early to suggest whether we are in the presence of growing corporatism or 
not; workers relate to their management in the same way they relate to their leaders (as had been 
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Figure 5: A gas source drilling brigade at Kochkor-Ata  
(© Asel Doolotkeldieva) 
 
Returning to the topic of the newly established process of collective decision-
making, the union has organized this within two areas. One concerns ‘political 
issues’, while the second addresses ‘technical issues’. Decision-making 
regarding technical issues had been the domain of the company executive, who 
enjoyed the trust of employees. However, the union wanted to ensure that 
management remained open and accountable to workers regarding significant 
matters and events. Employees therefore participated in the control over official 
biddings that took place within the company. In the interviews, workers 
demonstrated an awareness and pride concerning important bids that the 
company was able to carry out in order to acquire each year: 66 items of 
specialized machinery, 50 drilling pumps and a logging machine in 2013. As 
such, this mechanism of collective decision-making pertains to the desire of 
management to be accountable to workers. However, it serves other purposes, 
too. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the case during the Soviet era), and relate to the head of the union as another leader and 
organizer of social well-being.  
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Deliberation and decision-making regarding ‘political’ issues are organized by the 
union, but is based on the consent of all employees. Each brigade has its own 
informal leader, whose job consists of pre-formulating the brigade’s 
questions/concerns and mobilizing people for general meetings. Employees can 
participate personally in general meetings or delegate their leaders to do so. At 
the end of every general meeting, collective decisions are recorded in the form of 
protocols. Protocols are then signed and sent to a list of individuals that make up 
the main power-holders of the country: the five parliamentarian factions, the 
Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Economy and the Fund of State 
Property. An example of such a political issue involved the management’s 
decision to cancel a purchase agreement between Kyrgyzneftegaz and a 
Chinese machinery producer, which had been achieved by the former company 
director. Decisions made by management that are backed by brigades have a 
much more significant effect on central government and a better chance to keep 
local autonomy vis-à-vis the centre. This issue was considered to be political, 
because the workers’ decision regarding the purchase agreement had 
implications for the government. According to the head of the union, the board of 
management could not make a decision that contradicted collective deliberation; 
it could simply suggest the possibility of reviewing the collective decision and 
offer a new round of hearings. Hirsch notes that the process of collective 
deliberation plays an important role in sustaining membership within the 
movement: 
Committed protesters may feel bound by group decisions made during such 
discussions, even when those decisions are contrary to their personal 
preferences.259  
 
In summarizing this section, I described a number of group processes that 
included monitoring, collective empowerment, collective decision-making and 
learning processes, which I had already presented in the earlier section. For the 
purpose of clarity, I portrayed these factors as distinct processes, when in fact 
                                                       
259 Hirsch, E. (1990). 
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they take place simultaneously. For example, while initiators of the Movement for 
Truth were establishing new accountability mechanisms in order to win the trust 
of a larger circle of workers, other members of the movement were engaged in 
the exciting process of learning about protest-making and obscure central 
politics. Collective empowerment also goes along with collective decision-
making, which can grow only if trust is continuously produced and maintained. 
This is not to say that local protest groups cannot resort to collective action 
without the creation of internal resources. Kyrgyzstani history notes an 
abundance of such quickly emerging and rapidly declining grassroots 
mobilizations. In Kochkor-Ata, too, in the aftermath of the April Revolution, a 
resistance group comprising various local forces was able to launch a takeover of 
management. Yet such episodes may have remained sporadic and limited if 
resistance groups did not establish a basis for sustained mobilizations that would 
serve as a structure of legitimate leadership and committed membership. 
However, conditions that surround grassroots groups can significantly complicate 
this process. In the context of external uncertainty, only confidence in internal 
organization will allow protest groups not to fall apart. This is essentially the only 
process that protesters can own entirely. As we have seen, this can only be 
effected by producing trust in initiators of resistance and subsequently creating 
belief in the success of collective action and establishment of mechanisms of 
collective deliberation.  
 
In this empirical chapter, my aim was to present the Movement for Truth, which 
had been initiated by a group of politicized workers from a state oil and gas 
company located in the small remote town of Kochkor-Ata. During the period 
from 2010 and the start of 2015, the movement grew from a divided workforce to 
become a consolidated movement based on a growing union. To track this 
development, I showed how the workers’ initial public demonstrations had been 
highly improvised, weakly conceptualized and badly strategized. However, 
learning from continuous engagement with opponents helped them to ‘streamline’ 
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many of these shortcomings and as a result, establish by the end of 2014 a much 
more organized and structured resistance.  
 
The impact of political complexity on this learning experience cannot be 
underestimated. Workers had been unsure about which institutions to address 
regarding their issues, about who made informal decisions outside of formal 
regulations and where judges would ally themselves. Uncertainty about these 
centres of power had real implications for social mobilization in terms of form, 
volume and intensity. Thus, the appreciation of politics as not always easily 
readable but as a ‘messy’ entity can explain why collective meaning-making often 
occurs in retrospective and not before or even during the collective action. This is 
yet another reason why peripheral actors may feel confused, overwhelmed and 
misguided by external events. The appreciation of the difficult path they made in 
order to contest central decisions was a reason to take their initial bifurcated, 
provisional and amateurish styles of collective action more seriously.  
 
Against the background of a complex central system of power and an uncertain 
environment, the volume of mobilization against various opponents is another 
unexpected outcome. In the following empirical chapter we will see that not all 
Kyrgyzstani protest movements can afford an extended repertoire of collective 
action and most protest groups are unable to mount their resistance against 
opponents beyond the level of group discussions, provisional protests or violent 
acts. Finally, it is significant that the workers’ movement was capable of sidelining 
a dangerous element – brokers – and their destructive effects. In the second 
case study, we will see that not all grassroots groups are able to insulate their 
activities from individual opportunism. 
 
Finally, this case study constitutes a successful example of the formation of a 
grassroots movement that was able to create internal organizational and 
cognitive resources. It is quite astonishing to observe this success against the 
initial disadvantageous background, which consisted of opaque patronage 
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networks, institutional uncertainty and a divided workforce. Trust in the 
consistency and commitment of leaders and other members of the movement is 
a pre-condition for collective action. In weakly organized groups, consistency and 
commitment to the cause can be tracked only through regular monitoring, 
verification and reconfirmation of the behaviour of others. Episodes of collective 
action and group processes, more than anything else, seem to offer such a 
possibility for the participants in social mobilizations. In the next chapter, I will 
continue exploring industrial conflicts through an example from the gold mining 
sector.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V: ANTI-MINING RURAL MOBILIZATION IN ARAL VILLAGE 
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I.     Introduction 
In March and October 2011, a foreign mining firm, Talas Copper Gold, twice 
came under violent attack by residents of the Aral village in Talas Province. The 
area subjected to mining operations infringes upon farming and pasturage fields. 
Prior to the escalation of conflict, the group of residents put forward their 
environmental and economic grievances against the exploration project at the 
Taldy Bulak mine. Sharing ecological grievances, hundreds of individuals 
attended the initial episodes of mobilization. Thus, environmental risks posed to 
the Taldy Bulak area, even at an explorative phase, became the core issue of 
non-violent contention between a large group of residents of Aral village, the 
foreign miners and the Kyrgyzstani state between 2010 and 2011.  
However, soon enough residents grew suspicious towards the organizers of the 
anti-mining resistance. The ground for these suspicions was the ambivalent 
agenda that the initiators of resistance pursued under an environmental cause. 
For while, on the one hand, their actions aimed to publicly criticize the mining 
firm, this was incompatible with, on the other hand, the aim of gaining informal 
benefits from the firm. Thus, residents were not sure whether the anti-mining 
mobilization was a genuine expression of grievances against the miners or a call 
for co-optation. In other words, it was unclear whether the environmental cause 
served public or private interests. In addition, these initiators were involved in a 
parallel struggle for power within local politics and employed the mining project 
as the main point of critique against the incumbent local government. Watching 
after these ambiguous actions by the organizers of the resistance, residents 
gradually developed distrust towards them and began refusing to further 
participate in actions against the miners. The failure to construct a sustainable 
resistance led the initiators to change their tactics from peaceful gatherings to 
violent attacks against the company. This escalation of conflict, however, brought 
about the fragmentation of social interactions among residents and caused 
further demobilization. 
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In this empirical chapter I would like to investigate the social mobilization that 
involved rural residents, the foreign investor, and the state. As in the previous 
empirical case, I am interested in understanding the trajectory of mobilization and 
the role of trust in securing a sustainable organization of resistance. Secondly, as 
in the previous chapter there seems to be a strong interconnection between 
‘politics’ and ‘environment’ that affects the nature of the organization of 
resistance. Usually, making a distinction between politics and environment does 
not make much sense because environment becomes ‘relevant’ when and if only 
it is politicized on the level of public discussion and decision-making. However, 
as the story develops we will see that actors resorted to various types of politics 
to advance environmental concerns at different periods of the conflict. The types 
of politics involved here concern the ‘traditional’ struggle for power (informal 
politics) on the one hand and public deliberation (open politics) on the other. If 
under the former, the management of natural resources is employed merely as a 
cover and not the primary cause of struggle, under the latter mining has a 
potential to become a subject of public policy. Kyrgyzstani citizens have 
traditionally referred to the former and dominant type of politics as a political 
game (ouyn). The complication in such cases is of course when environmental 
claims are pursued on the level of both open politics and informal politics.  
Second, since the dynamics of mobilization seem to be tightly correlated to these 
divergent political dynamics, it will be important to track how exactly participants 
discover and make sense of these divergences. In other words, I will be looking 
at how the observations of polar political dynamics (open politics on the one hand 
and the struggle for power on the other hand) influence people’s decisions to 
participate (or not) in mobilization. Here I would like to uncover the moments and 
places in which individuals make observations of political dynamics and as a 
consequence form personal and collective opinions about the worthiness of 
participating in mobilization. 
Third, this case of social mobilization differs from my first empirical case in the 
ways the initiators of mobilization did not succeed in constructing a sustainable 
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structure of resistance. In other words, I am dealing here with a failed case. Why 
the study of a failed case is important in comparison to the successful case? The 
failed case is more likely to track those instances in which the construction of a 
sustainable organization of mobilization collapsed and is thus in a better position 
to gauge the validity of hypotheses posed in the dissertation.  
With these points in mind, my research agenda in this empirical chapter consists 
of exploring the relationship between the environment and different types of 
politics that produce social practices of contestation and the outcomes of 
collective action. My goal is to investigate how the interplay between open and 
informal politics conditions the delicate formation of group mobilization on 
environmental issues. In developing this argument, I structure my analysis in the 
following way. First, after a long introduction I draw attention to the place of 
environmental contention. Here, I am interested in developing the dynamics 
between the protesting group and the two opponents, i.e., the company and the 
state. Thus, I will describe the primary stages of mobilization and show how 
initiators of resistance engaged with the state through institutional means and 
attempted to mobilize fellow residents through large public gatherings. In the 
second part of the chapter I begin addressing the puzzle of the unexpected 
decline of mobilization. Here I will explore the reason of demobilization that are to 
be found, contrary to certain assumptions, in the dynamics of open politics that 
have unexpectedly emerged out of public gatherings. I will demonstrate how 
village gatherings led to the exposure of the ambivalent agenda that some of the 
anti-mining critics pursued informally next to their publicly propagated 
environmental claims. In the third part of the chapter I will show the ways in which 
exposure works through public scrutiny and monitoring. I will illustrate how the 
mismatch between private interests and publicly shared environmental claims 
becomes available for observation among wider circles of residents. In the final 
part, I will discuss some of the consequences of this exposure on the trajectory of 
mobilization and local politics. Here, I will demonstrate the ways public exposure 
created suspicion and distrust, which in return led to a decline in participation. I 
will also discuss the consequent fragmentation of the local political space and the 
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inability of residents to act together in relation to the post-arson enforced 
cooperation with the miners. 
 
These issues shall be addressed in turn below. I begin, however, by turning to 
the discussion of existing approaches to social mobilizations; then to the national 
and regional contexts that are helpful for understanding Aral mobilization within a 
wider picture; and finally to a chronology of major events in Aral village.  
1.1. Existing approaches to social mobilizations and the politics of natural 
resources in Kyrgyzstan 
Central Asian scholarship has advanced in the past decade various hypotheses 
to explain rural mobilization, especially in the sphere of mining conflicts. In this 
part of the introduction I will discuss four explanations: a class-based analysis, an 
institutional approach, ‘eco-mobilizeability’ and an elite-centred thesis.  
 
One of the possibilities to understand current mining conflicts is to view them 
through the lens of class struggle. A number of practitioners in the mining area 
(both investors and environmental NGOs) tend to frame mining conflicts as a 
result of domination of interests of the local rich over other social groups.260 In 
Aral, the category of the rich would concern the large group of farmers whose 
lands and pastures were exposed to changes under the explorative activities. 
Unwilling to compromise their source of income, they would turn their fellow 
residents against the mining company. This view stipulates that the conservative 
rich already have a stable income and are not interested in other, riskier, 
sources. The problem with such an assumption is that this group of farmers is in 
fact highly heterogeneous and can hardly represent the village’s rich men and 
women. Most of the landlords in fact do not farm since they critically lack the 
input such as fertilizers, seeds and machinery. While waiting for better farming 
                                                       
260 Interviews with representatives of Andash Mining and Talas Gold Mining companies that have 
operated in Andash and Jeroy deposits respectively (Talas province), Bishkek, 2013. 
Conversations with Kalia Moldogazieva (Tree of Life) and Natalia Ablova (EITI Supervisory 
Board), Bishkek, 2015. 
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opportunities, these landlords nevertheless put pressure on the foreign firm. But 
does their activism signify a clash of lifestyles grounded in class? In times of 
economic depression, when income is hardly stable and land is not a readily 
convertible value, the application of such class analysis is a little problematic. 
Thus the translation of interests of rebellious actors into the class interests is not 
an answer to our puzzle but certainly a complication.  
 
Institutional weakness has become one of the prominent explanations for all sorts 
of structural conflicts in this post-communist state. In regard to mining conflicts 
and environmental movements, a number of local scholars have advanced that 
state weakness had led to an adequate management of natural resources and to 
a week control over the operations of mining investors. The Eurasia Foundation 
has found in their country survey that one of the major reasons of social 
discontent is the lack of communications between miners and local communities. 
The lack of exchange of information between the two leads to misunderstandings 
and misperceptions among local communities.261 Another study by the National 
Institute for Strategic Studies supports this view and believes the major source of 
local discontent to be the non-transparency of mining operations and a lack of 
communications between miners and communities. 262  Elmira Nogoibaeva 
discovered that the absence of successful mining examples and the memory of 
environmental disasters are another factor that informs residents’ negative 
attitudes towards new mining projects.263  In my case, I also found that the 
perceived weakness of state regulatory institutions lead to increased risk 
                                                       
261  Oxus International, (2013) Extracting sentiments: The effect of mining exploration and 
extraction on eight communities in the Kyrgyz Republic’, Bishkek. 
262 A number of reports highlight this problematic: Gullette, D. (2013) ‘Conflict sensitivity in the 
mining sector of the Kyrgyz Republic’, OSCE Academy, Bishkek; National Strategic Research 
Institute of the Kyrgyz Republic [NSRI KR], (2013) Faktory negativnogo (nepriyaznennogo) 
otnosheniya mestnogo naseleniya k investoram, razrabotchikam mestorozhdenii poleznykh 
iskopaevykh, vzaimootnosheniya nedropol’zovatelei i mestnykh soobshchestv’ [Factors of the 
local population’s negative (hostile) attitudes towards investors, developers of mineral deposits, 
and the relationship between subsoil users and local communities], Bishkek. 
263 Nogoibaeva, E. (2016) ‘Zoloto Batkena. Socialno-kulturnye aspekty vzaimodeistvia mestnyh 
soobchestv i investorov v KR: (po rezultatom polevyh issledovaniy na primere Batkenskoi oblasti 
v sfere izvlechenia i ispolzovania prirodnih resursov)’, Bishkek, 2016. [‘The gold of Batken. Socio-
cultural aspects of relationships between local communities and investors in Kyrgyz Republic: 
based on fieldwork research in Batken province in the sphere of natural resources extraction]. 
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perceptions among residents exposed to new mining experiences. To these I 
also add another important factor; the authoritarian legacy.  I suggest that miners’ 
non-transparent operations during authoritarian regimes have led to situations in 
which the local control over mining has become a source of jealousies, rumours 
and competition between local factions.264 Competition for gold resources further 
produces ever-new rounds of informal politics whose workings are not clear to 
ordinary residents. In addition, residents cannot keep up with complex 
information and knowledge that extraction entails against the background of 
weak local institutions and ‘the absence’ of the central state.265 In my empirical 
chapter, I discuss the inefficiency and weakness of state institutions and the 
regime legacy for understanding why and how conflicts erupt in this sphere. 
 
Another popular explanation of current mining and environmental mobilizations is 
the elite-centred approach. Although anthropologists studying Central Asia have 
numerously highlighted the role of natural resources in local socio-economic, 
political and spiritual culture, 266 the elite-centred approach implies that natural 
resources are a residual category of elite struggle and manipulation. The role of 
local and national elites in supporting and sponsoring contentious claims within 
other contexts of ‘resource’ conflicts has been highlighted in the recent literature. 
Amanda Wooden explains: ‘elites sometimes use environmental concerns to 
motivate people, organize pseudo-green political actions, or co-opt 
environmentally related demonstrations.’267 Thurman (2002) notes, for example, 
                                                       
264 This chapter does not have the necessary scope to discuss the mining politics that served the 
authoritarian crony regimes of Akaev and the Bakievs. For examples of corruption and money-
laundering in the extractive industry during the era of the Bakievs, see Doolot, A. and 
Heathershaw, J. (2015) ‘State as resource, mediator and performer: understanding the local and 
global politics of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 34, no.1, March, pp. 93-
110. 
265 Local institutions such as local councils (ayil kenesh) and local administration (ayil okmot) that 
have been until recently stripped of real power. In 2013, the government initiated the so-called 
‘territorial-administrative reform’ in which the decision-making was reduced from a triple level 
(central bureaucracy-regional administration-local administration) to a double level (central 
bureaucracy-local administration). Although local institutions have received leverage on some of 
the issues concerning industry but they cannot exploit fully their potential due to being 
understaffed, lacking knowledge and information. 
266 Inogamova-Hanbury, Z. (2015), p. 200; Bichsel, C. (2009), p. 57; Reeves, M. (2014a), p. 61. 
267 Wooden, A. (2013). 
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that the rich in rural Central Asia use their social position to improve their water 
supplies. When it comes to extraction resources, a number of mining companies 
have advanced that members of national elite were behind the competing 
companies and community discontent. This important thesis draws our attention 
to informal politics on which Central Asian societies run and function.  
 
Although one cannot disagree with Reeves’ observation that the Kyrgyzstani 
contexts are ‘increasingly dominated by the interests of local patrons who 
perceived themselves to be above the law’268, there are problems with the elite-
manipulated thesis as such. It ends up silencing other, non-elite, interests and 
grievances that are crucial for understanding social mobilizations. Wooden, who 
conducted a public opinion survey in 2009, figured important individual 
environmental philosophies behind the ‘eco-mobilizeability’ in Kyrgyzstan. 269 
Countering the elite-centred approach, she has identified a complex set of 
variables in an attempt to explain environmental activism in Kyrgyzstan. These 
include blame specificity, problem salience, individual environmental philosophy 
and environmental behaviours. These variables would perfectly echo perceptions 
and attitudes of ordinary residents who view their Talas province as a place of 
ecological agricultural production. 
 
Yet, although environmental concerns are significant in the Kyrgyzstani contexts 
of mining, these variables might intersect in many unexpected ways and produce 
varying outcomes, all of which are dependent on local contexts. Most importantly, 
the ‘eco-mobilizeability’ explanation does not solve the question of power when it 
comes to Kyrgyzstani mining conflicts in which actors involved can easily divert 
the environmental theme to cover up power games. The issue of power cannot 
be discarded from mining conflicts. It would be a mistake to assume that it is 
possible to separate the possibility of political manipulation and the domination of 
                                                       
268 Reeves, M. (2014c) ‘The time of the border: Contingency, conflict, and popular statism at the 
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary’, in Reeves, M., Rosanayagam, J. and Beyer, J. Ethnographies 
of the state in Central Asia: Performing politics, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p. 
203. 
269 Wooden, A. (2013). 
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materialistic interests from natural resources (or any other topic) in the context of 
impoverished rural areas and harsh neo-liberal measures. Whereas the 
institutional approach is focused too much on structural factors, the elite 
approach is over-deterministic of the role of informal actors, the class thesis is 
less sensitive to political dynamics. The task ahead, then, is to find an analytical 
and conceptual model in which power interests and social concerns are not 
mutually excluded but explored under a complex interplay of local politics. 
 
Studying this case of social mobilization including the actors, grievances and 
agendas involved was a daunting task. How to account for incidents of informal 
politics if the very essence of such politics is secrecy? How to make sense of 
actors’ veiled intentions and strategies if, in addition, the volume of surrounding 
rumours complicates the analysis? My successive field trips are a great 
illustration of these difficulties. As I way paying visits to Aral village and Talas 
oblast in various years, I was consecutively exposed to different local narratives 
about what happened between the miner and residents. For example, at the early 
stage of my research local institutions such ayil okmot (village administration), 
ayil kenesh (village council), women and aksakal (the elders’) councils were 
reluctant to talk to me or kept formal accounts of events. In summer 2012, six 
months after the community has reached a post-conflict agreement with the 
company the favorite narrative circulating among residents was the ‘third forces’ 
explanation. According to this account, ‘external’ actors that did not belong to the 
community carried out the attack on the company’s geological camp. The 
external actors abstractly included members of the central elite, competitive 
mining firms and criminals. Later in 2014, this narrative was replaced by more 
moderate explanations. During my recent trips in 2014 and 2015, residents 
showed a greater acceptance of these events and attributed the guilt on specific 
individuals rather than on mysterious third forces. This was due partly to changes 
in local personnel and the removal of several anti-mining critics from the position 
of power. These changes in the local mosaic of power distribution have allowed a 
number of former officials to speak freely about the past events. Thus some 
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residents explained the anti-mining mobilization as a residual result of the 
struggle for power among local factions. Others were still confused unable to 
make sense of informal politics and contradicting rumours. The anti-mining critics 
themselves viewed their activities as a work of opposition.  
 
These changing economies of interests have also translated into the 
complications in access to information. Multiple activists refused to give interview 
whereas the removal of several leading figures has reduced the number of my 
informants. My accounts of the organization of resistance were therefore based 
primarily on personal interviews with one chief organizer, Sabyr Mamytov,270 and 
other provisional participants within the episodes of mobilization. I also used 
records and protocols of public gatherings that Sabyr Mamytov has carefully kept 
in his home archive.   
 
1.2.  National and regional contexts of resource extraction 
The attacks on Talas Copper Gold took place amid complex national, regional 
and local contexts. Kyrgyzstan is the CIS’s third largest gold producer, after 
Russia and Uzbekistan. Large-scale gold mining is the country’s primary export 
commodity and accounted for 30% of total exports in 2011.271 With more than 60 
gold deposits discovered (containing 448 tonnes of gold), only five mines are 
currently active, but even these make up more than 80% of incomes from the 
entire mining sector.272 Against this economic background, social insurgency 
against the extractive industry becomes particularly important for the country and 
for its significance to protest themes. As Wooden (2013) correctly observed, 
‘since 2010, anti-gold mining protests have reached the national level and have 
become regular and sustained across the country, against mines in every 
province.’ According to the National Agency of Geology and Mineral Resources, 
in 2012, there were more than 40 conflicts related to gold-mining projects in 
                                                       
270 The names of respondents are changed for their protection. 
271 Doolot, A. and Heathershaw, J. (2015). 
272 Bogdetsky, V., Ibraev, K. and Abdyrakhmanova, J. (2005).  
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Kyrgyzstan.273  
 
One reason why many projects in the country’s provinces have been halted at 
the explorative stage is linked to the controversial example of the largest gold 
production project, Kumtor in Issik-kul oblast, eastern Kyrgyzstan. In 1996, 
Kumtor, with reserves of more than 300 tonnes of metal and a production 
capacity of 650 thousand ounces per year, began production. However, following 
a cyanide spillage in 2002 and the involvement of high-ranked Kyrgyzstani state 
officials in corruption, 274  this gold mine turned into an epicentre of political 
controversies and local contention. According to Charles Buxton, this event also 
initiated a nation-wide environmental movement. 275  Controversies regarding 
Kumtor have provoked considerable political debate within the country regarding 
the nature of such developments for society and the environment, the absence of 
appropriate public participation and consultation, decision-making and regulatory 
processes, as well as concerns about the impacts of extractive industries on 
glaciers and wildlife. More recently, political disputes concerning Kumtor have 
even led to an attempt of unconstitutional overthrow of the government in the fall 
of 2011. 276  In October 2011, the political party Ata-Jurt initiated peaceful 
demonstrations in favour of the nationalization of Kumtor, which led to appeals 
for the takeover of ‘power’.277 These events gave a new impetus to a local 
mobilization in Saruu village (Issik-kul Province), which went as far as taking the 
provincial governor hostage and extorting financial compensation from Centerra 
Gold, the Kumtor operator. The subsequent major governmental crackdown of 
this anti-Kumtor local opposition in October 2013 was meant to show a 
‘formalization’ effort of state control and the political disciplining of other anti-
                                                       
273  State Agency of Geology and Mineral Resources, (2013) [Online], Available at: 
http://www.geology.kg/mineral/data [20 February 2013]. 
274 On corruption in the mining sector see Research Institute Fraser, (2011) Annual reports on 
global mining [Online], Available at: www.fraserinstitute.org [20 February 2013]. 
275 Buxton, C. (2011), p.62. 
276 For a full account of the Kumtor crisis see Gullette, D. and Kalybekova, A. (2014) ‘Agreement 
under pressure: Gold mining and protests in the Kyrgyz Republic’, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 
Bishkek. 
277  Doolotkeldieva, A. ‘Kyrgyz nationalist leader routed’, IWPR (19 October 2012), [Online], 
Available at: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/kyrgyz-nationalist-leader-routed [23 August 2015]. 
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mining activities across the country. 
 
Talas Province,278 in which Aral village and the Taldy Bulak mine are located, can 
be considered as the bedrock of anti-mining resistance, independent of Kumtor. 
The first peak of anti-mining protests in Talas Province coincided with the 
democratic openings in the aftermath of the Tulip Revolution, between 2005 and 
2007. The second peak occurred in the aftermath of the April Revolution, 
between 2010 and 2013. In these areas, local opposition demanded for a better 
government control or even the nationalization of gold mines (Buxton, 2011: 92). 
It appears that the two revolutions served as powerful triggers for mobilizing local 
populations on natural resources, which served as opportunities for opposing 
central policies and changing local orders. Some of these resistance efforts were 
successful. As a result of local resistance, for example, the Andash Project has 
been suspended since June 2011 and the Jerooy Project was reopened only 
recently, in June 2015.  
 
For Aral, contributing to the propagation of anti-mining resistance was particularly 
influential in terms of informal connections between Talas and Issik-kul 
opposition groups, 279  as well as for the dissemination of press and video 
materials about environmental violations by Ata-Jurt party. Yet, although national 
images and regional informal networks are important for propagating extractive 
resistance, Wooden (2013) rightly argues that ‘eco-mobilizeability’ is a place-
based phenomenon, so ‘subnational differences in protest occurrence and 
participation matter.’ This brings us to the local context, i.e. Aral village, where 
open contestation of a foreign miner took place between 2010 and 2012. 
 
1.3. Local context and chronology of major events in Aral 
                                                       
278 Talas Province is an oblast in northern Kyrgyzstan with its capital being the town of Talas. With 
an approximate population of 220 000, its primary economic resources are gold and the 
agricultural production of beans and potatoes. See Wikipedia [Online], Available at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talas_Region [23 July 2015]. 
279 The scope of this chapter does not allow for further developing this intriguing theme; I 
nonetheless have to note that the learning process in Aral had been stimulated by the sharing of 
experiences with anti-mining ‘activists’ from other sites within the country. 
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Talas Copper Gold came to Talas in 2005 under an official license to explore the 
Taldy Bulak gold and copper deposit. The company was originally a joint venture 
between Gold Fields, a subsidiary of South African assets and Orsu Metals, a 
British corporation. In July 2012, Orsu Metals sold Gold Fields its 40% stake in 
Talas Copper Gold and Gold Fields became the sole owner of the exploration 
license. Only 15 km from the Andash mine, the Taldy Bulak deposit is located on 
the southern slope of the Kyrgyz range on the right bank of the Karakol River, in 
the basin of the Taldybulak stream. The State Agency of Geology and Mineral 
Resources estimates gold and copper reserves in Taldy Bulak to be 120 tonnes 
and 80 000 tonnes, respectively, which makes the mine one of the largest 
deposits in the country.280  
 
Figure 6: Location of Aral village, Talas Province, Northern Kyrgyzstan 
 
Aral village is located 4,5 km from the Taldy-Bulak mine and hosts a population 
of 4000.281 Judith Beyer writes that Aral is divided into two parts, upper and lower 
Aral, which is noted by ‘the fact that there are two schools, two pharmacies and 
two mosques in the village – one for each side.’282 This division of the village is 
also political. Although organizers of the anti-mining resistance have officially 
framed their activities as representing the attitudes of the entire Aral population 
                                                       
280State Agency of Geology And Mineral Resources, [Online], Available at: http://www.geology.kg 
[15 June 2015]. 
281  Talas rayonu, Aral Ayil okmotunun pasportu [Talas district, passport of the Aral village 
government], (2015).  
282 Beyer, J. (2011) ‘Settling descent: place making and genealogy in Talas, Kyrgyzstan’, Central 
Asian Survey, vol. 30, nos. 3-4, September-December, pp. 455-468. 
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(Aral eli), resistance has primarily involved ‘members’ of the Chokoi line of 
descent.283 The implication of this uruu was due to two reasons: the Chokoi’s 
lands were being subjected to mining operations among the lands of other uruus 
and the primary organizers of resistance were descendants of the Chokoi. During 
the early independence years, 73 families of the Chokoi uruu were allocated land 
plots in the Taldy Bulak area, which today constitutes an important if not their 
primary source of income. 284 Thus, members of the Chokoi and organizers of 
anti-mining resistance claimed that explorative operations had led to decreased 
harvests and the death of animal stocks, and claimed that these operations 
presented major risks for wildlife in the area.  
 
The ‘core group’ of mining critics were known to many residents and involved 
mainly such individuals as the former school director and her husband (the 
former head of ayil kenesh), the head of the commission ‘on removing the 
company’, the current head of ayil okmot, the head of a local association Beishe 
Ata, several local council deputies and small local entrepreneurs such as grocery 
shop owners. They called themselves anti-mining ‘activists’. 
 
According to the accounts of Sabyr Mamytov, the head of Beishe Ata 
association, they began opposing to mining in 2007, when some of them became 
part of an informal opposition movement against the Bakievs’ regime. Sabyr 
Mamytov was, for example, delegated from the upper Talas district to attend a 
secret opposition gathering in Arashan village (Chui oblast) organized by the 
founder of the SDPK party and current President Almazbek Atambaev. Following 
this meeting, Sabyr Mamytov became part of an organization called ‘Support to 
Revolution’ as a representative from the Talas district.  
 
                                                       
283 I refer to Chokoi uruu in the way that actors themselves employ it. 
284 Sabyr Mamytov writes that next to Chokoi, other uruus also have land plots in the Taldy Bulak 
area such as Tolobai, Kalmak and Iygilik. See his official letter to the Talas District Administration, 
dated 24 February 2009. Beyer writes that after the disintegration of the kolkhoz system, land 
plots were distributed among residents according to the uruu principle. See Beyer, J. (2011). 
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As I understood from his account, their opposition to the mining company was 
boosted by their membership in opposition to the regime.285 At the end of 2007, 
Sabyr Mamytov and other members had already written official complaints to 
various regional and central agencies about the wrongdoings of the ayil okmot 
and ayil kenesh. In 2008, they formed a ‘group of control’ with the objective of 
defending the farmers’ rights and interests against the mining company’s 
operation on their lands. In February 2009, at their urge, the central government 
formed a special commission to verify the activities of ayil okmot in relation to 
mining.286 By that time they became members of diverse local and regional 
associations that sprung informally in opposition to the incumbent regime. Not 
surprisingly, when the demise of the Bakiev’s regime began Sabyr Mamytov and 
other residents from Aral have participated in the regional uprising in Talas town 
on 6 April 2010 that set the tone for a national rebellion against the regime.  
 
Following the demise of regime and the all-consuming revolutionary mood, the 
anti-mining activists returned to their village to begin mobilization against the 
miner. On 9 April 2010, a large crowd marched on the camp with slogans reading 
‘Kompania ketsin!’ – a statement imploring the removal of the company from the 
area. Arrived at the geological camp, they demanded the management of Talas 
Copper Gold to turn down all activities and remove their equipment in due time. 
The statement was even signed by the rayion akim, the head of district 
administration, not counting the present heads of local institutions. The activists 
organized another four large gatherings to demand the removal of the company 
yet to no avail.  
                                                       
285 See very rare news reports: ‘Talas raionunda Aral ayil okmotunun bashchysynyn mamlekettik 
mulktu tuura emes paidalangan dep ayiptashuuda’ [in Aral village of Talas district, the head of ayil 
okmot is accused of misuse of state property], Azattyk (10 November 2007) Available at: 
http://www.azattyk.org/archive/ky-news/20071213/828/828.html?id=1273408 [15 July 2015]. 
286  The commission’s response to Ismailov and Sabyr Mamytov, 11 February 2009. The 
commission consisted of the Talas Regional Financial Police, Talas Regional Department of 
Agriculture and Construction, Talas Regional Department of Emergency and representatives of 
the Central Agency for Local Self-Government. In their conclusion, the commission stated that the 
then head of the village administration did not provide complete information about the company’s 
social assistance and financial reports. However, the commission’s finding did not satisfy the 
activists’ demands. 
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The apogee of their anti-mining activities was a violent turn. The company’s 
camp was attacked and set on fire on two occasions, in March and October 
2011. The first attack on the company took place on 11 March, 2011. By this 
time, the company was not complying with demands and was undertaking 
measures necessary to win back cooperation of residents. While the company 
initially agreed to retract from the mine and even transferred part of its equipment 
to Talas, it also introduced a special liaison person who was responsible for 
repairing the company’s relationship with the community. The liaison person has, 
however, gained a bad reputation for having co-opted residents through various 
offers of employment and thus interfering with plans of the anti-mining activists. 
The company also established a local office – something that was deemed 
unnecessary during the previous authoritarian regime as all lucrative projects 
were decided in the centre.  
 
On 11 March 2011, residents gathered at the company’s local office in order to 
clarify its employment policy. According to a number of participants, they were 
promised employment and were placed on the company’s employment list. 
Residents considered the creation of an employment list as part of the company’s 
strategy to stay in the area.287 While the crowd continued to grow near the office, 
some participants began galvanizing people to go to the camp. They shouted, ‘If 
you are men, then let’s go to the camp!’ Participants then began mobilizing and 
moving toward the camp. Upon their arrival, residents demanded that Company 
Director Morozov talk to them. However, only geologists were present at the 
camp and residents were not given answers to their questions. At some point, 
amid the agitation and frustration of participants, the company’s premises were 
set on fire.  
 
                                                       
287 Although I do not discuss in length the investor’s strategies to remain at the mine and win back 
cooperation of residents, it is clear that the company’s politics prior and after the revolution played 
a role in the trajectory of mobilization. 
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It is unclear whether the arson had been accidental or a purposeful act. 
According to Sabyr Mamytov who had been present at the camp that day, the 
arson was an accident that happened because the premises had been 
constructed of wood and was therefore easily inflammable. Some participants 
say they did not plan or know that their march would end violently. Some of them 
even regretted being part of that march: the lack of experience regarding the 
organization of peaceful demonstrations had led to a loss of control among 
agitated individuals. 288  The company staff, however, noted that it was 
nonetheless a well-organized mobilization, because people had been bussed to 
and from the camp and alcoholic beverages had been generously distributed 
among them.289 Representatives of the police and the security services who were 
at the camp, together with other participants, did not prevent the incident.290  
 
In the aftermath of the arson, village authorities issued an official statement in 
which they condemned the attack and prescribed that the attackers compensate 
for the damage caused. Special security services established heavy surveillance 
on the resistance organizers, which successfully caused the defection of a 
number of anti-mining activists. The wife of one activist stated that one of the 
reasons she and her husband defected had been the difficulty of withstanding the 
pressures stemming from police and security services.291 While the police did not 
intervene during the actual episodes of mobilization and violent attacks, they 
became very active in-between these episodes. According to the activists, local 
police and special security officers exploited citizens’ resistance as an 
opportunity to extort money from the company and hence turn a blind eye to 
citizens’ complaints.292 The extent of surveillance and informal pressures exerted 
                                                       
288 Interview with a participant #1, Aral, August 2012. 
289 Interview with the employees of the Talas Copper Gold, August 2012, Bishkek. 
290  Erica Marat wrote about the current state of police in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and 
convincingly found that ‘alienated police officers might be able to decrease levels of crime, but the 
institution often loses its capacity to predict and prevent any escalation of tensions and 
mobilization among disaffected groups’. See Marat, E. (2014) ‘Policing public protest in Central 
Asia’, Central Asia Affairs, vol.1, no.1, pp. 5-23. 
291 Interview with the wife of an activist, Aral, November 2014. 
292 This is in line with many expert evaluations of the Kyrgyzstani law enforcement bodies as 
increasingly politicized, corrupt and disconnected from society. See Lewis, D. (2011) 
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on participants in grassroots mobilizations is another aspect to the difficult 
protest-making process in Kyrgyzstan. As opposed to direct repression, 
aftermath covert operations by the law enforcing bodies played a crucial role in 
intimidating and demobilizing activists.  
 
Notwithstanding police surveillance and official condemnation of the first attack, 
on 7 November 2011, the mining camp was subjected to a second violent attack. 
The second arson committed at the geological camp took place on the night 
between 7 and 8 October, 2011. A small group of young men on horses, armed 
with sticks and combustibles, attacked security personnel and set the premises 
on fire. As a result of this assault, one guard was hospitalized and the damage 
caused to the company’s property was estimated at more than 3 MLN som 
(approximately 60 000 USD). While the first arson took place in the presence of a 
large group of people, all of whom had demands related to employment policy, 
the second attack was carried out during the night and away from public 
attention. No demands were made and no clear interests from any large group 
were visible. The mode by which the second violence was carried out led the 
company to view the second attack as different from the first. Within its own 
investigation, it concluded that the second attack had most likely been carried out 
by a group of residents vying for power. According to the findings of the 
investigation, the group targeted the mining company because in the context of 
upcoming local elections it viewed the company’s position as informally 
supportive of incumbent village authorities.293 I will return to the crucial point of 
competition for power in the third part of the chapter. 
 
The ambiguous role of local administration and local institutions such as the 
women and elders’ councils is also interesting to note in this story. In the official 
press release regarding the attack made by ayil okmot and ayil kenesh, the head 
of ayil kenesh declared: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
‘Reassessing the role of OSCE Police Assistance Programming in Central Asia’, Open Society 
Institute, Occasional Paper Series no. 4. 
293 Personal communication with an anonymous expert, Bishkek, 2013. 
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This incident doesn’t reflect in any way the interests of Aral residents. 
Residents consider that the individuals who carried out this crime acted 
exclusively according to their own vested interests and that their actions do 
not promote community development.294 
 
Following the official condemnation of the arson by local and district authorities, 
young perpetrators were arrested and taken away to Bishkek. The arrest of 
young people caused new agitation in the village, as the families of those 
arrested began mobilizing village officials and the elders’ court. The families of 
the arrested put pressure on activists to drop all actions against the company. In 
November 2011, village authorities even convened a general assembly, kurultay, 
in order to discuss the situation and find ways to free fellow residents. 
Approximately 500 people took part in the kurultay alongside representatives of 
all local institutions. Participants decided to allow the company to continue 
operating under its exploration license until December 2015. In exchange, they 
officially asked the company to provide court assistance to liberate the arrested 
residents. Following the resolution, on 9 December 2011, the company and the 
local and regional authorities signed a triple cooperation agreement. 295 Village 
authorities even went to Bishkek and met with various officials in order to 
establish communication regarding a new era of established relationships with 
the company.296  
 
                                                       
294 ‘Mestnoe naselenie ne imeet nikakogo otnoshenia k napadeniu na geologichesky lager OcOO 
‘Talas Copper Gold’ [Local population doesn’t have any relationship to the attack on the 
geological camp of the ‘Talas Copper Gold Company], Talas Copper Gold (10 October 2011) 
Available at: http://tcg.kg/images/files/press-release/press-reliz-10-oktyabrya-2011.pdf [4 
February 2014]. 
295 The resolution of the kurultay of the Aral village community was dated 9 December 2011. In 
December 2013, Gold Fields sold its license to another foreign investor, Australian Robust 
Resources, for reasons unrelated to communal resistance. In the same year, Robust Resources 
purchased the Andash deposit, located closely to Taldy Bulak, another protracted site of 
communal resistance. The change of investors in Taldy Bulak occurred almost unnoticed in the 
village and no visible resistance was shown to the new mining agent yet. 
296 When the community reached a post-arson settlement with the mining company and asked 
regional state institutions to play a role as witness, it was an act aimed at ‘bringing the state back’ 
to bilateral interaction and hence, voluntarily enacting the state’s presence in the village. This was 
also surprising, taking into consideration that residents used to previously disregard directives 
stemming from district and provincial authorities. Interestingly, this selective approach toward 
activating or deactivating the relationship with the centre displays how conflicts work at the 
periphery. 
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This short chronology of events exhibits quite a complex situation in which 
revolutionary shifts, longstanding grievances against elites and local economies 
coincide to produce localized rebellions against foreign investors. It may appear 
that violence is a predominant path of resistance as attacks on geological camps 
have spread across Kyrgyzstani mines. The proliferation of violence in the mining 
sphere suggests that this type of response can be included in the current 
repertoire of collective action and that it represents citizens’ frustration that see 
‘no other way’ of gaining attention. However, the use of violence is not the first 
option in the long chain of events. In the next part of the chapter, I will 
demonstrate what has preceded the violent turn. 
 
II. Rising Mobilization 
During the period between April 2010 - the beginning of the mobilization - and 
March 2011, the moment of the first violent attack on the miner, the anti-mining 
activists launched an impressive record of attempts made to oust the company. 
These attempts took different forms, starting with the activation of central 
institutions and the mobilization of large public gatherings. These represent 
locally available typical resources and mechanisms that helped individuals to 
form collective action. I will discuss the major instruments of resistance in order: 
institutional channels and local public gatherings. 
 
2.1. Institutional means of contestation: state irresponsiveness 
Against the background of popular images of the anti-mining activists as 
galvanized crowd riding on horseback to smash camps, writing official complaints 
and mobilizing state institutions was the major instrument of contestation in Aral. 
They directed complaints to specialized state institutions such as the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and the National Agency for Local Self-Governance. They 
also addressed to the highest hierarchy, i.e. the Head of the Interim Government 
and the Speaker of Parliament. In a letter to Head of the Interim Government 
Rosa Otunbaeva on May 2010, the organizers referred to the collective resolution 
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of 9 April 2010 and demanded complete closure of the mine. They grounded this 
demand on the basis of environmental violations: 
Many birds, insects, fish and frogs have disappeared. Many rare flowers 
and trees have dried out. Because the company used water streams for 
their mining activities, many farmers suffered from drought and 
consequently saw a decrease in their harvests. Pastures were destroyed 
and cattle died.297 
 
They repeated their demands in a renewed letter to Otunbaeva and to Ahmatbek 
Keldibekov, Speaker of the Parliament dated 16 December, 2010, in which they 
foreground other grievances related to domination and dispossession: 
The company worked only with the power-holders and law enforcement 
bodies while completely ignoring ordinary people. The company exposed 
the Kyrgyz as a backward people (bechara) ready to sell their souls for two 
pennies.298 
 
The administration of the interim government only responded on 15 March, 2011, 
10 months after the letter had been sent, in which it informed the residents that 
their case had been delegated to the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Talas 
regional administration. However, these two institutions had already responded 
earlier that the company against whom the residents were seeking political 
support was a well-established global miner and that the actions taken against it 
did not conform to the national legislation.299 Hence, the two institutions to whom 
the interim government redirected the case refused to say anything new beyond 
their earlier responses. 
 
The experience of confronting state institutions led residents to put special 
emphasis on the double ‘effect of the state’, to use Mitchel’s term300, that is, the 
state’s perceived ‘unresponsiveness’ and ‘complicity’ with foreign economic 
actors. Activists complained that the state ‘system’ was malfunctioning: letters 
                                                       
297 Letter to the head of Interim government, Rosa Otunbaeva, 10 May 2010, [Aral]. 
298 Letter to the head of Interim government, Rosa Otunbaeva, 16 December 2010, [Aral]. 
299 Letters from the Ministry of Natural Resources from 27 December 2010 and Talas regional 
administration from 13 January 2011. 
300 See Mitchel, T. (1991) ‘The limits of the state: Beyond statist approaches and their critics’, 
American Political Science Review, vol. 85, no. 1, March, pp. 77-96. 
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that had been addressed to the central government were redirected to relevant 
ministries, who in return sent them back to regional administrations because local 
matters were their responsibility. However, since regional and district 
administrations already had established relationships with the company, activists 
viewed their position as biased. Consider the following example, which activists 
used to exemplify the ‘vicious circle’ that involved the central government, 
regional administration and the mining company: 
During the events of 6 April 2010, many state buildings in Talas city were 
damaged including the buildings of the regional administration and regional 
police department. After the revolutionary government came to power, the 
new regional administration received an order to restore the buildings and 
re-establish their proper functioning. But where would a poor administration 
find the money to do so? The answer was] simple. Regional authorities do 
what they usually do in cases when they need cash – they turn to private 
‘sponsors’. In Talas, there are not many large businesses. The obvious 
ones are mining companies. The governor and akims resorted to 
approaching Talas Copper Gold, among other miners that operate in Talas. 
The company gave them money but this rendered the regional authorities 
dependent on the company. So when ordinary people like us put pressure 
on the company, the company pressures the regional authorities who revert 
the pressure back onto us. Regional authorities therefore become trapped 
and in return, trap us, too. It’s a vicious circle.301 
 
Indeed, I found a document among other files in the activist’s archives titled ‘The 
program of social assistance in 2010’, which detailed the company’s spending for 
that year. Although the document has the company’s executive signature on it, I 
cannot claim with certainty its authenticity. However, interestingly, the document 
shows the granting of 60 000 som to the Talas district administration and 20 000 
som to the Talas regional police department under the title ‘Assistance to April 
event victims’.302 In neighbouring Kazakhstan, Edward Conway found similar 
informal payments made by mining firms to akims and other local permitting and 
regulatory officials, but these payments were related rather to the patron-client 
                                                       
301 Interview with Sabyr Mamytov, Bishkek, May 2015.  
302 ‘Vypolnennaia programma socialnoi podderjki 2010 goda, ispolnitelny director OcOO Talas 
Copper Gold, V. Morozov’ [The executed program of social assistance 2010, Talas Copper Gold 
executive director V. Morozov]. 
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system303 instead of indicating the chronic dependence of state institutions on 
investors observed in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
One has to carefully consider actors’ perceptions and allegations where the state 
is concerned. From the above statements it is clear that the state became a site 
of political fantasies and intense emotions, 304  such as the evidenced 
disappointment and confusion in our case; furthermore, individuals experienced 
the subjective effect of state power on their locality and their collective 
endeavours. On the one hand, based on the correspondence that took place 
between the activists and state institutions between 2010 and 2011, one cannot 
say that the state acted ‘unresponsive’ to their complaints. In fact, the state 
arguably ‘acted’ in its usual manner, i.e., differentiating and delegating societal 
issues to specific agencies. 305  However, rapidity matters when issues feel 
                                                       
303 Conway, E. (2014) ‘Mining junior, major political risks. Bridging structural challenges in the 
mining sector in Kazakhstan’, Central Asian Affairs, vol.1, no. 1, pp. 24-47. 
304 Navaro-Yashin, Y. (2002) Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Spencer, J. (2007) Anthropology, Politics and the State: Democracy 
and Violence in South Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
305 Until 2013, the Kyrgyz state preferred to turn a blind eye to anti-mining resistance, instead 
waiting for communities to eventually change their minds. Recently, however, government has 
slowly begun to shape mining policy. It reorganized the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
reshuffled other relative bodies: the Ministry of Economic Development, the State Agency of 
Geology and the State Agency of Technical Security. Mining policy, as such, had not existed until 
2011 and the state’s role had mainly been confined to the allocation and annulation of licenses. 
The new policy was conceived on the basis of the newly formed Department of Mineral 
Resources at the Ministry of Economic Development. The creation of the Department of Mineral 
Resources increased formal avenues for the protesting community in which to address and follow 
up their claims. The department became a point of reference for residents. The structure of 
command of the State Department of Mineral Resources follows a reverse pyramid shape, likely 
typical for resource-poor states. The department officer resides in Bishkek and heads a team of 
only 10 people. Lack of resources does not allow him to open regional offices and the 
understaffing of regional administrations also impedes a direct transfer of functions. The 
government is currently considering transferring some of the department’s central functions to 
local governments. For the moment, however, the department has to fashion and implement 
policy in a top-down manner. To be fair, the government had been proactive in resourcing well-
suited individuals for the department from the small business community based in Bishkek, as 
well as attracting independent experts. Most importantly, the government recently integrated local 
activists to special state commissions that had been designed to organize open auctions for gold 
licenses. Such a centralized mining policy has led to the concentration of decision-making within 
the capital. To compensate for the state’s ‘non-visibility’ in the province and to appease local 
concerns, the team undertakes trips in order to disseminate information about the state’s 
activities, to follow up with ‘local developments’ and to a lesser degree, resolve conflicts. Although 
department officers travel to contentious communities, these trips do not come across as routines 
that offer help in effectuating the state’s control over geographical space. These non-regular 
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pressing to citizens and therefore their perceptions of state responsiveness are 
important. Moreover, it seems like the outcomes of differentiation and delegation, 
in their current format, do not make the central state look good as a mediator of 
social conflicts on the ground.306 On the other hand, actors’ perceptions can tell 
us something about the context of dependence of state institutions as it creates 
distinct institutional conditions for grassroots mobilizations in the Kyrgyzstani 
periphery. Dependence on foreign investors is clearly seen as a sign of state 
weakness and has implications for groups that contest central policies. For 
example, in one of the letters addressed to the then head of Interim Government, 
Rosa Otunbaeva, Sabyr Mamytov wrote, 
One more thing to add to our argument, when you came as the head of 
parliamentarian delegation to the neighbouring Kopuro-Bazar village to 
attend the opening of a gold factory you might remember that the local 
population did not want to give its consent to the factory. But the company 
quickly resorted to a blackmail – if the factory were not open the village 
would have to return the 3.5 MLN som of social assistance invested by the 
company. You then reproached that the Kopuro-Bazar residents should not 
have taken the money and because of that there was no way back. We, the 
Aral people, remember your words very well.307 
 
Learning lessons from other mining sites, Aral activists thus decided to 
circumvent a plausible blackmailing both from the mining company and the 
central government. In the interviews with activists I was told that it was the 
reason why their demands to the company were formulated as ‘compensation’ for 
harm and not ‘social assistance’. Returning to the dependence of central and 
regional authorities on foreign firms, this creates a situation where protest groups 
acquire, in addition to its primary opponent (the mining company) another 
opponent – a ‘weak state’ – that cannot efficiently regulate conflicts on the 
ground. This obviously puts forth certain obstacles for grassroots mobilizations, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
‘drops’ involving officials were of a primarily apologetic character and did not resemble ‘normal’ 
state activities such as inspections, instructions and disciplining. From the difficulties that this 
department and two other state agencies (Agency of Geology and Agency for Technical Security) 
encountered in terms of transgressing these localities and imposing state regulation, I was able to 
observe the state’s limited ability for encompassing its territory. 
306  Elsewhere, Doolotkeldieva and Heathershaw showed that both local social groups and 
companies continue to resort to the state despite its deficient performance as mediator. See Asel 
Doolot, A. and Heathershaw, J. (2015). 
307 Letter to the Head of the Interim Government, Rosa Otunbaeva, 10 May 2010, [Aral]. 
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because in the absence of an institutional framework, local actors have to effect 
significant local organizational power in order to sustain resistance. This point will 
be further discussed in the final part of the chapter. To conclude this section, 
engaging regional and state institutions as a mediator of controversies turned out 
inefficient for Aral activists. This is why parallel to institutional channels they also 
engaged the wider circles of fellow residents to form a stronger leverage on the 
company and the state.  
 
2.2. Village public gatherings: grievances, risks perceptions and attempts 
to mobilize residents 
In this part of the chapter I will explore another mechanism of addressing mining 
issues, which became prominent in this case. I will relate to ways in which 
environmental concerns were brought to the attention of Aral residents and how 
these were translated into a partial collective action – public gatherings. I am 
interested here in exploring how public discussions and deliberation affected the 
path of mobilization. 
 
On 9 April 2010, a large crowd marched on the camp with slogans reading 
‘Kompania ketsin!’ – a statement imploring the removal of the company from the 
area. This march has transformed into a first large village gathering, eldik jyin. 
Gatherings were employed as a means for pulling residents together, to promote 
injustice frameworks, propagate nationalist discourses and advance anti-mining 
claims. In the initial stage of mobilization, village gatherings became an efficient 
means of communication among residents on the one hand and between 
themselves and their opponent, the mining firm, on the other. At first, these 
gatherings were attended by large amounts of people including representatives 
from local institutions, ordinary residents and specifically, members of Chokoi 
uruu. However, the volume of attendance has gradually decreased to involve, 
during the final gatherings, members of Chokoi uruu only. Below, I will describe 
chronologically the unfolding of gatherings and analyse their capacity for the 
construction of resistance.  
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There were overall five large public meetings that were called during the period 
from April 2010 to March 2011, the time of the first violent attack on the mining 
company. Although public deliberation and decision-making on important matters 
and events such as kurultays308 happen occasionally at local and regional levels, 
‘public space’ has nonetheless been weakly developed in rural areas. For 
example, local councils rarely practice open discussion of matters regarding 
socio-economic and political life. Their deliberation on issues such as the 
approval of local budgets and the allocation of land takes place within a closed 
format. In this sense, the sudden possibility of discussing mining activities in 
public was unprecedented. Thus village gatherings served as an important 
vehicle to air and disseminate a range of grievances and concerns. Consider the 
following concise opinion by one of the residents concerning the role of 
gatherings for learning about mining operations: 
Prior to the revolution we had no idea what harm the company was doing to 
our lands, our pastures, waters and nature. Everything was covert! Then 
our eyes were opened, we learned things, we began searching out 
information. And we began putting forward our demands!309 
 
Many were inclined to trust information about environmental risks provided by the 
activists and supported the anti-company cause, at least verbally. The following 
quote by a local farmer exemplifies the role of risk perceptions in forming 
resentment against mining operations: 
At this explorative phase, ecological damage is not comprehensible to us. 
But we have no idea how the company will behave in the future. If the state 
was strong and laws were enforced, it could give us some guarantee that 
the company will re-cultivate excavated lands. It would give us some 
guarantee that in case of ecological violations, we would be compensated. 
                                                       
308 Kurultay is a historic Turkic tradition of popular assemblies. Some politicians and public 
activists have even sought to incorporate it in the constitution as a tool for popular deliberation 
and decision-making. On the implication of kurultay in the Kyrgyzstani revolutions, see Madeleine 
Reeves and Kathleen Collins. Reeves, M. (2014d) ‘We’re with the people!’ Place, nation, and 
political community in Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 ‘April events’, The Anthropology of East Europe Review, 
vol. 32, no. 2, fall, pp. 68-88; Collins, K. (2011) ‘Kyrgyzstan’s latest revolution’, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 22, no. 3, July, pp. 150-164. 
309 Interview with a participant of gatherings #2, Aral, November 2014. 
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But we have to deal with Kumtor as an example regarding environmental 
violations! There is no certitude, so we prefer not to risk our lands.310 
 
Next to environmental concerns, village gatherings have also revealed a 
reservoir of grievances related to the company’s previous elitist approach. Prior 
to the April Revolution, led by the company Director Morozov, management was 
believed to have had a good relationship with the Bakievs’ crony regime. 
Morozov’s allegedly friendly relations with the district, provincial and central 
authorities, as well as the secret services served as proof of this suggestion. In 
addition, according to local narratives, Morozov chose to cooperate only with the 
village elite and neglected other social groups. Additionally, the Talas Copper 
Gold’s style of management did not differ much from the ‘vertikal vlasti’ (‘the 
vertical of power’) or the methods used by the central regime to stay in power, 
i.e., intimidation and repression.311 The company’s co-optation of village elites 
thus became one of the recurring topics that helped to foster a nationalist anti-
elite discourse. 
 
The first village gathering on 9 April, 2010, hosted approximately 500 people.312 
Galvanized by anti-elitist and environmental discourses, participants demanded a 
complete withdrawal of the company from the Taldy Bulak mine. The Talas 
district akim signed a protocol stating that the removal of the company from the 
area did not contradict the people’s will. The company’s representatives signed 
the resolution and promised to move out within a week period. This was an 
unprecedented example of the success achieved by organizers of resistance, 
who were able to mount resistance that received approval from local officials and 
even the mining company. This gathering became a crucial moment of 
mobilization: it set a clear agenda for resistance and because of the attendance 
of local and district authorities, gained official status. In follow-up gatherings and 
                                                       
310 Author interview with a participant #3, Aral, August 2012. 
311 To be specific, the company was not alone in this position; many other investors have been 
caught by surprise by the post-revolutionary social insurgency. Having no reason for working with 
local communities, investors simply ignored how local political and social relations functioned and 
were affected by their operations. Interview with mining companies, Bishkek, 2013. 
312 Author interview with Sabyr Mamytov, May 2015, Bishkek. 
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official letters, organizers of resistance would refer to this resolution as a decision 
made by all the people (jalpy eldik jyiyn). The gathering also led to the formation 
of a temporary commission for ‘removing the company’. Consisting of 12 
individuals elected from village kvartals, the commission’s job was to closely 
observe implementation of the 9 April resolution concieved at the first gathering. 
 
Resistance participants took the resolution very seriously. Thus, a week later on 
16 April, residents gathered again to check on the company’s progress for 
implementing the people’s will. Together with the head of ayil okmot and 
company representatives they carried out inspection of the mining camp and its 
remaining equipment.313 They recorded the speed of the company’s compliance 
with demands and because it was unsatisfying, the next residents’ meeting was 
scheduled for a week later, on 22 April. Roughly 310 people took part in the 
meeting. Besides checking on the company’s progress, the gathering had the 
objective of activating local institutions including women, elders and youth 
councils to the anti-mining cause. Their alliance was sought in order to provide 
more legitimacy to the resolutions passed at gatherings. The meeting was also 
marked by new advancements in the activists’ work against the mining company. 
Thus, activists collected information about international regulations that govern 
disputes between foreign companies and national states. They made reference 
to international conventions on environmental protection and expressed concerns 
related to risks of the Kyrgyz state losing the case if Talas Copper Gold decided 
to appeal in an arbitration court. This developed the new understanding that the 
anti-mining resistance was no longer a local matter, but a case that extended 
beyond national jurisdiction. This awareness regarding international regulations 
was surprising, given the poor penetration of Internet access and other sources 
of information in the rural area.314 
                                                       
313 Protocol of meeting, 16 April 2010, [Aral]. 
314 According to a study conducted by UNESCO in 2012, less than one subscriber per 100 
subscribers had access to fixed broadband Internet and only four out of 100 inhabitants 
subscribed to mobile broadband access in Kyrgyzstan. See UNESCO, (2012) The State of 
Broadband 2012: Achieving digital inclusion for all [Online], Available at: 
http://www.broadbandcommission.org/documents/bb-annualreport2012.pdf [20 August 2015]. 
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The next village gathering occurred a month later, on 29 May. Roughly 90 people 
took part in the meeting. Unlike previous meetings that had the objective of 
observing the company’s compliance with the resolution, this time, participants 
addressed internal issues. Most importantly, participants noted the dissatisfying 
level of participation among local institutions in the meetings. They noted the 
‘unacceptable passivity’ on the part of these institutions and urged them to 
comply with the ‘people’s will’ and not create ‘divisions’. After hearing numerous 
complaints about the inactivity of these representatives, participants created a 
resolution that included the following sanctions on said institutions: 
1. ‘The aksakal sotu (elders’ council) should side with either the 
people or free their seats.’ 
2. ‘The ayil okmot (village administration) should interact with local 
people independently from the district and regional administrations.’315 
3. ‘Those who spoil the unity of the people and oppose the people’s 
demands should be held responsible for doing so and bear the subsequent 
consequences.’316 
 
This gathering displayed the first signs of emerging problems within mobilization. 
Participants highlighted how the continuous commitment of local institutions to 
the cause was important for the integrity of mobilization and the legitimacy of 
resistance. Sanctions taken against these institutions demonstrated the 
importance of their commitment on the one hand and underscored the policing 
efforts within mobilization on the other. This meant that organizers of resistance 
attempted to undertake steps to stop defection in order to maintain the legitimacy 
of gatherings. These measures, however, were not efficient for mitigating the 
decreasing number of participants when by autumn 2010, the heads of ayil okmot 
and kenesh withdrew from mobilization, despite their initial alliance. This 
illustrates once again that village populations do not represent homogenous 
                                                       
315  The anti-mining activists considered that the district and regional administration were 
complacent with the company and had worked against people. 
316 On the emergence of local institutions of self-governance following the disintegration of 
kolkhozes, see an analysis by Pétric, B., Jacquesson, S., Gossiaux J-F. and Bourgeot A. (2004) 
‘L’émergence de nouveaux pouvoirs locaux sur les cendres d’un kolkhoze kirghize (oblast de 
Naryn)’, Cahiers d’Asie Centrale, vol. 13, no. 14, pp. 21-44. 
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‘communities’ steered by authority institutions and that defection is an important 
issue for grassroots mobilizations.  
 
The defection of participants explains why the next gathering became even more 
‘specialized’ in the way that it convened only the farmers of the Taldy Bulak area 
and primarily those from Chokoi uruu. The meeting took place on 24 October and 
brought together 177 farmers, who represented both farmers and their entire 
families. The goal of the meeting was to organize a ‘public discussion’ (talkuu 
jurguzuu) and to ‘express grievances against the company’s recent activities’ 
(naarazychylyk korsotuu). The floor was given to farmers to air their grievances 
about the alleged harm caused by the company’s activities. The protocol of the 
meeting shortly stated these grievances as follows: 
[Farmer, Eraliev Abdykan]: My three sheep have recently died. 
[Farmer, no name]: This year, my wheat and potato harvests decreased. 
[Farmer, no name]: Because of explosive activities, my house and the barn 
developed cracks and became unusable. 317 
 
Two things are noticeable regarding this gathering. First, it shows a decreased 
number of participants and an absence of representatives from local institutions 
and ordinary citizens (I will explain their withdrawal in the second part of this 
chapter). Second, another novelty of this meeting was that participants began 
recording ‘concrete’ grievances in contrast to the initial framing of resistance, 
which consisted of vague ‘ecological’ claims. It has to be noted that these claims 
could only have been vague, since the gold-mining project had at the time only 
been in the research, not production phase.318 At this stage of public gatherings, 
resistance organizers began requesting compensation for the alleged damage 
caused to land and lost harvest. Interestingly, compensation specifically 
concerned those farmers of Chokoi uruu whose lands were being subjected to 
mining operations. Other uruus contested that only Chokoi uruu benefited from 
                                                       
317 Protocol of meeting, 24 October 2010, [Aral]. 
318 At this phase of the gold-mining project, grievances concerning mining operations were fears 
about future risks that neither mining companies nor the state took seriously, because fears do 
not point to the existence of ‘concrete’ harm and violations. At this stage, such societal 
grievances are easily discarded and the inability to demonstrate harm may undermine movement 
claims. 
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compensations; the dispute among uruus over the ways the compensation 
should be formulated contributed to the alienation of many residents from the 
resistance movement.319 Although other residents later questioned the credibility 
of claims about harm, the initiators of resistance used records of these public 
gatherings as evidence for everyone’s grievances in their communications with 
the mining company and central authorities. 
 
To summarize this section, I view these public gatherings as fulfilling a number of 
important functions. First, they were an important initial step for raising 
awareness about mining among residents, which had been silenced during the 
authoritarian era (or diagnostic framework, to use Snow et al.’s (1986) typology of 
frame alignment). It was during these meetings that organizers framed the anti-
mining resistance in environmental and nationalist terms. Second, the meetings 
were also a first step in the organization of collective action on the part of a 
village segment (prognostic frame320). Third, with the help of meeting protocols, 
the evolution of organizers’ efforts for constructing resistance could be tracked, 
beginning with convincing local officials to their side, activating local institutions 
and finally, narrowing collective action down to a specific group of farmers. Thus, 
each gathering revealed new internal problems, which leads me to appreciate 
fragility and vulnerability of grassroots movements. This provides significant 
insights into the problems that protest groups face.  
 
I showed through these instances of mobilization how attempts to build an anti-
mining resistance came into being and lasted for almost a year prior to the 
escalation of conflict. Such an extent of contestation is surprising in the context of 
weak social organizations and power institutions on the ground. By weak local 
infrastructure, I do not refer to existing rituals, traditions and informal 
mechanisms of support that exist in rural Kyrgyzstan, and that may govern local 
                                                       
319 Competition between factions over compensation is also found in other parts of the world. For 
example for similar developments in Papua New Guinea see, Imbun, B. Y. (2000) ‘Mining 
workers or 'opportunist' tribesmen?: A tribal workforce in a Papua New Guinea mine’, Oceania, 
vol. 71, no. 2, December, pp. 129-149. 
320 Snow, D., Rochford, E., Steven, Jr., Worden, K. and Benford, R. (1986). 
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economy, ethics, social norms and politics. As Zemfira Inogamova (2015: 195) 
demonstrates, these traditions and rituals serve as ‘resilience techniques’ and in 
my understanding, are ill equipped to guide individuals through challenges of 
contemporary economy and politics. Instead we witnessed the emergence of 
provisional public space open for discussions of an important question. The 
creation of public gatherings is a positive surprise taking, into account that only a 
few months earlier, public space had been completely restricted. Passed in 2009, 
the Bakievs’ ‘reform strengthened central supervision over the provinces and 
guaranteed Bishkek a say in local affairs. With public opinion self-restricted and 
media [being] harassed by state authorities, no debate existed.’321 That initiators 
of resistance prioritized public and formal channels of communication before 
turning to violent means. 
 
III. Informal Politics Versus Open Politics 
Now I would like to address the main puzzle of this case; why, despite the initial 
success of mobilizing residents and the construction of collective grievances, the 
anti-mining activists did not manage to oust the company as in the neighboring 
Kopuro-Bazar where a strong resistance led to the closure of Andash mining. My 
earlier account of the consequences of violent attacks might strongly suggest that 
the escalation of violence and the arrest of young residents were the direct 
causes of demobilization. My contention, however, is that demobilization 
occurred prior to the escalation and that the violent turn can actually be 
understood as the consequence of a growing despair among remaining activists 
about the impossibility to achieve their goals by peaceful means. By the time of 
violent attacks the number of participants in anti-mining gatherings has declined 
from 500 to 90 (the last figure being probably conflated because of the inclusion 
of all family members). Furthermore, I link demobilization to the dynamics of open 
politics that has emerged out of public discussions and deliberations. The role of 
public discussions should not be underestimated; they create new dynamics that 
put the anti-mining activists and their cause under a larger and closer scrutiny 
                                                       
321 Wolters, A. (2013), p. 232.  
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and they set up conditions for the formation of opinions which cannot be 
achieved to the same degree under informal politics. The inclusion of open 
politics and all the accompanying complexities (such as rumours) as a new 
variable offers a much more nuanced understanding of conflict, that is usually 
fixated on the stakeholders’ analysis. In this part of the chapter, I will discuss how 
the emerging public scrutiny revealed an ambivalent agenda pursued among 
some anti-mining activists.  
 
3.1.  Ambivalent agenda: a struggle for power or environment?  
What came unexpected against the background of proclaimed environmental and 
nationalist discourses were rumours discrediting the anti-mining activists 
intentions. It turned out that vested private interests linked the major organizers 
of resistance to the company. Prior to the revolution Talas Copper Gold 
employed Sabyr Mamytov in the position of an important community liaison 
officer. He was retrenched in late 2009 and became an opposicioner (opposition 
to the company) exactly at this moment. This external opinion would contradict 
Sabyr Mamytov’s own account, according to which his opposition against the 
miner began as early as 2007 and had nothing to do with his employment but 
was linked to the crony regime covering up the company. Yet as the Talas 
Copper Gold’s employee has told me in the interview, it was a mistake to let him 
go as he turned out to be influential in the village.322 Other residents grew to 
share the same opinion as they learned that while Sabyr Mamytov had been 
propagating anti-mining claims, he had allegedly written letters to the company 
requesting he be re-instituted to his previous position. So they viewed his shift to 
opposition as false, not a genuine response. 
  
Similar parochial stories linked other anti-mining activists to the company. Thus 
rumours were circulating that the then director of a school and her husband, the 
former head of ayil kenesh, became harsh critics of the mining company when 
they failed to sublet their property to the company, which had been looking to 
                                                       
322 Interview with a Talas Copper Gold’s employee, Bishkek, 2013. 
 204 
establish a local office in the village. Another small entrepreneur allegedly joined 
this group when he failed to conclude an agreement with the company 
concerning food supplies. Still another member of the group, the current head of 
ayil okmot, held allegedly grievances against the company in relation to his failed 
election to the local office. He perceived the company as supporting an opposing 
candidate in the run up to elections. Strong rumours suggested that he organized 
a dozen of young residents to set a second attack on the camp in October 2011 
as a revenge for his lost office.  
 
Whether these rumours are false or true (and I am interested not in the validity of 
their content but rather in how they work in the creation of positive or negative 
opinions about mining), Sabyr Mamytov and other anti-mining activists’ struggle 
for economic and political resources can be better understood by placing this 
struggle into a local political perspective. This group hoped to come to power 
after many years of being in opposition to the regime and local power-holders. 
The revolution of April 2010 gave such an unprecedented opportunity but it was 
taken away by a competing group belonging to another opposition party Ata-
Meken that has also participated in Talas uprisings and contributed to the demise 
of regime. Following the revolution, Ata-Meken affiliated residents Dokturbek 
Dosmanbet Uulu and Medet Turat were elected to head respectively ayil okmot 
and ayil kenesh.  
 
Notwithstanding the popular support shown to these residents, Sabyr Mamytov’s 
group made several attempts to unseat the newly elected leaders, which included 
renewed complaints to the regional administration and central institutions and 
local attempts to sabotage their work. For example, in one of their letters to the 
National Agency for Local Self-Governance, a member of group and the then 
acting deputy Islam Israilov criticized the passivity of the heads of ayil okmot and 
ayil kenesh as the primary cause of the violent turn on the miner.323 The struggle 
for power within local institutions is important to our understanding of how some 
                                                       
323 Letter to the National Agency for the Local Self-Governance from 9 September 2011. 
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residents grew to view the mining project as closely associated with power 
dynamics. Sabyr Mamytov described his confrontation with incumbent politicians 
as a struggle against the desire of the Ata-Meken party to get hold of gold 
resources in Aral and Talas Province in general. In return, the elected head of 
ayil okmot, Dokturbek Dosmanbet Uulu, described Sabyr Mamytov’s resistance 
against the mining in similar terms: 
This group gained an interest in the company by observing how the then 
village seniors were receiving gifts and other benefits from the company 
management. They wanted to be part of this game (oyun) and since the 
company was used to dealing with village seniors only, they sought to take 
control of the local power institutions. They tried many means. They 
participated in elections, put forward their candidates and tried even to 
corrupt elections, but to no avail. Finally, they organized informal discussion 
bureaus at their homes and mobilized relatives and the wider Chokoi uruu 
to their side as a means to gain larger weight in the village.324 
 
This insight into local power dynamics adds a new dimension to the 
environmental claims that was not obvious in the beginning. In the context of 
impoverished rural countryside and corrupt governance, the company’s activities 
came to be viewed as closely connected to an individual access to resources and 
power. We can see how the company’s previous (whether real or imagined) 
activities, i.e., the co-optation of village seniors, gave rise to jealousies among 
competing faction.325 For individuals, these activities showed that one’s access to 
gold resources even at this study phase could be enhanced if one could achieve 
an official power position in the village. It can therefore be said that the desire to 
change the existing status quo between the company and village seniors was not 
a ‘spontaneous’ response to April Revolution but part of the authoritarian legacy. 
 
This extremely complex matrix of economic and power interests, which is only 
partially covered here, problematizes the objectives of the anti-mining 
                                                       
324 Interview with the former Head of Village Administration, Dokturbek Dosmanbet uluu, Talas, 
July 2015. 
325 My material does not allow discussing in detail the company’s policies but the appearance of a 
new large economic actor certainly created new tensions and dynamics within the structure of 
local relationships. In many instances interviews described the miner as a source of social 
disaccord. 
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organization. Was it meant to evict Talas Copper Gold so that the local lifestyle 
could never be compromised again, like in the neighbouring village Kopuro-
Bazar, or was it conceived in order to co-opt the company through blackmailing 
and threats? This question did not arise only in my mind but also in minds of my 
interviewees. The pursuit of power by anti-mining activists raised suspicions 
about the authenticity of their previous environmental concerns and nationalist 
discourses. In a world of discredited politics and generalized distrust, the 
discrepancy between ‘real’ intentions and public claims creates problems for the 
formation and sustainability of protest groups. In the next part of the chapter I will 
show the consequences of the exposure of the activists’ ambivalent agenda on 
the path of mobilization. 
 
IV. Declining Mobilization 
The above analysis helped to prepare the basis for a discussion of the primary 
research question of this empirical chapter: why mobilization declined despite 
the initial success? It answers my general question investigated in the thesis: 
under which conditions can local episodes of mobilization be transformed 
into lasting mobilization? This question becomes particularly intriguing against 
the background of growing conflict between publicly shared claims and the 
informal agenda for which this claim was activated. Taken separately, the two 
elements of the context, environmental concerns and competition for resources, 
do not fully explain the development of mobilization, although they are helpful in 
terms of accounting for the incidents that triggered it. I argue that a growing 
awareness among residents of the discrepancies between the two changes the 
dynamics of mobilization.  
 
Since environmental claims already began fading during public gatherings, it may 
be helpful to return to these episodes of mobilization. Here, I ask in particular 
what happens when participants of initial mobilization become aware that the 
initiators of resistance do not represent collective interests, as claimed, but 
instead seek out private benefits? How does a local audience become aware of 
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and have the opportunity to form opinions about the dual positions of anti-mining 
activists? What happens when the divergence between public environmental 
claims and mundane motivations (petty struggles for power and the distribution of 
resources) become known within the wider local arena? In this part of the chapter 
I will discuss the real implications of the exposure of the activists’ ambivalent 
agenda for the trajectory of mobilization. 
 
To answer these questions, I return to my conceptualization of the production of 
trust as a condition sine qua non for the formation of a structured mobilization, as 
outlined in Chapter III. I have stressed that in the context of precarious 
Kyrgyzstani conditions, the construction of grassroots mobilizations can only be 
successful if initiators prove their commitment to collective interests and if to-be-
participants put their trust in initiators, and follow their proposed ideas. 
Acquisition and maintenance of trust are even more current in contexts where 
informal politics meets with open politics.  
 
The establishment of trust takes place through repeated interactions between 
initiators and interested individuals. These interactions have to be sustained 
because trust is not formed at only one stage and individuals need to be 
reassured of initiators’ authenticity on a continuous basis. Discredited politics 
have created a significant legacy of generalized distrust, which can only be 
overcome through repeated actions. I termed this exercise a monitoring process, 
by which interested individuals observe initiators and other participants and can 
in this way form opinions about whether to follow the resistance or not.  
 
The production of trust is a circular dynamic, since it involves the attempts of 
initiators to breach suspicion on the one hand and individuals observing these 
actions on the other. The monitoring process can therefore produce both 
negative and beneficial outcomes: it can either lead to the creation of trust or 
even more suspicion, as well as the further alienation of individuals. I find this 
constructivist approach as a useful concept for analysing an otherwise weakly-
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structured resistance movement. In the context of local mobilizations in Aral, 
such interactions had been present during public gatherings and during meetings 
of the ‘Aral commission’. In the following, I focus on these sites of (non-) 
construction of trust and discuss their implications on the dynamics of 
mobilization, as well as on the wider notions of politics within the village. 
 
4.1. Monitoring of behaviour of initiators of resistance via village gatherings 
and the non-construction of resistance 
During the early stages of contention public gatherings served as crucial 
provisional open spaces in which residents received alternative interpretations 
about mining operations that those offered by the state and the mining company. 
As already demonstrated above, these public spaces turned into sites of intense 
meaning-making regarding on-going events, as well as the future risks that such 
events entailed for local economies and traditional lifestyles. Thus, gatherings 
were conducive to the creation and proliferation of environmental concerns and 
nationalist discourses.  
 
Figure 7: A village gathering including members of the Village Administration, 
Village Council, residents and representatives of Talas Copper Gold 
(© Asel Doolotkeldieva) 
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However, public gatherings turned out to have a different function than what the 
organizers had planned. Initially conceived as a platform where initiators of 
resistance could take a leading role by actively convincing residents to join the 
movement, these gatherings instead developed into a space where initiators’ own 
actions were subjected to scrutiny and criticism. The gatherings offered a perfect 
setting for making observations about this novel collective enterprise and its 
organizers. Additionally, participants of the meetings became active observers 
and not simply the recipients of the organizers’ strategies. In one meeting after 
another, residents were able to monitor the behaviour of initiators and made a 
number of important conclusions that helped them to make decisions about their 
individual participation in the anti-mining resistance. For example, respondents 
became aware that the initiators of resistance too often changed their positions. 
One resident recalls: 
At the beginning, I tried to attend all the meetings, because I am an 
ecologist by training and I believe our environment deserves attention from 
the state and from all citizens. I was, however, disappointed. The so-called 
activists are activists only by name. For example, they accused the mining 
company for not performing land reclamation and called for general 
mobilization. Then at the next meeting, they announced that they had 
received millions of soms from the company to work on reclamation. At the 
meeting after that, when asked what they had done with the money they 
could not provide clear answers. These movements were so confusing. I 
concluded that the activists did not know what they were talking about. I told 
to my family not to go to their meetings anymore because it was a waste of 
time.326 
 
Participants of gatherings accused the initiators of making contradictory 
statements within a short period of time, which was a strong indication of 
inconsistency to their opposition to the mining company. These inconsistencies 
were further exposed when rumours spread that activists had allegedly been 
employed at the camp, given financial compensation, or had established private 
business contracts with the company. Such rumours gave rise to suspicions 
about whether the initiators of resistance represented collective or personal 
interests. As one participant of a village gathering noted: 
                                                       
326 Interview with a participant of gatherings #4, Aral, October 2014. 
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This Ortok, he was the main opposicioner to the company. Yet, after he 
criticized the company he was hired, together with his association, to work 
on land reclamation. I do not remember exactly - he received two or three 
million som for this project. We did not understand this move: had his 
previous criticism been orchestrated to attain the contract? Had his 
opposition been fake (jasalma)?327 
 
The seeming inconsistencies of the activists’ positions introduced even further 
suspicion and distrust among other residents and soon, the public gatherings 
turned into intense practices of mutual criticism and policing of each other. One 
resident remembers the following debate during a gathering: 
There was one farmer who claimed that his sheep had died because of 
geological operations near his pastures. But another farmer, the first 
farmer’s relative, exposed him as lying during the next gathering. He said 
‘how can your cattle die if mine are in perfect shape and my pastures are 
located even closer to the camp than yours?’ Later, the company hired the 
first complaining farmer as an expeditor. Everything became clear to us: 
complaints about the dead sheep had been made up to help the farmer 
squeeze benefits from the company (kompaniadan ondurup alysh kerek).328 
 
Gatherings ended up unravelling petty power struggles and the opportunism of 
fellow residents, and undermined many previous social relationships in the 
village. This is reminiscent of what Hirsch (1990) wrote about such 
consciousness-raising exercises, which can ‘get out of hand’ since they 
necessarily involve the challenge of existing relationships. From sites of collective 
diagnosis and frame-making, gatherings turned into instances of mutual criticism 
and laying blame. The process of the construction of resistance was interrupted, 
because individuals who had initially been interested in the topic and attended 
the meetings discovered inconsistencies in the behaviour of resistance initiators. 
These inconsistencies led them to question the authenticity of the supposed 
leaders, leading to the negation of trust in the cause. Specifically, gatherings 
brought to light the fact that activists who had previously mobilized residents to 
oust the mining company were in fact involved in co-optation deals with the 
company. The number of meeting attendants rapidly declined as a result; at the 
                                                       
327 Interview with a participant of gatherings #5, Aral, October 2014. 
328 Interview with a participant of gatherings #6, Aral, October 2014. 
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fourth meeting, only 90 people attended, which was less than one fifth of the 
initial attendees. One may be surprised at the speed that such observations and 
deductions took place; however, in the context of generalized distrust, even a few 
instances are enough to formalize negative conclusions.  
 
This example shows how a promising technique for creating mutual 
understanding and collective action was transformed into fragmentation. To 
highlight this contrast, we saw in the previous chapter how group gatherings 
formed the basis for collective action among workers. In Aral, too, group 
gatherings had the potential to form strong resistance had initiators of resistance 
been authentic and therefore more likely to be successful in breaching through 
public suspicions. Most importantly, the exposure of activists’ opportunism led to 
the discrediting of environmental claims previously defended by activists. Against 
this background of informal deals, corruption and competition for power, no one 
will easily believe in the authenticity of environmental organization. Sabyr 
Mamytov had been aware of these perceptions surrounding his political activism 
and referred to their propagation as the jaman attuu kyluu (‘ruining one’s 
reputation’), a process that can in this instance be understood as a kind of local 
‘discrediting machine’. Not only was he aware of this discrediting process, he 
also tried to function within the context of distrust. After seeing how the exposure 
works in small social settings, I would like to address now some of it 
consequences on the ‘community’ and local politics. 
 
V. Ambivalent Outcomes of Mobilization: Amorphous ‘Community’, 
Political Space and Public Opinion 
In this part of the chapter, I will consider the impact of the exposure of the 
activists’ ambivalent agenda and further proliferation of confusion and distrust 
among people involved in gatherings. In the first place, I will show the inability of 
residents to act as a community, i.e. a group of people that are able to make 
collectively binding decisions. Secondly, I will demonstrate how a growing distrust 
among ordinary residents and even members of resistance led to the failure to 
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sustain the organization of resistance. Thirdly, I will illustrate how the failure to 
sustain resistance on the basis of trust led to discrediting of politics altogether.  
 
5.1.  Aral commission: further fragmentation of collective interests? 
The failure to form trust concerning the environmental cause and the further 
intensification of suspicions about the ‘real’ intentions of the anti-mining activists 
have produced lasting impacts on the local capacity to oversee mining 
operations. After signing of the cooperation agreement between village 
authorities and the company in December 2011, it was decided that mining 
operations would be delegated to a new body, independent from the ayil kenesh 
and ayil okmot. According to the former Head of ayil okmot, this decision was 
made specifically to provide new impetus for mining, because residents did not 
trust existing institutions and their capacity to oversee the company’s activities.329 
As a result, this specialized village commission was formed with the mining 
company’s assistance in order to create another space for open deliberation and 
decision-making on matters pertaining to mining. The delegated matters included 
various issues ranging from control for equal employment policy and supervision 
of the ‘social fund’, 330  to the allocation of social projects aimed at local 
development. The commission consisted of 12 members – three members per 
kvartal from each village section. 
 
Initially designed to represent the interests of all lines of descent to secure 
unanimity and the legitimacy of the commission’s decisions, the commission 
quickly turned into yet another battlefield over private interests. Residents 
accused members of the commission of corruption and lobbying their relatives to 
various positions within the company. As for the members, they rarely agreed 
among themselves regarding the spending of social funds and their meetings 
                                                       
329 Interview with the former Head of Village Administration, Dokturbek Dosmanbet Uluu, Talas, 
July 2015. 
330 Talas Copper Gold allocates $20,000 per district per annum (‘Base Fund’) and contributes 
additional funds depending on the number or metres drilled in that area (the amount contributed 
is calculated on a sliding scale from USD20 to USD5 per metre drilled) that is the ‘Additional 
Funds’. 
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were often marked by verbal aggression, mutual criticism and suspicion. In 
addition, after anti-mining activists had to demobilize they shifted their activities to 
intervening in the work of the commission. As a member of commission noted: 
The village lost control of these activists because they [had] a strong 
character and nobody could control them. I’ll give you an example: they get 
themselves elected to the commission from their village kvartals or if they 
fail to do so, they create intrigues within the commission to compromise 
other members and then capture their seats. They are able to mobilize 
‘dejurny baldar’ (boys on duty) in every kvartal to seed agitation among the 
residents. They criticize the mining company, but at the same time seek to 
be part of its core activities in the village. They create unnecessary havoc 
(yzychuu) and in this way alienate other residents who don’t want to get 
involved in activities pertaining to mining.331 
 
Members often quit the commission due to a growing disbelief in the success of 
this collective effort. Talas Copper Gold may disagree with my analysis because 
the company succeeded, despite these internal problems within the commission, 
to carry out a number of significant social projects in the village. These include 
the allocation of stipends for village students, the purchase of repair parts for 
agricultural combiners, the organization of garbage utilization, establishment of a 
TV station and others. 332  However, as some employees of the company 
admitted, due to the weakness of local power institutions and the Aral 
commission, the community was unable to take full advantage of these projects. 
Weakness of institutions was closely linked to the perceived opportunism and 
incompetence of local leaders.333  
 
One example concerning a kindergarten project can illustrate my point that the 
Aral commission is a manifestation of inability of residents to act collectively in 
regard to mining issues. Since money accumulated in the social fund was scarce, 
it was possible to implement only a limited number of projects. Proposed projects 
included the construction of a kindergarten, a hospital unit, the purchasing of 
farming combiners, roads repairs and the creation of small workshops. Naturally, 
                                                       
331 Interview with a member of Aral commission, Aral, May 2015. 
332 I do not discuss in length here the company’s activities aimed at fulfilling its ‘social license’ 
obligations. 
333 Interview with a former employee of Talas Copper Gold, Bishkek, May 2015. 
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each project mirrored the interests of distinct groups. A kindergarten, for 
example, reflected female voices united under the women’s council (ayaldar 
keneshy). The purchase of combiners corresponded to the needs of farmers and 
the repair of roads echoed the needs of the middle and rich classes who owned 
cars. Jonathon Hornbrook, Head of the Mineral Resources for Development 
Program at the German organization for sustainable development GIZ, rightfully 
noted, an average Kyrgyz who travels by horse will not need paved roads in the 
village.334  
 
At one of the commission’s meetings, residents planned to discuss the possibility 
for opening a kindergarten using social fund money. Several women conducted a 
survey during a period of three months and were about to present the results at 
one of the commission’s public hearings; however, anti-mining activists 
outnumbered them and halted their presentation. Taking advantage of the fact 
that ordinary residents did not attend such meetings in large numbers, activists 
managed to simply suppress female voices. A female respondent considered this 
a regretful turn of events, since many women provided positive feedback to the 
survey.335 However, members of the women’s council did not insist on being 
heard, as they wanted to avoid conflict and preferred ‘peace over struggle’ 
(tynchtyk kerek!). A school teacher, whose daughter-in-law had been part of the 
survey team, later considered that the opposicionery had simply tried to dismiss 
not only the kindergarten project, but all social projects, out of fear that the 
company would be able to ‘buy the residents off.’336  In early 2015, Robust 
Resources that purchased 100% of Talas Copper Gold in December 2013, 
bypassed the Aral commission and allocated funds to the women’s council 
independently. This move demonstrated that the commission had been ill 
equipped to adequately represent various interests of residents. 
  
                                                       
334 Interview with Jonathon Hornbrook, GIZ, Bishkek, June 2015. 
335 Interview with a female resident #1, Aral, November 2014. 
336 Interview with a school teacher, Aral, November 2014. 
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Figure 8: A slogan at the entrance of the Village Administration: 
‘Those who are united will unite, those who are not united will split apart.’ 
There are many of these slogans displayed in public places in Aral as 
‘reminders’ of unity, state and nation (© Asel Doolotkeldieva) 
 
By halting social projects, anti-mining activists precluded developments in the 
village. Collective meetings were an important group process for establishing 
cooperation among residents, as well as between the community and the 
company, and these aims were constantly being undermined. Reflecting on these 
developments, the Gold Fields country manager reacted bitterly: 
I just wished the community had been able to articulate exactly what they 
wanted. To be able to make a final decision about whether to withdraw 
operations or not, I needed a firm and legitimate response from the ground. 
What I instead faced was too many divergent arguments, weak voices and 
a formless resistance.337 
 
Although operation of the Aral commission took place in the aftermath of the 
demobilization of resistance, its work continued highlighting the fragmented 
nature of community and leadership. Amorphous or divided communities are 
often found in transition societies and state-building literature. During the Soviet 
era, integrative structures were present in rural areas such as collective 
                                                       
337 Conversation with the Country Director of Talas Copper Gold, David Grant, Bishkek, August 
2012. A company may often want to shift its responsibility to a divided community; however, 
Grant’s observation seems to be correct in this instance.  
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kolkhozes and sovkhozes, cultural clubs, party cells, professional associations, 
women and youth enrolment activities and others. Presently, rural Kyrgyzstan 
has few modern integrative structures that are able to provide individuals with the 
necessary orientation to make sense of complex contemporary phenomena such 
as natural resource extraction. The situation of political governance on the 
ground has become so dire that foreign companies are obliged to become 
engaged in ‘social-engineering’ activities (and not simply corporate social 
responsibility, as the central government assumes),338 that is, to encourage or 
directly participate in the formation of various organizations on the ground. In the 
case of Aral, social engineering activities were aimed at involving social groups 
whose interests had generally been ill represented by existing structures of 
power. Thus, it became a real-time challenge to activate these segments of the 
population, who were interested in working at the mine because of the 
diversification of individual incomes it promised. These individuals included 
women, professional youths and the poor of the village, whose voices had been 
marginalized in favour of local politicians, men and landowners.  
 
5.2.  Failure to form an organization of resistance 
In the remaining text, I will discuss other consequences of the proliferation of 
distrust on the trajectory of resistance. One such implication was the failure to 
form an efficient organization of resistance. The traditional social movement 
literature places special emphasis on the salience of organizational resources for 
the success of any collective enterprise. Within this literature, resource 
mobilization theory stresses that social movements must secure resources, a 
minimal form of organization, followers and a system of rewards for motivating 
                                                       
338 In an interview with the Head of the newly established Department of Mining at the Ministry of 
Economy, he stated that the mining operations were a matter of the relationship between the two, 
i.e., the mining company and the local community. The state has done its job by providing a 
liberal legislative framework, as well as the decentralization of government, where village 
governments receive full responsibility for mining activities. However, when the community was 
forced to cooperate with the company, residents complained that their weak local structures of 
power, which suffered severely from a lack of qualified personnel, were unable to cope with 
complex foreign actors on an equal foot. For similar processes of engagement of foreign 
corporate actors in nation-building in Mongolia see Jackson, S. L. (2015) ‘Imagining the mineral 
nation: contested nation-building in Mongolia’, Nationalities Papers, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 437-456. 
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membership.339 Below, I discuss the efforts of the chief initiator of resistance, 
Sabyr Mamytov, for forming an organization and the limits of ‘clan’ or tribe-based 
mobilization. 
 
Sabyr Mamytov made several attempts to form an organization using different 
local platforms. His focus, though, remained on the level of his native Chokoi 
uruu, who were meant to provide the main ‘infrastructure’ of mobilization. As 
already noted, he had been part of the opposition network that had assisted in 
overthrowing the Bakievs’ regime. In February 2010, he went on to form a public 
association, Beishe Ata, which included primarily members of Chokoi uruu. In 
addition to this platform, he participated in many other provisional groups such as 
the Commission for removing the company, the Commission for land reclamation 
and many others. Within the framework of these various crosscutting and parallel 
platforms, Sabyr Mamytov carried out his political activism. For example, while he 
used the commissions to threaten the company and to write official complaints to 
the central government, Sabyr Mamytov employed his association, Beishe Ata, to 
participate in the company’s business tenders and to request financial assistance 
for ‘cultural’ projects. Within this final framework, he obtained funds from Talas 
Copper Gold in order to promote the historical heritage of Chokoi uruu in the form 
of publishing a text on its genealogy.  
 
In addition to Sabyr Mamytov’s local profile, he became an active member of the 
regional network Talas El Yntymagy (Unity of Talas People) that comprises, 
according to information given by Sabyr Mamytov, approximately 3000 members, 
including 30 members from Aral. The main objective of this regional group 
consists of freezing all mining projects in Talas Province. The group participated 
in recent protests organized against the re-launching of the Jerooy gold factory in 
June and July 2015. 
 
                                                       
339 McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (1977). 
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One may wonder about the extent of the proliferation of such local and regional 
provisional groups and networks, and the desire of individuals to either form them 
or to be integrated in them. Moreover, questions arise regarding the potential of 
these multiple platforms for providing a ‘mass mobilization infrastructure,’340 as 
foregrounded in existing literature. 341  This question becomes even more 
intriguing when considering that the anti-mining group relied primarily on 
members of Chokoi uruu to mount their resistance. Yet, the Beishe Ata 
association did not thrive despite its promising cultural (Chokoi heritage) and 
economic (protecting farmers’ interests on Chokoi lands) appeals, and did not 
become the backbone of the resistance. This became obvious even to Sabyr 
Mamytov when members of his association declined to pay their membership 
fees, which was 50 som per month (approximately $1). Sustainable membership 
fees would allow for paying Sabyr Mamytov’s salary, keeping an operational 
office and continuing organizational activities. As to the question of why members 
were reluctant to contribute their membership fees, Sabyr Mamytov could not 
provide a decisive answer: 
Beishe Ata comprised between 60 to 70 farmers from Chokoi uruu. In 2012, 
I involved them in the land reclamation project that I won from the company. 
The plan was to splash water on the roads to decrease dust from passing 
tracks and to clean water springs that are located in the Taldy-Bulak area. 
That is how I thought to at least partially address the problem of holes left 
from excavations. For doing this job, people received three to four thousand 
soms monthly. But they did not want to work; by this time people had grown 
used to co-optation and wanted to receive money without working. When it 
came to a real work, they did not want to commit.342 
 
Sabyr Mamytov was unwilling to provide more details about the fragmentation 
that had occurred within his association, instead placing all the blame on the 
mining company. Talking about these developments with other interviewees 
revealed a scandal that took place within the land reclamation project related to 
financial discrepancies. Following this scandal, people became reluctant to 
                                                       
340 Radnitz, S. (2010), p.131. 
341 Scott Radnitz demonstrated through the example of the Aksy events how a rural community 
had been employed by a member of the elite in his opposition to the regime. See Radnitz, S. 
(2010). Temirkulov and Kapalova (2014) also advanced the idea that patrons can mobilize uruus.  
342 Interview with Sabyr Mamytov, Aral, July 2015. 
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contribute personal money to the association, whose leader was suspected of the 
misuse of public funds. When asked about the incident, Sabyr Mamytov accused 
the mining company of generating and propagating these allegations with the 
objective of ruining his reputation and ultimately, to demobilize him. By this time, 
incidents such as these that involved mutual accusations and suspicions were 
taking place on a daily basis; it therefore became difficult to identify the real 
reasons for members of the Beishe Ata association falling out with Sabyr 
Mamytov, since each side had their own interpretation of events.  
 
Against a backdrop of complex imagined and real relationships produced within 
the mining arena, an important point for me is that this example highlights the 
limits of clan or tribe-based political potential. Members of Chokoi seemed 
supportive of Sabyr Mamytov’s contentious activities when the latter implied the 
‘game of politics’, but showed less interest when the time was up for continued 
efforts of sustaining organization of resistance. If solidarity and networks based 
on uruu and territoriality played a certain role in helping activists to initiate 
mobilization, they appeared insufficient for providing lasting support. In another 
context regarding the distribution of natural resources and collective efforts, 
Bichsel makes a strong point that supports my findings: 
Solidarity for such a collective effort is often expected to arise between 
people who are held to be close, such as extended family and kinship 
groups, as well as ethnic groups… Such expected solidarity may fade once 
water arrives in the canals, and therefore is situational and contextual.343  
 
In line with Bichsel and contrary to Radnitz’s suggestion, I argue that even strong 
norms framing personal behaviours such as belonging to a community have a 
limited capacity for providing sustainable resources for political mobilization. With 
the example of individuals showing that trust and solidarity must be created and 
maintained through repeated and consistent occasions, one can question the 
                                                       
343 Bichsel, C. (2009), pp. 52-53. 
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capacity of tradition, specifically, that of the Chokoi descent line, for self-
reproduction as a political resource.344 
 
5.3. Discrediting of politics and grassroots resistance 
In this final section, I draw attention to another important consequence of the 
failed construction of collective action. Below, I present a collection of various 
opinions of residents that illustrate their understanding of and attitudes towards 
alternative politics in their village in the aftermath of mobilization. Although these 
perceptions of politics cannot be put into a historical perspective they advance 
nevertheless our understanding of the current processes of depoliticization in 
Kyrgyzstani society. 
 
I am specifically interested in the ways that individuals perceive the role of 
opposition in political processes, since respondents identified the anti-mining 
activists as opposicionery. One informant from Chokoi uruu differentiated 
between only two types of activism in the village: corrupt activists (prodajny) and 
fanatics (fanat). From her simple typology, there is no middle ground that might 
combine the features of fanatics (e.g., commitment and beliefs) and features of 
corrupt activists (e.g., pragmatism and creativity), among others. Regardless, the 
respondent indicated that neither the corrupt activists nor the fanatics could be 
trusted. If the nature of the current opposition to mining is being perceived in this 
light, it is less surprising that resistance has acquired such a small genuine 
following in Aral. Another conversation with a resident and his wife about the 
behaviour of anti-mining activists revealed the following understanding of 
opposition and its role concerning mining operations: 
[BA]: An opposicioner, in my opinion, is someone who has lost his job or 
who wants a job (kyzmattan ketti je kyzmattka kirish). If he receives 
monetary compensation for an unfulfilled expectation, he will let go of his 
frustration.  
[AD]: Does the village need opposition? 
[BA]: We need opposition, but it needs to be genuine and stable (chynchyl 
jana turuktuu) and needs to point out shortcomings and force the company 
                                                       
344 Wolters, A. (2013), p. 234. 
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to improve. But this is a hard work. One has to spend a lot of energy and 
time doing this to avoid the criticism of fellow villagers. Nobody pays you to 
do this. So who will agree to do it?345 	
From the above dialogue, one can conclude that resistance lacked authentic 
leadership that was ready to devote its own time and energy in the name of 
public service within the sphere of mining. These observations led the wife of the 
man interviewed above to conclude: 
Opposition in Aral has no roots, no ground (tuyu jok). But those who take 
part in it are loud and they suppress the opinions of others. As a result 
many villagers remain in the middle (ortodo), and cannot choose whether to 
cooperate with the company or oppose to it.346 
 
This is yet another powerful insight into the effects of fake resistance on the 
formation or rather, non-formation, of opinions among residents. The inability to 
formulate opinions about significant events reflects the bitter complaint made 
earlier by David Grant regarding an amorphous community with formless 
resistance. The inability to formulate opinions is further enforced if activists 
themselves do not take concrete positions within the conflict. Interestingly, when 
asked to describe his own political activity, Sabyr Mamytov declined being 
targeted as presenting opposition to incumbent politics and mining: 
[OM]: I am not an opposition guy; I just do the people’s job (eldin ishin kylam) 
because nobody else will. 
[AD]: What kind of people’s job is it? 
[OM]: It is about voicing people’s concerns and telling the truths that seniors 
an politicians in Bishkek won’t listen to. 
[AD]: Why did you take on this task? 
[OM]: Because nobody trusts either the local institutions or central politicians. 
Somebody has to do it. 
 
Although he did not present himself as engaging in alternative politics, Sabyr 
Mamytov assumed a public role by referring to what he did as ‘the people’s job’. 
This dialogue points to a more ambiguous status of activists within the realm of 
                                                       
345 Interview with a school deputy director, Aral, May 2015. 
346 Interview with a female resident #2, Aral, May 2015. 
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the state-society nexus in contrast to workers-brokers in the previous empirical 
chapter, who clearly stated themselves as mediators within social conflicts.  
 
I am further interested in how these perceptions of the role of activists structure 
understandings of the wider political arena within Aral. One informant drew a 
‘map of the anti-mining resistance’ that in her imaginary corresponded to groups 
involved in the conflict: 
1. The group ‘for land’ (jer uchun) – represents farmers whose lands may be 
exposed to future risks; 
2. The group ‘in the people’ interests (el uchun) – represents those residents 
who are concerned in general with the well-being of the community; 
3. The group ‘in one’s interests’ (ozun uchun) – represents anti-mining 
activists who were later recognized as opportunist individuals.347  
 
If the first two groups have a more or less clear status, the third group has 
acquired a bad reputation of spoilers, ‘buzukular’. According to residents, this 
group of spoilers had been responsible for the violent attacks on the mining 
company. However, even this structuration of mobilization does not offer any 
clear explanations, since the three groups are not homogenous or distinct, but 
overlap amongst themselves. For example, most of the actors who were in the 
spoilers’ group were also landowners. However, they differed from the first group 
of ‘real’ landowners due to the fact that they currently do not make their living 
from owning land, but use land rhetoric to advance their environmental claims. As 
I expected, many farmers could not work their land because they were unable to 
afford the necessary inputs needed for doing so such as machinery, fertilizers 
and seeds. Therefore, according to the residents’ perceptions, the size of the 
spoiler group fluctuated, depending on whether individuals wanted to conclude 
informal deals with the company or refrain from doing so. 
 
Another resident, an employee of the ayil okmot, made an observation that 
perfectly echoes that of the resident interviewed above and which illustrates the 
fluid nature of the opposition: 
                                                       
347 Interview with a member of women’s council, Aral, November 2014. 
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It is only a handful of individuals who pursue individual interests. We know 
them by appearance, maybe 10 to 15 people maximum. Yet this group 
becomes large at times. Nowadays, people are fighting for survival and 
need to look after their own needs rather than a common interest.348 
 
In addition to these perceptions, I heard two popular expressions that further 
nuance the meaning of such opportunism. ‘Ortogo salyp ishtoo’ (‘doing business 
in the middle’) and ‘sekiruu’ (literally, ‘jumping’) was employed to identify 
individuals or middlemen that shift from one side to another. Residents closely 
observed and subsequently commented on these movements with sarcasm. 
However, these terms were used to refer to many individuals whose positions 
were ambiguous or undecided. These striking insights also echoed a reflection by 
one of the oldest anti-mining leaders from the Bek-Moldo village (located near the 
Jerooy deposit in Talas Province, the second largest gold-mining project after 
Kumtor) concerning the fluid structure of leadership in the field of grassroots 
resistance: 
Let’s imagine a situation in a village. Presently, people don’t shy away from 
criticizing one another. It’s enough for one guy to propose some populist 
ideas that cannot be verified or implemented and have him succeed in 
mobilizing support. However, such support will be short-lived, since 
tomorrow, others or even seniors from the capital may arrive with even 
more populist ideas. In Soviet times, it was clear who the authority was in 
the village. This is no longer the case. Today, if I don’t visit these villages 
frequently enough, I stop being able to recognize young leaders. Every time 
I visit, I see new faces, new leaders.349  
 
Some observations are important for helping to understand these local 
perspectives. First, residents’ views reinforced my understanding that brokers’ 
activities do not go unnoticed by the local audience. The latter differentiates and 
categorizes the types of so-called ‘leaders’ according to their commitment to 
collective and private interests. Those who represent only personal interests are 
labelled ‘spoilers’; however, normative action cannot be taken against them, 
because the group of spoilers is extendible and can include new, previously 
genuine individuals at any time. To a certain degree, this differentiation helps the 
                                                       
348 Interview with a female employee of Village Administration, Aral, May 2015. 
349 Author interview with Sarymjan Toktoshev, September, Bishkek 2013. 
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local audience to orient itself and navigate using caution when engaging with 
opaque local politics. Yet it means that neither the structure of leadership nor the 
structure of membership that constitute a basis for sustainable mobilization has 
been established in Aral. For social practices of insurgency in the Kyrgyzstani 
periphery, this means that any attempt to launch collective action faces 
significant obstacles in terms of uncertainty and contingent commitment. In 
Western societies, the commitment of participants in social movements is 
dependent on their adherence to the cause and their own personal beliefs; 
however, commitment of participants in the underdeveloped periphery is subject 
to more existential issues. Furthermore, it seems that the impact of neoliberal 
reforms on social issues has led to the erosion of social structures of integration, 
which could have played an important role in terms of preserving collective efforts 
arising from opportunist behaviour. The current inflation of opportunist practices 
testifies to the increasingly precarious nature of the social fabric and its 
decreasing potential for resisting and withstanding potential external threats. I 
therefore find it difficult to place any belief in the efficiency of stable patronage 
networks that run all the way down from the centre to villages and which cast 
unconditional political support in those at the top.350 
 
Conclusions 
Major controversies regarding the country’s largest gold-mining project, Kumtor, 
gave rise to nationalist sentiments and environmental concerns country-wide. 
One may therefore have expected rural communities that supported the 
traditional Kyrgyz lifestyle to have successfully protested against non-transparent 
foreign mining projects and the neo-liberal fragmented state. However, resistance 
in Aral fell apart after a year of tension, unlike the successful resistance that took 
place in the neighbouring Kopuro-Bazar, where access to Andash mine has been 
shut down since 2011.  
 
                                                       
350 For similar findings in the context of the development of political parties, see Doolotkeldieva, A. 
(2015) ‘Development of parties and the pre-election situation in the regions. Perspective of 
regional party representatives’, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bishkek. 
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In this empirical chapter, I provided an example of a failed attempt of constructing 
sustainable resistance. Thus, the initial phase of mobilization, which included 
public gatherings, writing complaints to state institutions and violent attacks on 
the mining company did not lead to the successful sustainability of resistance. I 
linked this failure to dynamics of open politics that led to the exposure of informal 
deals and private interests among the core group of anti-mining critics. I showed 
how the provisional open space that was purposefully created in Aral with the aim 
of convincing residents to join the anti-mining cause has, paradoxically, disserved 
the organizers.  
 
The empirical case pointed out that trust in the organization of resistance holds 
critical decisiveness for the path of mobilization. Trust is a precondition for lasting 
grassroots practices of contestation and protesting because a traceable 
consistency concerning activists’ commitment to collective interests remains the 
only orientation left for to-be-members in the context of generalized distrust and 
institutional uncertainty. In a different context of successful associations, Bichsel 
quotes a participant of collective action whose reflections appear to be supportive 
of my argument: 
It was expressed by members of the association that there was strong 
cohesion among the villagers. A member explained that, ‘Leaders are very 
important. They help people to continue the work. Since the beginning, they 
did not try to deceive us, and that is why people continue to support them’. 
Thus, honesty and accountability qualify leadership.351 
 
Another environmental NGO that had been active in the gold sector noted the 
destructive effects of distrust in connection to struggles for power: 
Local leaders did not always understand the whole picture. They did not 
always accept our arguments, many of them hoped that they could resolve 
their problems by directly appealing to the president, and they saw our 
arguments as a simple struggle for power.352  
 
                                                       
351 Bichsel, C. (2009), p. 81. 
352 Buxton, C. (2011), p.93. 
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This leads me to formulating another finding from this empirical case: the creation 
of resistance beyond the core group of believers requires basic conditions of 
‘visibility’ or publicity. Since the infrastructure that enables individuals to observe 
public figures and their claims is weak in rural Kyrgyzstan, public gatherings 
served the purpose. This aspect can advance our theoretical considerations 
about Kyrgyzstani society. The example puts forward the notion that it is 
essential for individuals to observe a lasting political position for their continuous 
participation in social mobilizations. Individuals did not take for granted nationalist 
and environmental claims, but instead scrutinized the very cause and initiators of 
mobilization. Thus, the problematization of the production of trust as a reciprocal 
dynamic ‘brings back’ rural residents in our analyses as reflexive, active and 
contesting individuals. As such, the rejection of participating in fake mobilization 
questions existing theories pertaining to elite manipulation and clan mobilization.  
 
Observations from the two empirical studies remain that need to be addressed. In 
the next chapter, I will provide a comparative interpretation of data.  
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CHAPTER VI: A COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS 
 
The two empirical chapters have generated a large volume of observations that 
can be further illuminated if compared. In this chapter, I will continue discussing 
empirical findings by turning back to the literature and reflecting on the 
conceptual propositions that I have formulated at the beginning of the 
dissertation. Based largely on an inductive approach, this chapter attempts to 
build on variations of independent variables observed in two contentious sites 
and formulate conceptual conclusions about the nature of social mobilizations in 
rural Kyrgyzstan. The chapter is organized into three parts: in the first part, I will 
briefly discuss the main similarities and differences between two case studies; in 
the second part, I will reflect on the variations of two independent variables and 
different outcomes of the dependent variable. Specifically, I will look at: (1) how 
initiators of initial mobilization overcome generalized suspicion by proving 
their commitment to collective interests; 2) how participants of initial 
mobilization establish trust in initiators and agree to participate in 
subsequent mobilizations. I argued in Chapter III that these two conditions are 
accountable for the formation of structured mobilizations in the Kyrgyzstani 
context, as characterized by generalized distrust and corrupt politics. In the third 
part I will discuss the intervening variable – brokers – that tend to fragment 
integrity within protest groups. 
 
I. Grassroots Mobilizations in the Kyrgyzstani Periphery 
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At the start of my empirical research, I explicitly selected two cases that vary in 
terms of geography and modes of economic and political organization. One 
contentious site represents the mobilization of a segment of a rural community 
against a foreign mining firm and the weak state in the northern province of 
Talas. The second contentious site exemplifies the mobilization of workers in a 
small town against central power system, in the southern province of Jalal-Abad. 
Despite these geographic and organizational distinctions, the cases share a set 
of traits that are specific to the context and mode of mobilization. First, in both 
cases, peripheral dissent began immediately following major political changes in 
the capital in April of 2010. Local groups reacted to opportunities brought about 
by the revolution in a bid to change their existing local orders. Second, in both 
cases, groups suffered at the outset from weak internal resources and a lack of 
experience in engaging in contentious politics. Third, against the background of 
dire socioeconomic conditions at the periphery and a lack of resources, the 
selected case studies showed from the very beginning an impressive capacity 
for the self-organization of individuals, whether in terms of reviving a 
longstanding Soviet-type union or forming new associations. In both localities, 
actors resorted to ‘conventional’ means of contestation such as organizing public 
discussions, writing petitions and appealing to courts, before turning to 
‘unconventional’ means such as protests and violent actions. Fourth, my case 
studies are examples of resistance of the ‘periphery’ against the ‘centre’. In both 
instances, actors opposed central policies and institutions in the sphere of the 
extractive industry, as well as the state management of resources. Despite the 
fact that the main opponents in the case studies were the foreign mining firm and 
central elites respectively, the state became the target of social dissent because 
it came to be treated as a mediator of societal conflicts. The involvement of the 
state had important implications for widening the structure of conflict, which was 
initially conceived within local arenas but extended to involve central politics. 
Finally, both case studies exhibited the placing of significant value on the 
independent variables under question: initiators and participants of initial 
mobilization actively engaged in the production of trust via group interactions, 
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but the outcomes of these interactions were varied. The main analytical 
differences and similarities between the two cases are briefly summarized in the 
table below.  
 
Feature Case: Community-based 
mobilization in Aral village 
(‘mechanical solidarity’) 
 Case: Labour-based mobilization 
in Kochkor-Ata town (‘organic 
solidarity’) 353 
Structural 
basis 
Village  
 
Type of economic activity: 
agriculture and livestock 
production 
Segmental type: uruu-based 
and territorial 
Degree of interdependence: 
few integrative local 
structures 
Town 
 
Type of economic activity:  
industry                                                                                                          
 
Organized type: based on the 
division of labour 
Degree of interdependence: 
multiple integrative local 
structures 
Type of 
parties of 
contention 
Group of residents versus 
foreign miner and central 
government 
Work force, local union and new 
management versus central 
institutions and elites 
Type of 
agenda 
Simple: ‘against mining 
operations’ with no 
alternative agenda 
Complex: ‘against corruption’ 
with an alternative agenda 
Type of 
actions 
against 
opponents 
Few village gatherings and 
peaceful marches; 
Minor sabotage of mining 
operations and violent 
attacks on the company; 
Multiple large and minor protests;  
Legal actions; 
Building alliances with central 
political actors; 
Other actions 
                                                       
353 I borrow here Durkheim’s differentiation of mechanic and organic solidarities since such basic 
sociology is useful for the purpose of putting the two cases in starker contrast. See Durkheim, E. 
(1997) The Division of Labour in Society, translated by Halls, W.D., New York: Free Press. 
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No alliances with central 
political actors 
Type of 
political 
response to 
local 
contention 
Central government abstains 
from conflict between 
community and miner 
Central government makes 
concessions to certain demands 
of the labour movement 
Type of 
brokerage 
Beishe Ata association (later 
discredited) 
People’s Defense Committee 
(later sidelined) 
Group 
processes 
Learning process: 
consciousness-raising 
Monitoring process: failure to 
establish trust  
 
Collective decision-making: 
partial success of collective 
decision-making 
 
Collective empowerment: 
divided political community 
Learning process: 
consciousness-raising 
Monitoring process: successful 
production of trust 
 
Collective decision-making: 
successful establishment of 
regular mechanisms of collective 
decision-making 
Collective empowerment: 
successful episodes of 
mobilization and a growing belief 
in the success of collective action 
Type of 
outcome 
Failure to form sustained 
mobilization 
Successful formation of 
sustained mobilization 
Table 9: Differences and similarities between case studies 
 
After drawing on these preliminary similarities and distinctions, I will now discuss 
the two conditions that brought about diverse outcomes of sustainability of 
mobilization in the case studies.  
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II. Production of Trust and the Formation of Conditions for 
Structured Mobilization 
This part of the chapter serves the purpose of taking a closer look at the 
empirical manifestations of two conditions and their impact on the dependent 
variable. Specifically, I aimed to discover to what extent initiators and 
participants of initial mobilization engaged in trust production via the group 
processes that emerged from this engagement. In Chapter III, I insisted that 
formation of trust is essential to the sustainability of grassroots mobilizations in 
the difficult context of discredited leadership, corrupt organizations, and 
uncertain political environment. This type of trust is created and maintained 
through monitoring in public spaces, rather than through pre-existing social 
structures and/or patronage networks. I will develop my critique of existing static 
explanations of patronage networks in the final chapter of the thesis. I also 
claimed that the production of trust is a dynamic process and requires the 
participation of both sides. Thus, initiators of resistance have to overcome 
existing suspicions among local observers by proving that they represent 
collective interests. This process is not a sporadic event but takes place 
continuously in order to offset ever-emerging suspicions on the part of the 
audience. Participants do not attend to the process of verification passively. 
Participants of mobilization have to be able to observe the behaviour of initiators 
and other participants to be able to make informed decisions about whether to 
continue participation. Hence, here, too, the production of trust has to take place 
in a prolonged and repeated fashion. I refer to this process of the initial 
production of trust as a monitoring process. As informed by the above, the 
monitoring process accompanies the development of mobilization throughout its 
entire lifespan, since trust production has to permanently struggle against 
generalized suspicions that have already settled as the result of a legacy of non-
democratic governance. Although the monitoring process is a continuous 
exercise, I argue that once trust in the authenticity of initiators has been 
established and the commitment of participants has been created and 
maintained, provisional episodes of mobilization can hope to sustain themselves. 
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Thus, the production of trust is a necessary condition for structured 
mobilizations. If participants of mobilization can believe they are not being 
cheated, trust can give rise to other group processes that will further enhance 
opportunities for sustainability.  
 
The outcomes of such policing can therefore lead to both the successful 
construction of a protest movement (the Kochkor-Ata case), as well as to further 
social fragmentation (the Aral case). This contrasting potential of group 
processes leads me to suggest that they involve highly contingent and 
unpredictable outcomes. Furthermore, the importance of group processes gives 
critical weight to the fact that the fate of grassroots mobilization is decided 
internally. Maintenance and the disintegration of mobilization are therefore a 
result of internal factors rather than external pressures only.  
 
I also listed three specific group processes: collective learning, collective 
decision-making and collective empowerment. My conceptualization of the 
production of trust as a resource that is specifically required in the Kyrgyzstani 
context was inspired by the approaches of Hirsch and Fantasia, who view the 
creation of increased commitment and solidarity bonds in association, i.e. within 
group processes. Below, I summarize empirical findings about these processes 
in each case, as well as across both cases.  
 
2.1. Construction of sustained mobilization: the case of the labour-based 
Movement for Truth (Kochkor-Ata) 
In this section I would like to demonstrate a successful case in which production 
of trust has led to transformation of initial unstructured episodes of mobilization 
into sustained mobilization. As was shown in Chapter IV, the labour Movement 
for Truth emerged from a provisional structure that consisted of a divided 
workforce, contested leadership and improvised episodes of mobilization. In four 
years, the movement managed to become a structured group based on 
legitimate leadership, committed membership and an established repertoire of 
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collective action. I have attempted to show that this structuration had been the 
result of internal processes of learning, collective decision-making and collective 
empowerment through episodes of collective action. Achieving this had not been 
easy, since the organization of mobilization had to resort to costly endeavours in 
order to prove to the local audience their authenticity and commitment to 
collective interests. The Kyrgyzneftegaz company, in which mobilization took 
roots, offered multiple opportunities for repeated interactions that gave both the 
initiators and participants of mobilization opportunities to deliberate on the one 
hand, and to check and monitor each other on the other hand.  
 
The production of trust in these repeated interactions led to the formation of 
legitimate leadership and membership structures. Moreover, conditions were 
also created for engaging in extensive learning processes, which allowed 
workers and management to gain novel experience in protest-making, gaining 
access to information about the functioning of the central power system and 
acquiring knowledge about opponents located in the capital. The labour 
movement also engaged in an impressive volume of protests, strikes, political 
lobbying and legal actions. Throughout this engagement with various opponents, 
workers established an impressive record of victories that in turn dramatically 
enhanced their belief in the success of collective action and instilled among them 
the feeling of belonging to a collective endeavour. Finally, the collective decision-
making process introduced democratic mechanisms of deliberation and 
decision-making, which contributed to the sustained participation of members in 
mobilization. Of course, these processes were rather intermixed and took place 
simultaneously within the same avenues or sites. Yet, the monitoring of the 
organization of resistance and the ensuing trust in it led to the success of other 
processes. I have distinguished them into separate processes for the sake of 
analytical and conceptual clarity. 
 
At this point, I wish to pause to reflect on one such site, which hosted various 
group processes, i.e., the all-workers meetings. Let me remind that one of the 
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main elements of the labour movement was the local union that together with the 
management helped sustaining mobilizations. A part from actual episodes of 
collective action, the union promoted and organized important all-workers 
meetings, which were designed to collectively discuss issues of production and 
politics on a regular basis. Establishment of this mechanism of collective 
decision-making was a result of commitment to internal democratic governance, 
which workers learned to appreciate throughout their four-year mobilization. 
During the course of mobilization, general meetings became a salient 
mechanism that provided endless opportunities for discussing ongoing events, to 
construct ever-new grievances and to prepare for new rounds of mobilization. As 
per Snow et al.’s (1986) concept of frame alignment, meetings transformed into 
perfect platforms for the operationalization of diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational frameworks. I was able to observe how workers used these 
meetings to present their claims for general debate, enhance their arguments, 
convince other members, find the desired approval and subsequently mobilize 
for action. On the one hand, these processes may slow down actual mobilization 
of workers; on the other hand, the regularity and unanimity of these meetings 
increased the sustainability of this infrastructure of social interactions. Such an 
infrastructure is also more likely to provide the secured mobilization of 
participants in times of action, because individuals come to know one another 
through regularized social interactions.  
 
Another outcome of these regular meetings was the growing politicization of 
workers. In these meetings, consciousness-raising and the politicization of 
workers against central politics and the power system took place. As one 
participant noted, ‘in the past, workers were not involved in politics. Now they 
learned how to engage with politics.’354 This politicization led to workers being 
aware of their rights and not letting themselves be deceived by elites and state 
institutions. This construction of self against evasive central politics also gave 
rise to the valorisation of labour culture and a celebration of the meaningfulness 
                                                       
354 Interview with a brigadier, Kochkor-Ata, December 2013. 
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of workers’ jobs. As a participant noted, ‘we produce and procure southern 
regions with gas. We are doing an important job here. And these politicians, 
what do they understand about what we really do?’355  
 
Finally, regular meetings contributed to the creation of opportunities for 
movement reproduction. By reproduction, I refer to labour mobilization that 
achieves a stage of organization of material and non-material resources that it 
can reproduce itself. This point was highlighted by constructivist theoricians. 
Nicklas Luhmann for example suggested that social movements generated ‘new 
topics when the old ones have run their course’.356 Following Luhmann, Klaus 
Japp argued that at the early stage of mobilization there is a ‘readiness to 
criticize and protest’ and only then can a topic of public relevance be made the 
movement’s focus. 357  Protests are therefore not triggered by issues, but rather 
by the form – protesting. In Kochkor-Ata, the movement has also reached a 
phase of development in which it could reproduce itself from within. As an 
example, the last time I visited the town in January 2015, I observed an 
interesting development. During meetings, workers were creating new concerns 
in a bid to expand their field of mobilization to new areas of government policies. 
Such expansion of grievances and concerns meant that the movement was able 
to branch into new directions and create for itself new topics of focus, which in 
turn would give rise to new rounds of mobilization and thereby secure the 
maintenance of the movement. As such, I put forward the argument that 
according to the history of this mobilization, which had been achieved over the 
course of four years, the process gave ordinary workers the confidence to 
engage in a wide range of contentious topics against various opponents. This 
points to the development of the labour movement into a phase where resistance 
is carried out for the sake of resistance.  
 
                                                       
355 Interview with a head of gas distribution, Kochkor-Ata, January 2015. 
356 Luhmann, N. (1993) Risk: A sociological theory, translated by Barrett, R., New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter translated by Barrett. 
357 Japp, K. (1999) ‘The form of protest in the new social movements’, in Baecker, D. (ed.) 
Problems of form, Stanford University Press, p. 156. 
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In summary, it can be said that in the case of the labour movement in Kochkor-
Ata, trust was successfully established and maintained via group processes. 
Furthermore, group processes permitted the initially fragmented episodes of 
mobilization to grow into structured mobilization. Only when repeated trust had 
been established in the organization of mobilization, did a scale shift take place in 
the labour-based mobilization in Kochkor-Ata. It can therefore be stated that 
there is a direct causal relationship between trust in authentic organization and 
growth/consolidation of a protest group. 
 
2.2. Deconstruction of initial mobilization: the case of rural mobilization 
(Aral) 
The anti-mining mobilization in Aral village is an example of a failed case. I 
included a failed case in my thesis because it perfectly shows exactly where and 
why mobilization fails. This case demonstrates the stages of mobilization in 
which the anti-mining resistance has started with genuine claims but ended up 
with a corrupt leadership and discredited organization. The failed case tells us 
that the decline in participation in mobilization happens where the shift of public 
awareness about the fake organization takes place. Any pre-existing informal 
networks based on kin or ‘tribe’ that constituted at least some part of the initial 
mobilization could not mitigate this shift. In this section I will once again take a 
closer look at those instances where the public awareness shifted against the 
organization of anti-mining mobilization. 
 
The primary instances in which the local audience could form opinions about the 
worthiness of joining the collective action were public village gatherings and 
partly the specialized Aral commission meetings. During these meetings, fellow 
residents realized that activists were not being consistent in their opposition to 
mining. These inconsistencies gained even more negative connotations as a 
result of the news that some of activists had been offered jobs at the mining 
camp, as well as opportunities to conduct private business with the company. As 
a result, gatherings ended up unravelling petty power struggles and the 
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opportunism of fellow residents, and undermining many previous established 
social relationships within the village. From sites of collective diagnosis and 
frame-making, local gatherings turned into instances of mutual criticism and 
blame-laying. Most importantly, the exposure of activist informal agendas led to 
the discrediting of the public anti-mining cause and demotivated individuals to 
commit to it.  
 
Thus, unlike the previous empirical case, group processes and mechanisms in 
Aral village led to demobilization and further social fragmentation. From this 
empirical case, I therefore conclude that the observation of ‘good’ behaviour of 
others is a pre-condition for collective action. This finding contrasts with the 
findings of existing literature that viewed a pre-existing identity and networks as 
a condition sine qua non for collective action. My findings suggest that in the 
context of the post-Soviet disintegration of social structures and neoliberal 
reforms, even pre-existing identities and facilitative networks are not enough for 
inspiring action. Trust in authenticity of collective action is gained in action and 
during group processes, not individual. Group processes permit the observation 
of behaviours that had previously been hidden by informal politics. This function 
of group processes is closely linked to current conditions of public space and its 
infrastructure in rural Kyrgyzstan. In the absence of other means to 
systematically track political positions, group processes that had been activated 
for a different purpose inadvertently turned into such a medium of observation. 
This case concerning the deconstruction of a protest movement exhibits the 
growing need for public space in Kyrgyzstan. One can therefore read the 
uprisings at the periphery not as an expression of the predicament of 
socioeconomic underdevelopment only, but as attempts by ordinary citizens to 
organize spaces for local discussion and for establishing practices of public 
scrutiny.358 
 
                                                       
358 To borrow from Jürgen Habermas’s concept of ‘publicity’; see Habermas, J. (1991) Structural 
transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society, Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 238 
What do such social practices regarding the monitoring of commitment tell us 
about the bigger picture of politics? On the one hand, the abundance of group 
dynamics that do not always lead to normatively expected coherent protest 
agendas and uniform demonstrations may imply that group dynamics are merely 
performances.359 However, if we fail to understand the internal dynamics that 
shape these group processes, we may also fail to recognize the fact that they 
fulfil first and foremost an internal need for self-regulation and subsequent group 
formation. This leads me to suggest that social mobilizations that appear to lack 
meaning are aimed first and foremost at an internal audience rather than at 
external observers. This is an important finding, as it proposes understanding 
the formation and sustainability of mobilizations as foremost taking place during 
actual mobilization and less so prior to or in its aftermath.  
 
Another way to address the difference between two cases will be to look closer 
at the organization of two mobilizations. Both organizations had been subjected 
to informal politics of brokers and both suffered from the loss of integrity and 
credibility. However, again I have two stark examples of how the organizations of 
mobilization were dealt with. The labour movement had only been partially 
influenced by brokers, whereas the organization of anti-mining mobilization was 
conceived and dominated by brokers. I will consider these points in detail in the 
next section. 
 
III. Brokerage: an Important Antecedent Condition 
At the start of conceptualizing my preliminary empirical findings, I argued that 
brokers constituted an intervening variable that had a magnifying effect on the 
fragmentation of social mobilizations. More specifically, they corrupt and 
discredit the organization of mobilization. If brokers dominate the organization of 
mobilization the leadership of organization will less likely enjoy legitimacy and 
support within the local audience. In return, by acquiring a bad reputation 
                                                       
359 Reeves, M., Rosanayagam, J. and Beyer, J. (ed.) (2014) Ethnographies of the state in Central 
Asia: Performing politics, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 
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brokers also undermine their own activities in the long run. Later, however, I 
realized that brokerage encompassed much more than the actions of individual 
actors; brokerage should be rather understood as a social practice emerging as 
a response to the surrounding political climate, which in turn exposes individuals 
to opportunism. It will therefore be more useful to analyse this phenomenon as 
an antecedent condition that serves as a background to social mobilizations and 
politics. Although the case methodology does not particularly allow for making 
direct observations about the antecedent conditions, it still permits hypothesizing 
about its features on the basis of empirical findings (Van Evera, 1997). In the 
remaining part of this chapter, I will first elaborate on brokers as actors who 
perform certain functions and second, on brokerage as an emerging salient 
practice that has real implications for politics and collective actions. 
  
Looking back at the two empirical chapters, my accounts of brokerage practices 
appear ambivalent at best. I noticed that in every case, a societal grievance or 
concern was compromised at some point of protest-making by actors with vague 
positions and unclear interests within the protest groups. These actors came 
across as charismatic, outspoken, energetic and well informed; however, their 
commitment to the protest agenda was unstable during the course of events and 
gave rise to significant suspicion among ordinary participants. In the case of the 
labour-based movement, a number of salaried workers founded the People’s 
Defense Committee and clearly stated that their role encompassed  ‘bridging’ 
between central authorities and local constituencies, in particular, the workers’ 
movement. For some time, the People Defense Committee was part of the 
organization of mobilization. In case of community-based mobilization, 
organizers of the anti-mining mobilization found themselves in an ambiguous 
situation when residents revealed the contradiction between their informal 
pursuit of power and publicly shared environmental concerns. These organizers 
claimed, again, to have been ‘bridging’ between the community and the ‘absent’ 
state. The positioning of these specific actors in the middle between the 
periphery and centre led me to adopt the term ‘broker’ to define an intermediary 
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function that connects previously unconnected entities.  
 
This otherwise beneficial function turned out to be detrimental to social 
mobilizations in Kyrgyzstani contexts, however. In both cases, these actors, 
whom I call brokers, were identified and ultimately sidelined. In Kochkor-Ata 
town, this process was proactive in the sense that workers marginalized the 
People’s Defense Committee and made their union the principal representative 
body for the sake of avoiding the discrediting of their movement. By removing 
this broker, the movement ‘streamlined’ its organization and professionalized its 
engagement with central opponents. In Aral village, the process of discrediting 
brokers was passive, since the public condemnation of the second attack and 
the ensuing demobilization of the anti-mining resistance by default caused the 
marginalization of the organizers of mobilization. As a result, the exposure of 
brokers led not only to their removal, but also to the disintegration of mobilization 
altogether.  
 
This is only one aspect of the problem concerning brokerage. Other evidence 
showed that many other participants acted at times as brokers. Ordinary 
participants of mobilization made attempts to use collective grievances in order 
to advance private interests or seek integration into some ‘political game’. I came 
to conclusion, therefore, that it is impossible to estimate the scope of brokers in 
a given contentious site, as any participant can at any minute become an astute 
intermediary under the influence of a corrupt political environment. With this 
complication in mind, I turn to existing literature on the social and political 
functions of brokers with the hope that such a discussion will allow me to better 
understand the empirical and theoretical implications of their proliferation on 
collective action in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
3.1. Brokers’ functions 
Brokers have been treated contrarily by social sciences. For my purposes, the 
literature on brokerage can roughly be subdivided into two domains for the sake 
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of clarity. On the one hand, in the area of organizational and network studies, 
brokers have come to be treated as indispensable actors that fill in a ‘gap’ or 
provide a ‘bridge’ between disconnected entities, mediate ‘structural holes’ and 
therefore, make provision for the undisturbed flow of information and services. 
On the other hand, anthropologists and political scientists have noted the 
pervasive effect of brokers in electoral politics, in centre-periphery state building, 
in development aid, in patron-client relationships and other spheres that touch 
resources and power. What unites these two theoretical strands is that brokers 
function as intermediaries between different groups and these accounts portray 
largely successful examples of broker intervention. I will draw ideas from each of 
these camps for the benefit of my conceptualization of brokerage, since 
traditional social movement theory has to date paid insufficient attention to this 
phenomenon in the area of social mobilizations. I link this gap to the fact that 
SMT had been developed in Western institutionalized societies where even 
broker roles are determined and structured, and therefore rarely pose a problem 
for social movements.  
 
How can we understand the emergence of brokers in various spheres of human 
activity? Scholars of different disciplines agree that brokers provide mediation 
between different groups. Network theorist Ronald Burt conceptualizes 
brokerage in the following terms: 
Strategy guided by brokerage involves locating a position at the edge of 
two groups, and building relations between dissimilar people. Brokerage 
must be the more difficult strategy, but the further difference is that 
brokerage is explicitly about action that cuts across structural holes in the 
current social structure.360  
 
Burt further describes a person called Robert who easily navigates between 
different networks, controls for information and yields benefits by mediating 
between previously unconnected networks or people. Fernandez and Gould 
continue this line of inquiry and highlight that the flow of authentic information is 
                                                       
360  Burt, R. S. (2000) ‘The network structure of social capital’, Research in Organizational 
Behavior, vol. 22, pp. 345-423. 
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at the core of brokers’ legitimacy and sustainability. Brokers are interested in 
delivering the ‘right’ information that promotes more collaboration among groups 
and which therefore render brokers desirable by prospective participants.361 This 
type of context is characterized by the provision of access to perfect information 
and knowledge, which proved difficult to access on the part of Kyrgyzstani 
brokers. 
 
In relation to social movements, brokerage has not received much attention and 
existing approaches treat this phenomenon in relatively beneficial terms. 
Consider Diani’s assessment of brokerage: 
Brokers’ most crucial property lies in their capacity to connect actors who 
are not communicating because of some specific political or social barrier, 
rather than the mere absence of practical opportunities… In the case of the 
Milan environmental movement in the mid-1980s, barriers consisted mostly 
of the well-known differences between conservation and political ecology 
traditions. It is on such occasions that brokerage is crucial for the survival 
of chains of interaction, and therefore for the connectedness of a network 
as a whole.362  
 
In the above-mentioned case of environmental SMOs in Italy, in addition to 
sharing information, brokers’ activities consisted of establishing ties with distant 
actors and forging connections with prospect allies – activities that increase 
membership and network expansion. Diani makes another important point about 
‘barriers’. Brokers emerge due to such barriers, or as previously noted by Burt, 
due to structural holes. In the Kyrgyzstani context, one can hypothesize about 
sources of barriers; these might be, for example, found within the centre-
periphery structure of political communications. 363  For example, in Western 
                                                       
361 Fernandez, R. and Gould, R. (1994). 
362 Diani, M. (2003) ‘Leaders or brokers? Positions and influence in social movement networks, in 
Diani, M. and McAdam, D. (ed.) Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to 
collective action, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 107. 
363 Another source of barriers is the extractive industry itself. For example, the mining process, 
which was novel for Aral village with its emphasis on a new, transnational, mode of production, 
juxtaposed with local ‘traditional’ modes of production, created stark oppositions that required the 
emergence of mediators for negotiation. The process of the vernacularization of foreign economic 
projects is not straightforward and the ‘absence’ of the state was clearly a strategic mistake made 
by the neo-liberal government, which decided that an impoverished community would benefit 
from the expertise, knowledge and experience offered by the mining company. 
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contexts, SMOs that work towards changing official policies collaborate directly 
with local decision-making bodies and rarely do so with higher echelons of 
power.364 However, Kyrgyzstani protest movements have to directly address the 
highest bodies of power, since local political institutions are devoid of power; 
these movements therefore have to overcome many bureaucratic and political 
barriers. Although the focus of my dissertation is not directly linked to this topic, 
on several occasions throughout my empirical chapters I had the opportunity to 
illustrate the ways in which peripheral protesters attempted to overcome the 
centre-periphery structure of political relationships in their efforts to attract the 
attention of the central government, or to exploit weak political communications 
between local constituencies and the central government. A result of this was 
the organization of private delegations to the capital that were designed to 
establish contact with elites and to gain access to information, which became a 
chief concern of local brokers in the case of the workers’ Movement for Truth. In 
the case of community-based mobilization, such trips to Bishkek were much 
more limited, due to a lack of organizational resources. Brokers nevertheless 
travelled to the capital in order to gain access to independent ecological experts 
and members of Parliament. I find the grey zone in which local actors meet with 
central actors and the ensuing new political practices a promising direction for 
future research. These new political practices give rise to concepts of brokerage 
that present alternative avenues for thinking about the nature of politics in 
Central Asia. I will come back to this crucial point in the concluding chapter of 
this dissertation.  
 
Returning to the question of connecting groups (or overcoming holes or 
barriers), Gould and Fernandez studied the American public health sector and 
identified five structurally distinct types of brokers that ‘follow from a partitioning 
of actors into non overlapping subgroups.’365 These are differentiated as follows: 
(1) a ‘liaison’ role, a type of brokerage relation in which all three actors belong to 
                                                       
364 Diani, M. (2003). 
365 Fernandez, R. and Gould, R. (1994). 
 244 
different groups; (2) a ‘representative’ role; (3) a ‘gatekeeper’ role, in which an 
actor secures external resources and distributes them within their group; (4) 
‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘itinerant’ broker, where two actors may belong to the same 
subgroup while the intermediary belongs to a different group; (5) a ‘local broker’ 
or ‘coordinator’ – indicates someone who mediates between actors that all 
belong to the same group. In this elaborated effort to conceptualize 
communications within social settings, the key to understanding Gould and 
Fernandez’s typology are ideas pertaining to ‘impartiality’ and the non-
overlapping positioning of brokers. I stress these two aspects because they are 
important for my study of brokerage: 
Occupants of liaison and itinerant roles, who by definition link actors with 
interests dissimilar to their own…will be able to convert their structural 
position into influence only if they generally refrain from public advocacy of 
policies. In contrast, occupants of representative and gatekeeper roles 
should derive influence from their position irrespective of their stands on 
issues, because boundary spanners are expected to share goals of their 
own groups.366 
 
Brokers’ impartiality and influence are therefore subject to the type of role they 
play. Diani’s observation echoes the quote above, as he notes, ‘playing a 
brokerage role does not seem to affect the public profile of SMOs in a significant 
way, if not for the very core organizations.’367 In Western contexts, brokerage 
positions in the middle imply some degree of fluidity; nonetheless, they remain 
structured positions, due to the expectations others have of the specific functions 
of brokers. These expectations appear to structure commitment to impartiality 
and the specific roles assigned to brokers in a given social setting. In 
Kyrgyzstan, it is unclear to which degree brokers remain loyal to their initial 
positions.  
 
In the second group of literature, brokers are once again shown to operate at the 
boundary. This time, however, the boundaries demarcate complex political and 
economic relationships between, (1) clients (which are generally a local and 
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367 Diani, M. (2003), p. 113. 
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usually disfranchised population) and patrons (individuals with status)368; (2) 
between the state and ‘localisms’ in the former’s effort to expand spatially369; (3) 
between politicians and voters370 and between others. The research that focuses 
on these issues is extremely useful, as these studies stress firstly the ways in 
which brokerage has played a significant role in historical processes. Second, 
they emphasize the wider functions that brokers fulfil in these diverse political 
and socioeconomic settings. Third, they highlight, perhaps most importantly, the 
conflicting and dynamic model between brokers and their environment. Anton 
Block, who has studied the Italian mafia, writes, for example, 
The mafioso can therefore be considered as a variety of the political 
middleman or power broker, since his raison d’être is predicated upon his 
capacity to acquire and maintain control over the paths linking the local 
infrastructure of the village to the superstructure of the larger society.371  
 
Another important author, Eric Wolf, who studied social relations in Mexico, 
reflects on brokers’ roles in the following terms: 
Their basic function is to relate community-oriented individuals who want to 
stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack economic security and 
political connections with nation-oriented individuals… [Brokers] must serve 
some of the interests of groups operating on both the community and the 
national level, and they must cope with the conflicts raised by the collision 
of these interests. They cannot settle them, since by doing so they would 
abolish their own usefulness to others.372  
 
Wolf makes a crucial point here: on the one hand, a broker must satisfy some of 
the needs of his protégées; on the other hand, this satisfaction must not be 
complete, otherwise the former may no longer require the broker’s services. This 
finding echoes the difficulties that Kyrgyzstani brokers face in the field of social 
mobilizations. Wolf’s conceptualization of the limited exercise of brokers’ 
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functions can to some extent explain why Kyrgyzstani brokers help protesters to 
engage in contentious politics, but are not fully interested in the immediate 
resolution of their grievances and concerns. A prompt response to societal 
issues will eliminate the future need for brokers in this contentious field. 
 
Following up on Block and Wolf’s points regarding the delicate relationship 
between brokers and the groups upon which they exercise influence, Cornelius, 
another scholar of Latin American politics, writes: 
Thus the cacique will strive continually to impress his followers with the 
range and importance of the contacts he has succeeded in establishing, 
depicting himself as enjoying the exclusive support and recognition of 
various high-ranking officials in the city and even federal governments and 
stressing the usefulness of such contacts in his negotiations on behalf of 
the settlement.373 
 
Again, this highlights important aspects of brokers and their functions. Similar to 
these leaders of traditional rural and low-income urban areas of 20th century 
Latin America, brokers in Kochkor-Ata praised themselves in honour of their 
extensive connections to members of elite and even the country’s Prime 
Minister. The ways in which these connections were put forward by local brokers 
makes it possible to understand that their connections (imagined or real) with 
central politicians were fundamental to brokers’ status, as well as to their 
potential for exerting influence on peripheral protesters. Next to the importance 
of maintaining a balance between external and internal worlds, scholars also 
highlight the interests of brokers in the business of mediation. As Koster’s 
analysis of brokers in Chão Favela in Brazil emphasizes, 
Their connections to outsiders, I noticed, also offered them possibilities for 
gaining personal advantages that are critical for their survival, varying from 
monthly salaries to stipends for attending meetings and joining 
governmental programmes as well as other kinds of support, such as jobs, 
food aid or materials. These connections also add to their status vis-à-vis 
their fellow favelados; the community leaders frequently hinted at the range 
of their connections, their influence and the probable deals they would be 
                                                       
373  Cornelius, W. A. (1972) ‘A structural analysis of urban caciquismo in Mexico’, Urban 
Anthropology, vol. 1, no. 2, fall, pp. 234-261. 
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able to strike.374 
 
As was shown in the empirical chapters, Kyrgyzstani brokers pursued similar 
gains, ranging from ‘petty’ interests such as private contracts and jobs with the 
mining company in the Aral case to hypothetical opportunities of cooptation in 
the Kochkor-Ata case. In many respects, Kyrgyzstani brokers are similar to the 
intermediaries of the different contexts depicted above. Yet next to seeking out 
particular interests, brokers are also expected to deliver a number of public 
services such as the provision of physical security in their settlement and/or the 
provision of state services, mediation before central authorities and others. None 
of these were achieved in either Aral village or Kochkor-Ata town. This point 
leads me to reconsider the mediating role of Kyrgyzstani brokers. 
 
3.2. Kyrgyzstani brokers and the simulation of mediation 
Against the background of Gould and Fernandez’s ideal typology emerges a 
picture of a weakly institutionalized society, like that of Kyrgyzstan, in which 
brokers hold unstable positions and tend to combine many of these positions 
with the aim of accumulating benefits and/or navigating within an uncertain 
environment. In relation to mining operations, for example, brokers first served 
liaisons between the community and the miner. However, once relationships 
between the mining company and brokers deteriorated, brokers became 
representatives of a part of the community that resisted mining. To some extent, 
they also fulfilled a gatekeeping role, in the sense that they provided workers 
with information and expertise about mining, which was lacking in the village. 
Brokers also carried out coordination activities within their opposition group. 
However, residents suspected brokers of pursuing private interests and 
therefore not relinquishing their liaising role regarding the mining company.  
 
With regard to the labour movement, the People’s Defense Committee clearly 
positioned itself as a liaising actor between central actors and the local 
                                                       
374 Koster, M. (2014) ‘Brazilian brokers, boundaries and buildings: A material culture of politics’, 
Journal of Material Culture, vol. 19, no. 2, June, pp. 125-144. 
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constituency. However, since the head of the committee and its members were 
also salaried workers, other workers did not view their additional informal 
activities as completely impartial. Brokers also acted as representatives and 
coordinators of workers during private trips to the capital, as well as during 
protest actions, respectively. Yet during negotiations with central actors, their 
shift to a supposed impartial liaising position conflicted with their previous 
positions and therefore caused problems within the movement. By comparing 
the empirical chapters, I can conclude that these fluctuations of positions require 
high flexibility from a broker, but also imply the risk of gaining a reputation as a 
‘spoiler’ (in Aral) or opportunist, who ‘milks the cow’ (in Kochkor-Ata). Therefore, 
whatever the reasons for brokers to occupy multiple positions, this strategy is 
short-sighted. Sally Merry, who investigated the role of brokers in diffusing 
international human rights, supports this finding when she insightfully notes: 
Intermediaries are always suspect because they are not fully in one world 
or the other. Like the village headman in British Central Africa, they are 
vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty by either side.375  
 
In both cases presented in this dissertation, there were ‘structural holes’ and 
multiple bridging possibilities that could have significantly enhanced the status of 
local brokers. Indeed, brokers appeared to have begun as leaders or as ‘real’ 
brokers, who connected aggrieved populations to central authorities; however, in 
the process of protest-making against a background of corrupt central politics, 
they failed to keep their positions integral. Brokers’ fluctuating positions diminish 
– if not undermine – their influence over groups. Therefore, one can ask whether 
these brokers can indeed be viewed as such, or whether they are simply 
individuals who pretend to be intermediaries between different groups in order to 
advance their own private interests. It is therefore my position to view their role 
as effecting the simulation of mediation. Furthermore, these blurred positions 
and the convergence of private and collective interests lead ordinary participants 
                                                       
375 Merry, S. E. (2006) ‘Transnational human rights and local activism: Mapping the middle’, 
American Anthropologist, vol. 108, no. 1, March, pp. 38-51; For similar developments in Tajikistan 
see Heathershaw, J. (2012) ‘The practical representation of peacebuilding: an (auto)ethnography 
of programme evaluation in Tajikistan’, in Richmond, O. and Mitchell, A. (ed.) Hybrid forms of 
peace: From everyday agency to post-liberalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
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and bystanders to be highly suspicious of any leader, because the latter tend too 
often to morph into brokers. However, my focus on opportunist activists within 
the two chosen mobilizations goes beyond the ambition of putting forward the 
role of specific social agents. When structure and agency are broken, what 
remains are social practices of simulation, which further erode any opportunity 
for a solid structure or genuine agency to emerge. 
 
For the time being, brokers proliferate in current Kyrgyzstani settings. Given the 
development of this phenomenon, it would be timely to investigate the empirical 
and theoretical implications of brokers’ simulation of mediation on protest 
entities. I will draw up a non-exhaustive list of consequences that to me seems 
most prominent.  
 
First, by refusing to choose sides, these opportunist activists impede so-called 
‘operational closure’ and leave the protest entity vulnerable to interventions of 
opponents. 376  The process of interaction between a protest group and the 
opponent requires that each side takes clear positions for the sake of 
consolidating the conflictive relationship between them. We can therefore say 
that by informally shifting positions within the protest group, as well as between 
the protest group and the opponent, brokers impede operational closure and 
therefore, the structuration of mobilization per se. Second, by pursuing short-
termed goals, brokers erode the meaning of mediation and representation per 
se, since their impartiality as brokers – which fulfils specific functions – becomes 
questioned. Individuals will question every newcomer who will claim to represent 
public interests. Third, brokers’ simulation leads to their own instability in the 
long run, because sooner or later, movement participants become aware of the 
distorted services provided by brokers. Finally, they corrupt the organization of 
mobilization and this way discredit the cause advanced by the organization 
altogether. As a result of distorted brokerage, instead of a facilitated flow of 
                                                       
376  I borrow the term ‘operational closure’ from conflict studies. See Messmer, H. (2007) 
‘Contradiction, conflict and borders’, in Stetter S. (ed.) Territorial conflict in world society: Modern 
systems theory, international relations and conflict studies, London and New York: Routledge. 
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information and connectedness, the result is a distorted grievance message 
between a protest group and its opponent. Consequentially, the opponent and 
the wider public come to disbelieve the authenticity of protest messages and 
discarding the protest cause altogether. Once suspicion sets in, social 
mobilizations fail to serve as a democratic tool of social criticism. Moreover, 
widespread suspicion severely hampers social and political change. Thus, 
brokers are not simply one of many manipulative mechanisms of social 
mobilizations. They are instead symbols that at particular times serve as 
examples of the malfunctioning communications between society and the 
political system. Finally, the theoretical question – how do societal concerns and 
disagreements become structured and channelled in the presence of brokers – 
is one instance of a broader question about how change therefore occurs in a 
society characterized by multiple unmediated structural holes. I return to these 
issues in the concluding chapter. 
 
IV. Sustainability of Social Practices of Contestation 
Some significant points emerge from this comparative interpretation of empirical 
data. I have argued that the endurance of protest movements is subject to 
internal dynamics of movements. The comparison between two case studies 
demonstrates the extent to which local actors were capable of creating and 
maintaining their local (provisional or lasting) spaces, in which group processes 
proved decisive for the fate of mobilizations. Compared to traditional functions 
such as the construction of meaning, group processes also serve as means of 
internal monitoring and policing. In this way, a protest group, as well as the wider 
community in which the contention unfolds, can protect themselves from the 
destructive behaviour of opportunists. These processes therefore serve as 
safeguarding mechanisms and provide security. At the Kyrgyzstani periphery, 
initiators of resistance have a hard time lessening the effects of depoliticizing 
and discrediting practices of central politics and can only hope to do so by 
establishing some form of control over local practices. Therefore, group 
processes fulfil an important function through the policing of the behaviours of 
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others – a function that has developed into a dominant feature of current politics 
and social life in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Observations that are based on monitoring process lead either to the production 
or denial of trust. It is the varying results of these processes and mechanisms 
that conditioned the divergent outcomes of mobilization. In labour-based 
mobilization, workers succeeded in strengthening the union as the organization 
of the labour movement, whereas in community-based mobilization, participants 
showed distrust towards the organizers of the movement, which resulted in the 
demobilization of resistance. I believe these aspects of problematic group 
formation are shared by many grassroots mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
I have argued in my empirical chapters that these processes show protesters not 
as individuals who are influenced by members of the elite or guided by material 
benefits, but as highly reflexive beings. The ability of individuals to subject 
others’ positions to lengthy scrutiny, to observe, suspect and distrust, is at odds 
with mainstream explanations of collective behaviour, e.g., elite manipulation. 
This point is also highlighted by Balihar Sanghera’s timely critique of Central 
Asian scholarship, which tends to reduce human agency: 
As human agents possess multiple properties and powers at the personal, 
individual and collective levels, emerging from the biological, mental and 
social properties of a corporeal body, the mind, social settings and social 
structures, it would be a mistake to reduce human agency and capabilities 
to the social (such as social roles, coordinates, networks or discourses), 
because this would deny our reflexive powers and our ability to comply, 
circumvent and resist natural and social structures.377 
 
I hope that my accounts also contribute to the important attempt to reform our 
understanding of agency, which had previously been shaped by Central Asian 
scholarship. To continue in this direction, I argue that even with respect to the 
successful labour movement, structure and agency are fragmented in 
Kyrgyzstan. Protest structure is distorted, because for individuals and even for 
                                                       
377 Sanghera, B. (2013). 
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leaders to hold a stable position for a certain period of time (whether for or 
against a cause) is not a particularly affordable endeavour. Protest movements 
are therefore fragmented entities that rarely transform into enduring practices of 
contestation. This explains why in Kyrgyzstan, social and political protests 
emerge easily but find it difficult to sustain themselves over time.  
 
The fragmented nature of protest movements can be tracked in the following 
observed features of mobilizations. The evasive structure of social mobilizations 
has implications for the ways in which they are perceived by opponents and the 
wider public. In the current Kyrgyzstani context, it can sometimes be difficult to 
understand who exactly is protesting. Is it ordinary citizens or local bosses, or 
youth thugs mobilized by elites that instigate disobedience? Whose concerns 
and grievances are represented? In other words, who are the leaders and 
members that constitute local mobilizations? Participants are themselves 
confused about the main actors involved and their goals, as was the case in Aral 
village, for example. The fuzziness of protesting agency is further deepened by 
the fact that protest grievances and concerns are not always comprehensible to 
the public. Messages regarding naraazychylyk (dissatisfaction/discontent) raise 
questions about whether participants are guided by material, parochial interests 
and power, or by the genuine anger caused by deprivation and domination. Lack 
of organizational resources adds significantly to this problem, since participants 
of peripheral movements cannot afford publicizing their actions in mass media 
and lobbying their cause within power institutions. Another major problem with 
the observed structure of protests is the methods employed by participants. On 
the one hand, they heavily criticize the current system of political relations but on 
the other, paradoxically, aspire to become part of it by offering themselves to 
cooptation. Their struggles against ‘the system’ therefore attract additional 
suspicion about the sincerity of their claims.  
 
The non-intelligibility of protest claims is perhaps the biggest challenge for 
understanding local groups of resistance in Kyrgyzstan. In Aral, the anti-mining 
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resistance was not centred on themes that have become typical in the sphere of 
relationships between extractive firms and local communities. These themes 
usually include transgressions in terms of human rights, the environment, labour, 
social relations and others. In the Philippines, for example, indigenous groups 
have focused their struggle against foreign companies regarding the abuse of 
human rights. 378  In different states of Africa, small-scale miners have been 
struggling to protect their right to extract gold in the absence of other sources of 
subsistence.379 In Aral, the resistance to mining by one group conflicted with the 
general level of poverty in rural Kyrgyzstan and in Aral in particular, and against 
the idea that a large-scale gold mining project would create jobs and an 
alternative income for the village. Members of households whom I interviewed 
and who had meagre livestock numbers and limited possibilities for exploiting 
land, expressed the desire to diversify their incomes and provide their children 
with opportunities for attaining modern professions and stop youth out-migration. 
Considering this example, residents of Orlovka village (Tchui Province, Northern 
Kyrgyzstan) were more receptive to a mining project in the Taldy-Bulak 
Levoberejny mine. Residents of this village viewed extraction as having the 
potential for economic revival within their formerly industrial village.380 In Aral, the 
case study demonstrates that genuine concerns can be exploited and 
consequently discredited by the corrupt organization and as a result, lose their 
mobilizing potential. Yet the discrediting machine works the other way around, 
too, where the discrediting of opposition leads to the depoliticization of the 
environmental cause altogether.  
 
In the Kochkor-Ata case study, the workers’ movement was not an entirely 
traditional labour struggle. On the surface, this case of Kyrgyzstani workers did 
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not differ from other instances of labour dissent against managerial corruption in 
Russia or China.381 Indeed, in a country that shifted abruptly from social welfare 
to neoliberalism, such resistance by workers can be labelled a fight against 
neoliberal corrupt regime. This case study could celebrate the manifestation of a 
new social actor from within the Left, if workers did not merge with their 
managers and the political party with a dubious reputation. In addition, the 
implication of a political party suggests the existence of strong clientele-centred 
ties between the party and the labour movement and questions the autonomy of 
the later. Yet, the engagement of Kyrgyzstani workers in the fight against corrupt 
elites, which lasted for years, cannot be fully understood without understanding 
that politics is a precondition for thinking about the proper conditions for labour.  
 
I have shown so far the difficulty in describing the phenomenon of social protests 
in Kyrgyzstan. The intellectual problem in analysing this situation lies therefore in 
trying to comprehend the nature of politics that inadvertently compromises the 
formulation of societal grievances and precludes group formation. I will attempt 
to provide directions for thinking about this question by linking protest-making to 
current political conditions in the next and final chapter of my thesis.  
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
 
I. Introduction 
This thesis explored social mobilizations in the Kyrgyzstani periphery in the 
context of post-revolutionary uncertainties. Contrary to elite manipulation and top-
down approaches that have been dominant in Central Asian studies, my 
empirical cases have shown that grassroots mobilizations begun as reactions to 
changes at the centre, but developed against the background of highly complex 
local politics. In Chapter II, I overviewed major theories that account for the 
emergence and sustainability of social movements and mobilizations. In Chapter 
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III, I furthered the theoretical discussion by explaining my preference for the 
‘recent social construction of protest’ approaches (Hirsch, 1990). I conceptualized 
the formation of trust in group processes and developed a case methodology on 
the basis of ethnographic fieldwork. I argued that in the context of generalized 
social distrust and the proliferation of discredited images of protests, successful 
social mobilizations hinged upon internal dynamics of trust formation. In Chapters 
IV and Chapter V, I explored two contentious sites located in Kochkor-Ata town 
and Aral village, and uncovered the dynamics behind two examples of 
mobilization, one successful and one unsuccessful. The successful case of 
mobilization concerned a work collective of a state owned company that engaged 
against central elites along the local union and the company's management. The 
failed case of mobilization involved a group of rural residents who resisted a 
foreign mining firm through ambiguous environmental conflict. Finally, in Chapter 
VI, I provided an additional comparative interpretation of my empirical findings. I 
highlighted the critical role of group processes in the generation of trust as a 
necessary pre-condition for successful grassroots mobilizations and the 
destructive role of brokers that work to fragment collective action.  
 
Drawing on insights from the recent social construction of protests approach, my 
ambition was to explain the fascinating features of current contentious politics in 
Kyrgyzstan. Specifically, based on my initial observations, I was intrigued by so 
many protests emerging on various topics of concerns from almost all areas of 
country and the little consolidation success among these fragmented voices into 
larger movements. Here, the social construction of protests as a decentred 
process-oriented approach proves very useful, in that it finds clues to successful 
mobilization in action and group dynamics. Eric Hirsch (1990) and Rick Fantasia 
(1988) paid specific attention to actual episodes of mobilization and group 
processes as moments and sites in which movement participants are most likely 
to develop solidarity bonds, as well as belief in the success of collective action. I 
employed Hirsch’s concept of group processes as ‘sites’ in which I located 
important individual and collective processes that led to the sustainability or 
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disintegration of mobilizations in the Kyrgyzstani context. In settings that were 
characterized by weak institutions and weak organizational resources, the focus 
on group processes yielded particular value in terms of discovering the dynamics 
behind fragmented social mobilizations.  
 
My research concerning the difficulties of the self-organization of citizens for the 
purpose of collective resistance contributes to the theoretical discussion of 
protest movements in weakly institutionalized societies in general and in Central 
Asia in particular. Broadly speaking, there are two research areas to which the 
current study addresses its conceptual, empirical and methodological findings. 
First, my work adds to social movement literature, as I investigate difficult 
environments characterized by high volatility and social contingency. It is in such 
environments where I researched unlikely opportunities for forming lasting, i.e., 
structured mobilization, by following the dynamics of group processes. My 
insights help to advance our understanding of what to expect from and how to 
approach protest episodes and movements at the world’s periphery. 
 
Second, my dissertation adds a new body of empirical knowledge to our 
understanding of mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan. Shedding light on issues pertaining 
to the formation of resistance, I offer new insights into the state of politics. What 
do we learn about Kyrgyzstani politics beyond patronage systems, elite-driven 
mobilizations and semi-authoritarian regimes? I claim that politics in Kyrgyzstan 
are distinguished by high levels of elusive, amorphous and fluid processes that 
defy our attempts to conceptualize them as solid social structures and given 
points of departures for our analytical endeavours. What is more, to date, most 
scholarship has focused solely on central politics as the locus for political and 
social developments. Few research projects, however, have considered the 
political dynamics in the periphery, with the exception of recent work completed 
by selected authors. My analysis of local sites of autonomy and dissent also 
offers a nuanced perspective on the relationship between the centre and 
periphery. Not only does the locale distinguish itself with specific dynamics of 
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mobilization, but such dynamics are themselves embedded within complex 
relations with the centre and are, reciprocally, shaped by them. The analysis of 
these relationships reveals even more about our understanding of the state and 
society nexus. Against attractive assumptions about a weak state and strong 
society, I not only portray the fragmentation of the state in Kyrgyzstan, but I also 
suggest that such a weak state, paradoxically, contributes to the production of a 
weak society.  
 
I will begin by considering the contribution of my thesis to the literature of social 
movements and mobilizations in the first part, then move to discussing the 
literature of state and politics and its application to the case of Central Asia and 
Kyrgyzstan in the second part of the chapter. 
 
II. Contributions to the Literature on Social Movements and 
Mobilizations 
The following part of the chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, 
I will discuss the role of trust in building social mobilizations. Against the general 
idea that trust is a given resource ‘up for grabs’, I claim that in corrupt post-Soviet 
societies, trust has been eroded and must be generated for any effort aiming to 
create large mobilization beyond a core group of believers. Following this insight, 
I will turn to the functioning of group processes in the second section. Here, I 
defer from the existing approaches in two ways: first, unlike the traditional 
reading, I claim that group processes do not only create internal resources but 
most importantly, function in a monitoring capacity. Second, group processes can 
produce opposite outcomes, because monitoring may lead to the success or 
failure of subsequent mobilizations. Finally, in the third section, I will elaborate on 
the dynamics of brokerage. Where current approaches focus on the free-riding 
problem within collective action to highlight the risk of passive benefit seekers, I 
distinguish brokers in Kyrgyzstan as active producers of opportunities.  
 
2.1. Trust 
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In my thesis, I have shown that trust is a rare resource in the context of 
Kyrgyzstani society. It almost goes without saying that Kyrgyzstan has long been 
experiencing economic stagnation and a significant decrease in public goods. 
Distrusting politics, as well as the state and its various institutions have been the 
predicament of many regimes, authoritarian or not.382 However, contrary to our 
expectations, these structural factors do not necessarily translate into drivers for 
social mobilization. In the following, I will integrate this peculiar moment of 
Kyrgyzstani social mobilizations into the wider debate on trust and social capital. 
 
From the wider social capital literature, one can draw the conclusion that 
interpersonal trust is a product of social relations within a given organization. 
Referring to my findings, I challenge this conclusion and contend that it is not a 
product of social relations per se, but of the constant verification of these social 
relations. Let me broaden the perspective on the debate first. For Coleman 
(1988), social capital as a resource that is available to individuals depends on 
social organizations, whether clandestine South Korean student networks or the 
wholesale diamond market held by American Jews in Brooklyn, which he 
describes in his work. Coleman applies the workings of social capital in social 
settings such as markets, family or friend networks. He also provides a variety of 
resources that constitute social capital: information, norms and the 
trustworthiness of the social environment (which allows for the proliferation of 
obligations and expectations). 383  Applying his insights to the context of 
Kyrgyzstan, Coleman's approach turns out to be less useful, however, for the 
analysis of social mobilizations that do not yet represent social structures, but the 
nascent collectivity of individuals in motion. His overly structuralist 
conceptualization of social capital explains individuals that come together to act 
collectively based on already existing forms of trust. I argue, however, that this 
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approach is too static to be applied to cases where individuals run up against 
existing distrust.  
 
Furthermore, the existing literature aims to show how this capital is being 
mobilized and the outcome that is eventually created by such mobilization. Yet 
few have made an effort to present an adequate demonstration of how capital is 
‘engendered’ in the first place. For example, for Bourdieu, an explanation seems 
to rest on ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance or recognition.’384  Fukuyama follows this understanding 
regarding the capacity of networks of relationships when he writes that ‘social 
capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain set of informal values 
or norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among 
them.’ 385  Finally, Putnam refers to social capital as ‘features of social 
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit.’386 Again, at first glance, my two Kyrgyzstani 
cases appear to fit this vision. Both Aral village and the Kyrgyzneftegaz company 
can be identified as places embedded within communal networks, either based 
on kinship and descent or workplace identities. Yet as my subsequent analyses 
of mobilization efforts clearly demonstrated, such a conclusion is premature. 
Similar to Coleman's case, these interpretations of social capital are instrumental 
if our aim is to problematize the construction of trust in social settings that work 
against any sustained collective action. 
 
The question of social trust as a resource of social capital has been further 
advanced in two directions: the rational choice and traditional society paradigms. 
Rational theorists have promoted the idea that in societies based on rationality, 
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trust may be an archaic norm and can therefore be rendered unwarranted. 
Others have followed on logically, stating that for the opposite case of traditional 
societies, trust can be easily found in the social fabric made up of family ties, 
kinship, clans and religious networks. I claim here that both directions 
underestimate the destructive effects of post-Soviet transformation on the social 
fabric when applied to the case of Kyrgyzstan. Following my local groups in their 
attempts to mobilize, I discovered on the one hand the precarious conditions 
offered by a fragmented state such as amorphous central and local institutions 
and ambiguous political opportunity structures (see the following part of this 
chapter). Such amorphousness, which as a consequence also robs us off 
‘concrete’ analytical tools, directly challenges the foundations of rational choice 
theory that explains why actors join or do not join collective action. On the other 
hand, this approach enables us to confront the fragile and contingent social 
bonds of community members and the many obstacles they face to make use of 
these bonds in order to create larger trust-based networks.  
 
First, regarding the rational choice theory, the structure of incentives to which a 
movement’s leadership may resort in order to keep existing membership and to 
attract new followers might not be sufficient for overcoming barriers created by an 
uncertain environment and generalized distrust. To the contrary of such claims, I 
follow the argument developed by Karine Clément in an intellectual inquiry similar 
to mine. Observing collective action practices in Russia, Clément contends that in 
‘the institutional context of such new democracies as Russia …trust is a key 
condition not only for democratization but also for the re-composition of the 
society.’387 Following Piotr Sztompka (1999), Clément contends that trust is a 
gamble in that it ‘requires a person ‘to make bets’,388 but it is a necessary 
condition for involvement in action, even more so in collective action.’389 I find 
Sztompka’s conceptualization of trust and Clément’s problematization of distrust 
in Russian context very useful for understanding mobilizations in the Kyrgyzstani 
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context. These insights explain how individuals ‘gamble’ when they initially show 
an interest in joining a protest despite the presence of uncertainties, because 
they view it as a game, a show (Kyrgyz: oyun) in which they make bets whether a 
protest will be effective or not. Yet in subsequent stages, as it can clearly be seen 
from my empirical examples, they often withdraw from mobilizations if they fail to 
establish confidence in protest objectives and leaders. 
 
Turning to the second claim regarding ‘traditional’ social bonds, I propose at this 
point a preliminary critique that the assumption about their facilitating effect lacks 
substantial empirical evidence (see the following part of this chapter). To argue 
that the assumption about ‘those embedded in a broader environment of trust, 
whether of familial or religious network, find that communal trust can be carried 
into other spheres’390 follows a line of reasoning that has been criticized for its 
inadequate import from African to Central Asian contexts, among others (Rasuly-
Paleczek, 2005, 2006). This notion is a false departure from the idea that trust 
can be easily discovered and transported. Quite the opposite appears to be true 
when achieving and maintaining trust becomes the order of the day, as 
explicated by my empirical cases in Kochkor-Ata and Aral. 
 
To conclude the debate concerning social capital and trust, I have found that 
much in the current literature is inefficient for accounting for trust in both 
traditional societies (Kyrgyzstan included), in which trust is believed to be 
inherent to the social fabric and equally in ‘advanced’ societies, where trust is 
taken for granted due to the presence of vibrant associations based on 
professional or other networks. The differences involved concern among others 
specific features of Kyrgyzstani society, namely the high level of atomization and 
the corresponding social distrust towards individuals and political organizations, 
as well as the weakness of mechanisms of social integration and the informal 
character of networks. It is also due to the specific character of Kyrgyzstani 
politics, especially the high centralization of power in the capital, corruption and 
                                                       
390 Collins, K. (2006), p. 28. 
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what Wolters (2015) has called ‘mimicry politics’, all of which has demobilizing 
and discrediting effects on collective action.  
 
Before turning to some of these contextual factors in the next part of chapter, I 
would like highlighting the problem of trust construction in the following section. 
This discussion begins with the following question: what conditions allow local 
initiators of mobilization to achieve their desired goals via public contestation? I 
have argued that in the context of generalized distrust and discredited politics, 
the condition that allows for this transformation is the basic production of trust in 
the leadership and the cause. This production takes place in the form of specific 
group processes.  
 
2.2. Group processes 
At the start of this chapter, I stressed that group processes in the Kyrgyzstani 
context are less about the production of protests and more about the capacity for 
creating the necessary trust that contributes to collective action. The realization 
of this capacity arises from monitoring, a process by which future members 
observe, check and formulate opinions about the worthiness of participating in 
mobilizations. Only via the deployment of heavy and repressive techniques for 
observing and to monitoring can participants eventually gain confidence in the 
leadership and their proposed cause. Monitoring is the principal function of group 
processes. Other functions include actual episodes of mobilization, i.e., acting 
together, collective meaning-making and collective decision-making. Again, as an 
outcome of these processes, participants gain certitude in other members’ 
commitment and a belief in the success of collective action. Thus, the 
possibilities for scrutinizing social relations through real actions and in 
association with others are decisive for the success of any mobilization towards 
common goals. Yet, monitoring can also lead to the failure to convince others 
and therefore, to the failure of constructing mobilization. 
 
This depiction of the creation of social trust as the contingent outcome of group 
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processes was my response to overtly static accounts of the formation of internal 
cognitive resources which, supposedly, automatically enabled social 
mobilizations. In my approach, I relied largely on the valuable proposition made 
by Eric Hirsch (1990), i.e., to look for the formation of the commitment needed for 
collective action in dynamic (group) processes. Hirsch conceptualized his 
formation of commitment in group processes among Columbia University 
students, New York City, in a context that differs significantly from Kyrgyzstani 
settings. In Hirsch’s study, students did not mistrust each other or the leadership, 
but created ‘situations’ in which ideological commitment to the cause could be 
increased, thus providing conditions for lasting mobilization.  
 
In my preliminary empirical observations, I recognized significant support for 
Hirsch’s constructivist approach when I saw how local initiators of resistance tried 
to create open spaces as a way for raising awareness about ongoing events, 
interpreting meanings, sharing injustice frames and convincing the local audience 
to take part in mobilizations. One difference emerged, however, against Hirsch’s 
formulation. Individuals who participated in these open spaces came with pre-
defined suspicions about the initiators and their proposed ideas. Thus, the major 
task for organizers of open spaces became foremost to convince a suspicious 
audience by proving their consistent commitment to collective interests, i.e., their 
authenticity. Therefore, the initial participation in mobilization seemed to not have 
been oriented against an external threat per se, but directed at internal policing. 
In other words, initial participation in mobilization is intended, inadvertently, to 
establish repeated conditions that allow participants to monitor the behaviour of 
initiators and others in real time. From this conclusion, I adjusted Hirsch’s 
concept in two ways. I proposed the primary function of group processes in 
Kyrgyzstan to be monitoring as a precondition for the production of trust and 
stressed as a result of this, a high level of contingency regarding outcomes 
stemming from group processes. The monitoring of others’ behaviour can lead to 
both the formation of trust and opportunities for lasting mobilizations, or 
alternatively, the reinforcement of initial suspicions and the disintegration of the 
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initial mobilization.  
 
Conceptualized this way, my understanding of social mobilizations contributes to 
the existing literature in one significant way. I argue that in the context of volatile 
corrupt politics and institutional uncertainty, social mobilizations work not only as 
political projects aimed at challenging the external environment, but most 
importantly, as political projects aimed at producing a local political community 
from a suspicious audience. Such a double task involves many more thresholds 
than anticipated by the existing literature that initiators of collective action have to 
overcome in order to achieve their goals. First, they have to meet the conditions 
required to successfully deal with external opponents and that have been 
elaborated by such theories and concepts as frame alignement, political process 
and political opportunity structure, among others. Second, they have to create 
conditions in which initiators of collective action are ready to lend themselves to 
continuous scrutiny and therefore, run the ongoing risk that such scrutiny can 
endlessly create internal conflicts, in turn adding to the already cumbersome task 
of maintaining group integrity. This tremendously increases the cost of the 
sustainability of mobilization. It is my hope that my conceptualization of social 
mobilizations can contribute to a better understanding of the collective 
endeavours that take place in non-Western contexts marked by authoritarian or 
colonial legacies, in the absence of institutions that can voice societal concerns 
and for the use of grassroots organizations, which can demand satisfaction 
regarding societal issues. 
 
To conclude this section concerning the salience of group processes in the 
construction of social mobilizations, I would like to add an important point on 
methodology. The focus on group processes inevitably exposes a world filled 
with contingencies, dynamics and events that do not fully make sense. Such 
group dynamics put forward discrepancies on the ground and follows many 
instances of social fragmentation that neither structuralist and rationalist 
approaches nor theories of informal politics have shown an ability to deal with. As 
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social scientists, we therefore have to be methodologically prepared for facing 
the volatility of ‘real’ life. My case studies clearly demonstrate that in Kyrgyzstan, 
we can no longer take analytical categories such as identities, resources, 
networks, grievances and power as automatically translating into the world under 
analysis. The local actors that I observed were unable to readily rely on common 
values, shared norms, communal trust, or various sources of identity and power. 
This inevitably poses the question of how to proceed in rural Kyrgyzstan.391 How 
can we make sense of fragmented processes in the periphery outside of electoral 
cycles, development aid and processes of ‘outsourcing’ societal concerns like the 
outmigration? My emphasis on group processes assists in linking the seemingly 
‘meaningless’ political life at the periphery to the dynamics of social and political 
change. I go after the situations in which ‘things’ may or may not happen. These 
include resident gatherings, worker trips to the capital and ordinary meetings that 
at times unexpectedly morphed into something bigger. However, in many cases, 
these situations lead nowhere. We nonetheless must not discard these incidents 
as meaningless events in a chain of precedent failures. Furthermore, we have to 
be prepared to account for outcomes that are difficult to predict. Group processes 
appear to be a good method for tracing events, for capturing internal dynamics 
and to account for change (whether successful or failed collective action). I 
believe this methodological approach can better render the complexities on the 
ground so as to better account for the general dynamics of socio-political 
development in Central Asia.  
 
In the final section, I want to provide with a great manifestation of the above-
mentioned contingencies and with the complexities of the ground. In addition, this 
manifestation connects once again to our difficulty for accounting for the agency 
                                                       
391  Alexander Wolters and Svetlana Jacquesson made important attempts to grasp the 
complexities and contingencies of sociopolitical perceptions by introducing the issue of public 
opinion in their respective works on political conflicts and the reproduction of genealogies, 
respectively. Jacquesson (2012) highlights the growing awareness and knowledge of readers 
concerning newspapers and public media, and the changing context of genealogy production. 
Wolters (2012) contends that with different and progressively contradicting political claims, often 
from the same political actors, public opinion has not only been unable to question political 
positions, but has completely lost its capacity to structure political events and therefore, to provide 
political actors with meaningful orientation. 
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of contentious politics. With this I will turn to my final point, i.e., ‘brokerage’ and 
its role in social mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
2.3. Brokerage 
The rational choice theory within social movement literature has long underlined 
problems pertaining to free-riding in collective action. My study of brokers 
contributes to this topic in two meaningful ways. First, it expands our 
understanding of the nature of contingent agency in collective action. Here, I 
highlight that participants not only risk experiencing the free-riding dilemma 
(Olson, 1965) but also to engage in active opportunism. Second, my study of 
‘brokers’ contributes an additional perspective on the micro-dynamics of 
collective action. By situating themselves in the middle of social positions, 
brokers produce blurred categories pertaining to leadership, membership and 
organizational structure. 
 
In 1965, Mancur Olson introduced the important issue of actors' rationality and 
the free-riding dilemma in the context of collective action. Olson linked this 
dilemma to group features and suggested that free-riding is likely to occur in 
large groups. The subsequent literature dealing with collective action arose in 
reaction to Olson's innovation in two ways. The first thread of literature developed 
on Olson’s proposal by suggesting different solutions to the dilemma of free-
riding in the format of increased control and additional incentives within groups. 
The second thread of literature criticizes rational choice theory based on different 
arguments.392 Although I do not agree with the foundations of rational choice 
theory, I find Olson’s point useful for once again highlighting the problematic 
agency of collective action. My study of brokers differs from Olson’s rational actor 
in two ways. First, I find that Kyrgyzstani brokers do not act as passive seekers of 
benefits but actively engage into the production of opportunities. Second, 
                                                       
392 Rational choice theory overlooks the fact that actors are ‘socially embedded with loyalties, 
obligations, and identities that reframe the issues of potential support for collective action’. See, 
for example, Morris, A. and Mueller, C. (ed.) (1992) Frontiers in social movement theory, New 
Havel and London: Yale University Press. 
 268 
brokers’ opportunism is less a result of Olson’s organizational qualities and more 
a product of developments in society and politics in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The first insight refers to the puzzle that in my two cases about the Kyrgyzstani 
mobilizations, each participant of collective action could potentially have become 
a broker. I reasoned that for these participants, brokerage consisted of ‘doing 
business in the middle’, i.e., between the parties of contention, whether it 
concerned mediation between the central government and local constituencies, 
or mediation between rural residents and the mining company. These individuals 
sought various benefits from their location in the middle: from informal deals to 
financial remuneration, from access to employment to increased social status. 
They worked hard to create local structures of opportunities for themselves 
based on societal grievances and concerns. Yet irrespective of this, their 
calculation for benefits and investment remained incredibly risky, because these 
opportunities were always hypothetical and elusive. Thus, in contrast to Olson’s 
low risk free-riders, agents of collective action in the Kyrgyzstani context engaged 
into personal high-risk enterprises.  
 
With regard to the second point and Olson’s explanation of free-riding as an 
organizational outcome, I stress that brokerage is a political phenomenon. 
Independent of group size and organizational specificities, presently, brokers 
emerge and proliferate in almost all spheres of human activity in Kyrgyzstan. 
Brokerage is a product of corrupt politics, institutional uncertainty and a volatile 
environment. The proliferation of brokerage questions existing assumptions 
about traditional societies in which ‘norms and social pressure from peers and 
elders within the clan guard against opportunism.’393 Therefore, Olson’s, as well 
as other rational choice scholars’ solutions to free-riding such as increased 
control, attractive incentives for members and the management of group 
composition are less likely to remedy issues of brokerage in Kyrgyzstan. In this 
case, politics bears much larger implications for micro-dynamics of collective 
                                                       
393 Collins, K. (2006), p. 30. 
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action than it does in the West. 
 
I now wish to address the final question in relation to brokerage, i.e., its effect on 
the micro-dynamics of collective action. Since abilities for observing and checking 
on one another exist within local sites of mobilization, the opportunistic strategies 
of brokers become visible to others. In my empirical cases, I showed to which 
extent the observation of brokerage produces distrust among other participants. 
As a result, any genuine leader will face suspicions, regardless of whether they 
are a broker seeking private interests or not. Similarly, leadership will also remain 
uncertain, regardless of whether members keep their commitment to collective 
interests or turn into a broker at any given moment of contentious politics. Such 
dynamics impede the structuration of collective action. My study of problematic 
agency further echoes other post-Soviet scholarship on social mobilizations. The 
discrediting of movement leaders is a prominent problem in other hybrid regimes. 
For example, in the case of Russia, Clément formulates the problem in the 
following terms: ‘activists and other citizens not under control are seen as 
provocateurs, and the only accepted kind of collective action is that which is set 
up and run by the bureaucracy [my emphasis].’394 Clément’s point makes sense, 
since the Russian state has much more resources than any other social group to 
control for the cohesiveness and efficacy of mobilizations in a top-down manner. 
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, resources are much more dispersed and are 
specifically lacking at the grassroots level and therefore, do not prevent the 
proliferation of brokers. 
 
III. Theoretical and Empirical Implications of the Dissertation for the 
Study of Society, Politics and the State 
My research into fragmented social mobilizations within a weakly institutionalized 
state contributes to a wider range of topics beyond social movement literature. 
The findings of this dissertation can be linked to ongoing debates on political 
processes and political structures, and may be of interest to researchers of post-
                                                       
394 Clément, K. (2008). 
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communist societies. I identified two broad intellectual fields on which my study 
sheds additional light: the study of weak/failed states and the analysis of informal 
institutions. I will conclude my contribution to this body of scientific inquiry by 
reflecting on the possibilities for social and political change in Kyrgyzstan that 
these peripheral mobilizations can potentially generate.  
 
3.1. Weak state – weak society? 
Social mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan have shown various struggles between 
different social groups, which provide new insights into processes of social and 
political change in the country. In particular, I have demonstrated how central 
rules and regulations are accommodated or defied within far corners of the 
society. In this section, I will discuss my findings in light of the state/society nexus 
(Migdal, 1988) and propose that in Kyrgyzstan, we not only have a ‘weak state’ 
but also a ‘weak society’. 
 
Various Central Asian scholars have focused on or implied the role of the state 
through a prism of societal conflicts and tensions, whether they involve state 
borders (Reeves, 2014; Megoran, 2007), Islamic revival (McGlinchey, 2009), civil 
war (Heathershaw, 2009, 2011), clan competition (Schatz 2004; Collins, 2006), 
competition among regional elites (Jones-Luong 2002; Markowitz, 2013), or 
clientele-focused relations (Radnitz, 2010; Engvall, 2014), to name a few. In most 
of these accounts the Central Asian states appear as ‘failed’ (Markowitz, 2013; 
McGlinchey, 2009), or ‘stable outside, fragile inside’ (Kavalski, 2010), or again 
‘dispersed’ (Jones Luong, 2004). 
 
In the Kyrgyzstani context, economic crisis and political instability attracted 
similar assessments. Eric McGlinchey, for example, identified the state’s failure in 
terms of its incapacity to provide ‘basic public goods’.395 Lawrence Markowitz’s 
research on the Tajikistani state and its periphery can be rightly extended to the 
                                                       
395 McGlinchey, E. (2009) ‘Islamic revivalism and state failure in Kyrgyzstan’, Problems of Post-
Communism, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 16-28. 
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Kyrgyzstani context when he notes: ‘weak states by definition have a very limited 
governing presence in peripheral areas, where systems of authority are 
notoriously diffuse and difficult to control. The periphery of weak states, then, is 
fertile ground for the beginning of state failure.’ 396  This dominant approach 
towards perceived state weakness in Central Asia has focused on elites and their 
instrumentalized clientele. For example, Scott Radnitz and Pauline Jones Luong 
examined how contentious national elites and ‘local strongmen’ developed within 
and outside of the regime, leaving the state fragmented and curtailed in terms of 
its powers (Radnitz, 2005, 2010; Jones Luong, 2004). In general, capturing of the 
state by corrupt elites can be identified as a common problem in post-Soviet 
regions, Africa (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999) and Asia (Gupta, 1995). In 
addition, repeated overthrows of government by the elite and regional social 
groups inevitably pose questions, if not about the capacity of the state, at least 
about specific political regimes. Suggesting the weakness of the political regime, 
a Russian political observer noted in 2005: ‘the events that took place in 
Kyrgyzstan [2005 revolution] show explicitly that neither ideology nor extensive 
masses or a distinguished leadership are needed to topple…power.’397  
 
In support of weak state advocates, my two case studies also demonstrated the 
limited extent of state organizational ‘expansion’ into the periphery. State 
institutions that deal with central policies and programmes in the extractive 
industry were missing or malfunctioning. Additionally, the Kyrgyzstani state has 
developed a rather ambiguous attitude towards social mobilizations in this 
growing economic field. For example, in an interview with the Head of the 
Analytical Department of the Ministry of Interior in Bishkek (department #10) 
about the nature of popular protests, I was given rather inconclusive answers. I 
was told that there were basically two types of protests. According to the 
interviewee’s typology, protests were organized either by those who aspired to 
                                                       
396 Markowitz, L.P. (2013) State erosion: Unlootable resources and unruly elites in Central Asia, 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 3. 
397  Afanasieva, E. (2005) ‘Obyknovennaia revolucia’ [An ordinary revolution] in Kyrgyzsky 
perevorot, Mart-Aprel 2005 [The Kyrgyz overthrow, March-April 2005], Moscow: Evropa. 
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power or by those who were let go from positions of power (kyzmatka kirish je 
kyzmattan ketish). Furthermore, he showed a lack of interest for any detailed 
investigations of such cases. When asked whether the Ministry of Interior 
conducted systematic observations of protests, he referred to ‘konfliktnye ochagi’ 
(conflict hotbeds), which included sites of ethnic and religious tensions.398 His 
interest in hotbeds rather than ‘manipulated’ protests was clearly due to the 
degree of the perceived ‘seriousness’ of the former and their role within the 
current ‘discourse of danger’.  
 
Another state official, the Head of the Special Mineral Resources Department of 
the Ministry of Economy, was interviewed about the ways in which the state dealt 
with conflicts in the mining industry. His response was that ‘communities would 
calm themselves down with time.’ To be clear: in public discourses, these and 
other government officials claimed that the government had carried out all the 
necessary measures to facilitate the relationships between foreign miners and 
rural communities. Such measures typically included the liberalization of national 
legislation, the transparent regulation of licenses, conducting information 
campaigns among the population, etc. However, to my insisting remark that most 
communities lacked the institutional capacity to deal with complex mining issues 
and that they entered into conflicts with miners because of their risk perceptions, 
which result from the weakness of the law, this government official bluntly replied 
that the state does not have the resources to send him and his team to localities 
to carry out basic responsibilities.399 In the context of scarce resources, the state 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude, until foreign firms were able to establish a 
common language with local communities on their own. These opinions 
demonstrate on the one hand the simplified interpretation of protests and on the 
other, the lack of state policy in extractive industries. Such examples show what 
little transformation takes place in the Kyrgyzstani state as the result of pressure 
                                                       
398  Interview with the Head of Analytical Department of the Ministry of Interior, Bishkek, 
September 2012. 
399 Interview with the Head of Special Mineral Resources Department of the Ministry of Economy, 
Bishkek, September 2012. 
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enforced by popular movements, which contrasts their democratizing effects on 
institutions in the West.  
 
Although one may find it difficult to disagree with observations about state 
weaknesses, an awareness of its limited explanatory power is nonetheless 
warranted. As John Heathershaw pointed out in the case of Tajikistan: ‘state 
weakness seemed self-evident but this concept did not explain the survival and 
strengthening of the Tajikistani state after the early civil-war period.’ 400 
Heathershaw raised the important question of why, despite its weakness, the 
state nevertheless persists in this part of the world. Following this intellectual 
inquiry, Doolotkeldieva and Heathershaw explored the ‘pervasiveness of 
statehood’ in the context of state mediation within extractive conflicts in 
Kyrgyzstan401 and found that both national and foreign actors keep soliciting the 
state, despite its poor performance regarding the provision of security and formal 
regulations on the ground. This intriguing evidence also found support in my 
empirical cases. In Aral village, the state was sought out as a mediator of 
conflicts between a foreign miner and the rural community, and in Kochkor-Ata 
town, the state was lobbied to ‘tame’ unruly elites that had been trying to 
establish rents at the state company.  
 
I further showed how actors at the periphery not only perceived state weakness, 
but also how they interacted with a fragmented state. Using different examples, I 
demonstrated the ways in which actors experienced their quest for the locus of 
power within the Kyrgyzstani political system. I had lengthy discussions with local 
residents on the subject and was often identified as someone ‘coming from the 
centre’ and therefore, more knowledgeable about potential sources of power 
(biyliktin butagy). This search for power was not always successful for every 
resistance group. Such peripheral protesters were reminiscent of social 
scientists, who attempt in their intellectual endeavours to locate the centres of 
                                                       
400 Heathershaw, J. and Herzig, E. (2011) ‘Introduction: the sources of statehood in Tajikistan’, 
Central Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 5-19. 
401 Doolot, A. and Heathershaw, J. (2015). 
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decision-making that bear potential for changing situations in remote localities. 
One can literally trace together with these peripheral actors not only the inner 
workings of the obscure Kyrgyzstani political system, but also the evolution of 
theoretical thought on the state. Like some of the more statist thinkers who have 
been conceptualizing the state as a special organization – a fulcrum of power 
that sits atop society – these peripheral protest groups journeyed to the capital, to 
the centre, with the hope of finding there an ‘ultimate’ source of authority. Their 
quest was brought to light in the letters that anti-mining activists directed to the 
highest representatives of power at the centre and workers’ stories regarding 
their travels to the capital, Bishkek. Yet, sources of power were not to be found in 
concrete institutions, or elites or bureaucracy. Power was diffused among 
intangible channels and state authority was fragmented. Workers realized that 
the state did not represent a ‘coherent, controlling organization’402 that observed 
the implementation of law; additionally, there were other formations (elites, 
institutions and patronage networks) that competed with the state in the field of 
implementing rules and regulations.  
 
This experience brings to the fore Joel Migdal’s dichotomy between the state’s 
‘image’ and ‘practices’ par excellence (Migdal, 2004). Peripheral social groups 
came to witness in situ the ‘real’ functioning of the state. However, this learning 
experience also had real implications for their contentious politics. Protest groups 
that employ institutional channels such as petitions, complaints and the justice 
system must rely on formal rules and regulations. But what happens when they 
realize that these institutional channels are somewhat arbitrary and managed 
according to unknown rules of the game? At this point, many resistance groups 
that lacked information, knowledge and established human and financial 
resources have to stop their quest to find the needed political support. Ignorance 
about the central rules of the game adds more reasons for peripheral actors to be 
confused, overwhelmed and misguided by external events and hence, take their 
                                                       
402 Migdal, J. S. (2004) State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and 
constitute one another, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.16 
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bifurcated, provisional or amateurish styles of collective action seriously. This 
was the case among anti-mining activists in Aral, who failed to convince regional 
and central authorities to back their environmental and nationalist causes.  
 
Groups that decide to use informal channels and play according to the obscure 
rules of the game must be prepared to bear high costs in terms of the generation 
of political connections, financial capital, time and emotional solidity. The labour 
movement was one such rare examples of persistent engagement with the 
‘unresponsive’ state. Here, I note that once the worker delegations discovered 
the multiple sources of authority in the capital, they began acting not ‘towards’ the 
state, but in parallel to those elites and institutions that were perceived as 
substituting state functions. In competing with corrupt elites and institutions, 
these peripheral groups exploited state weakness to their benefit by protracting 
local conflicts against central policies. One of the outcomes of such successful 
sustained engagement with the state is the successful transformation of the 
dichotomy between the ideal image of the state and its corrupt practices into a 
strong source of contention for societal groups. The title of the labour movement, 
‘for truth’, explains the long journey the workers undertook to understand where 
truth, i.e., answers to their demands, was located. In Russia, similar citizen 
groups ‘against state deception’ (protiv proizvola) have emerged during the past 
decade. Thus, instead of a predicted growing ‘separation’ between state and 
society, which according to Madeleine Reeves is an analytical (or heuristic) 
distinction,403 the state appears to be a place of constant contention and tension 
that brings together various groups. Here, Migdal’s model of ‘state in society’ is 
helpful for understanding that the state, even when weak, is in a constant 
process of reproduction within society. 
 
In previous scholarly work within Central Asian studies, various authors have 
illustrated how different parts of society worked for or against the state. Although 
these accounts have shed a great deal of light on problems of statehood in this 
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part of the world, less has been conceived of societies themselves. My research 
moves beyond this limitation and addresses the condition of society itself. The 
question that now arises is how do we characterize society in such a fragmented 
state? What effects does a fragmented state produce on the various parts of 
society, especially in its remote corners?  
 
Previous studies have suggested that Central Asian societies rested on local 
‘strongmen’ who have been able to defy the state’s authority on the totality of its 
territory and therefore, more or less conclusively, implied the presence of a 
strong society. Based on the findings of my empirical data, I propose that a weak 
state can result not only in a strong society, but of a weak society, too.404 While 
examining the fragmented and provisional nature of social mobilizations, I could 
not help but notice that these characteristics were the result of features of other 
parties that were part of the conflict. Whereas the main parties of conflicts were 
the foreign firm on the one hand and corrupt elites on the other, the third and 
omnipresent actor was the state. The state featured in these conflicts at different 
stages as mediator, an indirect opponent and a source of political support. Most 
importantly, the state provided a general political, institutional, regulatory and 
judicial background against which the conflicts between opponents and local 
groups have been unfolding. One difference was noticeable between the two 
local arenas; in the case of Kochkor-Ata, the state was more ‘responsive’ to the 
demands of the local group due to the involvement of the justice system and 
central institutions within the conflict. In contrast, in Aral, the state was perceived 
as ‘unresponsive’ to the demands of the local resistance group because firstly, it 
delegated responsibility to the disempowered regional administration and 
secondly, it left the conflict to the sole discretion of the mining company and the 
community.  
 
                                                       
404 John Heathershaw makes a similar argument, claiming that rebellions against the state are 
caused by the state. See Heathershaw, J. (2015) ‘Rebels without a cause? Authoritarian Conflict 
Management in Tajikistan, 2008-15’, European Society of Central Asia Studies, 8-11 October 
2015, University of Zurich. 
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These interactions between local groups of resistance and the state can reveal 
aspects about the additional role ‘the other’ plays in the dynamics leading to the 
success or failure of social mobilizations. To shed light on the role of reciprocity 
as it concerns these dynamics, I drew on conflict studies and specifically, on 
Messmer’s conflict theory. Heinz Messmer suggests observing conflicts as 
distinct systems whose formation, or so-called ‘closure’, as self-generating 
entities, depends on sequences of interactions between opponents. These 
sequences eventually imply that each opponent takes a position regarding the 
initial communication of rejection of the other and responds to this rejection by 
further rejection. Only when these interactions are sustained can we begin to 
consider the formation of distinct conflict. This approach highlights the salience of 
interactions between opponents as a source for the internal reproduction of 
conflict. It therefore suggests that proper conflict is based on mutual reciprocity 
and therefore cannot sustain itself if only one party supports the conflict.405 When 
transported to the field of social mobilization, this reciprocity underlines the 
importance of a strong opponent, i.e., a strong interlocutor, against whom 
grievances can be shaped and demands can be formulated. Moreover, with 
Messmer, we are able to learn about the relevance of the opportunity to actually 
engage with the opponent, to communicate with it and to ‘practice’ the conflict. If 
the opponent is amorphous and unresponsive, contentious activities will not have 
much room for further development.  
 
In my two case studies, the state to which the peripheral protesters referred to (in 
its triple quality as opponent, supportive party and mediator) behaved 
ambiguously in the creation of conflict. By taking an elusive position in the 
interactions between local groups and their opponents, which can be read as 
neither assent nor rejection, the state produced an incredibly demobilizing effect 
upon protest groups. Against the background of a fragmented state, protesters 
have a difficult time to achieve their desired results and therefore, to sustain their 
activities. Thus, state deception serves as a source for sustained engagement 
                                                       
405 Messmer, H. (2007). 
 278 
only to a minority of social and political groups; for the majority of societyit 
instead bears a powerful demobilizing effect. If in other post-communist societies 
it is the authoritarian state that impedes the unification of individuals for political 
action,406 in Kyrgyzstan, it is – quite paradoxically – the weakness of the state. In 
Kyrgyzstan, the state does not openly work against the emancipation of its 
citizens, since its apparatus is too weak for such a task. Yet, the 
unresponsiveness (neither assent nor rejection) of state institutions to societal 
demands, the corruption of courts and the inability of political organizations to 
mediate conflicts demobilize citizens’ self-organization, without this necessarily 
being the intention of the state. In order words, my resistance groups in Aral and 
Kochkor-Ata had no centre to resist against. I therefore view the fragmented state 
in Kyrgyzstan as partially accountable for fragmented social mobilizations. 
 
3.2. Uncertain politics and patronage networks 
My work provides further insights to a second debate on the specific forms of 
politics in the region. In the preceding research agenda that dominated the early 
discovery of independent Central Asia, the fixation on the formation of new 
institutions at the centre (various types of authoritarianism and their 
surrogates407) had led to a partial failure for detecting developments unfolding in 
the regions. Subsequently, this caused some surprise regarding the unforeseen 
existence of revolutionary ‘hotbeds’ located at the periphery. At the other end of 
the spectrum, our fascination with informal institutions has led to exaggerating 
                                                       
406 McGlinchey, E. (2013).   
407For Central Asia, some scholars have suggested introducing the concept of neopatrimonialism, 
as based on Weber’s typology. For this group of literature, see: Ilhamov, A. (2007) 
‘Neopatrimonialism, interest groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the governance 
system in Uzbekistan’, Central Asia Survey, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 65-84; Ishiyama, K. (2006) 
‘Neopatrimonialism and the prospects for democratization in the Central Asian republics’, in 
Cummings, S. N. (ed.) Power and change in Central Asia, New York and London: Routledge; 
Laruelle, M. (2012) ‘Discussing neopatrimonialism and patronal presidentialism in the Central 
Asian context’, Demokratizatsiya, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 301-324; Lewis, D. (2012) ‘Understanding the 
authoritarian state: neopatrimonialism in Central Asia’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 19, no. 
1, pp. 115-126. For the discussion of authoritarianism: Cummings, S. N. (2012); Hale, H. E. 
(2005); Hale, H. E. (2006) ‘Democracy or autocracy on the march? The coloured revolutions as 
normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 39, 
no. 3, September, pp. 305-329; Melvin, N. J. (2004) ‘Authoritarian pathways in Central Asia: A 
comparison of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan’, in Ro’i, Y. (ed.) Democracy and 
pluralism in Muslim Eurasia, London: Frank Cass. 
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conclusions about the relevance of tribe/clan/regional identities as alternative 
mobilizing platforms in the face of failing formal organizations. In this section, I 
employ my empirical material to suggest that patronage politics has to date been 
theorized according to static models and as a consequence, has evolved into a 
rigid and over-determined concept. I argue that the uncertain political 
environment of the immediate post-revolutionary period in Kyrgyzstan (2010-
2015)408 has had an impact not only on grassroots mobilizations, but also on the 
dominant form of politics – patronage. Based on my empirical observations, I 
discuss the nature of post-revolutionary politics between the centre and periphery 
and its implications for collective action, as well as the relevance and power of 
informal institutions. 
 
The most prevalent conceptualization of politics in Central Asia has to date been 
patronage politics. Scholars have highlighted various resources of patronage 
such as tribalism (Esenova, 1998; Temirkulov 2004), clan politics (Collins 2002, 
2006; Schatz, 2004), territoriality (Radnitz, 2005, 2010), kinship (Ismailbekova, 
2014) and regional identities (Jones Luong, 2002).409 Azamat Temirkulov and 
Altyn Kapalova state, 
In 20 years Kyrgyzstan was basically “embedded” in patronage networks in 
which people support their patron in exchange for…access to resources.410  
 
There is the expectation that patronage relationships work either on a vertical 
axis, such as in Kazakhstan, where loyalty to the hierarchy is maintained from the 
top all the way down (Isaacs, 2011), or they work on a horizontal axis among 
elites, as is the case in Kyrgyzstan (Radnitz, 2010). Scott Radnitz has thus far 
provided the most detailed account of patron-client relationships in rural 
Kyrgyzstan. In his analysis of the Tulip Revolution, he advances the thesis of 
                                                       
408 It can be argued that the second parliamentary elections held on 4 October 2015, after the 
introduction of a semi-parliamentary system in 2010, led to less uncertainty, because of the 
victory of the pro-presidential SDPK party and the gradual consolidation of presidential power. 
409 For a critique of these approaches, see: Gullette, D. (2010) ‘The problems of the ‘clan’ politics 
model of Central Asian statehood: a call for alternative pathways for research’, in Kavalski, E. 
(ed.) Stable outside, fragile inside? Post-Soviet statehood in Central Asia, Farnham: Ashgate. 
410 Temirkulov, A. and Kapalova, A. (2014). 
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strong localism and employs the original concept of subversive clientelism to 
explain the relationship of dependence between rural communities and 
autonomous (non-regime) elites in the post-independence years. Subversive 
clientelism has developed as a result of the ‘shrinking’ welfare state and the 
failure to provide the countryside with public goods. The reliance of rural 
communities on elites (vertical ties) provides the latter with support bases that 
can be mobilized against the regime in coordination with other independent elites 
(horizontal ties). Radnitz further explains the success of overthrowing the regime 
in 2005 through the activation of these horizontal and vertical ties.411  
 
Radnitz’ thesis is convincing in regard to elite strategies of contestation of regime 
and the existence of patronage networks in the country. As Cummings points out: 
‘few can deny the importance of patronage networks for sustaining social, 
political and economic life and for mobilization.’412 However, as a result of my 
empirical study, I claim that Radnitz’ argument provides a somewhat static 
explanation of patronage networks between local communities and elites. I 
believe we need a more dynamic model to account for the incapacity of 
patronage in order to remain immune to the fragmentation of the state. Such an 
approach needs to take into account the contingency of patronage relationships 
and the rising cost of the efforts required to maintain them, both at the vertical 
and horizontal levels. Second, Radnitz’ account ends up portraying local 
collectives as lacking voices on their own and as mere recipients of these elite 
strategies. 413  This shifts our attention away from complex issues of self-
organization and the intricate politics of grassroots actors. In general, by reducing 
the complexities of the organizational and cognitive realities of social life, 
clan/tribe/geographical static accounts of patronage risk giving us only a partial 
answer to the dilemma of collective action within weakly institutionalized 
societies. Furthermore, these approaches inadvertently cause depoliticized 
                                                       
411 Radnitz, S. (2010). 
412 Cummings, S. N. (2012), p. 71. 
413 For critiques of Scott Radnitz, see also Megoran, N., Heathershaw, J., Doolotkeldieva, A., 
Reeves, M., Cummings S. and Radnitz, S. (2013). 
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interpretations of politics. Madeleine Reeves takes an important step in this 
direction by presenting a research agenda that re-politicizes so-called ‘resource’ 
conflicts (Reeves, 2014). In the same vein, Amanda Wooden brings back 
individual environmental philosophies to explain environmental mobilizations 
against the ‘elite manipulation’ thesis (Wooden, 2013). Elmira Satybaldieva 
makes an attempt to ‘re-politicize’ Kyrgyzstani local politics by introducing the 
rural poor as a political actor (Satybaldieva, 2015). 
 
My study continues along this line of argument by emphasizing the contentious 
politics of the working classes and rural communities that cannot be reduced to 
the elite manipulation thesis. I argue that although the effect of patronage as a 
form of current political competition and mobilization is valid, its scope is over-
determined. For that, members of the peripheral groups that I studied for four 
years expressed uncertainty and mixed feelings about patronage politics at the 
centre and in vicinity. I illustrated how workers launched multiple attempts at 
finding patrons in the centre to back up their cause. For this purpose they 
organized several delegations to the capital, met with high-ranked government 
officials and lobbied in Parliament. Even their long-standing ally, the Ata-Meken 
party, showed limits of efficiency of patronage. No patron was readily at hand in 
these times of uncertainty, and neither horizontal nor vertical ties offered enough 
potential for coping with the challenge of lobbying peripheral concerns at the 
centre. In my Aral case study, I indicated the limitations of clan/tribe/geographical 
solidarities in the organization of anti-mining resistance. That a rural community 
fails to be provided with stable social and family networks stands in sharp 
contrast to existing theoretical assumptions about Kyrgyzstani rural communities. 
In fact, the experience of uncertainty had repercussions for the very ability of 
resistance groups to make sense of central and local arenas and therefore, to act 
politically. In the next section, I reflect further on how uncertainty affected the 
rebels’ perceptions of patronage politics, as well as their efforts to activate it for 
their own purposes. 
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In general, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, uncertainty414 about the post-revolutionary 
period had confusing implications for local sites of resistance: at the initial stage, 
the contingency related to the openness of the new parliamentary system 
allowed actors to act and approach ‘the system’; however, later, the same 
contingency inhibited them from acting. In the immediate post-revolutionary 
period, uncertainty sent signals about the unlikelihood of the use of repression 
against protesters. Furthermore, the openness of the political system was 
perceived as a central structure of opportunities to which peripheral groups could 
relate in order to become a part of it. Here, vertical and horizontal patronage 
networks may partially endure in answer to growing uncertainties about old and 
new centres of power. However, patronage practices changed according to 
lessons learned regarding the new (dis-) functional parliamentary system. In the 
intermediary run, uncertainty about ‘whose rules rule’ complicated the access to 
power holders. Furthermore, as my research shows, protesters did not fully know 
how to relate to their opponents (whether foreign miners or corrupt elites), due to 
quickly changing configurations of power relations at the centre, a lack of 
information and routinized knowledge and experience in public contestation. Prior 
to the April Revolution, it was clear that large foreign firms and central elites were 
protected by the regime. The current uncertain environment served as fertile 
ground for the proliferation of intermediaries, i.e., the brokers noted in my case 
                                                       
414 The most prevalent conceptualization of uncertainty in political science is that of incomplete 
information in various fields of the economy, law, politics and corresponding institutions, and its 
effects on actors’ behaviour. This concept has become especially popular among scholars of 
democratization and regime studies. Drawing on this vast literature, which I cannot discuss due to 
space restrictions, it can be argued that uncertainty can be viewed as a product of multiple 
distinct and parallel processes. Thus, it can act as an accompanying feature of the transition from 
authoritarianism towards new democracy. See O’Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986) Transitions 
from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies, Baltimore, Md.; 
London: John Hopkins University Press. It is also judged as a stable element of electoral 
outcomes in democracies (see Schedler, A. (2001) ‘Taking uncertainty seriously: The blurred 
boundaries of democratic transition and consolidation’, Democratization, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1-22) 
and can be viewed as a legacy of previous colonial politics, as well as an outcome of competition 
between formal and informal institutions (Helmke, G. and Levitsky, S. (2004) ‘Informal institutions 
and comparative politics: A research agenda’, Perspective on Politics, vol. 2, no. 4, December, 
pp. 725-740). In regard to developing democracies, uncertainty arises specifically from the 
disjuncture between competing incentives stemming from formal and informal institutions and 
takes the form of confusion among individuals and collective actors about the rules that govern 
political interactions (see O’Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986)).  
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studies, which profited from societal concerns and grievances to advance their 
particular interests.  
 
One further manifestation of uncertainty that increases the cost of mobilization 
among local protesters is the fact that Kyrgyzstani politics is also affected by a 
specific authoritarian legacy in the form of ‘mimicry politics’ (Wolters, 2015). 
Proliferation of mimicry politics and pervasive corruption plays an important role 
in the formation of negative public opinion about protest movements. For 
grassroots movements, it becomes extremely difficult to sustain internal cohesion 
against generalized external distrust. Moreover, public recognition of grassroots 
leaders quickly becomes limited to militant groups at the local level and as a 
result, attracting new members across other social spheres and regions is almost 
impossible. Another outcome of this changing political culture is the current 
proliferation of ‘paid’ mobilizations. I link this phenomenon to a lack of secure 
‘mobilization structures’, if such structures ever existed. Here, a lack of or 
fragmentation among ‘genuine’ (or traditional) clientelism is replaced by the 
possibility of paying protesters. If elites nowadays have to pay individuals to 
stage mobilizations in their support, it may indicate limitations to patronage 
relationships and the predominance of mimicry politics.  
 
Another useful approach for connecting the impact of uncertainty on protesters is 
to employ Debra Javeline’s concept of ‘blame attribution’ in post-Soviet Russia 
(2009). Javeline explains that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian 
citizens struggled to make sense of complex national events that were from then 
on irrevocably intertwined with global processes. The blame attribution difficulty 
can explain the passivity of Russian workers. This is an interesting explanation, 
as it attempts to focus attention on the situation of ordinary citizens whose 
individual and collective actions are hindered by a lack of information, of nuanced 
knowledge concerning their rights and of orientation in national and global affairs. 
Wooden (2013) found that ‘the more consistently and specifically people attribute 
blame to government for local environmental problems, the more likely they are 
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to protest about the environment.’ Javeline’s concept is particularly helpful in 
demonstrating that protesters have a difficult time formulating their demands, 
because of their limited access to information and knowledge. Individuals may 
sense that they are being dispossessed of something, but find it difficult to 
articulate their breached rights in coherent terms and to build up wider social 
support. 
 
My empirical material showed that although Kyrgyzstani protesters were puzzled 
by obscure central politics, the blame attribution dilemma did not stop them from 
engaging in contentious activities at the initial stage. Yet, the blame attribution 
dilemma increased the costs of mobilization, e.g. making private travels to the 
capital, engaging in negotiations with elites and giving rise to the intervention of 
opportunist intermediaries. Therefore, if the dilemma does not prevent initial 
episodes of mobilization, it has implications for the subsequent course of 
mobilization by diminishing the opportunities of peripheral protesters who lack 
organizational resources. Differences in organizational capacity explain why the 
blame attribution dilemma had been decisive in disadvantaging communal 
resistance, but not the labour movement. All of these observations provide a 
picture of an unstable system in which the opportunities for patronage 
relationships to emerge and be maintained are continuously challenged by 
increasing levels of contingency.  
 
3.3. Local politics and change 
In thinking about social mobilizations and their effects on politics, this dissertation 
also addresses broader questions regarding social and political change that are 
of interest to students of political science and the post-Soviet region. Drawing on 
my empirical material, I will engage in a final round of reflection about the 
connection between fragmented social mobilizations and effecting change in 
specific localities. This is a continuation of the above discussion concerning 
central politics and the ways in which it is both reproduced and countered at the 
local level. The reproduction of central politics took place in the form of local 
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groups being power-oriented and seeking cooptation from central patrons. 
However, resistance also developed by privileging democratic consensus-
building and collective decision-making in open spaces. It will be interesting to 
see what types of change we can expect from these different types of 
contentious politics. 
 
I start this discussion by stressing one more time that the grassroots 
mobilizations I observed do not fit into clear-cut analytical categories that we, as 
social scientists, may sometimes conceptualize in order to reduce complexities 
on the ground (Wolford, 2010). Thus, in one case study, mobilization was 
connected with local politics regarding the distribution of gold resources. 
Specifically, local actors did not vie for control over resources per se (the gold 
project was in the study stage) but for control over access to informal deals 
offered prior to the revolution by the foreign mining company. Organizers of the 
anti-mining contention employed environmental damage as a means for framing 
their resistance, both in negotiations with the miner and the central government 
and in their attempts to convince fellow residents. Although the environmental 
theme may have represented genuine concerns of residents who were 
preoccupied with the future of their lands and income – in line with the insights 
produced by Wooden (2013) – it eventually became an ambiguous cover of petty 
struggles for power. Similarly, in the second case study, the labour movement 
emerged as a response to rent seeking and the corruption of central elites. 
However, labour’s expansive and lengthy engagement with central politics is 
ambiguous, taking into account the merge between workers, the trade union and 
the company’s management. Thus, these examples of grassroots mobilizations 
do not represent cases of clear struggles for ‘conservation’ or against 
‘dispossession’ in Latin American and Asian mining sites, or of ‘rightful 
resistance’ in China,415 or fully ‘environmentally-driven’ or clearly labour issues.  
 
                                                       
415 O'Brien, K. and Lianjiang, L. (2006) Rightful resistance in rural China, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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In each of my cases, along ‘ideological’ topics (labour and environment), local 
actors were preoccupied with and involved in politics. For example, they 
challenged existing structures of power, which made them appear less authentic 
to the public than if they had, for example, demanded pure labour or 
environmental concessions. This is related to the ways in which the spheres of 
politics and the political are perceived. According to my case studies about 
protests in the Kyrgyzstani provinces, it appears that in order to understand 
social and political change, one has to consider this amalgamate of societal 
concerns and politics together. From the perspectives of these local sites of 
resistance, only the ‘political’ can provide hope for achieving a victory that will 
enable individuals to set up conditions that will be conducive to the satisfaction of 
more ‘conventional’ labour and environmental demands in the long-run. Hence, 
at this stage of our analysis, extended engagement in political clashes can be 
interpreted as a precondition for later-stage policy contests.  
 
What type of change, then, can be expected if grassroots movements become 
involved in current forms of politics and are at least partly power-oriented? In the 
case of Russia, Clément suggests that protest movements reproduce features of 
the central power model at the bottom.416 The reproduction of the central power 
model, according to Clément, takes place in two formats: the adoption by 
individuals of patron-client relationships or a retreat of individuals to the private 
sphere. In Kyrgyzstan, similar tendencies can be observed regarding the general 
level: individuals adopted the central model by making themselves available to 
cooptation and simulating central power games, 417  or opted for hidden 
resistance.418 Yet, my case studies also revealed other strategies and tactics that 
                                                       
416 Clément, K. (2008). 
417 Here I want to underline how the simulation of the power model in the locale reproduces 
cooptation and therefore conditions the political culture. Instead of arguing that Central Asians’ 
obedience to authority is rooted in their ‘culture’ or 'tradition' (Anderson, 1997) I demonstrate how 
a new dynamic results out of processes of observation and emulation of the behaviour of central 
elites and the dominant power model. Conceptualizing political culture as a dynamic process, it 
becomes then possible to argue that patriarchy and loyalty to authority (Gleason, 1997) are not 
‘imprinted’ in local traditions but are heavily subjected to and prone to constant change and 
transformation.  
418 On hidden resistance see Satybaldieva, E. (2015). 
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differed from the above-mentioned emulation and exit options. In both 
contentious sites, there were attempts to form resistance based on public 
discussions via open village gatherings and regular all-workers meetings. 
Organizers of mobilization have also attempted to formalize their contentious 
politics by creating organizations of resistance (such as growing unionization and 
local cultural association). In the case of the labour movement, participants went 
as far as establishing democratic mechanisms of collective decision-making and 
consensus-building. Even in Aral, other incentives (such as the temptation to play 
political games) and norms (such as kin and uruu obligations) did not assist in 
avoiding public discussions as the core aspect for collective action. These 
aspects of local contentious politics run contrary to assumptions about 
Kyrgyzstani society, specifically, the prevalence of informal politics over open 
politics (Temirkulov and Kapalova, 2014; Commercio, 2010).  
 
These elements (emulation and resistance) provide a rather diversified picture 
about the types of social and political change these grassroots movements imply, 
both for local and central politics. They clearly highlight endurance, as well as the 
contingency of patronage on the one hand and a growing necessity for open and 
formal politics on the other. The latter happens precisely because participants of 
contestation realize that without organizational resources and social trust, which 
can be gained only in open and collective processes, it is impossible to withstand 
the fragmented state and the unresponsive central government within the public 
sphere. This double effect can perhaps be framed in what Sally Cummings 
termed mobilization ‘within and without the system’ (Cummings, 2012). I leave 
this intriguing point of convergence/divergence between informal and formal, and 
between central and local politics for future research.  
 
A final note regarding the role and function of social mobilizations. If it does not 
concern traditional loyalties and integrated networks and if it does not address 
the disruption of existing orders (the Western logic of protests), then what exactly 
is the function of protests in the provinces in Kyrgyzstan? To respond to this 
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intriguing question, I begin with a quote that was repeated like a mantra by one of 
the participants of the labour movement and that eloquently captures the purpose 
of protests: 
Blocking the roads and storming the state institutions is a last option for us. 
You see, laws don’t work and formal complaints and official letters are 
inefficient. Only by staging strikes can we make sure to grab the attention of 
authorities. It’s politics [sayasat]…in the past, workers weren’t able to do 
politics.419  
 
The above statement puts questions concerning outcomes and the prospected 
achievements of these local struggles, at the centre of the discussion. If one 
understands the meaning of politics as striving for power, as it is practiced in 
Kyrgyzstan, one might come to a pessimistic conclusion about social protests as 
movements that move towards gaining political resources. However, there is 
more to the above statement about that workers learnt ‘to do politics’. It will be 
premature to dismiss this claim as a naïve reference to a newly gained ability 
among workers to penetrate political structures and to become a weighty political 
force. Instead, this phrase alludes to the wider understanding of politics as 
providing access to the public, as creating a space and place where 
governmental decisions are subject to revisions and bargaining, and where 
workers gain more power simply by means of increased participation. The above 
statement thus refers to a newly developed political consciousness that contrasts 
the limits of a fragmented neo-liberal state.  
 
To many critical thinkers, social movements in the West are the result of 
fundamental changes within social structures (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). For 
Castells, a social movement is a form of ‘purposive collective actions whose 
outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of 
society.’420 For Melucci, a social movement is ‘a form of collective action (a) 
based on solidarity, (b) carrying on a conflict, (c) breaking the limits of the system 
                                                       
419 Interview with the Head of the People’s Defense Committee, Kochkor-Ata, November 2012. 
420 Castells, M. (2004) The Power of Identity, 2nd edition, Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, p. 3. 
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in which action occurs.’ 421  These conceptualizations suggest in one way or 
another a break with the existing system and the aspiration for significant change 
in cultural, institutional, political and even economic settings. They present a 
clear critique of dominant structures and ideologies, and highlight the existence 
of suppressed voices and marginalized groups in modern society. However, 
Kyrgyzstani grassroots mobilizations that go against existing economic and 
political orders while lacking knowledge and information, do not engage in the 
generation of a genuine political project (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Collective 
meaning-making and consciousness-raising occur in retrospective and not before 
or even during collective action. In the case of an uncertain environment, the 
depoliticizing and discrediting practices of the central political system create an 
atmosphere in which actors adopt short-term strategies and visions, where they 
can rarely sustain commitment to initial goals. Instead, to ‘do politics’ and to ‘go 
against’ is the manifestation of attempts to create opportunities for conflict in the 
first place. 
 
The question that follows is whether or not these localized sites of resistance can 
transform into nation-wide movements and provoke widespread change. As 
already noted, micro milieus are able to give rise to specific issues and may even 
be successful in defending them. Yet, is it possible for fragmented protest 
movements that represent localized leftist critiques of current neo-liberal policies 
to go beyond the ‘clique’ style? (Clément, 2015). In the case of Russia, 
Robertson suggests that the parochial nature of protest demands ‘inhibited the 
scaling up of protests into a broader movement.’422 With the exception of teacher 
strikes against low wages from 2010 to 2011 across Kyrgyzstani regions, 
localized sites of resistance have thus far not offered a medium in which wider 
positions can be formed that would speak to broader collectives. This is true not 
only for grassroots activism, but also for political parties and interest 
organizations. These findings question the possibility of protest emulation that 
                                                       
421 Melucci, A. (1985) ‘The symbolic challenge of contemporary movements’, Social Research, 
vol. 52, no. 4, winter, pp. 789-815. 
422 Robertson, G. (2010), p. 59. 
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have been famously conceptualized by Beissinger (2007) during the ‘coloured 
revolutions’.423 Social distrust of politics and collective organizations currently 
precludes any opportunities for a local movement to gain followers from other 
regions. From this perspective, the likely potential for cross-cutting geographical 
isolation amid social distrust appears to be similar to Radnitz’ account of elite 
situational cross-regional cooperation (2010). Yet as can be deduced from my 
case studies, even such cross-regional cooperation will be challenging if each 
new bond needs to be subjected to new rounds of reciprocal observation and 
monitoring. Generalized distrust and the inability to build lasting cross-regional 
alliances also explain why social mobilizations currently remain parochial. Most 
likely, we can expect to observe social change in small groups, as well as the 
transformation of selected local arenas. Kochkor-Ata certainly serves as an 
interesting example in this context. 
 
In this part of the chapter, I attempted to extend my theoretical and empirical 
findings to ongoing debates concerning state and politics. Local actors perceive 
and interact with the state despite its failures to mediate local conflicts and to pay 
attention to societal concerns. Furthermore, the weak state has had a 
demobilizing effect on local groups of resistance. With regard to existing 
scholarship on patronage, I argued that existing concepts of patron-client 
relationships are too static and do not reflect the contingent nature of patronage. 
In the end, the changing nature of patronage has less to do with ‘cultural 
predispositions’ and more with historical legacy and in particular, political 
uncertainty. Finally, I reflected on the type of social and political changes that 
fragmented social mobilizations can induce within Kyrgyzstani society and in 
conclusion, presented the obstacles that wider mobilization inevitably has to face 
in this society. 
 
In summary, my thesis observed mobilizations within the extractive industry. I did 
                                                       
423 For a well-structured critique of Beissinger’s emulation model see Heathershaw, J. (2009) 
‘Rethinking the International Diffusion of Coloured Revolutions: The Power of Representation in 
Kyrgyzstan’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 25, nos. 2-3, pp. 297-323. 
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not follow established theories about labour mobilization or resource nationalism. 
In exploring the labour movement, I did not link high protest rates with labour 
strength and I overlooked specific indicators such as unionization rates, decrease 
in wages, unemployment rates, corporate institutions and individual ‘exit’ options 
developed in countries with informal economies, 424  among others. 425  These 
theories have been used in comparative and quantitative studies to explain the 
weaknesses (or relative strengths) of labour. In the investigation of anti-mining 
mobilization, I also overlooked the following explanations that have been popular 
in environmental/extractive studies. I did not systematically consider traditional 
links between the unequal consumption of scarce resources and violent conflicts, 
426 between political instability and violent conflict or between the absence of 
effective systems for mediating impending conflicts and violence.427 To some 
extent, a focus on quantitative indicators and the use of the above-discussed 
theories was impossible, due to the existing structure of data in Kyrgyzstan. I 
hope that more can be done to further establish this type of knowledge about the 
growing extractive industry field in Kyrgyzstan and that more comparative 
research can be drawn from in future.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
424 Hirschman, A. (1970) Exit, voice and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and 
states, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.  
425 Kelly, J. (1998) Rethinking industrial relations: Mobilization, collectivism and long waves, 
London: Routledge. On economic theories of strikes see Kennan, J. (1986) ‘The economics of 
strikes’, in Ashtenfelter O. and Layard, R. (ed.) Handbook of Labor Economics, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science, vol. 2, pp. 1091-137; Soskice, D. (1978) ‘Strike waves and wage explosions, 
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Glossary 
 
 
akim - head of district 
 
aksakaldar sotu – court of elders 
 
aktcii mitingov or protestnie aktcii – Russ. generic term to designate protest 
actions 
 
ayaldar keneshy - women’s council  
  
ayil kenesh - village council 
 
ayil okmotu - village administration 
 
bechara - backward people 
 
bizge yntymak kerek! – we need peace  
 
biylik – power 
 
biyliktin butagy – source/foundation of power 
 
buzukular - spoilers 
 
chon sayasat - big politics  
 
chondor – lit. ‘big men’; elite 
 
chyndyk uchun kyimyl - movement for truth 
 
chynchyl jana turuktuu opposicia - genuine and stable opposition 
 
dejurnie aktivisty – Russ. lit. ‘activists on duty’; paid ‘activists’ or protesters  
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dejurny baldar – Russ. and Kyrg. lit. ‘boys on duty’; young males at someone’s 
service 
 
dyikan charba  - farmers’ unit  
 
el uchun - in people’s interests 
 
eldik jyin – people’s gathering  
 
eldin ishin kyluu – doing the people’s job 
 
eldik korgoo komiteti - people’s defense committee 
 
fanat – Russ. fanatics  
 
ishenich - trust 
 
jalpy eldik chechim - all people’s decision  
 
jaman attuu kyluu - ruining one’s reputation 
 
jasalma - fake  
 
jer uchun - for land  
 
ketsin! - get out!  
 
kirgizbeibiz! - we won’t let you in! 
 
kopuroo - bridge 
 
kollektiv – Russ. work collective 
 
konfliktnye ochagi – Russ. conflict hotbeds 
 
kurultay – public assembly  
 
kvartal – Russ. village part 
 
kyimyl – movement, to move 
 
kyzmatka kirish je kyzmattan ketish – aspire for power or resign from power 
position 
 
maseleni kotoruu – voicing one’s concerns  
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mej-etnicheskie mitingy – Russ. inter-ethnic protests 
 
mitingy – Russ. generic term to designate protests and other forms of 
mobilization 
 
naarazychylyk korsotuu – express grievances/discontent 
 
nachalnik – Russ. boss 
 
narodnoe pravlenie – Russ. people’s management 
 
neftyannik – Russ. oilman 
 
obchestvenno-politicheskie mitingy –  Russ. ‘public-political’ protests 
 
OBON – Russ. lit. ‘women’s unit of special mission’; group of females, 
manipulated or autonomous, using violent means of pressure to achieve social 
and political goals 
 
ondurup aluu - squeezing benefits from someone or something 
 
opposicioner – Russ. opposition 
 
ortodo - in the middle  
 
ortogo salyp ishtoo – lit. ‘doing business in the middle’; being an intermediary 
 
ozun uchun - in one’s interests  
 
prodajny activist – Russ. corrupt activists  
 
protiv proizvola - Russ. against state or elite deception 
 
rabochie gorodki – Russ. workers’ settlements 
 
revolutsialyk komitetter - revolutionary committees 
 
sayasat – politics 
 
sayasiy oyun - political game 
 
sekiruu – lit. jumping; shifting sides, changing loyalty 
 
socialno-economicheskie i bytovye mitingy – Russ. ‘socio-economic and daily 
routine’ protests 
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Talas el yntymagy - unity of Talas people 
 
talkuu jurguzuu - public discussion  
 
torpedy – Russ. lit. ‘torpedoes’; young males used by elite for intimidation, 
simulation and other purposes 
 
tuyu jok  - no roots, no ground  
 
uruu – descent line 
 
vertikal vlasti – Russ. ‘vertical of power’; a hierarchical political relationship 
between political entities or between the regime and constituencies 
 
vystuplenie radi vystuplenia – Russ. performance for the sake of performance 
 
yzychuu kyluu – politicization, agitation, noise, mobilization 
 
 
 
List of acronyms 
 
CEO – Chief Executive Officer 
 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
 
GIZ - German Organization for Sustainable Development 
 
ICT - Information and Communication Technologies 
 
IRI – International Republican Institute 
 
MENA - Middle East and North Africa 
 
MI – Ministry of Interior 
 
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization 
 
OBON - Women’s Unit with Special Mission 
 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
 
SDPK – Social-Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan 
 
SMT - Social Movement Theory 
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SNB – National security services 
 
POS - Political Opportunity Structure 
 
PPT – Political Process Theory 
 
SMO – Social Movement Organization 
 
UPRW - Union for the Protection of Railway Workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of interviews 
 
N Date and place Interviews 
1 January 2014, Bishkek Gulshair Abdirasulova, NGO ‘Kylym-
shamy’ 
2 September 2012, Bishkek Head of Analytical Department of the 
Ministry of Interior 
3 September 2012, Bishkek Head of Mineral Resources Department 
of the Ministry of Economy 
4 December 2011, Jalal-Abad Former Mayor of Jalal-Abad city 
5 December 2011, May 2013, 
December 2014, Jalal-Abad 
Head of the local newspaper ‘Aymak’ 
6 December 2011, Bishkek MP Iskhak Pirmatov from the Respublica 
party, House of Parliament 
7 December 2011, Bishkek MP Gulasal Sadyrbaeva from the Ata-
Meken party, House of Parliament 
8 November 2011, May 2013, 
December 2014, Kohckor-
Ata 
Head of Kyrgyzneftegaz trade union, 
Akynbek Raimkulov 
9 May 2013, December 2014, 
Kohckor-Ata 
Member of Kyrgyzneftegaz trade union 
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10 November 2011, May 2013, 
Kochkor-Ata 
Member #1 of local branch of Ata-Meken 
party 
11 November 2011, May 2013, 
Kochkor-Ata 
Member # 2 of local branch of Ata-
Meken party 
12 May 2013, Kochkor-Ata Member of local branch of SDPK party 
13 May 2013, Kochkor-Ata; 
September 2013, Bishkek 
Member of Board of Directors of 
Kyrgyzneftegaz Company 
14 May 2013, Kochkor-Ata; 
September 2013, Bishkek 
Former Chair of Board of Directors of 
Kyrgyzneftegaz Company 
15 December 2011, Kochkor-
Ata 
Employee # 1 of Kyrgyzneftegaz 
Company 
16 December 2011, Kochkor-
Ata 
Employee # 2 of Kyrgyzneftegaz 
Company 
17 December 2011, Kochkor-
Ata 
Employee # 3 of Kyrgyzneftegaz 
Company 
18 December 2011, Kochkor-
Ata 
Employee # 4 of Kyrgyzneftegaz 
Company 
19 December 2014, Kochkor-
Ata 
Brigadier of drilling team of 
Kyrgyzneftegaz Company 
20 December 2014, Kochkor-
Ata 
Worker of drilling team of 
Kyrgyzneftegaz Company 
21 December 2011, May 2013, 
Kochkor-Ata 
Member of People’s Defence Committee 
22 December 2011, May 2013, 
Kochkor-Ata 
Chair of People’s Defence Committee, 
Ondurush Zamanov 
23 December 2014, Kochkor-
Ata 
Head of kindergarten of Kyrgyzneftegaz 
Company 
24 November 2014, Bishkek Member of Board of Managers of 
Kyrgyzneftegaz Company 
25 November 2011, May 2013, 
Kochkor-Ata 
Female worker #1 of Kyrgyzneftegaz 
Company 
26 November 2011, Kochkor-
Ata 
Female worker #2 of Kyrgyzneftegaz 
Company 
27 December 2014, Kochkor-
Ata 
Head of Transport Department of 
Kyrgyzneftegaz Company 
28 December 2014, Kochkor-
Ata 
Head of Gas Distribution Service 
29 December 2014, Kochkor-
Ata 
Worker of Gas Distribution Service 
30 November 2011, Kochkor-
Ata 
Worker #1 of Transport Department 
31 November 2011, Kochkor-
Ata 
Worker #2 of Transport Department 
32 August 2012, Aral Participant #1 of a village gathering 
33 August 2012, Aral Participant #2 of a village gathering 
34 August 2012, Aral Participant #3 of a village gathering 
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35 August 2012, Aral Participant #4 of a village gathering 
36 August 2012, Aral Participant #5 of a village gathering 
37 November 2014, Aral Participant #6 of a village gathering 
38 November 2014, Aral; May 
2015 and July 2015, 
Bishkek 
Anti-mining ‘activist’ and Head of Beishe 
Ata association, Ortok Mambetaliev 
39 August 2012, Aral; 
September 2012 and 
November 2014, Bishkek 
Employee #1 of Talas Copper Gold 
40 August 2012, Aral; 
September 2012, Bishkek 
Employee #2 of Talas Copper Gold 
41 August 2012, Aral; 
September 2012, Bishkek 
Employee #3 of Talas Copper Gold 
42 August 2012, Aral Participant #1 of violent attack I 
43 August 2012, Aral Participant #2 of violent attack I 
44 2013, Bishkek Anonymous expert 
45 November 2014, July 2015, 
Aral 
Member #1 of women’s council 
46 November 2014, July 2015, 
Aral 
Member #1 of women’s council 
47 November 2014, Aral Member of aksakal sotu 
48 August 2012, Aral Member #1 of youth council 
49 November 2014, July 2015, 
Aral 
School teacher 
50 November 2014, July 2015, 
Aral 
Deputy director of school 
51 September 2013, Bishkek Representative of Andash Mining 
Company 
52 September 2013, Bishkek Representative of Talas Gold Mining 
Company 
53 August 2012, Aral Local police officer 
54 2013, Bishkek Former Country Manager of Talas 
Copper Gold, John Schloderer 
55 July 2015, Talas Former Head of Village Administration, 
Dokturbek Dosmanbet uluu 
56 November 2014, Aral Member #1 of local branch of Ata-Meken 
party 
57 November 2014, Aral Member #2 of local branch of Ata-Meken 
party 
58 November 2014, Aral Member of Aral commission 
59 November 2014, Aral Member #1 of Village Council 
60 November 2014, Aral Member #2 of Village Council 
61 June 2015, Bishkek Jonathon Hornbrook, Head of Mineral 
Resources for Development Programme, 
GIZ 
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62 November 2014, Aral Female employee of Village 
Administration 
63 August 2012, Bishkek Country Director of Talas Copper Gold, 
David Grant 
64 September 2013, Bishkek  Former Head of Village Council of 
Bekmoldo, an anti-mining ‘activist’, Bakyt 
Seitaliev 
65 November 2014, Aral Member of Beishe Ata association and 
anti-mining ‘activist’ and his wife 
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